

OUTLINES
OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF UNIVERSAL
HISTORY,

APPLIED TO
LANGUAGE AND RELIGION.

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P R E F A C E

TO

THE SECOND VOLUME.

THE Aphorisms on the philosophy of the history of mankind, and on the history of religion in particular, which formed part of the first edition of "Hippolytus and his Age," were destined to present some leading philosophical thoughts on the religious history of mankind: fragments of a system which lies at the bottom of my treatment of that subject. They contained the elements of three philosophical inquiries.

First, a sketch of the progress and results of that sublime portion of philosophy which is generally called the philosophy of the universal history of the human race. Secondly, the outlines of such a philosophy applied to the principle of development in religion, and particularly in Christianity. Thirdly, a faint delineation of the connexion between religion and language, as to their common origin and their cognate principles of development. Such a juxtaposition of language and religion rests upon the assumption, that they together form the real ancient history of

every tribe and of every age of the world, and that their phenomena, intimately connected with each other, both as to their origin and as to the position in which they stand to the individual, constitute the records of what is primordial in the history of mankind. According to this view, that which we are used to call universal history, so far as this is meant to designate a more or less complete and connected history of all known tribes and nations, represents only the modern history of our race. The tribes of mankind, at their first appearance on the horizon, enter upon the world's stage with language and religion. Their language is very often more perfect and beautiful in its construction than when they are at their culminating point; and their religion sometimes manifests, in its symbolical rites and words, notions respecting God and Man's divine nature, which prove to the historian of mankind to be both deeper and wider, more philosophical and more spiritual, than the practices and speculations of these tribes, when grown into nations and standing in the zenith of their historical day.

Now there certainly must have been a period, and that a long and an all-important one, when that language and that religion were forming; and when, with them and through them, those societies, or their heirs in the world's history, were forming into acting members of the social body of humanity at large. Nor can it be said that we are in want of documents for the history of that primeval period, and in particular as far as language is concerned. For language bears in itself the indestructible records of its own history and origin, and is, in most cases, much more important for universal history by itself than by all

which is written in it afterwards, just as original compositions like the *Iliad*, Herodotus, and Plato, are superior to their commentaries. For language, considered and analyzed as such, is a very artistic composition, at once poetical, historical, and philosophical. The only question, then, which remains is, whether a method has been found, or can be established, enabling us to make the phenomena of language, as such, systematically available for universal history? If, by such a method, we should be able to represent the languages, at least of all historical nations, as branches of the genealogical tree of the families of mankind, and as integral parts of the picture of the truly ancient epoch of our race, such a reconstruction would form the scaffolding for the primeval history of religion, chronologically and internally. For religion, as a complex both of ideas and of rites, presupposes the expression of thought and the vehicle of tradition, which is language; and language and religion together bear witness, each in its way, to the primitiveness of that distinguishing feature of mankind, which consists in the power of reducing phenomena to a unity, and of rising from the effect to the cause. In the same manner, as no religion can be understood thoroughly without a knowledge of the language of the nation which formed it, the philosophy of religion is incomplete without that of language. But so are also the beginnings and prospects of Christianity incomplete and unintelligible without a philosophical understanding of the beginnings and prospects of mankind.

The Aphorisms were destined to be the philosophical key to the understanding of the deeper bearings of the subject treated in "*Hippolytus and his Age*." Nobody felt more than myself

how inadequate that form was which the limits of my book obliged me to adopt.

When, therefore, I resolved to develop them into a separate treatise, I thought it indispensably necessary to represent my view as to the beginnings (and therefore also prospects) of the human race in its entirety. Consequently the Aphorisms were to become a sketch of the principle of development in those collateral, primordial creations of the mind, language and religion.

A lecture delivered at Oxford, on the 28th June, 1847, before the British Association for the Advancement of Science, and printed in the Transactions of that year, offered the materials and scaffolding for the one part of my task, as the Aphorisms did for the other. I have had but to develop the method followed in that lecture, and to bring down to the present day the facts to be recorded as to the progress of that most rising part of the science of the mind, comparative ethnology, in order to make this first part a suitable match for the developed Aphorisms on religion. The volume thus exhibits these two grand subjects as what they always have been in my mind, integral parts of one great whole, the primordial records and ruling creations of our race.

I flatter myself that this extension will not be unwelcome to the general thinking public. As to the readers of Hippolytus in particular, I hope they will find in this combined review of the leading facts and thoughts of our primordial intellectual history a more complete philosophical introduction to what is said in that work respecting religion and mankind, and especially respecting the origin and prospects of Christianity. The philo-

sophical view of religion stands and falls with that of language, and nobody can, as a rational being, think highly of the beginnings and prospects of Christianity without thinking highly of those of mankind. A high religious faith and a low philosophy of human nature must drive a thinking and honest mind, if not into despair and madness, into comfortless chilling indifference and stupor.

This is indeed the leading idea of the Aphorisms, and therefore I certainly do not regret having presented them to the English public in connexion with "Hippolytus and his Age," even in that compressed and incomplete form. Nor have I reason to be disheartened by the reception they have met with. Little appreciated by those who first felt called upon to pronounce an opinion upon my work, without having even made an attempt to understand them, ignored by most readers, and insidiously perverted by some who see in the connexion of thought and religion either a folly or a crime, they have, in the course of the last three months, gradually become acceptable to the public, and dear to many who seem to have discovered in those laconic sentences a uniting and guiding thread even for other labyrinths than that of the Trinitarian speculations of the third century. Indeed I believe the fault of the Aphorisms was not so much that they were an intrusion and an excrescence, as that they left too many chasms even for those who are accustomed "to read between the lines."

Much as I have endeavoured to make them less incomplete and less imperfect in the present book, I am fully aware that even in this form they must partake both of the defects inherent

in all sketches, and of those which are inseparable from all first attempts to strike out a new path of thought and of research. They require, therefore, peculiar indulgence from my readers, and perhaps a little more reflection and study, than some of my critics have bestowed upon them, from those who will have to give their judgment on the present composition.

What can only be asserted here — that the system of which they exhibit the outlines exists as a connected whole in the author's mind, and rests upon Baconian principles — I hope at no remote period to prove by the publication of a complete exposition of my system.

In the meantime I trust that this sketch, in spite of its insufficiency and its defects, may not be found entirely deficient in that peculiar charm which is attached to a rapid view of a vast, not to say immeasurable, field. May it assist those who are desirous of fixing, in that course called the universal history of mankind, some landmarks pointing out the progress of our race! It is a field encumbered with the ruins of ages, bearing mutilated inscriptions, full of the enigmatical hieroglyphics of the mind. A conscientious writer, who respects both his subject and the public, cannot offer, at the present stage of our knowledge, such an epic account of universal history, uninterrupted by research, as the Muses inspired Herodotus to write, and the Genius of the nation prompted him to recite before assembled Hellas. However heavily the immensity of facts and the sublimity of the subject may weigh upon him, he will not think it right to lighten his task by substituting his own frivolous inventions for God's poetry in the destinies of our race, or by

repeating, with thoughtless unction, the used-up unintellectual formulas of unexplained tradition. Even in a sketch, the mixture of abstract reasoning, research, and historical recital is a necessity, although certainly not an advantage.

May then my feeble pen, here and there at least, succeed in shadowing forth, however faintly, an image of that sublime subject! There is a sacredness which surrounds the view of human destinies, and a peculiar glory which manifests itself in those original and wonderful primordial workings of the human mind, the less conscious reproductions of the mystery of creation. Such a view doubles our knowledge of history. It carries us through barren plains and over naked rocks, and presents to us whole centuries of darkness and apparent death. But from a higher point of view, that painful image vanishes, and we behold an encouraging and elevating development of life and light — a glorious course, starting from reason and liberty, and tending towards them as the conquest of the conscious Spirit. Both language and religion, the great records and monuments of primordial life, unanimously attest the divine dignity, and proclaim with heavenly voice the sublime destiny, of mankind. The universe around us has been to the contemplative and creative mind of man a symbol for framing words and rites; but the symbol sprung out of the idea, not the idea from the symbol. The symbol must die when the development of the idea requires a purer reflex, because its life and aim are not in itself, but in the idea. What comes from reason cannot end in unreason; and what springs from the Spirit, “which maketh free,” can end neither in matter nor in servitude. This is a

deeply comforting truth, not only for the understanding of the past, present, and future of the history of mankind, but also for our belief in the immortal substance, and the eternal conscious life of the individual soul. That which is the manifestation of eternity (and thought is eternal) cannot perish with the dust; that which is the conscious, personal, creative cause of the phenomena of rational life, must needs partake of the immortality of the First Cause of the Universe.

INTRODUCTION.

**THE
GENERAL RESULTS
OF THE
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LANGUAGES OF
ASIA AND EUROPE.**

GENERAL RESULTS

OF THE

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LANGUAGES OF ASIA AND EUROPE.

FIRST CHAPTER.

THE ORIGINAL AND HISTORICAL UNITY OF ALL THE NATIONS OF ASIA
AND EUROPE, AND THE ASIATIC ORIGIN OF THE KHAMITES OR
EGYPTIANS.

ADOPTING the principle of the strictest philosophical criticism, and the severest method of establishing the proofs of physical and historical kindred, we examined the languages of the nations of Asia and Europe in three great groups. Starting from the analysis of the Germanic and the classical languages, and examining those families which are incontestably connected with them, we arrived by overwhelming evidence at the proof of the immediate unity in blood of by far the greater half of the civilized nations of the world.

We then examined the languages of another great family, second in its importance to the civilization of mankind only to that first, generally called the Indo-Germanic stock, and we laid before our readers the documents which self-evidently establish the following facts. First, that the Semitic languages, commonly so called, form a most closely connected family among themselves. Secondly, that the Egyptian language, or the tongue of Kham, belongs to the same stock, but points, however, to

a considerably more ancient period of mankind. Thirdly, that the cuneiform inscriptions of Babylonia exhibit to us a language in the transition from primordial to historical Semitism.

But, at the same time, we could not help seeing from an evidence which is similar in its character to that founded upon natural facts, that these two families, as they appear together in the same part of the earth, really belong to one and the same stock, and that Iranism and Semitism represent only members of one and the same family.

Now, following the same method, we discovered, in the third place, that all the remaining nations of Asia and Europe, which are neither Iranians nor Semites, form among themselves a third family, which is the greatest in extent, and reaches up to the most ancient formations. But, moreover, we found that this family, which in my Lecture of 1847 I had ventured to call Turanian, was intimately connected with the Iranian, and stands to it in a similar position as Khamitism to Semitism. It is primitive Iranism, onesidedly and wildly modified and particularised.

Thus we arrived at two great historical facts: first, that the four great families of the historical time reduce themselves to two, the Iranians and the Semites; the one having its primordial roots in Turanism, and the other in Khamitism; secondly, that by a more close and methodical investigation both prove to be originally, and, therefore, physically cognate among each other; or in other words, that, as far as the organic languages of Asia and Europe are concerned, the human race is of one kindred, of one descent.

Now the question arises, if those two great families are thus united, is not their unity represented by some positive primitive formation? All the facts hitherto examined, lead us to assume, that this formation must have differed from even the most ancient historical Turanism, or Khamitism, in a similar manner as inorganic nature differs from the first organic formations.

Those strata of organic structure are, therefore, necessarily underlaid by an inorganic, or as it were crystalline language, which according to all probabilities is preserved in the ancient Chinese, on which the Turanian formations are bordering internally, as they do geographically. This development requires a period of time which may appear very long according to the traditional ideas of the extent of human history ; but, in fact, is very short and recent if we look back upon the history of the earth and of her lower productions.

The time required for the gradual formation of such a primitive idiom, having throughout substantial, and possessing no formative words, must, therefore, necessarily occupy a great part of that period.

Although we had already, long before approaching the most ancient deposits of that course of development, lost sight of chronological history, which, indeed, is only the second epoch of the modern history of our race, we felt that we moved within most positive limits. We were likewise aware that we had before us strata of mental existence, as well defined as those of geology, but infinitely more intelligible, because intellectual themselves, and carrying in themselves their order of succession by their own law of development.

In short, we were forced to acknowledge that the sacred annals of ancient humanity which we had examined, are records and organs of intellectual and creative life, and themselves possess an intellectual origin and nature. We were moving in the mysteries of nature, but that nature was the mind.

It will, therefore, be worth while to review these historical results, and their general bearings upon the history of our race, a little more in detail, before we undertake the task of investigating the laws of that marvellous epoch of development in which we ourselves are placed.

I.

THE IRANIAN STOCK.

EIGHT, more or less extensive, historical families or single nations have been ascertained to constitute one great Asiatic-European stock, of which even the remotest members speak original languages, more intimately connected with each other than with any third tongue, or family of tongues, in the world. We have called this stock the Iranian, according to a terminology which recommends itself by many advantages.

The *first* great branch of this stock are the *Celts*, once spread over Asia Minor (Galatia), Spain, France, Belgium, Helvetia, a great part of Germany, and throughout the British Isles: it lives still in the Kymric (of which the Bas Breton is a corrupted form), as the language of Wales, and in two cognate forms, the Gaelic and the Erse, as the native tongue of the Highlands of Scotland, and of the whole of Ireland. This family we consider as representing the most ancient formation of the whole stock. We have given Dr. Carl Meyer's theory as to the relative position and history of the different branches of this stock, with particular reference to the immigration into Great Britain.

The *second* branch is the *Thracian* or *Illyrian*, once spread on the Dnieper, the Hellespont, and in Asia Minor, in which countries it was followed, and partly supplanted, by the *Pelasgian*, or ante-historical formation of the Hellenic. Dr. Paul Boetticher, in his "*Arica*," 1850, applied Burnouf's theory to the Thracian language, and to those of Asia Minor; by which method he was enabled to prove from the words preserved to us

by the Greeks, that the Phrygians, the Mæonians, or Iranic Lydians, the Western Cappadocians, are, as well as the Thracians, next in kin to the Arians Proper, the Persians, and Bactrians. The languages of the Epirots and Macedonians belong to this family, which is now represented in those countries by the Skipetarian, the language of the Albanians or Arnauts.

The *third* is the *Armenian*, the language spoken during the historical age, in the country which, according to the most ancient traditions of the Semites, was the cradle of mankind, and again the primeval seat of man after the deluge of Noah.

The *fourth* formation we propose to call the *Arian*, or the Iranian stock as presented in Iran Proper. Here we must establish two great subdivisions. The one comprises the nations of Iran Proper, or the Arian stock, the languages of Media and Persia. Its most primitive representative is the *Zend*. We designate by this name both the language of the most ancient cuneiform inscriptions (or Persian inscriptions in Assyrian characters) of the sixth and fifth century B. C., and that of the ancient parts of the Zend-Avesta, or the sacred books of the Parsees, as explained by Burnouf and Lassen. We take the one as the latest specimen of the western dialect of the ancient Persian and Median (for the two nations had one tongue), in its evanescent state, as a dead language; the other as an ancient specimen of its eastern dialect, preserved for ages by tradition, and therefore not quite pure in its vocalism, but most complete in its system of forms. The younger representatives of the Persian languages are the Pehlevi (the language of the Sassanians), and the Pazend, the mother of the present, or modern Persian tongue, which is represented in its purity by Ferdusi, about the year 1000. The Pushtu, or language of the Afghans, belongs to the same branch. The second subdivision embraces the Arian languages of India, represented by the Sanskrit and its daughters.

The *fifth* branch is the *Hellenico-Italic*, or the Greek and

Roman, and all the Italic languages, with the doubtful exception of the Etruscan, which at all events was a mixed language, having a groundwork kindred to Greek and Latin, with a great barbarian admixture. Under Italic tongues we understand the languages of Italy Proper, south of the Apennines, and of the Italic Isles.

The *sixth* branch is that of the *Slavonic* nations in their two great branches; the eastern, comprising the Old Slavonic of the Bible and of Nestor, the Russian, Servian, Croatic, and Wendic; and the western, the languages of the Tschekhs (Bohemians), Slovaks, Poles, and Servians. These languages, once prevalent in the north of Germany, are now spoken from the Adriatic to the Dnieper. In the ancient world, this great, powerful, and much-divided family is represented by the *Sauromatæ* of the Greeks, or the *Sarmatæ* of the Romans, a nation living on the Don and near the Caspian Sea. The statement of Herodotus that they spoke a faulty Scythian, can certainly as well be understood in the sense in which the English may be said to speak a bad French, as in that in which one might say, the French speak an incorrect Franconian German. But the first interpretation is, according to the testimonies of other ancient writers respecting the physiognomy of the Sarmatæ, the only admissible one. Those tribes which Herodotus knew, spoke their language mixed with that of the Scythians, which does not prove that the rest did.

The *seventh*, nearly allied to this and the next branch, that of the *Lithuanian* tribes, among which the ancient Prussian represents the most perfect form, is in some points nearer to the Sanskrit than any other existing tongue.

Finally, last not least, the *Teutonic nations* in their two families, the Scandinavian and the German. The first has preserved its most ancient form in the Icelandic; the Swedish and Danish are the modern daughters of the Old Norse language of Scandinavia. The second is the German, now the language

of the whole of Germany, and almost the whole of Switzerland. Its northern or Saxon form has received a peculiar individuality in the Flemish and Dutch tongues, and, by the emigrations which took place in the fifth century of our era, has become (mixed with French words since the Norman Conquest) the prevalent and leading language of the British Isles, and is becoming now, by the emigrations which began in the seventeenth century, and are still continuing, that of the northern continent of America. The southern German tribes have successively formed, with a greater or less infusion of words into the Latin groundwork, the Italian, French, and Spanish languages.

II

THE SEMITIC STOCK.

It is generally acknowledged that the following nations form another compact mass, and represent one family, whose branches are physiologically and historically connected: the *Hebrews*, with the other tribes of Canaan or Palestine, inclusive of the Phœnicians, who spread their language, through their colonization, as that of the Carthaginians; the *Aramaic Proper* tribes, or the historical nations of Aram, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Babylonia, speaking Syriac in the west, and the so-called Chaldee in the east; finally, the *Arabians*, whose language is connected (through the Himyaritic) with the *Æthiopic*, the ancient (now the sacred) language of Abyssinia. According to Dr. Paul Boetticher's researches, in his "*Horæ Aramaicæ*" (1847), and in his "*Rudimenta Mythologiæ Semiticæ*" (1848), the Lydians Proper belong to the Aramaic stock, as the ancients themselves say of the Eastern Cappadocians (*Leuco-Syri*). He finds a proof of this in the composition of some of their proper names with *Atthis*, their divinity (as *Alyattes*, *Sadyattes*, *Myattes*). It is evident that in these words the name of the divinity represents the genitive, which, in the Aramaic languages, invariably follows the word on which it is dependent, whereas in the Iranian compositions it precedes it. We shall call this second family, now generally termed Semitic, the Aramaic stock.

The Egyptian and Babylonian researches enabled us to show that this historical Semitism has two very deep roots in the primordial ages. The first is the Khamitic Stock.

The language of ancient Egypt (*Kham*, the black land) has

an equally organic structure, but much less developed than the Iranian and Semitic, and is connected in its roots with both, and in its grammatical forms with the Semitic more particularly. This phenomenon cannot be explained, except by the supposition that those two great families were originally connected with each other.

The second ante-historical phasis of Semitism is the Elamitic, or the sacred and official language of Babylonia, preserved to us in the cuneiform inscriptions.

The reconstruction which, from the comparison of these two ancient formations, we were enabled to make of the Semitic family, led to the following results as to the history of language, and as to the monumental chronology of mankind.

It is very striking, in how narrow a compass, and with what inward energy, the Semitic formations move in the historical times. They are reduced to the northern branch, spoken in the Euphrates and Tigris region, Syria and Palestine, and to the South-Semitic idioms, or the language of Arabia. The northern branch is represented, first, by Hebrew (the language of the Ibrî, men who came from Arapakhitis), fixed in Palestine (Canaan), and divided into Phœnician and Hebrew Proper; and, secondly, by popular Chaldee, or the common language of Babylon and Assyria (Elam and Assur), and of Mesopotamia and Syria (Aram, and probably Lud, or Semitic Asia Minor). The second branch is represented by North and South Arabia; the language of the Sinai peninsula (Amalekite dialect) belonging to the second. The Abyssinian, in Africa, is an evident offshoot of the South-Arabian idiom.

Now the difference between the idioms of either branch is little more than dialectic; and that between historical North and South Semitic itself does not go beyond the difference exhibited, on the Iranian side, between German and Scandinavian, Gothic and Icelandic.

The Hebrew must be supposed to have been substantially fixed

at the time of Abraham, allowing for the necessary loss of forms in the fifteen centuries which elapsed between him and Moses. The Arabic must have been fixed at a considerably earlier period, on account of its preserving the ancient system of forms so much more connectedly and symmetrically than the Hebrew. In this particular, also, the Mosaic genealogical table of nations confirms the results of scientific analysis: the origin of the Joktanite tribes is placed there by five links or epochs anterior to the Abrahamic migration, and is represented as immediately connected with Eber, the grandson of Arpakshad, or the first or second settlement of that branch out of the mountains north of Armenia.

If, then, we are thrown into the fifth or sixth millennium before our era, as to the grammatical point of culmination for historical Semitism, we have the infallible documents of two ante-historical formations of the same line. Of these, the most ancient, the Egyptian, which appears almost stereotyped in language and in writing at the opening of the fourth millennium before Christ, presents an idiom so considerably different from the historical formations, although undoubtedly of the same family, that we must place the culminating point of its grammatical structure before that great, although local, catastrophe of Northern Asia which we call the Deluge. Khamitism is the deposit of ante-diluvian or ante-historical Semitism. But the Babylonian language, expressed by the cuneiform inscriptions, must belong to the same primitive world or to the very beginning of the new.

It will be shown in another place, that a concurrence of facts and of traditions demand for the Noachian period about ten millennia before our era, and for the beginning of our race another ten thousand years, or very little more.

The details of the history of the Hebrew language are better known to us than those of any other. The Bible presents to us an almost uninterrupted series of documents from the time of the

Exodus to that of the Maccabees, including nearly twelve centuries; and the most careful studies concerning the history of Hebrew forms, assisted by comparative Semitic and Iranian philology, enable us to mark the epochs of this great line of development.

The history of the Aramæan language is as yet much less known, but sufficient evidence lies before us to enable us to place the so called Chaldee of the book of Daniel, posterior to Esra, and little before the Talmudic idiom. This verdict entirely coincides with the result of criticism, applied to the Hebrew portions of that book. For these parts manifestly present to us the last stage of the language, which, after having been the peculiar vernacular tongue of the Israelites, became, after their return from the Babylonian captivity, the learned or sacred language.

Before we proceed to Turan, we must look back to the general results of the history of writing. For this consideration belongs exclusively to the Iranian and the Semitic family, and most preponderantly to the latter. Tur learnt to write from his more intellectual brethren, and, generally speaking, very late.

The history of writing is the reproduction of the process of the human mind which manifests itself in the development of speech. It begins with a visible reproduction of the objects around man, as exponents of quality and action. This primitive hieroglyphism, or the exclusively ideographic manner of writing, is either only supplementary, a picture to be illustrated by speech and gestures, or, independent of both, a real hieroglyphic expression of speech. Both, however, presuppose a language analogous to such writing; a language consisting only of words of substance, each distinct sound expressing a real object, as the external cause of its phonetic representation by the mouth.

The organic language with its formatives and terminations offers already difficulties to a purely objective writing. The proper stage, therefore, for primitive hieroglyphics is that of which ancient Chinese represents to us the most important specimen in its last stage. Khamitism finds it already impossible to stop there: it wants the supplementary element of phonetic writing, and we find Kham thus using his images to represent by them syllables, and, in process of time, even single letters, irrespective of their meaning. Kham must himself have invented this means of writing, because he uses his own materials: but even these materials, the purely ideographic part of his hieroglyphics, cannot have more than its first rudiments in primitive Asia. The most ancient system of writing which we can trace in Asia itself, is the syllabic writing of Babylonia, and of this we find only the very last end, a perfectly conventional system of signs, invented for the brick, and intended to conceal, not communicate, the reading of the language.

But then there arose probably among the Canaanites, and certainly among the historical Shemites, that great genius whose name has perished, like that of the inventor of the plough, but who lives enshrined in the most intellectual of all monuments, the alphabet in the proper sense of the word. The genius of that man started from the apperception, that the most simple normal sounds are very limited, and that the consonants are independent of their apparently inherent vowels. He shows his superiority not only by what he expresses, but still more by what he wisely omits. As the diatonic scale fixes only the principal knots in the scale of sounds, so the inventor of our alphabet excludes all the numberless modifications of the normal and universal sounds, produced by the artistic cooperation of the organs of speech in a well organized and harmoniously perceiving and reproducing mind. He probably began with twelve letters; soon, however, if not originally, increased to sixteen; the Egyptian system exhibits only thirteen real letters; the

Babylonian syllabarium, in its expiring stage, represents only thirteen consonants, and the vowels A, I, U, with two or three diphthongs, evidently formed subsequently by a syllabic combination of those primitive vocalic sounds.

The genius of Hellas worked upon this traditional element as he did upon every object delivered to his creative, intellectualising power. He made the Canaanitic alphabet universal, by eliminating the signs for the harsh idiosyncrastic guttural sounds of the Shemite; preserving, however, faithfully, even the rejected signs, by using them in the series of numerals. The twenty-two Phœnician letters became, under the handling of the Greeks, twenty-four. By this process, however, the original organic structure of the alphabet became somewhat obscured, and its component sounds, being less transparent, were used with inconvenient liberty and partial misunderstanding by the Germanic nations.

On the other side, the Japhetic genius had reconstructed, among the Arians in India, the original alphabet into a scientific philosophical arrangement, which surpasses the Arabic extension of the Hebrew alphabet, effected by diacritical signs. Up to the present moment, the Devanāgarī alphabet is the most philosophical and comprehensive, and reproduces admirably that artistically rich, and still symmetrical, structure represented by the Sanskrit.

Thus, by the combined energies of Shem and Japhet, the way has been prepared for a philosophical alphabet, founded upon the Roman alphabet, the exponent of modern civilization. The German character, happily already dropped by the Dutch and Swedes, is only a monkish form of the same, kept up by idiosyncrastic provincialism. The European alphabet is the only basis for transcribing all Asiatic idioms, into a standard alphabet for all the tribes, henceforth receiving the torch of civilization from Japhet's favoured hands.

The last result of the researches of historical comparative

philology on this field, becomes thus a frame for the history of primitive civilization.

In the first stage, we find the hieroglyphic writing, corresponding with that language which we discovered in the valley of the Nile, as the deposit of most ancient western Asia. Phoneticism is just beginning to try its wings, exactly as the organic element had done in the speech itself.

Next comes the syllabarium, surrounded by the conventionalised ruins of the primitive Asiatic hieroglyphical structure.

The historical Shemite invented the pure alphabet, still, however, connected here and there with syllabism, and preserving, in the names and forms of his twenty-two letters the trace of the hieroglyphics of the primitive world.

At this point Japhet takes up the torch, and the Hellenic genius universalises Shemitic tradition, by imprinting upon it that same stamp of normal humanity which makes the Greek language the most perfect of the world, and exhibits in the structure of the Greek verb that same sense of beauty which shines forth unrivalled from the Parthenon and from the Jove of Phidias.

The philosophical review of primitive universal history of writing, appears then to be the most natural introduction into the general history of the civilization of which writing is one of the principal bases and organs.

Before we proceed to show the connection of the unity of the development of speech and writing, with the unity of the civilization of mankind, we must consider, from our present point of view, the historical importance of the Turanian researches with which the first volume concluded. The following statement gives the result of the comprehensive researches of Dr. Müller, as contained in the first volume. My learned friend has written it himself at my request, so as to form a part of the present recapitulation.

III.

THE TURANIAN STOCK.

IN the grammatical structure of the Semitic languages we can clearly perceive traces of one powerful Mind who once grasped the floating elements of speech, and impressed on them his own stamp, never to be obliterated in the course of centuries. The same applies to those grammatical features which constitute the characteristic expression of the Arian dialects. As mighty empires founded by the genius of one man perpetuate for ages to come the will of one as the law of all, the Semitic and Arian families have preserved, at all times and in all countries, so strict a continuity as to connect the language of Moses with that of Mohammed, the poetry of Homer with that of Shakspeare. The principal branches of each of these two families never stand to one another in a more distant degree of relationship than French and Italian, German and English.

This is not the case with the Turanian languages. The very absence of that close family likeness which holds the Semitic and Arian languages together seems to form a distinguishing mark of these nomadic dialects. There is, however, one positive principle, which pervades the whole Turanian speech from its lowest to its highest manifestations, and which cannot be better expressed than by the name of "agglutination." This principle, which consists in the mere juxtaposition of material and formal elements, may seem so simple and purely mechanical as hardly to offer a distinctive attribute on which to establish a family of languages; still it forms so broad a line of demarcation, that neither in Turkish and Finnish, where the Turanian approaches nearest to

the formative principles of Arian grammar, nor in the Tungusic and Tai dialects, where it verges toward Chinese simplicity, does it fail to keep the nomad type distinct from that of family or state languages. There are many ways in which the principle of agglutination can be applied; and the greater or less perfection to which it has been brought furnishes the best scale by which the close or distant relationship of Turanian languages can be determined. There is, however, besides this formal, a material relationship also between the members of this world-wide family; only that, owing to the very nature of these languages, its traces must be sought for in radicals only, and not, as in Greek and Sanskrit, in derivatives.

The separation of the Turanian stock took place long before the ancestors of the Arian family left their common home; for, wherever these Arian colonists penetrated, in their migrations from east to west, they found the land occupied by the wild descendants of Tur. Through all periods of history, up to the present day, by far the largest share of the earth belongs to Tur; and the countries reclaimed by Shem and Japhet, although they mark the high road of civilization, and comprehend the stage on which the drama of ancient and modern history has been acted, are but small portions if compared with the vast expanse of the empire of the Turanian speech. The Arian and Semitic languages occupy but four peninsulas—India, Arabia, Asia Minor, and Europe: all the rest of the primeval continent of Asia belongs to the descendants of Tur.

The chief branches of the Turanian stock all radiate from a common centre; though they are not, like the members of the Semitic and Arian families, descended from one common parent. Their geographical distance from China seems to indicate the successive dates of their original separation; and the different degrees of grammatical perfection to which they have each attained may likewise be measured by their distance from Chinese monosyllabism.

There are two divisions, the Northern and the Southern.

The Northern Division comprehends the Tungusic, Mongolic, Tataric, Samoëdic, and Finnic branches.

The Southern Division comprehends the Taï, Malaïc, Bhotiya, and Tamulic branches.

In the Northern Division the Tungusic and Mongolic, in the Southern the Taï and Malaïc branches, are the nearest neighbours to Chinese, not only in geographical position, but also by the low degree of their grammatical development.

Next follow the Tataric in a northern, and the Bhotiya in a southern direction; the former spreading through Asia toward the European peninsula and the seats of political civilisation, the latter tending toward the Indian peninsula, and encircling the native land of the Brahmanic Arians.

The most distant branches of the Turanian stock, and therefore probably the first to attain an independent growth, are the Finnic in the north, and the Tamulic in the south. The regularity and settledness of the grammar of these languages bear witness to an early literary cultivation; of which in India nothing remains but tradition, owing to Brahmanic encroachment, while in the fens of Finland oral tradition has preserved up to our own time the songs of Wäinämöinen, and of his sacred home, Kalevala.

Besides these regular radii of Turanian speech, there are still several sporadic clusters of dialects, equally belonging to this family, but severed from the rest by mountains or deserts. In their seclusion, and debarred from the severe attrition which every dialect experiences in the intercourse with other languages, they have each produced the utmost variety of grammatical forms, and revel in a luxuriance of verbal distinctions which small and secluded tribes alone are able to indulge in. These are the Caucasian languages, spoken in the impenetrable valleys of Mount Caucasus; the Basque, in the Pyrenees

and on the very edge of Europe; and the Samoïedic, in the still less accessible Tundras of the North of Siberia.

That all these branches of speech on the Asiatic continent form a historical unity in themselves and as opposed to Semitic and Arian races, is a conviction which has been gaining strength from year to year; and the connecting links of several branches have now been laid open by the skill of comparative philologists. Much, however, remains still to be done before the mutual relation of all these branches can be considered as finally settled. A further extension of this nomadic family of speech has been hinted at, not only with regard to America, but even to Africa. In the former case, the bridge on which the seeds of Asiatic dialects could have been carried to the New World is clearly indicated by the researches of physical science; in the latter all is still conjecture, except this, that, besides the Semitic type of some African languages north of the equator, there is another grammatical character impressed on African idioms, such as the Hottentot, which, by its mechanical perfection and somewhat artificial complication, invites a comparison with the grammatical system of the descendants of Tur.

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE UNITY OF THE CIVILIZATION OF MANKIND.

It is only necessary to reflect on the names of the nations constituting the two civilizing Asiatic families, in order to be convinced that the linguistic facts just stated are not merely interesting and important in the ordinary view of etymological research and antiquarian erudition, nor only for the history of language, important as this history is. I have stated the general results upon the civilization of mankind in the preface to my "Egypt" somewhat in the following way. Universal history, as far as it is the history of the human mind and of civilization in what we call the historical age, is nothing but the history of those two great families, the Japhetic and the Semitic, in Asia and Europe, including Egypt and the Egyptians. But the Egyptian language, allied to both families, not only represents the primeval history of Egypt, but is moreover the only known historical monument of an earlier period of the human race, and therefore (unless we would derive the Asiatic man from the valley of the Nile) the record of the language and civilization of primitive Central Asia. Of this period, thus recorded, we shall here say nothing more. Nor shall we here develop the idea that Egypt's ancient history itself represents the middle ages of the most ancient world. But if we look into the later, or so-called historical age—into what may be termed, from an elevated point of view, the modern history of mankind,—the principal parts of the drama of human progress are, in the three wonderful acts we have before us, distributed

ethnologically in the following manner. In the first, we meet on the one side with the Bactrians and Medians, the Indians and Persians: on the other hand, with the Babylonians and probably the Assyrians, with the Jews and Phœnicians. For on the very border of the ante-historical age, we find, in the East, according to Berosus, the Bactrian empire, the oldest Iranian State, coeval with the first great western empire of Semitic Asia (posterior only to the primitive Turanian) of which we have any tradition. This is the Babylonian, or the kingdom of Babel (Babiru) on the Euphrates. The primitive masters of Babylonia in the primeval period spoke the language of the undivided stock, preserved to us by the Egyptian, and at a later epoch the most ancient form of the already individualized Semitic. But even the most ancient Babylonian language must have inclined to the Semitic idiom. As to that of Bactria, if its list of kings, preserved by the Armenian Eusebius, deserves, as I believe it does, serious consideration, all its traditions were in decidedly Iranian tongues. As the one may therefore be called the mother of Hebrew, the other must have been either the mother of Zend and its colonial scion, Sanskrit, or the most ancient form of that very language.

The neighbouring metropolis of Assyria, Nineveh (Ninyah), belongs, as its name proves, to the late historical age; for admitting that it means the city of Ninus, he, according to all credible accounts of the historians, confirmed by the Egyptian synchronisms, cannot be placed higher than the thirteenth century before our era. Geographically it appeared to me highly probable that the Assyrians, the men of Old Kurdistan, having Nineveh as their later southern metropolis, spoke a Semitic language: even the apparent affinity of the names of Assyria and Syria seems to lead to this assumption. But it must be candidly confessed, that up to the present time we had no positive proof of it. Assyria, as regards its most essential and primitive region, is represented by modern Kurdistan; and the Kurds speak

an Iranian language. So do the Armenians, their northern neighbours, whose historical traditions reach very far back. Indeed there is no proof of an Aramaic language on the left bank of the Tigris. However on the other side, the cuneiform alphabet, the characters of which are called by the ancients Assyrian, is undoubtedly not constructed for an Iranian language. Moreover, Assur, which means the Assyrian nation, is in the Mosaic table of Semitic origin, and posterior to the Babylonian empire. Having said so much in 1847, I am now enabled to appeal to the glorious discoveries of Rawlinson. In finding the key to the Babylonian and Assyrian inscriptions, he has for the first time given us also the key to the very annals of their kings, and of their civilization. According to these discoveries, so effectually assisted by the efforts of Layard and the researches of Hincks, the civilization and sway of the Semites in the first dawn of post-Noachian history was preceded by a Turanian, Scythian empire. To this empire belongs the name and tradition about Nimrod, who so vividly personifies the Turanian man, the hunting monarch, wild and valiant, the man of conquest not of civilization.

In the *second* act of the modern history of mankind, we find, on the Japhetic side, the principal parts of civilization entrusted to the Hellenic and Italic nations; the Jews again, with the Carthaginians, representing the Semitic on the other. Finally, in the *third* act, now still on the scene of the world, we have, as the leaders, the Scandinavian, the Germanic, and the Slavonic nations: but here also a powerful admixture of the Semitic element is not wanting. There is, nationally, the conquering Arab, who with his sword and his Islam once penetrated even into Europe. There is, individually, the Jew, standing without a country and temple, between the past and the future, and meanwhile living as a cosmopolite among the children of that Japhet, who was destined "to live in the tents of Shem," and whose children, at the dawn of history, drove Shem out of his

primitive seats, and finally destroyed his city, and that temple, upon the ruins of which the Christian church was built, to spread all over the earth. Now, what is the remaining history of the world, but an account of incursions and devastations, with the names of disturbing tribes, savage conquerors, and a few isolated sages? Egypt, in spite of occasional conquests and a continued but mummified civilization, is in this historical age only remarkable as having nursed the great legislator of the Jews, and given him occasion to found the first religion, based upon our moral consciousness, emancipated from the bondage of the elements, and striving after liberty through the law of conscience. That whole age is the agony of Kham.

If we compare the relative position of the two civilizing families, we observe an increasing extent and power of the Japhetic element, evidently destined to rule the world by a series of successive nations. Of the two first known empires of the world, the more powerful and influential seems to have been that which, speaking the most ancient form of Chaldee, must be considered as the representative of Shem. Shem appears in his own annals as one who had left his native land, and in the course of ages migrated west and south from the primitive common seat of the civilizing stock in Central Asia, with an unceasing tendency towards Egypt. In the historical age of the world the power passes rapidly and irresistibly to Japhet. The great continuous stream of human civilization runs, since that time, clearly in a Japhetic channel; whereas Shem takes the most prominent part in the religious development of mankind. The three cognate religions which govern the world are Semitic, based upon Semitic records, and founded and propagated by Semites. But conscious speculation and philosophy speak by the mouth of Japhet; their heroes are Hellenes and Romans, Romanics and children of the Germanic stock; they dawn among the Iranians, and burst the fetters of Islamism in the Sufism of Persia. It is to the sons of Japhet that the beautiful

was revealed. Before the Hellenes received that revelation in its fulness, before the divine human form, the image of God was beheld by the reproducing artist, architecture, sculpture, and painting had their temples in Iranian Asia. Sesostris of the old empire and his predecessors borrowed from Japhetic inventors, as Solomon and Hiram did. In poetry, the Semite excels in the lyric; his feeling of nationality, weakened by the prevalence of attachment to tribe, is not sufficiently wide and vivid to produce epic poems, or poetical narrative representations of national destinies. Finally, the drama, or the combination of the lyric and epic elements, and the complete representation of the eternal laws of human destiny in political society, is entirely unknown to the Semite. It is exclusively the creation of the Hellenic mind, feebly imitated by the Roman, reproduced with originality by the genius of the Germanic race. Nor is Iranian India entirely wanting in this last of the three species of poetical composition. The "Song of Solomon" shows how near the Hebrew mind was in its zenith to the dramatic form, without being able to go beyond the lyric. Thus everywhere the Semitic and the Japhetic mind assist and complete each other; but the Japhetic formation is nationally always the higher. Individually the power of a great individuality is higher among the Semites than among the Japhetites. Throughout history the Semitic nations act, as it were, the great episodes in universal history by temporary reconquests of the land of the Japhetites, and by opposing profound thought and religion, enthusiasm and cunning, to the more comprehensive genius, in science, politics, and war, of the sons of Japhet. But what they do is prominently the embodied thought and continued impulse of one great hero. The only great empire which the Semites founded in the historical age (for the internal history of ancient Babylon and Assyria is lost), that of the Arabs, was solely formed by the impulse of Mohammed, and under the influence of religious fanaticism. It fell to pieces when that impulse and that excitement faded away.

Christianity is of Semitic origin; but it was stamped as the general religion of the world, and as the organ of civilization, by uniting in its cradle the Semitic and Japhetic element. First preached by Jews, it was carried over the world by the sons of Greece and Rome. Language and civilization, physiology and philology, go hand in hand to illustrate the fact, that Shem and Japhet can no more coalesce into one without splitting, than be kept asunder without exercising upon each other a strong and animating influence.

Now, even in this historical and chronological age of the world, Turan comes in for his share. His stratum underlies, even in Europe, the modern humus of Celtic civilization, in the east and the west, in the north and the south. The Turanian conquerors, descendants of Nimrod "the hunter before the Lord," disturb and rouse, as Scythians, the old Iranian empires, as in a later age they influenced Hellenic civilization and energy. The Huns, those powerful actors in the great drama of the destruction of the Roman empire, and of the foundation of Germanic and Germanized states, were Turanians. So were the tribes whom Djingiskhan and Timur led to the conquest of Persia and India; so were the destroyers of the Eastern empire, the heirs of Byzantium. In the middle ages they powerfully influenced, as Tatars, the Slavonic tribes, and, lastly, as Magyars, roused and modified the energies of the German and Slavonic nations. Gradually mixing in Europe with the Iranian tribes, they became an active element and agent in the progress of civilization.

The native religion of the Turanian is Shamanism, based upon the tendency to orgiastic excitement and a belief in the force of spells.

This, however, is not the character of that nation whose place the Turanian took in Central Asia; I mean the Chinese, in whose language every syllable is a word, and every word the expression of a substance or its quality and action, or rather of

all this at once. The object or symbol of their veneration is the firmament, with its majestically and mysteriously moving starry host. Their poetry and philosophy is enshrined in their language and its reproduction in hieroglyphical writing. Every word is a riddle, and every sign a poem. A truism is a philosophical effort; a homely perception of the nature of mind, an epic or lyric production, prized highly after thousands of years. Yet amid all these humble efforts are contained the germs of high aspirations: we see in them the first essay of a Promethean flight, which will soon burst its fetters, and kindle a celestial fire brought down from above.

There is a sacred tradition, at least as far as Asia and Europe are concerned, handed down from mother to child, from father to son, in language as well as in all that thought and learning, and in all those customs and institutions which form the civilization of mankind. The myth of Prometheus, the Japhetide, the deepest of all mythological fictions and the most ancient of all historical recollections of the Hellenes, and indeed of all Iranian Japhetites, lives in the Caucasus, in a perfect, original, native form, among tribes without literature.*

* There is, north of *Gori*, a high mountain (of *slate* formation) which overhangs Ossetia from the north, in the *Liachwa* valley. It is called *Brutsam-Veli* (i. e. Hay-rick, from its shape), and its upper parts are covered with eternal snow.

The tradition among the Ossetes is the following:

There is in that mountain a cavern. Here a man (a giant?) lies in chains, with a sword hanging over his head, suspended by a silk thread.

A bird visits him which gnaws at his entrails.

This is his punishment for having stolen, or endeavoured to steal, the hidden treasures of the mountain.

It is reported (but not warranted) that the *Kefsure*, a tribe south-east of Ossetia, have the same tradition, only in a different form.

At all events, the Prometheus myth is only found in the southern extremity of the Caucasian mountains, far from *Elbordj*; and hitherto it is only known with certainty to live among an Indo-Germanic tribe, the Ossetians.

The Caucasians speak of those mountains with awe, and do not like to ascend them.

I owe this interesting fact to the verbal information of Dr. Abich, of Berlin,

A small space would contain the series of fathers or mothers as representatives of the six or seven hundred generations which may, at the utmost, have succeeded each other in Asia.

Which is more wonderful—their unity with so much diversity, or the contrasts they exhibit together with that unity?

Where are the laws, and what is the principle, the antagonistic action of which can explain the two and make these historical facts credible and intelligible?

How can Greek be connected with Chinese, or with Mongolic, or even with Hebrew? and how can a law of development be found to produce that chain?

The most natural method seems to be to consider first the phenomena, the origin and history of which are best known to us, and to show the facts respecting the progress and decay of certain given languages; then to proceed to the investigation of the general principles indicated by those phenomena; and finally to throw a glance over the still imperfectly explored idioms of the earth, and slightly touch upon the indications they present of a connection with the languages of Asia and Europe. Phenomenology, Theory, and Application will be the subjects of the three remaining sections.

the celebrated geologist of Caucasia and Armenia. He received it, when lately at Tiflis, from M. Khanikoff chief of the diplomatic *Chancellerie* of Russia at that place, whose article on the subject will soon appear (or has appeared) in the Petersburg Geographical Ephemerides. M. Khanikoff is a good geographer, and understands the Caucasian languages. — *London, December 3. 1854.*

FIRST SECTION.

THE

PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE;

OR

THE VESTIGES OF ITS FORMATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND
DECAY.

THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE;
OR,
THE VESTIGES OF ITS FORMATION, DEVELOPMENT,
AND DECAY.

FIRST CHAPTER.

ANCIENT AND MODERN GERMAN, AND THE ROMANIC. THE EFFECT
OF AGE AND OF A NEW FORMATIVE ELEMENT UPON A LANGUAGE.

THE origin of language is enveloped in deep mystery. It is only by a patient investigation of facts, and by generalizing those facts as far as we safely can, that we may hope to establish a fair test for a speculative view of the general principles of its formation. The history of most languages is only very imperfectly known. The best method to understand the gradual formation of a language, the extent of alterations it can undergo without losing the unity of its existence, its individuality as it were, and the changes to which it can be subjected in consequence of a violent crisis, seems therefore to be to examine the origin and gradual formation of those languages where the necessary facts are generally known, or at least most easily ascertainable. These are the daughters of Latin, and the modern German and Scandinavian languages. With the exception of the Romanic or Vlachic, or the language of Wallachia, formed with an admixture of Slavonic words, the first are the tongues of the South of modern Europe. They were formed out of the Latin in consequence of the settlement of one or other of the

advancing German tribes in Romanized countries, inhabited, as to the numerical majority of the inhabitants, by a Celtic population, which in former ages had in some of them succeeded to an Iberian. This is the origin of the Italian, the Provençal, the French, the Spanish, and the Portuguese languages; the two latter have received since, through the ascendancy of the Moors, an admixture of Arabic.

We have here clearly two great elements. The German tribes, who destroyed the Roman empire, were the instigating causes of the utter decay of the declining Roman language, the native tongue of Italy for ages, and introduced into the other countries by military colonization. This language had been adopted by the Celtic populations imperfectly, but to such an extent that they gradually forgot their own language, not being gifted with sufficient formative energy to master and incorporate the intruding element. The energetic and conquering German tribes did possess this energy, and gradually made the mixed Germano-Latin language the badge of their young nationality.

The remodeling cause of the formation of those languages was therefore Germanic. The element upon which it worked was the Latin tongue, represented by a decaying Roman nationality which (with the exception of Italy Proper) had been engrafted in the South upon a Celtic, and in Valachia upon a Slavonic population. The active movement of the Germanic mind, operating upon the subject Roman population, dissolved, and as it were burst the compact structure of the Latin tongue. Thus Germanic words were first substituted for Latin, but only in respect to the nouns and verbs. As for the particles and the degenerate inflexional forms, the old ones were superseded by the substitution of periphrastic forms, derived however from the Latin, and not from the Germanic stem. Thus the words *cis* and *ultra* (originally *uls*) disappeared. The Italian says, *al di quà*, *al di là*; the French, *au (en) delà*, *au (par) delà*, which

gives, as the original form, the Latin words, *ad illud de quâ* (*parte*) and *de illo* or *per illud de illâ*. In the same way *dorénavant* replaces *abhinc*. To understand the origin of this phrase we must reduce it to the barbaric periphrasis, *de hora in ab ante*. The most palpable proof that conjunctions represent a whole sentence is the Italian *conciossiacosachè*, literally *cum hoc sit causa quod*, meaning *although*. The gradual decay and disappearance of the neuter gender in the substantives may be traced in the popular dialect from the third century to the year 1000 of our era, when the utmost confusion prevailed among the ruins of the magnificent language of ancient Rome, and nowhere more than in Rome itself and its neighbourhood. The cases of the noun gave way to declensions formed by two prepositions, *ad* and *de*, taken from the Latin stock, and coalescing with the wreck of the pronoun *ille*, which became the article of the Romanic languages, the first part in Italian, the second in French. In the same way the Latin conjugation disappeared more or less under the influence of a periphrastic formation, by the help of *esse* and *habere*; thus here also the elements were taken from the Latin stem. It is worthy of remark, that the Germanic nations had themselves as complete inflexional declensions as the Latin; they also possessed the article like the Greek; but their conjugation of the past and future tenses was decidedly defective, and was therefore necessarily supplied by the periphrastic use of the verbs *to be* and *to have*. In both cases we see how the remodeling element influenced the new formations from the Latin. Still the change which took place was only indirectly effected by the Germans; directly it was the work of the Latin nations, mixed with those Germans who had destroyed the old world of Greece and Rome, upon a language, the decay of which had followed the decline and fall of the Empire. Thus the languages of Southern Europe have all Latin grammatical forms and particles, with a strong admixture of German words (besides the Celtic, and in Spain the Arabic

also), nouns and verbs introduced by the conquering race, which adopted the established language, strengthened as it was by literature and the liturgy.

We find absolutely the same phenomenon in the formation of the middle and modern Persian and the Turkish. The Parsi of the Achaemenidian inscriptions was made Pehlevi, under the Sassanides, by a powerful influx of Aramaic words, and became the language of Western Persia. The same happened, after the Islamitic conquest, to the Persian of Farsistan; the modern Persian receiving into its dictionary an overwhelming number of Arabic words. In the same manner, still later, the formation of the present Turkish took place by the influence of the language and civilization of the leading Mahommedan nation, the Arabs. The grammatical forms with the pronouns and other particles are from the original stock, Persian in the one, Turkish in the other. But one half of the modern Persian consists of Arabic words, and the elegant Turkish possesses still more foreign elements, Persian or Arabic.

The mixture in the Romanic languages is between two tongues of the same Iranian family; in the Persian between an Iranian and a Semitic; while the Turkish admits, besides these two, a third element, widely different from either.

In all of them we find the same phenomenon which we observe in the formations of the Romanic languages. A new tongue was created through what we may call a secondary formation, having as its substratum a decaying old language, which we may consider as the primary one. The secondary formation discarded the ancient grammatical forms, and most of the particles; but it retained the radical part of the nouns and verbs, incorporating from the new intruding elements only substantial words. That portion of the words which had no longer any definite or substantial, but only a formal or ideal signification, disappeared almost entirely. The want was supplied by a new

creative act, which, operating upon a highly organized language, produced a great decomposition of ancient forms.

It was altogether otherwise with the Anglo-Saxon tribes*, which conquered and colonized England in the fifth and sixth centuries. Possessed of greater energy than the Franconian tribes, which conquered France but lost their mother-tongue, the Anglo-Saxons in a short time made their language that of the country, with the exception of Wales, and built up the Old English language, which contains some Latin and Kymric words, but only German grammatical forms.

In German itself the Celtic, and in part, the Slavonic elements, which the Germans found in the land, exercised a similar influence. But such was the vitality of the formative process of the rising Germanic race upon the sporadic old elements, that single words only were introduced from those languages; even from the Latin, the language of civilization and of Christianity, they borrowed few single nouns and still fewer verbs. A comparison of the Germanic languages with the old Scandinavian and the Gothic, combined with a more profound study of the Slavonic, and particularly of the Celtic, seems to be the safest method of detecting their Slavonic and Celtic roots; for the Scandinavian and Gothic are either wholly or in a great degree free from them.

All these roots have been prolific, they having admitted all the German inflexions, and submitted to derivations and compositions like the original Teutonic roots. These foreign ele-

* I take this opportunity of adverting to the unhistorical use of the word Anglo-Saxon as equivalent with the dominant race in England, Scotland, and, to all appearances, very shortly also in Ireland, as if the word *Anglo* alluded to England, whereas it only means that the German tribes which colonized England in the fifth and sixth centuries, were pre-eminently Angles—from Anglia in Schleswig—and the Saxons from Lower Saxony, particularly from the coast, besides the Frisians from Frisia, and some smaller tribes.

ments accordingly have not exercised a disorganizing influence upon the German language. How, then, has the language of Goethe grown out of that of Ulphilas and of collateral formations in the kindred Germanic tribes? It has done so by an uninterrupted development of 1500 years, which has produced in the same country a tongue so different from the old form, that no German can, without a study like that of the classical languages, understand a single line of Ulphilas' translation of the Bible in 380. No German even is able without a certain study to comprehend (although that is a comparatively easy task) the national epic, the "Nibelungen," in its most modern text of the year 1200. Charlemagne could not have understood one word of the speech which his fiftieth successor on the throne of the German empire made a thousand years after his ancestor's coronation, that is to say, after the Ulphilatic language had passed through thirty or forty mothers. The last of this series of mothers taught her child the Lord's Prayer in a language handed down to her from mother to mother, but entirely unintelligible to the thirtieth or fortieth grandmother. How then has this process been working? Is it purely accidental, or what are its laws? Certain phenomena must strike everybody as being universal.

Many words of the ancient idiom are lost in the modern, and the grammatical forms have been undergoing a continual process of reduction. Instead of our present periphrastic conjugation of the passive, we had in the Gothic, as in the Icelandic, an organic form. In like manner, in the ancient idiom of the Franks, instead of our periphrastic mode of expressing after the verbs of perception and thought, the compound object (substantive and verb) by the particle *that*, we find the direct construction of the accusative with the infinitive, or the still more intuitive Greek construction through the participle. On the whole, the abstractions increase in the process of the language. In the same way, the roots and words

(particularly the verbs) receive more and more a less material, therefore freer, more intellectual, or metaphorical sense; and the original material signification disappears.

What may be stated empirically, as the minimum of time required for the formation of a new language?

The Hebrew began to be unintelligible to the Jews after the Babylonian Captivity, the Latin to the Italians 600 years after the settlement of the Germanic tribes. The Gothic became extinct by the destruction of their empires and their mixture with other tribes and nations; the old Frank language cannot be considered as a direct continuation of it; but the language of Otfried, a thousand years ago alphabetically fixed and possessing a literature like our own, has become unintelligible for the last five centuries to the direct descendants of the Carlovingian race, without any intervening great catastrophe of the nation, or any violent and lasting intrusion of foreign elements. The epochs of the language are indeed marked by great events political and national. The present German language has been fixed, after a very unsettled state, by Luther's translation of the Bible, by the uninterrupted production and use of German hymns since the Reformation, by the course of regular preaching, reading, and instruction in that same dialect, and finally by the modern literature of Germany, the daughter of that same Reformation.

We cannot point out this difference between old and modern German better than by the juxtaposition of the Lord's Prayer, beginning with that of Ulphilas, in his Gothic translation of the Gospels. If this table exemplifies the agency of time and civilization alone, the following tables, exhibiting the change of the Latin into the languages of the Romanic idioms of Western Europe, and into the Rumanic in Dacia, present the most authentic instances of the formation of various new languages out of one decayed mother-tongue, by the agency of a new formative element.

THE LORD'S PRAYER

<i>In Ulphilas, about 360.</i>	<i>In the Old High German Version of Tatian, about 360.</i>	<i>In Notker, about 1000.</i>
Atta unsar, thu in himinam, Veihnai namo thein.	Fater unser, thu thar bist in himile, Si geheilagot thin namo.	Fater unser, du in himile bist, Din namo werde geeiligt,
Quimai thiudinassus theins.	Queme thin rihi.	Din riche chome.
Vairthai vilja theins, sve in himina, jah ana airthai.	Si thin willo, so her in himile ist, so si her in erdu.	Din wille gescehe in erdo, also in himile.
Hlaif unsarana thana sinteinan gif uns himmadaga.	Unsar brot tagalihhaz gib uns hintu.	Unser tagelicha brot kib uns hiuto.
Jah aflet uns thatei skulans sijaima, svasve jah veis afletam thaim skulam unsaraim.	Inti furlaz uns unsara sculdi, so wir furlazemes unsaron sculdigon.	Unde unsere sculde belaz uns, also ouh wir belazen unseren sculdigen.
Ja ni briggais uns in fraistubnjai.	Inti ni gileitest unsih in costunga.	Unde in chorunga ne leitest du unsih.
Ac lausei uns af thamma ubilin.	Uzouh arlosi unsih fon ubile.	Nube lose unsih fone ubile.
Unte theina ist thiudangardi, jah mahts jah vulthus in aivins. Amen.		

IN GERMAN.

<i>In Luther, 1518.</i>	<i>Modern Orthography.</i>
Vater unser, der du bist in dem Himel, Geheiligt werdt dein Name.	Vater unser, der du bist in dem Himmel Geheiligt werde dein Name.
Czu kum dein Reich.	Dein Reich komme.
Dein Wil geschehe als ym Himel und in der Erden.	Dein Wille geschehe, wie im Himmel so auch auf Erden.
Unser teglich Brodt gib uns heute.	Unser täglich Brot gib uns heute.
Und verlass uns unser Schulde, als wir verlassen unseren Schuldigern.	Und vergib uns unsere Schuld, wie wir vergeben unsern Schuldigern.
Und füre uns nit yn die Versuchung oder Anfechtung.	Und führe uns nicht in Versuchung.
Sondern erlosse uns von dem Ubel. Amen.	Sondern erlöse uns von dem Uebel.
	Denn dein ist das Reich und die Kraft und die Herrlichkeit in Ewigkeit. Amen.

The Oath of Lewis to Carolus Calons in the Treaty of Verdun, 842.

1. Pro deo amur et pro Christian poble et nostro commun salvament, d'ist di en avant, in quant deus savir etpodir me dunat, si salvarai eo cist meon fradre *Karlo* et in adiudha et in cadhuna cosa si cum om per dreit son fradra salvar dist, in o quid il mi altresi fazet, et ab *Ludher* nul plaid nunquam prindrai, qui, meon vol, cist meon fadre *Karle* in damno sit.

2. Si Lodhuvigs sagrament, que son fradre *Karlo* jurat, conservat et *Karlus* meos sendra de suo part non los tanit, si io returnar non l'int pois, ne io ne neuls, cui eo returnar int pois, in nulla adiudha contra *Lodhwig* nun li iv er.

The Song in honour of St. Eulalia, 9th Century.

Buona pulcella fut *Eulalia* ; bel auret corps, bellezour anima. Voldrent la veintre li deo inimi, —Voldrent la faire diaule servir. —Elle non eskoltet les mals conseillers, —qu'elle deo raneiet, chi maent aus en ciel, —Ne por or, ned argent, ne paramenz, por manatce, regiel ne preicment. —Niule cose non la pouret omqi pleier, —la polle sempre non amast lo deo menestier. —E poro fut presentede *Maximien*, —chirex eret a cels dis soure pagiens. —Il li enortet, dont lei nonqi chieft, —qued elle fuet lo nom christien. —Eil'ent adunet lo suon element —melz sost endreiet les empedements, —qu'elle perdeye sa virginitet : —poros furet morte a grand honestet. —Enz enl fou lo getterent, com arde tost, —elle colpes non auret, poro nos coist. —Aezo nos voldret concredeir li rex pagiens ; —ad une spede li roveret tolr lo chief. —La domnizelle celle kose non contredist, —vott lo seule lazsier, si vuoret *Krist*. —In figure de colomb volat a ciel. —Tuit oram, que por nos degnet preier, —qued auuisset de nos *Christus* merit —post la mort et a lui nos laist venir —par sonne clementia.

VERBAL TRANSLATIONS

1. Pour de Dieu l'amour et pour du chrétien peuple et le notre commun salut, de ce jour en avant, en quant que Dieu savoir et pouvoir me donne, assurément sauverai moi ce mon frère *Charles* et en aide et en chacune chose ainsi comme homme par droit son frère sauver doit, en cela que lui à moi pareillement fera, et avec *Lothaire* nul traité ne onques prendrai, qui à moi vouloir, à ce mien frère *Charles* en dommage soit.

2. Si *Louis* le serment, qu'à son frère *Charles* il jure, conserve, et *Charles* mon seigneur, de sa part ne le maintient, si je détourner ne l'en puis, ni moi ni nul, que je détourner en puis, en nulle aide contre *Louis* ne lui y serai.

Bonne pucelle fut *Eulalia*, bel elle avait le corps, plus belle l'âme. Volaient la tenter de Dieu les ennemis, voulaient la faire (au) diable servir. Elle n'écoutait (pas) les mauvais conseillers, qu'elle à Dieu reniait, qui demeure audessus en ciel, ni pour or, ni argent, ni ornements, ni pour menace, bonne parole, ni pour prière. Nulle chose ne la pouvait jamais plier, la vierge toujours n'aimait à abandonner Dieu. —Et après fut présentée à *Maximian*, qui était roi à ces jours sur (les) payens. Il l'exhorta —dès qu'elle ne lui cacha rien —qu'elle fuyât le nom chrétien. Elle prit (aunat) plutôt son heaume (casque), —(afin que) mieux soustriedrait les assauts, qu'elle perdit sa virginité ; (elle) comptait pour moins la mort que grand honnêteté. Dedans en le feu la jetèrent —comme sitôt il brûle ! —elle n'avait de reproches, guère de plainte. Facilement ne la voulait lui abandonner le roi payen ; avec une épée lui ordonna enlever la tête. La demoiselle à cette chose ne contredit, (elle) voulait le siècle laisser (quitter), si demanderait *Christ*. En figure de colombe volait au ciel. Tous priens, qu' (elle) pour nous daigne prier, que *Jésus-Christ* aie merci de nous après la mort, et à soi nous laisse venir, par sa clémence.

* The first three pieces are printed according to Diez, *Altrömische Sprachdenke*.

The Provens Fragment on Boethius, about 1000.

Nos jove omne, quandius que nos estam,
—de gran follia per folledat parllam,—Quar
no nos membra, per cui viuri esperam,—
qui nos soste, tan quan per terra annam,—
È qui nos pais, que no murem de fam,—per
cui salv esm, esper, pur tan quell clamam.
—Nos jove omne menam ta mal jovent—
que us non o preza, sis trada son parent ;
—Senior ni par, sill mena malament,—ni
l'us vell aitre, sis fai fals sacrament ;—
Quant o (a) fait, mica no s'en repent,—et
ni vers deu non fai emendament.—Pro non
es gaigre, si penedenza n' pren,—dis, que
l'a bressa, mica non qua la te :—que eps
lor forfarz e sempre fai epsamen,—laisan
deu lo grant omnipotent,—k'il mort et vius
tot a in jutjamen :—eps li satan son en so
mandamen :—ses deu licencia ja non faran
torment.—Enfants en dies foren ome fello,
mal ome foren, a ora sunt peior.—Vold i
Boecio metre quastiazio :—Ouvent la
gent fasia en so sermo,—creessen deu,
qui sosten passio,—per lui aurien trastut
redemcio.—Mas molt s'en penet, quar non i
mes foiso,—anz per eveila lo mesdren e
preiso.

IN MODERN FRENCH.

Nous jeunes hommes, si longtemps que
nous sommes, de grand folie par erreur par-
lons, parce que ne nous souvient, par qui
vivre espérons, qui nous soutient, tant que
par terre allons, et qui nous paît, afin que
ne mourions de faim ; par qui je suis sauvé,
j'espère, en tant que l'invoquons. Nous
jeunes hommes menons si mal jeunesse, que
un ne cela prise, s'il trahit son parent,
seigneur, et pair, s'il le mène méchamment,
et l'un voile l'autre, s'il fait faux serment ;
quant cela fait, mica ne s'en repent, et ni
vers dieu non fait amendement. Profit
n'est guères, si pénitence en prend, dit qu'il
l'a prise, mie jamais la tient ; vû que même
à l'heure forfait, et toujours fait de même,
laissant Dieu le grand tout-puissant, qui les
morts et vivants tout a en jugement : même
les satans sont en son mandement ; sans de
dieu licence jamais ne feront torment.—En-
fants, jadis furent hommes félons ; mauvais
hommes furent, à l'heure sont pires.—Voulut
y Boece mettre correction ; Oyant le peuple
faisait en son discours, qu'ils crussent dieu
qui souffrit passion, que par lui auraient
trestous redemption. Mais beaucoup s'en
peîna, car n'y mit foison ; mais par envie le
mirent en prison.

*From Wace's Rou, about 1100 : publié par Pluquet,
Rouen, 1827, p. 877.*

Al Duc vint un hom de Bealveia,—ki dui
culteals, k'il aveit feis,—mult buns et beals,
li présenta,—et li cent livres li dona.—Li
hom se tint à bien guagé,—a l'ostel vint,
mult s'en fist lié.—Devant sei numbrat sez
deniers,—quant un mes vint o dui destriers,
—de par li Duc li ad dunez,—ne sai ki li
ont présentez. Cil ki ont li deniers eus—
e li dui chevaux recéus,—sur l'un munta è
l'autre prist,—e à la veie tost se mist ;—
tart li est ke esluigné feust,—k'alcune
rien ne lui néust.—A grand joie è tost s'en
alout—o li dous chevaux k'il menout.—
Itant ont li Quens un présent—d'une cupe
chiere d'argent ;—dez k'il en sa main la tint :
—véez, dist-il, ço ke devint—cil ki li
cutiax m'aporta.—Asquanz li dirent : luing
est ja :—Pur kei, dist-il, si tost s'en vait ?
—Ceo pese mei, poi li ai fait ;—S'en poi
od mei plus demurast,—manant è riche
s'en alast.—Tel custume li Duc aveit,—sa
gent tute bien le savait ; quant hom present
li aportout,—cil à home tost [le] donout.
Jà puiz li jour present ne eust, se ço chose
à mengier ne feust, ke cil ne l'eust mainte-
nant, ki l'autre aveit eu devant.

Au Duc vint un homme de Beauvais, qui
deux couteaux qu'il avait fait, très bons et
beaux, lui présenta ; et li cent livres lui
donna. L'homme se tint bien engagé, à
l'hôtel vint, s'en fit très gai. Devant soi
(il) comptait ses deniers, quand un messager
vint avec deux chevaux de bataille, de côté
du Duc lui donnés de plus, ne savait qui les
lui avait présentés. Celui qui avait reçu
les deniers, et les deux chevaux reçu (ainsi)
sur l'un prix l'autre prit, et aussitôt se mit
en chemin. Il ne lui arriva point qu'il se
fût arrêté, (afin) qu'aucun ne lui nuisît rien.
A grande joie aussitôt il s'en alloit avec les
deux chevaux, qu'il menait.—En ce moment
le Comte avait un présent d'une coupe chère
d'argent. Dès qu'il en sa main la tint :
Voyez, dit-il, ce qui devint (de) celui qui les
couteaux m'apporta. Quelques-uns lui
dirent : Loin (il) est déjà : Pourquoi, dit-il,
si tôt s'en va ? Ce me pèse ; peu lui ai-je
fait ; s'il eût demeuré plus ou un peu de plus
possédant et riche s'en allait.—Tel contume
le Duc avait, ses gens tous bien le savaient.
Quand homme présent lui apportait, celui
à (l') homme aussitôt donnait (quelque
chose). Or, jusqu'au jour présent il n'y eut,
si ce ne fut chose à manger, que celui ne l'eût
maintenant, qu'un autre ne l'eût eu aupara-
vant.

FRENCH FROM 1150 TO

<i>Latin (St. Hieron.).</i>	<i>12th Century, Adelung, II. 590.</i>	<i>13th Century, par Desmonlains, from Cod. Bodl. nr. 212.</i>	<i>14th Century, Cod. Bodl. nr. 971.</i>
Pater noster, qui es in coelis, sanctificetur nomen tuum, veniat regnum tuum, fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra : panem nostrum super- substantialem (<i>al.</i> quotidianum) da no- bis hodie, et dimitte nobis de- bita nostra sicut et nos dimittimus de- bitoribus nostris, et ne inducas nos in temptationem, sed libera nos a malo.	Sire Pere, qui es ès ciaux, sanctifier soit li tuens nons, avigne li tuens regnes, soit faite ta volante, si comme ele est faite el ciel, si soit elle faite en terre : nostre pain de chascun jor nos done hui, et pardone nos nos meffais, si come nos pardonnons à cos qui meffait nos ont. Sire, no soffre que nos soions tempte par mauvaise tempta- cion, mes, Sire, delivre nos de mal.	Nostre Pere, qui es el ciel, ton non soit saintefie, ton regne vienge, ta volente soit faite en terre, comme elle est el ciel : Sire, donne nous hui nostre pain de chas- cun jour, et nous pardonne nos pechiez, comme nous pardonnons a ceus qui nous meffont, et ne nos maine mie en temptation, ce est a dire, ne sueffre mie que nous soiens mene en temptation, mais deliure nous de mal. Amen.	Nostre Pere, qui es ou ciel, ton nom soit sainti- fiez, ton Regne aviengne, ta volente soit faite en terre, si comme elle est ou ciel : Sire, donnes nous huy nostre pain de chas- cun jour, et nous pardonnons nos pechiez, si comme nous pardonnons a ceux qui nous mef- font, et ne nous maines mie en temptation, c'est a dire, ne sueffres mie que nous soions temptes, mais deliure nous du mal. Amen.

1850, COMPARED WITH THE LATIN.

<i>Manuscript of the British Museum. 1515.</i>	<i>Calvin's Translation. 1564.</i>	<i>Modern.</i>
Nostre Pere, qui est es cieulx,	Nostre Pere, qui es és cieulx,	Notre Pere, qui es au ciel,
ton nom soit saintifie,	ton Nom soit sanctifié,	ton nom soit sanctifié,
ton regne nous adviengne,	ton regne vienne,	ton règne vienne,
ta volente soit faicte en terre, si comme elle est au ciel :	ta volonté soit faite en la terre, comme au ciel.	ta volonté soit faite sur la terre, comme au ciel.
Sire, donne nous nostre pain de chascun jour,	Donne-nous aujour d'huy nostre pain quotidien.	Donne-nous aujourd'hui no- tre pain quotidien,
et nous pardonne nos pechez, ainsi comme nous pardon- nons a ceulx qui nous mef- font,	Et nous remets nos dettes, comme aussi nous les re- mettons à nos detteurs.	et pardonne-nous nos of- fenses, comme nous les par- donnons à ceux qui nous ont offensés,
et ne nous meine mye en temptacion, cest a dire, ne souffres mye que nous soy- ons temptez,	Et ne nous induy point en tentation,	et ne nous induis point en tentation,
mais delivre nous de mal. Amen.	mais delivre-nous du malin. Amen.	mais delivre nous du mal. Amen.

ITALIAN, PIEMONTESE, PROVENÇAL*,

<i>Old Italian, 1471.</i>	<i>Modern Italian, Bible, 1787.</i>	<i>Waldensic, about 1100.</i>	<i>Provençal d'Aïre.</i>
Patre nostro, el qual sei in cielo, sia sanctificato il nome tuo ; venga il tuo regno, sia fatta la volontà tua come in cielo et in terra :	Padre nostro, che sei ne' cieli, sia sanctificato il tuo nome ; il tuo regno venga ; la tua volontà sia fatta in terra, come in cielo :	O tu lo nostre payre lo cal sies en li cel, lo tio nom sia sanc- tifica, lo tio regno venga, la toa volunta sia fay- ta en ayma illi és fayta al cel, sia fayta en la terra :	Nouestre Paire, que sias au ciel, que vouestre noum siegue sanctificat, que vouestre regne arriba, que vouestre vouloun- ta sie facha sur la terre, coume au ciel :
a noi da hogi il pane nostro substancial ; et perdonace li nostri debiti, come etiam noi perdoniamo a i debitori nostri, et non ce inducere ne la temptatione, ma liberace dal mal.	dacci oggi il nostro pane quotidiano, e rimettici i nostri de- biti, come noi ancora li rimettiamo a' nos- tri debitori, e non c' indurre in tentatione, ma liberaci dal male.	dona nos la nostre pan quotidian en choy, pardonna a nos li nos- tre debit ô pecca, co- ma nos perdonnen ali nostre debytor ô of- dadors, non nos amenar en tentacion, ma dealivra nos del mal Amen.	douna nou nouestre pen quoutidien, pardouna nous nou- estreis offenses, coume perdounon en a que- leis que nous en of- fensa, non laissé pas suc- cumba a la tenta- cion. maï delivra nou dau mau.

* The first four texts are

SPANISH, AND PORTUGUESE.

<i>Spanish Bible, Madrid, 1833.</i>	<i>Portuguese. Jo. Ferreira d'Almeida, 1819.</i>	<i>Rumanic of the Grisons, Bible, Chur, 1718. (Adelung.)</i>
Padre nuestro, qui estàs en los cielos, sanctificato sea el tu nombre, vengo el tu reyno ; hágase tu voluntad como en el cielo, así tambien en la terra : el pan nuestro de cada día dānos le hoy, y perdónanos nuestras deu- das, así como nosotros per- donamos a nuestros deu- doras, y no nos dejes caer en la tentacion, ma libranos de mal, Amen.	Pae nosso, que estas nos ceos, sanctificado seja o teu nome. venha a teu Reyno, seja feita a tua vontade assi na terra como no ceo : o paô nosso de cadadia nos da hoje, e perdoa nos nossas dividas, assi como nos perdoamos a nos nossos devedores. e não nos metas em tentação, ma livra nos do mal. Amen.	Bab noss, ilg qual eis enten tachel. soing vengig faig tieu num, tieu raginavel vengig nou tierra, tia velgia daventig seo enten tachel, aschi er sin terra : niess paun da minchiagi dai a nus oz, a nus pardunne noss puccana seo nus pardunein à noss culponta, a nus manar buc en prova- ment, mo nus spindre d' ilg mal.

APPENDIX

TO THE

HISTORY OF THE LATEST LATIN AND THE EARLIEST
ITALIAN IDIOMS.

MURATORI has given, in his classical dissertation on the origin of the Italian language, interesting documents to show the gradual decomposition of the Latin language after the invasion of the Teutonic nations and the downfall of the Western Empire.* I add a document, since discovered and published by Pertz in the third volume of the *Monumenta Germanica*, of the year 1000, which may be considered as the most striking proof of the learned barbarism of that age in Italy.

The origin of the Italian language is undoubtedly as old as the fifth century, when the barbarians were settled in that country. Its progress is parallel with the deterioration of the language of the learned. We find already an Italian phrase in a document of the end of the eighth century†; but as to a whole document of undoubted authenticity, the oldest Muratori gives in the vulgar tongue is a privilege of King Baraso in Sardinia, about the year 1182.‡ There is already some sprinkling of Italian in another Sardinian document of 1153.§ Such Italianisms in the midst of bad Latin show that the notaries, where their learning failed, employed the vulgar idiom spoken in common life.

* *Antiquitates Italicæ Medii Ævi*, tom. ii.^{4^{ta}} p. 1026. *Charta Rexolfi Presbyteri*, anno 765, "regnante Domino nostro Desiderio et Adelchis Regibus." Others of 768 and 777, pp. 1027—1030. In the last there appears already the Italian by the side of bad Latin. A witness who could only make the sign of the cross is thus designated: "Signum manna Garibaldi filio quondam Placito da Porta Argenta testis."

† See preceding note.

‡ P. 1059.

§ P. 1084.

THE LATIN OF THE MONK OF SORACTE ABOUT 1000.

Benedicti Chronicon Pertz Script. III. 698.

TEMPORE illo de quo diximus, Theodoricus, rex Gothorum, Symmachum confectis ac patriciis Ravenna trucidavit. Abebat autem Symmachis filia una tantummodo, nomine Galla, intra adolescentie tempore marito tradita; in unius anni spatio ejus est morte viduata. Qui dum fervente mundi copia ad iterandum thalamum, et opes et ætas vocaret, eligit magis spiritalibus nuptiis copulari Deo, in quibus a luctus incipitur, sed ad gaudia æterna pervenitur. Hic itaque omnes res suas quas patrimonium et matrimonium hac maritis suis, cunctaque sacrarum ecclesiarum, ædificare precepit. Abebat autem agrem cum montem qui vocatur campana, territorio Colinense est posita; nam uno latere fines Cusiano, da secundo latere ribos cum aqua qui dicitur Cava, qui incole locis vocitantur Carba. Nam de tertio latere rivos Grifianello vocatur. De quarto vero fluvium magnum, de qua a fundamento juxta aqua parietinis edificare jussit. Super cunc macerie murorum construxit ecclesiam in onore sancti Andree apostoli juxta ipso flumen. Et juxta ipsa ecclesia portus qui vocatur Bonus.

Nam in agro Pontianello construxit ecclesia in onore sancti Laurentii martyris et levite. Qui dum agrum cum monte de Campana cum ejus affinibus in monasterium sancti Silvestri, qui dicitur montem Serapti (Soracte), per instrumentum cartarum constituit. Edificavit autem ecclesia sancti Johannis Babbiste juxta qui dicitur Taréga, terretorio Nepesino, cum omnia sua rebus proprietatis in ecclesiis sancte Dei genitricis semperque virginis Marie, Domine nostre, episcopatum Nepesine civitatis.

Pag. 712.

Mortuo idem Lothario successit in regno Karolus, filius ejus, pro eo non multum tempus. Orta est persecutio Romani inter se; exierunt viri scelerati et legatos miserunt a rex Babylonie, ut venirent et possidere regnum Italie. Tanta denique Aggareni in Italia ingressi a Centucellensis portus, sic impleverunt faciem terre, sicut locuste velut segetem in campo.

SECOND CHAPTER.

ANCIENT AND MODERN ENGLISH, OR THE EFFECT OF MIXTURE IN
LANGUAGE.

WE should seem therefore to be authorized in drawing from the phenomena observed both in the Romanic and Germanic, and in all modern languages the origin of which we are acquainted with, the following three conclusions :

I. Language is changed by the very action of the national mind upon it, involving a process of filing down of roots, forms, and inflexions, and producing new derivative or compound words. There takes place through this same agency an unceasing advance of words and expressions from a substantial to a formal sense, or from the natural to the metaphorical, from the physical to the intellectual, from the concrete to the abstract, from the lexical to the grammatical.

II. An alphabet and literature fix a tongue as it were by a process of instantaneous crystallization of the floating elements of the national consciousness of language ; but they do not prevent the change of the spoken dialect. Languages artificially preserved in a fixed state (e. g. by religious institutions) become obsolete and dead : for instance the Hebrew, the Zend, the Sanskrit, the Old Egyptian and Abyssinian. A new popular language is created gradually by an undercurrent ; and national events make it a written national language.

III. The formation of a new language always implies the decay of another. Such new formations must be both hastened and greatly influenced by the violent intrusion of a foreign element. This element cannot substitute a new grammar, unless it abolishes the language (as the Anglo-Saxon did the Kymric); but it may produce a *mixed language*, the grammar of which is from a native, the words, for the most part, from a foreign stem. The change, in the natural course, is an organic development; the broken and mixed idiom shows a less organic structure. The natural feeling and understanding of words as significative becomes as it were dimmer, because the roots often disappear, whereas derivations remain, and foreign words are introduced having merely a conventional signification. On the other hand, whenever the organic movement of the language has been interrupted by an extraneous element and great national catastrophes, the native elements in the mixed language will often retain the ancient form, whereas the native stock, left to its own natural development, will use up and lose it.

Of this phenomenon the Germanic languages offer the most remarkable instance in the origin and development of the English tongue. By the Conquest the language of the Anglo-Saxon people was driven from the palace, the legislature, and the tribunals. Gradually, however, the conquering Norman minority adopted the language of the country; the Normans could not overthrow the Saxon foundation of England's idiom, as the Saxons had done that of the Celto-British. Out of the struggle of the two idioms arose a mixed language like the modern Persian; but there is in the English a more organic intermixture of the two elements than in the Persian, because the two constituent parts were not so different from each other in origin and formation as Arabic and Persian, or Semitic and Iranian. The Persian forms a new verb by placing *kerden* (to do), or a similar Persian verb, after an Arabic word. In

English we have purely hybrid words by the blending of English roots and Romanic formative syllables, such as *unspeakable*, *starvation*, and the obsolete English word, still found in the seventeenth century, and preserved by the Americans, to *happify*. But such formations constitute the very extreme limit of formative power; and they appear even, on the whole, as anomalies. The inverse formation of English words out of Latin roots and Germanic affirmatives is much more extensive, such as *common-er*, *common-est*; and this is a consequence of the principle that the formative grammatical element works itself into new though not altogether congenial matter, not the intruding lexicographic element into the grammatical. The old Saxon form is thus much more easily adapted to French and Latin verbs or nouns than a formative syllable of the French or Latin idiom combined with the Saxon root. New prepositions and conjunctions have been formed, none of which are *Latin*, all are German (as "*by way of*") or hybrid (as "*on account of*"). As in the Romanic, they are compounded in order to replace the worn out, simple Saxon particles. These became obsolete because they had become isolated and inexpressive. But the power of forming compound nouns and verbs inherent in all Teutonic languages is almost entirely paralyzed; and the organic forms of inflexion remain only in isolated fragments.

THE LORD'S PRAYER IN ENGLISH.

<i>In the Anglo-Saxon of King Alfred's time.</i>	<i>In a version of the Evan- gels, about 1160.</i>	<i>In the English of Wiclif (1380).</i>	<i>In the authorized version (of 1600).</i>
Fäder ure, þu þe eart on heofenum.	Ure fäder, þu þe on heofene eart.	Our fadir, that art in hevenys.	Our father, which art in heaven.
Si þin nama gehal- god.	Sy thin name geha- leged.	Halewid be thi name.	Hallowed be thy Name.
To becume þin rice.	To cume þin rice.	Thi kyngdom come to.	Thy kingdom come.
Gewurpe þin villa on eorðan swa swa on heofnum.	Geworde þin ville on heofene and on eorðe.	Be thi wil done in erthe as in hevene.	Thy will be done in earth, As it is in heaven.
Urne gedāghumlican hlaf syle us to dæg.	Syle us to daig urne daighumliche hlaf.	Give to us this day oure breed ovir othir substaunce.	Give us this day our daily bread.
And forgyt us ure gyltas, swa swa we for- gytfað urum gylten- dum.	And forgyf us ure gettes swa swe for- gyfath aelcen þare þe wiþ us agylteð.	And forgive to us our dettis, as we forgiven to oure dettouris.	And forgive us our trespasses, as we for- give them that tres- pass against us.
And ne gelaedde þu us on cofnung.	And ne laed þu us on cofnunge.	And lede us not into temptacioun.	And lead us not into temptation.
Ac alyse us of yfle.	Ac alys fram yfele.	But delyvere us from yvel. Amen.	But deliver us from evil. Amen.

THIRD CHAPTER.

THE ICELANDIC AND THE MODERN SCANDINAVIAN, OR THE EFFECT
OF COLONIZATION.

THERE is one agency which requires special consideration—the effect of emigration; for most of the languages owe their origin to the colonization of a foreign country by emigrated tribes.

It follows, from the general principle, that *colonization* may produce such a crisis as we have assumed and found to be necessary for the formation of a new language. But here a more accurate distinction must be drawn. A part of the nation, settling, in a more or less organized state, with more or less intellectual means and resources, in a foreign country, isolated from the mother country, will necessarily in process of time differ in language from the native stock. It is evident that the formation of the colonial language has a new fixed point in the new conditions of life under which those are placed who have immigrated and may therefore follow a very different course from that of the mother country. Peaceable and intelligent colonists, settled in a new country under prosperous circumstances, will preserve the ancient idiom with great pertinacity. The act of separation works as an artificial interruption of the flow of language, while the inhabitants of the mother country become subject perhaps to violent changes introduced by foreign elements, or move on in the natural course of development, as the Frank language did in Germany from Otfried to Goethe.

Of this class we have a most instructive instance within the domain of the German language, in the Icelandic, which is the old Norse tongue, transplanted into that northern island by the emigration of many noble families, unable longer to endure the

tyranny of King Harold Harfagr (Fairhair). That event took place in the year 875. Since that period, therefore, during the lapse of almost a thousand years, the intellectuality of the Teutonic stock, and the energy of the Norman race, have maintained, in the midst of snow and ice, the sacred fire of the Muses. The most ancient document of Icelandic literature is still heathenish: I mean the poetical *Edda*, or the songs of Odin, and Helge, and Sigurd, and of all the gods and heroes of our common forefathers. The clearest proof that the language of these songs represents simply the old Norse is, that the law-book of 1123 exhibits already a decidedly impoverished system of inflexions, whereas in the *Edda* we find that richness and completeness of forms which places the old Icelandic on the same level with the Gothic of the fourth century. Again, if we compare that work with the remarkable historical compositions of the historian Snorro Sturleson, of the thirteenth century, and with the writings of the last centuries, we find in rapid progress the gradual extinction above referred to of the grammatical forms of the language. Still, if from the Icelandic of this day we look back to its native country, we find among the descendants of the same stock two modern idioms formed out of the old Norse, the Swedish and Danish, neither intelligible to the other without some practice, and each as unintelligible to the Icelandier, as his tongue, and still more his *Edda*, is, and has been for the last four hundred years at least, to the Dane and Swede; whereas the Icelandier of 1840 can understand with a little practice his Norse of more than a thousand years ago. Thus their evulsion from the stem, and their subsequent isolation, preserved among the isolated Icelanders the ancient heirloom of their fathers so long and so successfully, that the colonial language and that of the mother country became for ever distinct, the first being even now scarcely anything but the language of Scandinavia, suddenly fixed in the ninth century, and since that time shorn only of some of its luxuriant forms. We have already observed that every new language is pro-

duced by what we have called the secondary formation. Such a secondary formation is scarcely traceable in Icelandic, while it is much more visible in the Swedish and Danish. In the new Icelandic we can only quote the formations of new abstract words; all other differences consist simply in the loss of ancient forms. As to the old Icelandic, a comparison with the Gothic and some isolated formations of a very primitive nature show that the new formation by which the Scandinavian branch obtained a distinct character, was equally marked as well by loss of forms as by the prominent working out of elements which in the old united stock were less developed, but stood there by the side of collateral forms dropped in the Scandinavian. The old Norse article *hinn*, *hinna*, *hit*, has been supplanted by the new Scandinavian article, and has transformed itself into a suffix appended to the noun. It has lost consequently its whole declension, and of the three genders of the ancient article two have survived in that suffix; one common for masculine and feminine, and one for the neuter gender.

The Dutch itself, which is nothing but a scion of the great Saxon or Low German dialect, individualized and fixed by the national separation and independence, has changed less than that dialect has done in the mother country. Lastly, the same thing occurs in the Anglo-Saxon. The idiom of the Anglo-Saxon remains of the ninth century is decidedly impoverished in forms and inflexions, when compared with the anterior state of the language, represented by the Gothic of Ulphilas, which must be considered as collateral with that which the Saxons, Hengist and Horsa, brought with them from Germany. But it is no less decidedly nearer to that preceding period than the documents of the Saxon dialect in German justify us in supposing this to have been at the same period. Finally, according to good authorities, the English of the sixteenth century has become fixed in some English colonies of that time in words and pronunciation; and in like manner the French in Canada use the language and orthography of Louis XIV. Before three

centuries elapse, a new instance will be supplied by the difference between the English of America and that of Europe. To the critical observer this difference is already strongly marked, both by the retention of the forms and pronunciations of the seventeenth century, and by new Americanisms in formation and signification. The American is in phraseology more open to European influences than the insular English of the mother country.

We have therefore undoubted instances of the fact, that a colonial transplantation of a language may, by putting a stop to the continuous flow of its development, preserve the ancient form of speech more fully than in the mother country. But all the cases which we can quote of this description, are taken from the same family of languages, one which, in its most ancient form, presents itself in a state of complete development, as compared with others. In the second place all those secondary formations were the work of rising nations. In those processes a considerable decomposition of the old element necessarily preceded the new formation; but there was also a new impulse, a growing life.

A widely different effect must of course be produced upon the language of a colony, if the emigrant or expelled population sinks from a relatively superior and growing intellectual and physical station to a lower. The new society may then gradually fall into a very different state of existence, either through the inclemency of the climate, extreme cold or extreme heat, or from other, perhaps concomitant, unfavourable circumstances, such as the persecution and enmity of more powerful tribes. Now every lasting contraction of the mind must produce a corresponding reduction of the means of expression. Thus the present Laplanders, a Finnic population, having been driven by the Swedes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries out of their native land, and pushed more and more towards the polar regions, possess a language greatly impoverished and disorganized,

as compared with their Finnic brethren in Finland. There seems to have been no positive secondary formation among the Laplanders: they have lost many forms and words; but, on the other hand, they have also preserved with colonial tenacity, and as it were pious anxiety, many ancient forms (such as the dual of the pronouns), which have been lost by the Finlanders. Swedish words have been introduced by Christianity, evidently because the native expressions had become obsolete; for the Finns express the same ideas by native words. When we consider what would have become of the Laplanders, if Christianity had not sustained them, and if the translation of the Bible had not fixed and preserved their language, we shall not be very much surprised by the fact, that the idiom of the degraded Bushmen (whom Linnæus identified with the Orang-utang), cruelly hunted down by Hottentots and Kafres, can be traced to a corrupt Hottentot language, and that the Hottentot language itself is only a degraded dialect of the noble language of Sechuána and other branches of the Kafre tribes, the oppressors of the Hottentots.

We must therefore distinguish the phenomena of rising and sinking languages. Lastly, we must acknowledge the possibility of a new formation, as the consequence of emigration. A language in a state of incipient development, if transplanted by emigration, that great agent in forming nations and languages, perhaps races, by a totally new scene of existence, may shoot out into a luxuriant new formation, which in process of time may almost entirely overgrow the primary one and destroy all vestiges of the ancient roots. It will then require a very complete knowledge of the new idioms, and of the history of their development, to discover the primitive roots of the ancient stock. A new method may perhaps be found of supplying this want by the evidence of analogy of structure. At the present stage of our inquiry we can only establish such a possibility, but not define the condition and nature of such formations, and the method of analysis which they require.

THE LORD'S PRAYER IN SCANDINAVIAN.

<i>In the Language of the Edda. (Composed by Dr. Aufrecht, Oxford.)</i>	<i>In the Icelandic Bible. (1747—1813.)</i>	<i>In the Swedish Bible. (Modern, 1828.)</i>	<i>In the Danish Bible. (Modern, 1806.)</i>
Faðir várr, þú er ert í himnum, Helgisk þilt nafn. Komi þilt ríki. Görisk þinn vilja sva á jörðu sem é himni. Gef oss í dag vórt dagliga klaf. Ok forlát mein vár, sva sem ok ver for- látum þeim oss mein göröndum. Ok leigattu oss í fristni. Helldr leystu oss frá illu. þvíat þilt er ríki, ok mátt, ok hróðr, um aldir alda. Amen.	Fader vor, þú sem ert á himnum. Helgest þilt nafn. Jilkome þilt ríke. Verde þinn vile so á jordu sem á himne. Gef þu oss í dag vort daglest broad. Og fyrergef oss vorar skulder, sosem ver fyrergefum vorum skulldunantum. Og innleid oss eige í fristne. Helldur frelsa þú oss fra illu. þvíad þilt er ríked, og maattur, og dyrd, um allder allda. Amen.	Fader vår, som äst i himlom, Helgadt warde tilt namn. Jilkomme titt ríke. Ske tin wilje såsom i himmelen så oik på jorden. Gif oss i dag vårt dageliga bröd. Och forlåt oss våra skulder, såsom och wi förlåte them oss skyldige äro. Och inled oss üke i frestelse. Utan fräls oss ifrån ondo. Jy riket är tllit, och machten, och här- ligheten, í ewig het. Amen.	Vor Fader, du som er i himlene, Helliget vorde dit navn. Komme dit rige. Skee din villie, some er i himmelen saa og paa jorden. Giv os i dag vort dag- lige bröd. Og forlad os vorskyld saa som wi og for- lade vore skyldener. Og leed os ikke ind i fristelse. Men frie os fra de onde. Thi dit er Riget, og kraften, og herlighe- den, i evighed. Amen.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

THE EGYPTIAN AND THE PRIMITIVE ASIATIC SEMITISM, OR COLONIZATION
AND SECONDARY FORMATION IN A VERY EARLY STAGE OF LANGUAGE.

THE Egyptian language brings us some steps nearer to the solution of the general problem, and in particular for understanding the nature of what we have termed secondary formation. Egypt is connected with the undivided Asiatic stock ; for its language is much less developed than the Aramaic and Sanskritic, and yet it admits the principle of those inflexions and radical formations, which we find developed, sometimes in one, sometimes in the other of those great families, and particularly in the Semitic. As both of them in their historical form are much more advanced than the Egyptian, this language, if the principle of colonization be admitted, will point to a more ancient Asiatic formation, since extinct in its native country, just as the Icelandic points to the old Norse of Scandinavia.

The Egyptian language is also interesting as illustrative generally of another phenomenon, which we have traced through more modern formations ; I mean the nature of the secondary formation. In order to obtain a clear view of this formation, as exhibited by the Coptic, we must first consider the words taken from the Greek. As to this admixture, we meet with an entirely new phenomenon : the Coptic has not only adopted single nouns and verbs, living roots, but also particles, especially conjunctions, in the proper sense, such as the Greek *ἀλλὰ*, *but*. This forms no exception to the rule above deduced from that striking phenomenon in the Romanic and Germanic languages, that foreign particles are as little apt to expel native

particles as in general foreign grammatical forms to supplant the native; for the Egyptian language never possessed discriminating particles. In translating, therefore, from the Greek, the Copts were obliged to adopt the Greek conjunctions, for the same reason as they adopted the word *Λαός*, *nation*; for, owing to provincialism, Pharaohs, and priests, the idea of a nation had never been developed even into a word current among the Egyptian race, and capable of expressing that notion as the Bible and the Hellenes understood it.

The other secondary formations are also in entire conformity with those by which the modern tongues of Southern Europe, as well as those of Germany and Scandinavia, were produced. We have noticed already some of these phenomena in the first volume of "Egypt"—such as the change of the appended feminine sign of the old Egyptian *t* (the remnant of *ta*, the original pronoun of the second person, preserved in *an-ta*, thou) into a female article *t* or *ti*, e. g. *t-mu*, the mother, instead of *mu-t*. To this class belong also the formations of the definite and indefinite articles in Coptic. The first (*pi* or *pe*, masc.; *ti* or *te*, fem.; *ni*, *n*, *nen*, pl.) is an evident remnant of the pronominal formations, exactly as the Greek article and the masculine and feminine termination in the two first declensions are. The indefinite article (*u*) in the singular is, like the German and Romanic, an abbreviation of the numeral for *one* (*ua*); the plural (*han*) has its full substantive root in ancient Egyptian. The plural of a noun substantive has a termination only by exception; but, instead of the *u* of the ancient language, we find different decompositions of this long vowel, together with other forms, not discernible at all in the ancient language. One of them is the frequent in the Semitic, and analogous to the German Umlaut prolongation of the vowel of the root; an internal formation, so in *Väter*, the plural of *Vater*. Thus *uhor* means a dog; *uhór*, dogs; *aho*, a treasure; *ahúór*, treasures; *bók*, a servant; *ebiaik*, servants.

A complete pseudo-declension is formed by prepositions connected with pronominal roots, thus :

Nom.	<i>îdje</i> , or <i>m</i> or <i>n</i> .		
Gen.	<i>ñte</i>	„	„
Dat.	„	„	„
Acc.	„	„	„
Abl.	„	„	„

By a similar mechanical process the deficiency of forms for the comparative and superlative degree is supplied in the ancient Egyptian, and the derivative pronouns formed. The most striking change in these formations is the Coptic phrase *p.ek.si*, *ô σοῦ víós* (corresponding to the old Egyptian *pai.k.si*); but the Coptic has lost the simpler ancient form of *si.k*, *víós σου*.

The same principle pervades the Coptic conjugation. It differs from the Egyptian as much in the loss of some very simple ancient modes for indicating the inflexion of the verb, as in the employment of a great number of auxiliary verbs for supplying an evident defect by new formations. These auxiliary verbs combine with the personal pronouns, and thus form a very periphrastic mode of distinguishing moods and tenses. The negative particles do the same; and the Coptic has a complete periphrastic negative conjugation, of which there is not the slightest trace in the old Egyptian. The old language seems to me to preserve the indubitable germs of two much more organic and higher forms. It exhibits a germ, first, of what I venture to call the Semitic conjugation, by which term I designate the modification of the *predicate* contained in each adjective verb, and even of the Iranian conjugation, which is intended to mark the modifications of which the *copula* is capable, according to time and mode of existence. Now the development of those germs in the Coptic is not organic, as we find it in the Iranian and even in Hebrew, but, on the contrary, is effected by a purely mechanical process. The change is no real development. Thus the verb *tre* or *thre*, uniting

itself with the pronominal affixes, makes a verb causative, as the Hebrew Hiphil does.

The ancient Egyptian had incontestably the germs of the composition of words, to express, by the union of two, a third more abstract or ideal notion, for which the language had no simple expression. Such a union originally took place by juxtaposition, afterwards by means of the preposition *n̄*. Coptic formations, like *mû-n̄-hôû*, water of moisture, viz. rain, or *uôm-n̄-het*, to consume the heart, viz. repent, are analogous to the ancient language, but of much more frequent occurrence. In many cases the original simple expressions may have become obsolete by having become unintelligible. There must have been, besides, in progress of time, an increased consciousness of intellectual modes of existence; and this consciousness called forth, necessarily, new formations in the Coptic. But such formations are all conglomerations or agglutinations of words, not compositions. The component parts exercise no influence one over the other; no change is produced in the root by placing before or after it a modifying word or particle; but the ancient Egyptian language does exhibit such an attraction. The Egyptian root is not the unalterable particle, or rather primitive word, of the Chinese, and does not exhibit, in composition, the insensibility of the modern Coptic. *Hûr*, Horus, becomes in composition *hr*, *hër*. Here a decided sensibility of the root is perceptible: it is affected by the substantive which follows it, and with which it is united. This is the same sign of life which a substantive exhibits in the Hebrew *status constructus* when followed by another substantive with which it is connected by what we call the relation of the genitive case: as *iâm*, a lake; *iâm* (or *iôm*) *Kîneret*, the lake of Gennesaret; *shânâh*, a year; *shnâtadonâi*, the year of the Lord. All Coptic abstracts and derivative nouns, on the contrary, are formed by mechanical processes or mere juxtaposition. In order to make out of *skhôpi*, to inhabit, a word for habitation, they were obliged to say, a place to inhabit, *mâ-n̄-skhôpi*

Thus *hap* is judgment, *manhap* a place of judgment, tribunal. In a similar way they formed out of *taio*, honour, *maitaio*, ambitious, literally, loving honour. There is no power manifested by one word over the other, as in *φιλόδοξος*, or *misericos*, or *barmherzig*. There is a mere mechanical agglomeration of two words (sometimes connected by a preposition) having one accent. This is, of course, much less the case in hybrid words; for the Greek nouns used by the Copts have neither case nor number. *Rem* (native), with the preposition 'or *n'*, both prefixed to a simple noun, form derivative adjectives; *pe*, heaven; *rem-pe*, heavenly. *Ref* (probably from *ra*, to make, with the nominal formative *f*), the maker, is used in order to form a verb or substantive denoting him who exercises the function or causes the action expressed by the verb, as *naú*, to see; *refnaú*, an inspector; *ref-múút*, *afferens mortem*, the killer. The intermixture of the article makes such formations still more clumsy, as, in order to express *vision*, they say *sa-pi-naú*, *actio* (τοῦ) *videre*.

Those who understand the principle of the formation of words in the Semitic and Indo-Germanic languages, will perceive at once that the first have some, and the latter an inexhaustible abundance of terminations, variously affecting the root, and indicating all the shades of the different modes of existence and action, which the Coptic expresses very incompletely and clumsily by mere agglomeration. The decomposing principle which we observed in the formation of the new Romanic words, especially the particles, prevails throughout in the Coptic. But it acted differently, because the Latin was a developed, perfect, inflexional language; the ancient Egyptian was, as we shall see, a form of speech only just emerging from the monosyllabic state and the absolute isolation of words.

The intrusion of foreign elements, from the time of Alexander, helped to destroy what there was of organic power in the Egyptian language; but it was not the original cause of that destruction. It was the effect of the slowness of the Egyptian mind,

which had long been mummified, acting upon a material repugnant to development, and stereotyped by colonization, by the hieroglyphic system of writing, and by a complete system of priestcraft, religious tradition, and Pharaonic despotism. This slow action upon an almost impenetrable material produced, for the uses of common life, a secondary formation, the country-tongue, written in the less ideographic, demotic, or enchorial character. This secondary formation is of the same kind as the secondary formation of later languages; in degree it differs less: there is also less of the destruction of forms, because a germ of forms only existed altogether in the Egyptian language.

THE EGYPTIAN LANGUAGE IN A COURSE OF MORE THAN
4500 YEARS.

THE LORD'S PRAYER.*

<i>In the Sacred Language of the most ancient Monuments. (Composed by Lepsius.)</i>	<i>In the Demotic of the time of the Psammetics, 6th Century B.C. (Composed by Dr. Brugsch.)</i>	<i>In the Coptic of the Translation of the Gospel, 2nd. Century, A.D. (From Schwarzé's edition of the Gospels.) Matt. vi. 9.</i>
Atf-ñ ñti ñ p ^e .t. ¹ Pater-noster qui in cœlo,	Pan at ñt ñ na pa.tsu. Noster pater qui in rōis cœlis,	Pepiôt et hen ni phéûi :
Mai - s.ube ² pai - k - r ^e n. sit - sanctificatum τδ σού nomen.	Ran - k ñtaf - uab. Nomen - tum sit - sanctifi- catum.	Maref tûbo ñdje pekran.
Mai - i aut ^e ni. t - 'k Veniat regnum tuum.	Ta - k auta - seten ñtas - i. Tuum regnum veniat.	Mares i ñdje tekmetûro.
(H ^e n) ³ - k mai - au. f h ^e r t ^e Voluntas - tua sit ea super terram,	H ^e n - k ñ. taf - sópi h ^e n ta pa. t. Voluntas - tua fiat in τφ cœlo,	Petchnak maref shôpi în phrêti hen tphe,
Xa ñ p ^e .t. sicut in cœlo.	ñ - s ^e hi - t ^e t - ñ kahi. sicut supra terra.	nem hidjen pi kahi.
Ti. k n ^e n hr ^e - n ⁴ ñ - s ^e f Da nobis cibum hesternum hur p ^e n. diem hunc.	Pan oik ñtak - ti. f. Nostrum panem eum des mani n p ^e hu. hoc in die.	Nenôik ñte rasti mêt nan în phou.
Au X ^e ma - k asf ^e tu - n. ⁵ Et dimitte - tu peccata nos- tra,	Au ñtak - ui ñbol ñpan n ^e bi. Et dimitte circa nostrum peccatum,	Ôoh kha net e ron nan ebol ñ phreti
Xa n ^e n X ^e ma - n asf ^e tu sicut nos dimittimus pec- cata r n ^e n. contrâ nos.	ñ s ^e an - ui ñbol ñ - na teti - u. sicut remittimus nos circa nostros inimicos.	hôu ñtenkhô ebol ñ né ete ñon ñtan e rôu.
Au n ^e n ñ - ñ r [pires- mes ⁶]. Et non duc - nos in temp- tationem.	Al ñtak - tem ni - ten. Et ne ducas nos. ñ - h ^e n [pirasmos]. in temptationem.	Uoh ñper enten e hûn e pirasmos.
N ^e hm - en - an hu. Libera - nos a malo. ⁷	Au n ^e h ^e m t ^e n sed serva nos ñ ta met - ata - t. a τφ malo.	Alla nahmen ebol ha pi pet hôu.

* For the notes to this Table see next page.

NOTES TO PRECEDING TABLE.

- ¹ The upper heaven should properly be *hur*, *pe* being the lower.
- ² *Mure* is the Coptic of *mai* : "tubo" of "aube."
- ³ This word (*hne*, *ehne*) is Coptic : its hieroglyphic has not yet been found.
- ⁴ The monumental word for bread (*ti*) signifies "sacrificial bread."
- ⁵ Literally : "diminish our offences," and used in this sense, in "Book of the Dead," c. 126. s. Compare Champollion's "Grammaire," p. 418.
- ⁶ No Egyptian word exists for *wepasμds*, adopted by the Copts.
- ⁷ Although the exact value of the first sign in this word is doubtful, Champollion's reading as *h*, appears to be certain, as the Coptic shows.

FIFTH CHAPTER.

POSSIBILITY AND DOCUMENTS OF A SECONDARY FORMATION IN THE
CHINESE LANGUAGE.

It is evident that, in the ordinary sense of the word, no secondary formation can be looked for in the modern Chinese, or the modern and familiar style, as compared with the old style. The modern style indulges in the use of words which correspond to the expletive particles and conjunctions of our languages: but it must not be overlooked, that, even in modern Chinese, these sounds still represent nouns or verbs, or full roots, according to the expressive terminology of the Chinese grammarians. Strictly speaking, there are no exclusively grammatical words or forms in the modern Chinese any more than in the old; the roots may in most cases lose their meaning, when indicating what our particles and connexions express, but never their formation. The root remains what it is, incapable of change: it loses neither quantity nor accent. It is merely used as a conventional expression for what the ancient language did not express at all. Not a step is made towards the exclusive use of affixes or suffixes, still less towards inflexions.

The Chinese language, with some similar structures in Eastern Asia, forms, as Wilhelm von Humboldt was the first to establish in all its extent, a contrast to all other languages, not so much from any defect, or from the external fact of

its being monosyllabic, as from its totally opposite view of the means of attaining the end of all language. This end is the construction of a sentence, the expression of a logical proposition by a subject, predicate, and copula, with all their dependencies.

All other languages not only express, more or less perfectly, the component parts of a sentence, but they have also words employed solely for that purpose (particles), or inflexions, destined to bring audibly before the hearer the mutual relations of nouns and verbs to each other. All other languages, moreover, have more or less distinct forms for those different component parts of a sentence; as the noun for the subject, the verb for the predicate, and generally also for the copula. The old Chinese has no such tendency whatever; and nobody will ever understand its nature and do justice to its incomparable perfection, if he apply to it the forms and categories of the grammars of the rest of the world. As Humboldt says, the other languages have an etymological and a syntactical part, but the Chinese has only a syntactical one; and this Chinese syntax may be comprised under two rules: that the determinative precedes the word determined, and that the object follows the word on which it depends. All other syntactical rules, even those which appear as exceptions, may be explained upon these two simple principles. Thus *position* alone points out the verb in a sentence: what precedes it next is either its own determinative (adverb), or the subject, which may equally be preceded by its determinative, the relation of genitive in particular. Finally, every one of these words is like the other: not only are they all monosyllables, that is to say, have an accent of their own, which separates them from the preceding or following syllable or particle; but every one of these monosyllabic words may be interpreted as a verb, or substantive, or adjective, or as a grammatical particle—an empty word, as the Chinese grammarians

say. The difference of tone or accent by which that word is to be pronounced—and every one may have four, and has on an average three accents—is an accessory towards finding out in what sense it is to be taken in a given position. If a word changes from its original verbal sense into a nominal, or *vice versâ*, it sometimes changes its accent.* Thus, what other languages effect by affixes or inflexions, the Chinese indicates by two means, quite distinct from the formation of the word; by the architectonical arrangement of words, and by a musical change in the pronunciation. Add to this, that the Chinese language has only 450 syllable-words, which, by the variation of the accent, become 1203. Now, the Chinese, were it considered as a structure of the same kind as ours, and all other languages, would certainly be the most imperfect. So indeed it is, as speech, for practical purposes; for in spite of accents, position, and traditional tact, no native would understand one sentence of the old Chinese, which very seldom uses grammatical particles, if he merely heard it read as it stands, without the help of repetitions, expletives, pauses, and finally of gestures. All these are necessary to supply, to a certain degree, what in writing is effected by innumerable ideographic, now wholly conventional, signs, which constitute a sort of general or pasigraphic system of writing, destined, not to express the sound, but to assist in guessing the meaning of the word. It can be proved that this system of writing was originally figurative, as the ideographic part of the Egyptian is: and, indeed, a language of that cast evidently admits of no other.

Would it not be natural therefore to assume that the old Chinese formation, preserved in the old sacred books, is in its principle, among languages, what the inorganic formations are in the kingdoms of nature? Its component parts are not organically articu-

* Humboldt, *Lettre*, p. 24., and Rémusat's note (4) to it.

lated words as parts of speech, but crystals of thought, employed architectonically in building up a sentence, which is made more intelligible by musical enunciation. Accent and position give each crystal a more or less prominent part in this symmetric arrangement; but each is in itself a complete, though not an explicit, sentence, whether it appear rather as a noun or as a verb. Thus every word has in itself a fulness of life and value, of which it can only be deprived, by making the substance, quality, existence, or action, all which lie enshrined in it, the mere sign or symbol of determination or of relation to another word, that is to say, to another substance, quality, existence, or action, or to the whole sentence. According to the Chinese formation, every word (or syllable) is an undeveloped sentence; or, if we follow out the analogy with nature (which to us is by no means a mere metaphor), we may say, every word spoken in a sentence is a magnetized mineral, forming itself without any outward change into polarity (the nominal and the verbal pole), and thus having for its centre, as the indifferential point between the two, the adjective-participle quality. Position, assisted by accent, elicits the polarity required, or reduces the word to its indifferential point. Suppose the creative human mind absorbed in this first formative process of speech, and it will be admitted that it must shrink, during the power of that process over the mind, from the notion of having its produce treated as an imperfect plant or a maimed animal formation. Only by decay does such a language acquire a superficial and deceptive likeness to the formations of our languages. It is intrinsically the very opposite of them. It has a life of its own, capable of manifold development and endless variety; and it cannot receive an essentially different one without ceasing to exist, just as a plant may grow on soil formed by the calcined mineral, but the mineral can never develop itself into a plant.

All this is, from our present phenomenological point of view,

merely an assumption; it is, however, one which appears to recommend itself by the succession of phenomena observed in other formations. If language exhibit a principle of development by a gradual increase of the sensibility of the single words in reference to the whole of the sentence, and by conglomerations or compositions arising out of this sensibility, such a development points to rather than excludes a state of language where there was no such sensibility at all, not even so far as to give, by the unity of accent, a certain organic union to two rigidly separate words into one. Such an insensibility then would be normal, primitive, not a consequence of decayed organization. Do not the phenomena of the old Chinese look very much like such a formation? and as no less than a third part of mankind speaks in tongues of this nature, will it not be worth our while to consider well its original and peculiar character before we pronounce for or against the genealogical unity of the human race? We must, at all events, allow that the phenomena present no difficulty in assuming that a given organic language may have passed through such a state as the Old Chinese represents compared with the modern. On the contrary, the Chinese phenomenology confirms the supposition that the law of secondary formation in language is universal. The process of dissolution, which prepared in the Chinese the very first germ of development and the approach to organic language, is one and the same with that observable and traceable in all other languages.

But evidently this process must have been much slower than in the organic languages themselves.

We subjoin the Lord's Prayer in modern Chinese. Those supplementary words which would not be used in ancient Chinese have been omitted in the progressive numbers. An analysis of a few sentences of the Shoo-King, compared with a modern paraphrase, would give a much more complete idea of

the characteristic difference between the ancient and modern languages.

THE LORD'S PRAYER IN MODERN CHINESE.

earth	<i>tí</i>	地	11		<i>Wú</i>	吾	
as	<i>jū</i>	如	12	Our {	<i>tang</i>	等	
in	<i>yü</i>	於		father	<i>fū</i>	父	1
heaven	<i>tien</i>	天	13	in	<i>tsái</i>	在	
truly.	<i>jen.</i>	焉	14	heaven	<i>tien</i>	天	2
Grant	<i>Tsz'</i>	賜	15	he,	<i>ché,</i>	天	
us {	<i>wo</i>	我		wish	<i>yuen</i>	愿	
to-	<i>tang</i>	等		thy	<i>'rh</i>	爾	3
day	<i>kin</i>	今		name	<i>ming</i>	名	4
the day	<i>jih</i>	日		perfectly	<i>ching</i>	成	
what	<i>jih</i>	日	16	holy,	<i>shing,</i>	聖	5
use	<i>so</i>	所		thy	<i>'rh</i>	爾	6
food ;	<i>yung</i>	用		dominion	<i>tsái</i>	宰	7
forgive	<i>liáng ;</i>	糧	17	rule	<i>wáng</i>	王	
our	<i>mien</i>	免	18	come	<i>lin</i>	臨	8
sin-	<i>wo</i>	我		to,	<i>chí,</i>	至	
debts	<i>fū</i>	負		thy	<i>'rh</i>	爾	9
as	<i>tsái</i>	債	19	will	<i>chí</i>	旨	10
we {	<i>jú</i>	如		received	<i>fung</i>	奉	
	<i>wo</i>	我	20	done	<i>hing</i>	行	
	<i>tang</i>	等		in	<i>yü</i>	於	

wickedness.	<i>ngoh.</i>	惡		forgive	<i>mien</i>	免	21
For	<i>Kái</i>	蓋		sin-	<i>fú</i>	負	
kingdom	<i>kwoh</i>	國	28	debts	<i>tsái</i>	債	22
the,	<i>ché,</i>	者	29	against	<i>yu</i>	與	
power	<i>kiuen</i>	權	30	us	<i>wo</i>	我	
the,	<i>ché,</i>	者	31	those	<i>tang</i>	等	
and	<i>keih</i>	及		so.	<i>yé.</i>	者	
glory	<i>zung</i>	榮	32	Not	<i>Puh</i>	也	23
the,	<i>ché,</i>	者	33	lead	<i>yin</i>	不	
all	<i>kiái</i>	皆		us	<i>wo</i>	引	24
belong-to	<i>shuh</i>	屬	34	enter	<i>tsin</i>	我	
thee	<i>'rh</i>	爾	35	seducing	<i>yú</i>	等	
for ever { in	<i>yú</i>	于		temptation,	<i>hwoh,</i>	進	
age	<i>shí</i>	世	36	but	<i>nái</i>	誘	
age	<i>shí</i>	世		save	<i>kiú</i>	惑	25
indeed.	<i>jen.</i>	焉	37	us	<i>wo</i>	乃	
Heart	<i>Sin</i>	心		out of	<i>tang</i>	救	26
wishes	<i>yuen</i>	願	38	evil	<i>chuh</i>	我	
exactly	<i>ching</i>	正			<i>hiung</i>	等	
so.	<i>shí.</i>	是	39			出	
						凶	27

SECOND SECTION.

THE

SPECULATIVE ELEMENTS;

OR

THE INDUCTIVE METHOD FOR FINDING THE ORIGIN OF
LANGUAGE, AND THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT.

THE
SPECULATIVE ELEMENTS;
OR
THE INDUCTIVE METHOD FOR FINDING THE ORIGIN OF
LANGUAGE, AND THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT

FIRST CHAPTER.

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE TWO ANTAGONISTIC SYSTEMS, SENSUALISM
AND SPIRITUALISM.

THE theories about the origin of language have followed those about the origin of thought, and have shared their fate. The materialists have never been able to show the possibility of the first step. They attempt to veil their inability by the easy, but fruitless assumption of an infinite space of time, destined to explain the gradual development of animals into men; as if millions of years could supply the want of the agent necessary for the first movement, for the first step in the line of progress! No numbers can effect a logical impossibility. How, indeed, could reason spring out of a state which is destitute of reason? How can speech, the expression of thought, develop itself, in a year or in millions of years, out of unarticulated sounds, which express feelings of pleasure, pain, and appetite? Animal sounds

are the echoes of blind instincts within, or of the phenomena of the outward world, uttered by suffering or satisfied animal nature, and in all cases resulting from mere passiveness. The common sense of mankind will therefore always revolt from such theories. So did Frederic the Great, in his memorable answer to d'Alembert and his school. He protested against what he calls the *salto mortale*, which that school wanted him to make, from a monkey to man, from reasonlessness to reason. In our days nobody has expressed himself more strongly against such a materialistic explanation of language than the greatest and most acute anatomizer of almost all human tongues, Wilhelm von Humboldt, in his admirable Letter to Abel Rémusat on the nature of grammatical forms in general, and on the genius of the Chinese language in particular*, a letter which

* Lettre à M. Abel Rémusat sur la nature des formes grammaticales en général, et sur la génie de la langue chinoise en particulier, par M. G. de Humboldt. Paris, 1827, 8vo. M. Abel Rémusat, who published himself this letter, has added his valuable remarks as to the points on which his opinion had differed or still differed from the views developed by Humboldt. We shall quote here two passages. P. 55. Speaking of the origin of the most perfect languages, the author says,—"Je ne crois pas qu'il faille supposer chez les nations auxquelles on est redevable de ces langues admirables des facultés plus qu'humaines, ou admettre qu'elles n'ont point suivi la marche progressive, à laquelle les nations sont assujetties: mais je suis pénétré de la conviction, qu'il ne faut pas méconnaître cette force vraiment divine que recèlent les facultés humaines, ce génie créateur des nations, surtout dans l'état primitif où toutes les idées et même les facultés de l'âme empruntent une force plus vive de la nouveauté des impressions, où l'homme peut pressentir des combinaisons auxquelles il ne serait jamais arrivé par la marche lente et progressive de l'expérience. Ce génie créateur peut franchir les limites qui semblent prescrites au reste des mortels, et s'il est impossible de retracer sa marche, sa présence vivifiante n'est pas moins manifeste. Plutôt que de renoncer, dans l'explication de l'origine des langues, à l'influence de cette cause puissante et première, et de leur assigner à toutes une marche uniforme et mécanique qui les traînerait pas-à-pas depuis le commencement le plus grossier jusqu'à leur perfectionnement, j'embrasserais l'opinion de ceux qui rapportent l'origine des langues à une révélation immédiate de la Divinité. Ils reconnoissent au moins l'étincelle

contains all the germs of his posthumous German work, and therefore is an almost indispensable introduction to the study and understanding of that gigantic concentration of learning and reflection. As to the general speculative grounds for such a view, in opposition to the materialistic theories of French and English philosophers of the earlier part of the eighteenth century, they have been established most accurately by Kant, and developed by his illustrious successors. To reproduce Monboddo's theory in our days, after Kant and his followers, is a sorry anachronism; and I therefore regret that so low a view should have been taken of the subject lately, in an English work of much correct and comprehensive reflection and research respecting natural science. I grieve that a man of so much thought should have been carried away by a narrow philosophical theory, and perhaps also by a violent reaction against dead dogmatism and formalism. But neither has its counterpart, the spiritual system of philosophy, been able to give a wholly satisfactory explanation of the phenomena, and particularly of the origin of language, and therefore has been unable to drive the other theory from the field; for as the one cannot take the step from matter to thought, so the other cannot take that from thought to matter. Absolute spiritualism contradicts nature, as materialism contradicts mind: it has reality and history against it as much as its opposite. According to its one-sided notions all development in language descends from the height of con-

divine qui luit à travers tous les idiomes, même les plus imparfaits et les moins cultivés."

In p. 71., when refuting the notion that the Chinese language represents the babbling of children, he has these remarkable words:—"Des nations peuvent se trouver à différentes époques des progrès de leurs langues par rapport à cet accroissement, mais jamais par rapport au développement primitif. Une nation ne peut jamais, pas même pendant l'âge d'une seule génération, conserver ce qu'on nomme *le parler enfantin*. Or ce qu'on veut appliquer à la langue chinoise tient précisément à ce parler, et au premier développement de langage."

sciousness to a state of decline. It justly disclaims the savage as the prototype of natural, original man; for linguistic inquiry shows that the languages of savages are degraded, decaying fragments of nobler formations. The language of the Bushman, as before observed, is a degraded Hottentot language, and this language is probably only a depravation of the noble Kafre tongue. But, on the other hand, when that school pretends, as Frederic Schlegel does, that in the noblest languages, those of organic structure, as he calls them, the spiritual and abstract signification of roots is the original, such an assumption is contradicted by the history of every language of the world. Nay, his whole distinction between organic and atomistic languages is decidedly unhistorical. The African languages in particular protest against such an unholy divorce in the human race. Individually, we believe with Kant, that the formation of ideas or notions, embodied in words, implies the action of the senses, and the impression made by outward objects on the mind, as much as the formative power of the reacting mind. It is the mind which creates and forms; but this power of the mind is one reacting only upon impressions received from the world without. We believe Leibnitz to be perfectly right in his great supplement to Locke's dictum: "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu*"—" *nisi ipse intellectus*." We are moreover convinced that the power of the mind which enables us to see the genus in the individual, the whole in the many, and to form a word by connecting a subject with a predicate, is essentially the same which leads man to find God in the universe, and the universe in God. Language and religion are the two poles of our consciousness, mutually presupposing each other. The one is directed to the changing phenomena of the world, in the assumption of their unity, the other to the unchangeable, absolute One, with the subsumption of all that is changeable and relative under Him. Our present purpose, however, is not to enter into these higher spheres of speculation; we are desirous of showing how

by the application of the inductive method, based upon facts, we may arrive at understanding the origin and the principle of the progress of speech, and show that the primeval facts of language, and all those phenomena which we have examined in the preceding section, may be explained by a law so simple and constant, that we may hope to apply it with equal success to the researches still to be made.

SECOND CHAPTER.

INDUCTIVE METHOD TO DEFINE THE GENERAL CHARACTER BOTH OF
INORGANIC AND ORGANIC LANGUAGES.

IN examining the phenomena of languages which are perfectly well known and sufficiently investigated, we arrived at the fact, that the further we proceed in the examination of the most ancient formations, the more we perceive that every sound had originally a meaning, and every unity of sounds (every syllable) answered to a unity of object in the outward world for the world of mind. We found this to be the character of the Chinese language. We again found, beginning with the latest formations, that inflexions, apparently mere modifications of the sound of a word, were in most cases reducible to prepositions or postpositions, and these again and all particles to full roots, or nouns and verbs. We established the fact, that every word had first a substantial object in the outward world, and received only in process of time an application to the inward.

In order to arrive at the law which we are endeavouring to find, let us first assume, as Geology does, that the same principles which we see working in the development, were also at work at the very beginning, modified in degree and in form, but essentially the same in kind. We leave it here a moot point, whether there was one beginning, or whether there were many beginnings of speech — whether one only of the great families of mankind began the work from the first elements of speech, and handed it down to others who successively developed it, or whether there be many beginnings, each tribe forming its own

materials of speech, and developing them more or less, according to their peculiar nature and history. This question cannot be settled by speculation: history alone, based upon philological facts, can decide, and, I think, does decide it. Let us consider here what we are obliged to assume. If we adopt the latter of these two suppositions, we shall find ourselves obliged to assume that the starting-point of all was essentially the same, but that the materials employed were quite distinct from the beginning. Different families of languages will then, according to this system, represent at the utmost only different stages in lines of parallel development. According to the first supposition, on the contrary, they all, with the exception of one, must have found something of speech, and materials, more or less, already stamped and fixed, which they had to work upon, when entering upon the critical process of their nascent nationality. But whether there was one beginning or more beginnings, the primitive language or languages must be substantial, without words or syllables set apart for grammatical forms.

Now as to the principle of development, the supreme law of progress in all language shows itself to be the progress from the substantial isolated word, as an undeveloped expression of a whole sentence, towards such a construction of language as makes every single word subservient to the general idea of a sentence, and shapes, modifies, and dissolves it accordingly. Language is the product of inward necessity, not of an arbitrary or conventional arrangement; consequently, every sound must originally have been significative of something; it must have been connected both with the sound and with the object to be expressed. Now the link between the two is the analogy felt between this object and the configuration of that wonderful musical instrument, the mouth. This protoplasmic instrument is capable of a great variety of configurations by the difference in the employment of one only or of more of the special organs of speech. These organs are the throat (guttur), the palate, the

tongue, the teeth, the lips. This, then, is the subjective organon of language, the physiological vehicle for that protoplasmic art, speech, which combines architecture and music, the plastic or sculptural, and the picturesque. Johannes Müller has developed this physiologically, Sir John Herschell acoustically. But we must now examine the objective substratum more closely. The unity of sound (the syllable, pure or consonantized) must originally have corresponded to a unity of conscious plastic thought; and every thought must have had a real or substantial object of perception. The mind cannot embrace existence except in things existing; and, on the other hand, every distinct notion of a thing presupposes its existence. Thus every object of perception appears necessarily to the mind as a thing placed under the category of qualitative existence, existence being the necessary attribute of everything contemplated by the mind. Now the noun is the expression of a thing existing. The substantive noun is the existing thing, denominated according to that quality of the object which strikes the mind, when reacting upon the impression received from it through the senses. The noun-adjective in general is the quality of an existing thing, considered as separate from it. Or, we may say, as was suggested to us by the nature of Chinese words, that the substantive and verb represent the two opposite poles of the originally undivided notion; the adjective is the indifferential point between the two poles, presenting itself towards the nominal pole as an adjective, towards the verbal as a participle. But the original substantial word must represent the unity of these differences, by being a substantive, or verb, or adjective, according to its use, indicated by its tone and position in the sentence. No substantive-noun can originate without the specific quality or property of the thing (which is expressed by the adjective) having operated upon the mind. Quality, therefore, is only a term for a mode of existence, that is to say, for a mode of that, of which the verb is the abstract expression. Every act of word-forming implies,

therefore, the unity of these three fundamental parts of speech. That is to say, every single word implies necessarily a complete proposition, consisting of subject, predicate, and copula. Such, indeed, we found to be the case in Chinese.

The following figure will make this clearer :

<i>Nominal pole.</i>	NOUN-VERB.					<i>Verbal pole.</i>
	<i>Thing.</i> (Substantive-noun.)	<i>Quality.</i> (Adjective-noun.)	<i>Affirmative</i> or <i>negative</i> <i>position.</i> (<i>COPULA.</i>)	<i>Quality.</i> (<i>Participle.</i>)	<i>Existence.</i> (<i>Pure verb.</i>)	
	SUBJECT.			PREDICATE.		

Thus if the very beginning of speech be impossible without the creative power of the mind reacting upon the impression of the senses, the original expression of thought is entirely substantial. Nothing but a substance is expressed by mind, although no substance can ever be expressed without the ideal power of the mind which stamps it. The action of the contemplating mind itself, the copula, as it is called in logic, the affirmation or negation which connects a subject and predicate, a noun and a verb, substantive and adjective, will least of all have originally an abstract expression. Indeed, the negation of a sentence (which sentence may be one word) is most naturally expressed by a gesture, added to the expression of some existence or movement. Gestures and accents are the natural commentaries upon the sentence-forming word. The same is the case with the relations of nouns and verbs to space and time, or to any quality or degree. The prepositions and postpositions, the affixes and suffixes, the declensions and conjugations of our languages, are, in primeval speech, expressed like the copula, by position, by accent, declamation, pauses, gestures, finally by the accompanying image of the object. Language, in its primitive substantial state, requires for its completion and illustration the writing of the image of things, as much as later languages find a useful commentary in the orthography of words, and a necessary one in the context of speech. How, for instance, are we to distinguish in English *might*

and *mite* ; or *right*, *wright*, *write* and *rite* ; or *u*, *you*, *yew*, *ewe* ; or *to*, *too*, *two* ; unless an unmistakeable synonym be added, or the context offer a direct explanation of it? But before, as after, the invention of image-writing, the musical and gesticular element are necessary accompaniments of speech.

Absolute, unchangeable, and unbending substantiality then is the character of the primitive language, if, as we must suppose, it be not a conventional arbitrary expression of the mind, but the product of instinctive necessity. It is equally true, that the ideal principle, or the action of the mind, which produced language by a spontaneous repercussion of the perception received, cannot be considered as ever resting or ceasing ; but, on the contrary, as being continually working upon the language. If substantiality be the principle of existence in a language, ideality is as essentially its principle of development or evolution. *Language has in itself, by the very nature of the principle of its origin, a principle of development.* The mind which forms a language changes it also. Having started from sentence-forming words, it tends to break their absolute isolating nature, by rendering them subservient to the whole of a developed sentence, and changing them into parts of speech ; and this it can only do by gradually using full ancient roots for the expression of all that is formal in language. The same principle which works upon those languages, the formation of which we can investigate, must therefore have been working upon the most ancient language of mankind. What we found as a prominent phenomenon is the necessary effect of a general law, of that law without which there would be no language. What exists in thought must gradually find its positive expression in language.

Language therefore is driven by this incessant action of the mind to express what is not substantial — that ideal conception by which men connected from the beginning of all speech (indeed before it) things with existence and things with things. But it

cannot express these ideal connexions except by using the substantial materials it possesses. The substantial words become to the mind what the things themselves were at the beginning of speech — the objects of its action.

The affirmation or negation of the connexion between a subject and predicate, and the accidental relations as to space and time, certainly claim now an explicit expression : so also do the internal necessary relations of nouns and verbs in general. All these must be gradually expressed, which can only be done by words originally coined for things substantial. This is the origin of personal pronouns (the consciousness of self and its antithesis, which is a great abstraction), of other pronouns, of prepositions, lastly, of conjunctions, or words expressing the relation of whole sentences to each other, as prepositions do the relation of nouns with nouns or with verbs. The words thus divested of their substantial meaning, lose their substantiality, in the proper sense of the term.

This step coincides necessarily with the division between syllables and words, and precedes the origin of affixes and inflexions.

THIRD CHAPTER.

THE CHINESE LANGUAGE, AN EXAMPLE OF THE INORGANIC
FORMATION.

EVERY really primitive language (if there are more than one) must therefore have commenced, as we find that the Chinese and all monosyllabic languages really did commence. We may perhaps also discover the necessary steps of development from such a beginning to the perfection of formative languages. Whatever they are, there is above all one step which forms the paramount distinction between the languages of mankind. This is the transition from a language in which all the component parts of a sentence are themselves signs of an undeveloped sentence and incapable of modification according to their specific meaning, in a given sentence, to one in which the form of words has been made subservient to this sense. This difference is that between inorganic and organic languages. That transitional step which is still within the first inorganic structure, and therefore compatible with the rigidly monosyllabic state, is from simple to compound roots or syllables. The simplest roots must consist either of a mere vowel (pure syllables in the strictest sense), or of a consonant having its inherent vowel either before or after it. Of these compound syllables again those ending with a consonant, unless it be a servile one, as the liquids and the sibilating sounds generally are, are already suspected as maimed dissyllables. This difference in the degree of substantiality of the consonants is a powerful element in the development of words into an organic structure. Monosyllables

with two substantial (mute) consonants are the furthest point to which monosyllabic languages can reach, if we only follow out our fundamental assumption, that in languages of this nature (having only full roots, or sentence-forming words) there is a rational correspondence between the unity of perception and of sounds. Two equally strong consonants again of the same organ of speech (as two labials, two linguals, and so on), may come under the head of a simple increase and slight modification of the one impression. But syllables with two mute consonants of two different organic classes imply a union of two perceptions, which requires originally two syllables.

In measuring the capabilities of this system, the difference of accent must not be considered a trivial circumstance. The original language is certainly one which must be accompanied by gestures, and rendered intelligible by the position of the words. The gesture interprets the sound, the position shows whether the word be subject or object, whether noun or verb. Both are assisted by image-writing. But the principal resource of such a language lies necessarily in the tone. The language of monosyllabic sentence-words is calculated for being, not spoken, but sung. The vowel may be pronounced long or short; the word may be enunciated in an ascending or descending scale. Thus only can such a primitive structure be not only intelligible, but even a vehicle of development for the mind in this primary stage. As soon as it combines all these elements, it is perfect. The line of its progress is its path to death; for no progress is possible but by breaking up the character of substantial fulness and the isolation of the single words. The only preparation which, after a literature of four thousand years, the Chinese presents for such a change is the use of some of its unchangeable roots as signs of grammatical relations. A nation starting, by a great intellectual and natural movement, into existence from such a state of language, may easily have made that great step which leads to affixes and then to in-

flexions, but the mummified Chinese is become incapable and unwilling to do it. Such is his feeling of the absolute independence and isolating substantiality of each word in a sentence, that it makes him contemplate that change as a decided decay and barbarism. He expresses *daylight* by two words signifying exactly in the same order *dáy light*: but he cannot condescend to subordinate the second to the first, by saying (with one accent) *day'-light*. If he could, the spell of monosyllabism would be broken.

The tendency to compound syllables is in itself a tendency to such a change. The distinction between words and syllables by the formation of polysyllabic words, is the signal of the entrance of a nation into the second great stage, the organic one of the words. Every composition produces or prepares decomposition: it presupposes a third thing, uniting two distinct units of perception and thought. One of the things thus united will be in process of time subordinated to the other, as the determinative or accessory. A word of more than one syllable is the expression of a compound notion: it constitutes the expression of a higher unit by the subordination of one simple notion under another simple one. The former loses the accent; for without unity of accent there is no unity of the word in speech. The Chinese has no real compound words; for in such apparent compositions as *day-light*, *horse-man*, each component word, as we have already observed, preserves its own accent, and there is a pause between them. The same is the case with the words interspersed to supply the want of all flexion. All that the strict Sinologists relate of such contrivances is a delusion, a want of philosophy. It is just as if a naturalist would prove a crystal to have limbs, because it can be placed upon moving wheels.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

THE LINE OF PROGRESS IN THE ORGANIC LANGUAGES.

IF we fix our regard on the second great class of languages, there can be no mistake as to which is the last formation, the goal of the whole process: it is evidently that of perfect inflexions. We say advisedly, the last formation, not merely the most perfect. No language can have inflexions, which had not previously formative particles (affixes and suffixes): and these affixes themselves must once have been independent particles; lastly, there can be no particle, which was not originally a substantial word, and primitively a substantial syllable.

This is the result both of our examination of the phenomena of languages, and of our speculative reasoning. The first showed us, that such was the case in the languages, the history and formation of which we know. The second proved, that this phenomenon results from a general law; and in order to arrive at this law, we ventured, as far as we are aware, to make out our assumption, that everything expressed in language, which is the expression of reason, must originally have been reasonable, and therefore a truth and a reality. The question, whether a language can be supposed to begin with inflexions, appears to us to imply an absurdity. So does the first of all questions: why must every word be originally a true and adequate expression of the mind? Simply because language is not an arbitrary fiction, but a truth: it not only is the vehicle of the development of reason, but also the product of a mind endowed with reason, and impelled to express the qualities of things by sounds imitative of that quality which strikes the

word-coining mind. But it must be well understood that the sounds of speaking man are not imitations of sounds of things (few of which besides are sonant), nor expressive of pleasure or pain, but an organic, artistic representation of a thing or of an existence by the instrument of instruments, the mouth with all its organs.

The examination of the facts shows us how that law operates. First, inflexions, as we have seen, resolve themselves, whenever we have the means of observing their formation, into worn-out prepositions or postpositions: these again we found, in the instances we examined, to have been in an earlier stage substantial words, nouns or verbs. We further found, that, when flexions are worn out, and some event brings about a new secondary formation, worn-out flexions call forth the formation of a new affix or suffix from the class of particles.

Thus the line of progress runs in the direction of an increase in the number of words formal, that is to say, of words serving for the formative purposes of the mind. This coincides with the necessary purpose of all organic language, to constitute and mark all the component parts of a sentence. Now it is clear that no word, which has once ceased to be full or substantial, can ever become so again: it has lost its substantial, independent life, its distinct substantial signification. It becomes an algebraic sign, and more or less unintelligible in itself. The more substantial and independent state is, therefore, necessarily the more ancient in any line of development.

Thus much we can establish by following out the logical process we have undertaken to explain. But this method alone cannot carry us further. Logically, it is impossible to define the different classes of this second great family of languages, otherwise than by establishing that the more the single words of a sentence are regarded as unchangeable, and their position in the sentence as the sign of the part they represent in it, the nearer such a language must be to the first class. But whether,

for instance, the system of agglutination or incorporation of the American and the Basque languages be proof of a backwardness in the stage of development, compared with the use of affixes, must depend upon concomitant circumstances. It certainly will be so, whenever the affix-languages are freer from the symmetrical construction of a sentence, and the isolation of the single words from each other.

The great fact upon which we here insist, is this: every primitive language must be composed of words which are absolutely inorganic, because in this way alone the origin and progress of word-forming, and the origin and development of languages can be rationally explained.

It is a modern idea of Asiatics and Europeans, that in writing man is to express the sound of words, and not the object which he is struggling to designate by all the means in his power. But it is still more remote from the primitive view of the matter to imagine that words were originally intended to express anything but those objects which call forth the response of man to the universe and man's address to his Creator.

FIFTH CHAPTER.

RECAPITULATION, AND ALGEBRAIC FORMULA.

WE will briefly recapitulate the results of the two preceding investigations, the phenomenological and the speculative. We first examined some striking phenomena in the formation and component parts of language, and then endeavoured to explain them by a general philosophical induction.

By the first process we think we have established the constant recurrence of the following phenomena.

The *first* is the fact that every language contains within itself an element of progress, which upon some crisis may become the element of death to the old and of life to the new language. The constant action of the mind upon the articulate expression of substantiality prevails gradually, but necessarily, over the positiveness of this substantiality, and makes single words auxiliary to the expression of all that belongs to the mind; of relation, outwardly of time and space, and inwardly of quality, action, direct and indirect, and all the other categories of existence; finally, of the copula, or that act of the mind by which a sentence and even a word is formed.

The *second* is, that every extant language has grown out of the death of another. This forms the basis upon which the new formative power works, or, as it were, the substratum or *humus* for the new formation. The birth of a new language presupposes the death of an old one. No language dies without a great crisis occurring in the tribe or nation which speaks it. This crisis may be a great physical revolution, or a voluntary

change of country by emigration, or a dissolution of the ancient form of political society by external human force, by invasion, conquest, subjugation. A new language and a new nation are so far identical, that a new language cannot originate without the dissolution of an ancient nationality. A new nationality certainly may arise out of an old one without the creation of a new language, although there will always be in the new nationality some reason why the development of the old language is slower and retarded, or more rapid and accelerated.

The *third* phenomenon is, that every new language consists in itself of at least two different elements or formations — the traditionary old one, and the new, the product of the crisis. We shall call the one the *primary formation*, the other the *secondary*. But this position is equivalent for all languages, except the first and second, to this formula: every language has necessarily three elements — the secondary formation, that by which it became a new language out of a kindred older one — the primary formation, or the living roots of the older language — and finally, the *deposit*, or that which was the primary formation of the same older language.

By generalizing this fact, we arrive at an algebraic formula. Calling the older language A, all anterior formations x , the new language B, and distinguishing in each of these three formations the two necessary component parts as b and a ; and by designating the number of successive formations of a and b by n ; we arrive at the following expression:

$$B = b + a + x$$

$$x = n(a + b).$$

$$\text{Therefore } B = b(a + b).$$

Fourthly. We have seen that the principle of secondary formation may be the stronger, the less development there is in the basis; and must be the weaker the more that basis is developed.

Fifthly. That the secondary formation is the weakest where it is impeded by the continual influx of an extraneous element.

Sixthly. That the extraneous element will never intrude into the grammar, but only into the lexicographical portion of it.

Seventhly. That secondary formations are less organic; the more violent the transition has been from one stage to another.

Eighthly. That ancient form of the language of the mother-country may often be preserved by colonization.

Ninthly. That Chinese language exhibits a formation in direct contrast to all others hitherto examined. Its peculiarity does not consist so much in its monosyllabic character, as in the circumstance of each word representing an implicit sentence, not divided in its component logical parts, and serving therefore, according to its position and accent, sometimes as a substantive or adjective, sometimes as a verb.

As to the second, the *philosophical inquiry*, we have seen that those phenomena are constant, as far as our observations go, and must therefore be the manifestations of a general law. According to this, we established the following axioms:

First. The original or primitive language must consist of inorganic words, each word presenting a whole undivided sentence, having no connexion with nor modified by the preceding or following word.

Secondly. The principle by which a language is produced, the reaction of the mind upon the impressions of the outward world, is also the principle of its development: consequently every language must either remain wholly inorganic, or must arrive at a more or less perfect state of organization subject to the law of development and decay.

Thirdly. The aim and end of this organic formation is to produce languages with inflexions, a system which we find harmoniously developed in Sanscrit and Greek, and more or less in all Indo-Germanic languages.

Fourthly. The intermediate phenomena must be arranged in a series, as steps of the general development from the inorganic to the organic.

Fifthly. Inflexions cannot be explained otherwise than as worn-out affixes, or as independent particles, which again are decayed complete (nominal or verbal) roots.

THIRD SECTION.

THE
APPLICATION OF FACTS AND THEORY COMBINED
TO THE PROBLEM OF
THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

THE
APPLICATION OF FACTS AND THEORY COMBINED
TO THE
PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF MANKIND.

INTRODUCTION.

OUR historical researches respecting language have led us to facts which seemed to oblige us to assume the common historical origin of the great families into which we found the nations of Asia and Europe to coalesce. The four families of Turanians and Iranians, of Khamites and Shemites, reduced themselves to two, and these again possessed such mutual material affinities as can neither be explained as accidental or as being so by a natural, external necessity, but they must be historical, and therefore imply a common descent.

The philosophical inquiry showed us that the monosyllabic or particle-language on which the most ancient of those formations border, both the Turanian in the East and the Khamitic in the West, is the formation which must be supposed theoretically to have preceded the organic or formative language. Every word was a sentence before it could become a specific part of speech; and either every language separately must once have been like the Chinese, or the Chinese itself is the wreck of that primitive idiom from which all the organic (or Noachian) languages have physically descended, each representing a phasis of development. Such a phasis itself would, under the latter supposition, be a necessary element in the evolutions of the idea in time, a link in an uninterrupted chain of development.

FIRST CHAPTER.

ETHNOLOGICAL FACTS IN THEIR BEARING UPON THE QUESTION OF
ONE OR MORE ORIGINS OF THE HUMAN RACE.

AFTER a twofold course of investigation, philological and speculative, we are arrived at the point where we must look in the face the two different systems which we met with in the history of ethnological philology, respecting the historical origin of language. The dilemma which we encounter may be formulized thus. Either there has been an infinite number of beginnings, out of which different tribes have sprung, and with them different languages, each doing originally the same work, and continuing and advancing it more or less according to its particular task, its natural powers, and its historical destinies: or the beginning of speech was made but once, at the outset of human time, in the dawn of the mental day, by one favoured race (however this was originally formed) in a genial portion of the earth, the garden of Asia. After the partial or total reconstruction of the great Iranian and Turanian families of Asia, the branches of which by means of emigration and settlement spread all over Europe, it would be useless here to repeat the reasons so often advanced and so admirably developed by Prichard, which force us to the conclusion, that the primæval seat, if not of mankind in general, at least of such members of it as figure in universal history, was a more or less extended sphere of Central or Northern Asia. Of these spheres, that which is bounded on the west by Mount Ararat in the south and Mount Caucasus in the north, and has the Ural and Altai at its northern and eastern, and the Paropa-

misus and Hindukush at its southern extremity, is the only one which combines the necessary requisites of central position and of climatic advantages. I must reserve for my work on the "Beginnings," which will soon appear in German, the development of all the reasons which seem to me to prove that the physical data and the concurrence of independent primæval traditions admit of but one explanation. It is this, — that the northern part of this sphere, with the Ural Mountains as islands in an open polar sea, was the cradle of mankind, or of that portion of it of which we have documentary knowledge by their languages for thousands of years, until a partial catastrophe in those regions, connected with a change of climate, drove the western tribes to the region of the Euphrates and Tigris, and the others from the higher Oxus and Jaxartes to Asia. For the purpose of the present sketch, it is sufficient to adopt, as the basis of our reconstruction, the hypothesis that there existed such a centre, or centres, of primordial life in Central Asia.

The development of mankind must, therefore, have been in very early times not only connected with emigrations into other parts of the globe, more or less distant, but also with different crises, by which social existence and therefore speech must have been modified. New nationalities must produce new languages. In consequence of these inward or outward, physical or political and religious catastrophes, colonists set out, swarms of men issued forth into distant countries, bearing with them the heirloom of their first fatherland in their language, and carrying it on from that starting-point with their own individual strength, under more or less favourable circumstances. On this supposition there will be in some races a more continuous and organic evolution, retaining more of uninterrupted consciousness of the past; while others will tend rapidly towards a premature or conventional development; and others again will preserve the old state with inflexible tenacity. Thus one race will distinguish itself above all others by a full development

from the inorganic to the organic formation. Although its language thus becomes in the course of ages the most perfect organic structure, that race will, by virtue of the harmonic development of all its parts towards perfection, preserve more of the ancient heirloom than other less harmoniously developed races. The imperfections will be manifold, but these will all originate in the tendency to develop one portion of the system more than the rest. This tendency must have the effect of covering and concealing, as it were, the ancient stock under the luxuriance of one-sided off-shoots. The perfection of an organic language consists not only in what it expresses, but also in what it does not express, by special forms: not only in the distinctions which it marks, but also in those which it does not mark.

This phenomenon in the historical development is foreshadowed by the series of physiological formations. In the animal creation, man appears as the centre and end of all organic formations, uniting harmoniously the relatively highest perfection of all systems, whereas the others, in tending towards one of them only, deviate from the path of steady and perfect development, and fail to reach the goal.

Colonies may either preserve the ancient form, or become the instruments of a great change. The early language of Northern Asia, which, according to Chinese tradition, is the land of their earliest recollections, may have been preserved by the colonists who formed the Chinese empire, while Thibet and Mongolia developed the inorganic language into organic structures.

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES OF LANGUAGE APPLIED TO THE
PROBLEM.

SUCH will be, according to our inquiry, the general march of development, whether the one or the other hypothesis as to the origin of the human race be the true one.

If the former be correct, the different tribes or families of languages, however analogous they may be (as the product of the working of the same human mind upon the same outward world by the same organic means), will evince but little affinity to each other in the skill displayed in their formation, and in the mode of doing so. Their very roots, whether complete or empty, and all their words, whether monosyllabic or polysyllabic, must necessarily be totally different. There may be some kindred expressions in the inarticulate outbursts of feeling, not reacted upon by the mind, which the grammarians call interjections. There are also some graphic imitations of external sounds, called onomatopoeics, words the formation of which indicates the relatively greatest passivity of the mind. But the number of these is very limited. Language proper never imitates external sounds or designates objects by an inarticulate cry : the imitative nature of language consists in an artistic imitation, not of things, but of the rational impression which an object produces by its qualities. This imitation is effected by a combination of the elements of plastic and musical reproduction ; the plastic or formative by a configuration of the mouth, the musical by the sound thus produced and the accom-

panying tone in enunciation. There may be also some casual coincidences in real words; but the law of combination applied to the elements of sound furnishes a mathematical demonstration: for, with all allowances, the chance is less than one in a million that the same combination of sounds signifies precisely the same object. This chance is still further diminished, if the very strict and positive character of the laws be considered by which the application of a word to a given object in a given language is governed. But the ordinary crude method suffices to prove, that, if there be entirely different beginnings of speech, as philosophical inquiry is justified in assuming, and as the great philosophers of antiquity have assumed, there can only be a few isolated coincidences between words of a different origin.

We have therefore now to consider the axioms according to which we may be authorized in applying facts and theory in reference to the problem of placing those great families, which comparative philology has hitherto reconstructed in Asia and Europe, in contact with the idioms of Africa and the transatlantic regions, in order to see whether and how all may be considered as one historical series of development. We believe that the following axioms flow spontaneously from what precedes.

First Axiom.

We are not authorized in comparing any given language with one entirely disconnected from it, without having first compared it with the intermediate links. Chinese and German may be of the same stock, but it would be madness to compare German words with Chinese.

Second Axiom.

In comparing languages of different families we must confront the most ancient form of the one with the most ancient

of the other. If a German and Celtic word, or a Swedish and Finnish root or form, present some similarity, the apparent resemblance must be tested by recurring to the Gothic or ancient Norse form. It is only by this process that we can judge whether the one language has simply borrowed it from the other, or whether it comes from a more ancient common stock, or whether it is an accidental and only apparent similarity.

These two laws are the simple application of principles already fully established in Indo-Germanic philology, and they merely require a more extended application. But the remaining laws are peculiar to our problem.

Third Axiom.

The connexion between the different members of the same family can and must be proved by the identity of the grammatical forms, but the proof of the connexion between branches of different families consists in the analogous correspondence of roots, and it must be conducted with scrupulous attention to the first axiom. To compare Egyptian roots with Sanskrit, neglecting the Aramaic formations, which, as the grammar shows, are decidedly nearer of kin, would be unphilosophical.

Fourth Axiom.

In order to steer clear of that great danger of etymology, random comparison, we must distinguish between central and eccentric formation. All such languages must first be eliminated as are spoken by those nations which exhibit a distinct physiological character of their own. The American Indian may be, and, I believe, is a scion of the Mongolian stock, the Negro merely a variety of a dark-coloured Æthiopian cast in early times into the tropical regions. Physiology itself affords proofs that peculiarities of formation in one and the same species, the result of specific climatic and other in-

fluences, may become hereditary by long continued separation of individuals thus distinguished from all others of their species. No physiological difference of races can get rid of the undoubted fact, that intermarriages between the most distant races produce a fruitful progeny, and one having a tendency to return to the common, and therefore aboriginal, stock. The arguments advanced against this either come from a suspicious quarter, or show that good physiologists may be very indifferent philosophers.

THIRD CHAPTER.

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL QUESTION EXAMINED.

PHYSIOLOGY, of itself, never can prove or disprove historical affinity. The philosophical historian moves the previous question against the presumptions of those who insist, as physiologists, upon the originality of the races. This question is: Why these existing races should be considered as primitive? Prichard has most conclusively shown how, and under what conditions, varieties become hereditary; and, on the other hand, that the greater part of what is called typical in a race, as the form of the skull and the colour of the skin, present exceptions in one and the same tribe. But then the ethnological philosopher will not stop there: he will take the offensive, and ask, whether or not it is an axiom of natural history, that only animals of one and the same species produce issue capable of propagation? and whether or not the caste-physiologists still deny this to be the case as to the most distinct races of the earth? All the pretended instances are fallacies and fables. Mixed families become extinct, so do families of one and the same stock. But the marriages between English soldiers and labourers with New Zealand women or even with Papua girls, which have lately been encouraged by the British authorities, prove fruitful, and the children have all the signs of vital strength. As diversity of family is necessarily connected with diversity of climate and of habits, of food and exercise, it is natural that the chances of a lasting perpetuation should depend greatly upon these concomitant circumstances; but the fact of such mixed marriages

producing fruitful issue in any degree, is sufficient to prove that unfruitful marriages, or speedy extinction of mixed families, are not to be ascribed to physical incompetency. Nor is another concomitant fact to be overlooked, namely, that the nobler type absorbs the degraded, not the degraded the nobler. Nature always tends towards perfection, and the image of God, hidden under deviations from the perfect type, returns, *jure postliminii*, as soon as outward impediments are removed.

But, on the other hand, the method of proving (what physiology never can do) the historical affinity or consanguinity of such peculiar scions with the original Asiatic stock must be very strict and methodical, not only in order to convince those who maintain that the presumption is against our hypothesis, but also to prevent our remarks from being encumbered by an unmethodical, because unconnected, comparison. It is only after we have established the relative position of the leading Asiatic families of organic languages that we can proceed to the eccentric formations of Africa, America, and Polynesia. Then only shall we be able to discover which among those Asiatic families and branches is, as regards physiology and geography, and especially language, nearest of kin to each of them. By this means we shall be enabled to point out that part of the great stem from which those scions branched off, the stage of development at which they separated.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

THE CHRONOLOGICAL QUESTION EXAMINED.

THE solution of the ethnological and linguistic question is also of great importance as furnishing the possibility of establishing an approximative primordial chronology. The time which these scions must have required for forming and fixing for ever their own peculiarities is not calculated in the chronology of the human race. It only runs parallel to a part of that straight line of development which historical humanity presents. The great stream of universal history runs in a few great beds, the rest are canals branching off from them. Carrying on the metaphor of the common stem, the problem for fixing the place of what we may call eccentric formations consists in finding the knot from which they branched off towards their isolated idiosyncrastic existence, by which they generally lost much of their original hereditary consciousness, and frequently indulged in luxuriant secondary formations. If this method can be followed out, it is clear that the series of development in the languages of Asia, formed with the assistance of their deposits in Europe and Egypt, may give us the epochs of the primæval world, and a certain approximative chronology of the ante-historical age in the ordinary sense of the word. We have seen what is the minimum of time required for the formation of an affiliated language. Those who are not persuaded of the truth of our hypothesis will, at all events, do well to follow out the same method as to comparative philology. For if the different stages of development, as we have shown

them to be inherent to language, do not represent the epochs of one and the same language of mankind, but the independent history of originally different tribes, having no historical connexion with each other, our central series, if true in itself, must even according to their views represent ideal stages of development, which will be best understood by following the plan proposed by us. Of those central formations some are to be considered as collateral and therefore synchronistic, according to the principles laid down in the theory.*

* "In the hymns of the 'Rigveda' we still find the clearest proofs that the five principal tribes, the Yadus, Turvasas, Druhyus, Anus, and Pûrus, were closely connected by ties of nationality, and had their gods in common. In the succeeding age, that of the epic poetry of the Mahabharata, these five nations are represented as the sons of Yayâti, one of the patriarchs of the Indian world. Yayâti curses four of his sons, and the curse of Turvasa is, that he shall live without laws and follow the brutish propensities of the barbarians in the North. In the name of *Turvasa*, as well as afterwards in that given to the Indo-Scythian kings in the history of Kashmir, *Tūr-ushka*, we find the same root as in the Zend *Tūra*, the name of the nations of the North. But *tūra* itself signifies *quick*, from the root *tvar*, to run, to fly, and thus their very name offers the same characteristic of these nomadic equestrian tribes, which is afterwards ascribed to them by Firdusi, and which makes them always appear in India, as well as on the Sassanian inscriptions of Persia, as the An-irân, or no-Arian people, that is, as the enemies of the agricultural and civilizing nations." See Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, p. 728.

FIFTH CHAPTER.

THE LANGUAGES OF THE NORTH-AMERICAN INDIANS ARE PROBABLY SCIONS OF THE MONGOLIAN STEM.

It is not yet proved in detail, but it appears highly probable, in conformity with our general principles, that the native languages of the northern continent of *America*, comprizing tribes and nations of very different degrees of civilization, from the Esquimaux of the polar regions to the Aztecs of Mexico, are of one origin, and a scion of the Turanian tribe. The similarity in the conformation of the skull renders this affinity highly probable. The wonderful analogy in the grammatical structure of these languages, with each other and with the Turanian tongues of Asia, is universally admitted; and we think that the curious and, at first sight, startling problem, of the apparent entire diversity of the lexicographical portion of those American languages, by the side of that grammatical affinity, will be satisfactorily accounted for upon a fuller acquaintance with the roots, and by the application of our principle of secondary formations sometimes overlaying the ancient stock of roots.

I had written so far in July, 1847. I was not then aware that on the 3rd of March of the same year, an Act had passed the Congress of the United States of America, authorizing the publication of a great national work on the Indian tribes of the territory of that Republic. In 1850, the first volume of that gigantic work appeared, and now a third volume, printed in

1853, has been transmitted to me by the liberality of that government.*

It may fairly be said that, by this great national and Christian undertaking, which realizes the aspirations of President Jefferson, and carries out to their full extent the labours and efforts of a Secretary of State, the Honourable Albert Galatin, the government of the United States has done more for the antiquities and language of a foreign race than any European government has hitherto done for the language of their ancestors. Certainly, scarcely any single man has done more for collecting and digesting the materials than Mr. Schoolcraft, whose own observations and inquiries form the most important part of that publication. The whole work is conceived in a spirit of true philanthropy, and breathes a feeling of brotherhood towards the Indian scion of the human species. The section on language is without doubt the most important portion; it occupies a place in the second and third volumes, and we may hope to see it completed in the course of the following volumes. But the linguistic data before us, combined with the traditions and customs, and, particularly, with the system of pictorial or mnemonic writing (first revealed in this work), enable me to say, that the Asiatic origin of all these tribes is as fully proved as the unity of family among themselves. According to our system, the Indian languages can only be a deposit of a north Turanian idiom. Indeed, in addition to the evidence already collected by Prichard, the passage of tribes from Siberia (where we also find traces of the same pictorial writing), over the northern islands, is placed beyond all doubt by the work in question. The Mongolian peculiarity of the skull, the type of the hunter, the Shamanic

* Historical and Statistical Information respecting the History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States. Collected and prepared under the direction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, per Act of Congress, March 3rd, 1847, by Henry R. Schoolcraft, LL.D. Published by authority of Congress. Part i. Philadelphia, 1851; Part ii. 1852; Part iii. 1853; great quarto, with numerous plates.

excitement which leads by means of fasting and dreams into a visionary or clairvoyant state, and the fundamental religious views and symbols (among which the tortoise is not to be forgotten, ii. p. 390), bring us back to primitive Turanism. As to the languages themselves, there is no one peculiarity in them which may not easily be explained by our theory of the secondary formation and of the consequences of isolation. The unity of the grammatical type was long ago acknowledged, but we have now (as I think) the evidence of the material, historical, physical unity. The Indian mind has not only worked in one type, but with one material, and that a Turanian one.

We may now hope to receive, in a few years, from these energetic efforts of the government and citizens of the United States, a complete linguistic Thesaurus of Indian languages; and this deserves the more grateful acknowledgment as most of those tribes, in spite of the renewing power of Christianity, will soon become entirely extinct.

SIXTH CHAPTER.

THE LANGUAGES OF POLYNESIA ARE PROBABLY SCIONS OF THE MALAY, AS TO THE TRIBES OF LIGHTER HUE, AND THEY ALL OF THEM ARE TURANIAN.

I THINK that Wilhelm von Humboldt established the connexion between the Polynesian languages and the Malay, or the language of Malacca, Java, and Sumatra, and that this Malay language itself bears the character of the Turanian languages of Central Asia.

Whether the Papua languages, spoken in Australia and New Guinea, and by the aborigines of Borneo, of the peninsula of Malacca, and some small Polynesian islands, be a primitive type of the same stock as the Malay, which afterwards in many parts superseded it, is a point which must be left undecided till we obtain from the missionaries a Papua grammar. Thus much, however, we know, that it is an earlier and very primitive formation, and one which will probably prove to have only degenerated. To the analysis of it, as such, it will be necessary to apply the method above discussed.

SEVENTH CHAPTER.

GENERAL RESULT AS TO THE UNITY OF ALL ORGANIC LANGUAGES.

WE thus see that a very considerable part of the inhabitants of America and the Polynesian islands belong to that one great family which we call the Turanian race, and that the former branched off from the Mongolian, the latter from Malay tribes. In many parts we know, historically, that the Turanian race has preceded the Iranian: its language certainly represents not only an anterior step or preceding stage of development, approaching at its opposite pole the Chinese, but it has primitive materials in common with the Iranians, using this term for the general family name, and applying the name of Arians only to the inhabitants of middle Asia (Bactria, Media, Persia). The two families, therefore, were originally united.

The Iranian have, in common with the Semitic languages, including Chamism or Egyptian, the principle of a fixed individuality, which alone renders a progressive development possible: in this development the Iranian goes beyond the Semitic; but, as the Eastern branch of individualized humanity, it has more in common with Turanian than the Semitic has. Primitive, Asiatic, Chamism has disappeared: its existence is only proved by the Egyptian. Canaan is not only a child of Cham, because the Canaanites, in the earliest period, as again a few centuries before the Mosaic time, left Lower Egypt and occupied Palestine and Tyre, but because the historical Semitic is itself a child of the original stock from which Cham descended. The

Egyptian language is as certainly the primitive formation of countries about the Euphrates and Tigris, established in Africa and preserved by the Egyptians, as the Icelandic is the old Norse established in that island.

Now with this Semitic formation Africa is closely connected. Semites occupied Abyssinia: not only the Berber but also the Galla language evidently belongs to the same stock. But what do we know of the rest of Africa? We know thus much—that its languages are in a more developed state than Turanism. They are more organic. Here the gigantic and truly admirable labours of two indefatigable German Messengers of the Church-Missionary Society of England require particular attention. One of these is the Rev. John Lewis Krapf, whose comparative grammar and dictionary of the Sawahili language and the cognate dialects of the Wanicka and Wakamba tribes, with introductions and numerous translations, in manuscript, were, on their arrival from Africa, entrusted to me by the enlightened secretary of that Society, the Rev. Henry Venn, and are now printed. The other is the worthy countryman and friend of Krapf, the Rev. W. Koelle, in the service of the same illustrious Society, who, during his missionary labours, has availed himself of that providential facility which, through the languages represented there, Sierra Leone offers to missionary labour in the interior of Africa, for the researches of comparative ethnology. Our readers are aware that, in pursuance of the measures for that most noble and Christian of all national objects, the abolition of the slave trade, the English vessels on the western coast of Africa convey liberated slaves to Sierra Leone, where they learn English and receive a Christian education. Thus, what no human effort could have effected is here brought about by God's providence, through the instrumentality of what Luther called God's deacon upon earth, the devil. The Rev. W. Koelle has returned to Europe, after many years' patient and judicious observation, with specimens of

more than one hundred and fifty African languages spread over the remotest parts of Africa; and, with the assistance of that excellent geographer, Mr. Augustus Petermann, has succeeded in localizing them on a map of Africa constructed for that purpose. Mr. Koelle has, by a preliminary examination, classed them into certain groups and, as far as it was possible, furnished us with materials for establishing a unity out of an overwhelming and perplexing mass of tribes and families. Tutschek's and Krapf's labours upon the south-eastern languages of Africa had already dispelled the unfounded notion of there being an infinite number of rude and poor dialects of African tribes. We now know that the Galla language, which joins on to the Abyssinian in the north, a very fine specimen of grammatical structure and euphonic formation, is spoken at least as far as the fifth degree south of the equator; that it extends far into the continent along the eastern coast of Africa; that it is joined by the noble Caffre idioms, which also extend far into the interior; and that the Congo idioms on the western coast, if not cognate, are at least very analogous in structure, as the Galla and Caffre languages decidedly are with each other.* But Koelle's ma-

* At the moment that these sheets are going through the press (April 26. 1848) we have received the first and second numbers of the "*Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*," and find in it Prof. Pott's learned article on the languages of the Caffre and Congo tribes. We beg particularly to refer our readers to the ingenious and acute observations of Prof. Schott, which are cited in this article. (Note to Lecture.) We have now (March, 1854) to add the learned and well-reasoned article of the same distinguished scholar on the Languages of Inner and Western Africa, in the last number of the *D. Morgenl. Ges.*, p. 413—441.; and Dr. Bleek's Various smaller Essays on African Languages. Prof. Bopp expresses a wish, in which I most cordially join, that the missionaries may be induced to send their linguistic monographies to the principal learned societies of Europe, which otherwise become only accidentally acquainted with the results of their praiseworthy and important literary productions. The directing committees in Europe might easily effect this by circular instructions.

P. S. 10th June, 1854. Since the last lines were written, Dr. Bleek, having volunteered his scientific services for the Expedition to the Upper Tshaadda or the Benue, has, through the enlightened and generous kindness of the Earl of Clarendon, been employed in it, for the purpose of investigating the African

terials furnish us, for the fifth time, with a safe basis as to the origin of the African languages of the interior.

There evidently has been a southern as well as a northern immigration. The northern was certainly Semitic. The primitive state of Chamism, exhibiting the germ both of Semiticism and of Iranism, is left behind in both the Northern and Southern African formations. This development of theirs, however, does not run in the Semitic line. In the historical Semitic formations, the copula is constantly expressed by the pronominal form (*he*), whereas the Iranian possess the more abstract and therefore more advanced verbal form (*to be*). In this decisive characteristic most African tongues agree with the Iranian; as they do in the whole system of conjugation in opposition to the Semitic conjugation, as explained above. As the American and, in a certain manner, all Turanian languages are distinguished by their system of incorporation, and particularly by the agglutination of words, together with that of postposition; so these African idioms bear the type of prefixes and indicate the congruence, or grammatical position, of the parts of speech by changes in the initials of the words. Lepsius' preliminary observations respecting the two languages of the Upper Nile which he has discovered and analyzed, would lead to the supposition that they also represent a considerably greater advancement than the Egyptian.

languages on that river. He will be accompanied from Lagos by the apostle of his native country, Crowther, the author of the Yoruba Grammar and Dictionary.

EIGHTH CHAPTER.

THE PROBABILITY OF A HISTORICAL CONNEXION BETWEEN THE
ORGANIC STOCK AND THE CHINESE, OR THE INORGANIC LANGUAGE.

WE have hitherto excluded altogether from the application of our method that wreck of the primitive language, that great monument of inorganic structure, the *Chinese*. But we have already intimated, that it may be joined on to the other families of human speech, by the least developed Turanian. There is no scientific proof that it cannot: the law of analogy says, it must; philological and philosophical arguments combine to show the method of verifying the fact. Chinese philology, from a general point of view, is in its infancy. Morrison's merit consists in having given us a tonic dictionary, that is to say, a dictionary which really deserves that name, an alphabetic collection of sounds, not a system of signs. But the execution of this laudable plan is very defective. The object of real philology must be to classify, with due regard to accent, the numberless significations of a full root or syllable, so as to discover the primitive significations; for, as is still the case in the Egyptian, one sound generally comprises several roots now apparently identical, but originally different. With this view the ancient style ought to be consulted very carefully, if not exclusively: for instance, by treating in this manner, the roots *ngò* (the pronoun I), and the roots for *father* and *mother* (*foo* and *moo*), the original substantial meaning of the last two words will easily be ascertained, and the signification of reciting or speaking for *ngò* will lead to the

natural origin of the pronominal signification. This corresponds perfectly with the primitive signification of the pronoun of the second person, *öl*, ear, hearing. The speaking and the hearing are correlate notions for those two personal pronouns. Nor is it less important to discover the original pronunciation and phonetic rules of that language. Endlicher, in his Chinese grammar, is the first who has consulted the language on this point. Lastly, we cannot help thinking that a system of transcribing Chinese words in Latin characters ought to be introduced in the tonic dictionary as well as in the grammar, and the ancient texts published in the same manner. The philological as well as historical treasury of Chinese literature would thus become accessible to the philosophical and comparative study of that most interesting language. It is only by its being taken up by general scholars in this way that we can hope to obtain a basis for the comparison of roots; although we are far from denying that the historical study of the signs by the professional Chinese scholar will also contribute much to the real understanding of this peculiar formation. The study of the Tibetan or Bhotiya language, and that of the Burmese, offers the nearest link between the Chinese and the more recent formations: but even a comparison with Sanskrit roots is indicated by our method. For it is the characteristic of the noblest languages and nations that they preserve most of the ancient heirloom of humanity, remodelling and universalizing it at the same time with productive originality.

It would have been presumptuous, in 1847, to anticipate the issue of a thorough and well-digested comparison of this kind: I limited myself, at that time, to saying that I inclined to think it would be in favour of the existence of a primitive connexion. There was a gap between that formation and all others. This chasm has now been filled up, to a considerable degree, by Müller's successful Iranian researches. The Chinese now appears only as the most ancient of the anto-diluvian or ante-Noachian

monuments of speech. The origin of Turanism as well as of Khamism belongs to the primordial epoch. None of these nations consequently possess a tradition about the Flood, whereas both the Iranians and Shemites have. There is, therefore, a separation which corresponds with that caused in the general development of the human race by that great destructive catastrophe. The movement consequent upon that event separates the modern history of our race from its primordial origins. The Chinese, however, remains not only the eldest monument of ante-diluvian speech, but forms, in principle, the opposition to Turanism and to Khamism, as well as to Iranism and Semitism. Indeed, the first emigration from the cradle of mankind is said in Genesis to have gone eastward, which would point to the high table-land of Mongolia as the land of Nod or of exile, and the Chinese derive their rivers mythologically from those primordial regions.

Whatever may be the result of the inquiries which still remain to be made, there is but one mode of arriving at the truth, and that is by a combination of accurate philological observation and analysis with philosophical principles, and with the collateral researches of history and physiology. It is only by such a combination of researches that we can hope to fix definitively the place of each language in the general history of human speech, and to pronounce with historical certainty on the great questions connected with that problem. The difficulties are immense, but not greater than those which have been overcome in the last thirty years. Much less has been done hitherto, even by the governments of the most civilized nations, and by the most learned academies of Europe, for man, than for stones, plants and animals. The United States have lately set an example which deserves to be imitated in Europe. Nor has sufficient attention been given to the subject by the leading academies of Europe, one of which, that of Berlin, was founded by Leibnitz especially for this purpose. It will be the highest reward of my humble efforts, if the preceding inquiry,

and in particular my method of distinguishing between primary and secondary formation, and of determining the succession of the phenomena of development, and thus of languages, shall not be found entirely useless in the pursuit of those ulterior researches which form not only the basis of the history of our race, but are intimately connected with the highest object of speculation — the Philosophy of the Mind.

I shall conclude this first portion of my Sketch with some remarks which have a bearing upon that subject. They will serve to authenticate the juxta-position of Language and Religion which is founded on the fundamental assumption that these are the two collateral primitive manifestations of the human Mind.

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSION.

THE

BEARING OF LANGUAGE UPON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

RESPECTING THE

OBJECTIVE REALITY OF TRUTH.

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSION.

THE BEARING OF LANGUAGE UPON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND RESPECTING THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF TRUTH.

THE introduction to this volume has presented to the reader the results which a methodical analysis of the facts of language furnishes for understanding the universal history of human civilisation, and for reconstructing its primitive epoch.

These results will certainly appear the more striking, when we consider that the foundations of that methodical and comparative analysis of languages were only laid at the beginning of this century. If our researches be not entirely fallacious (and they scarcely can be so, based as they are upon constant phenomena and incontrovertible facts), we are already able, with more or less certainty, to prove the common descent of all the tribes of Asia and Europe, and to show that the historical languages of Khamites and Shemites, of Turanians and Iranians, have their common roots and deposits in the primitive world. Of the existence and state of this primitive world, language and the sacred traditions of mankind give concordant evidence. That part of central Asia, in which about a myriad of years ago a great physical catastrophe took place, proves, by the light of comparative linguistic researches, to be the cradle of the human race, and it must have existed about another myriad of years, during which numerous migrations took place, recorded by the deposits of speech they have left in Asia and Africa.

This historical unity is not simply a physical, external one, it is that of thought, wisdom, arts, science, and civilisation. By

facts, still more conclusive than the succession of strata in geology, comparative philology proves what our religious records postulate, that the civilisation of mankind is not a patchwork of incoherent fragments, not an inorganic complex of various courses of development, starting from numberless beginnings, flowing in isolated beds, and destined only to disappear in order to make room for other tribes, running the same course in monotonous rotation.

Far beyond all other documents, there is preserved in language that sacred tradition of primeval thought and art which connects all the historical families of mankind, not only as brethren by descent, but each as the depository of a phasis of one and the same development. In language are deposited the primordial sparks of that celestial fire which, from a once bright centre of civilisation; has streamed forth over the inhabited earth, and which now already, after less than three myriads of years, forms a galaxy round the globe, a chain of light from pole to pole.

The ground on which our civilisation stands is a sacred one, for it is the deposit of thought. That thought originated in the mind of the men of genius of antiquity, in the noble efforts of the self-sacrificing heroes of mankind; and the primitive formation of these strata is language. The prospects of mankind are therefore brightened by the contemplation of the development of language. For language as it is the mirror, so is it the product of reason, and as it embodies thought, so is it the child of thought.

It is impossible seriously to contemplate this great fact of history, which lies demonstrably at the bottom of our linguistic researches, without asking something like the following questions. What is the evidence of language as to the primitiveness of spirit or matter, of thought or sensation? What does its analysis prove, in the last instance, as to the existence of objective truth conveyed in language? What as to

our reasoning on objects beyond the senses, and our notions respecting God, the Soul, Free Will, and Immortality? What as to the value of symbols of ideas and realities, such as words, and rites too, undoubtedly are?

We cannot reason without words; what right have we to attribute any reality to such a connection, not of things but of conventional signs? The answer to such questions must evidently depend essentially upon two elements. The one will be the relation of language, as such, to objective truth: the other the objectivity of thought itself. The two elements are closely connected. We come to logical conclusions by connecting ideas syllogistically: are we connecting merely words or the things themselves? Does our magic formula of twenty or thirty sounds conjure up realities or only imaginations? Where is the rational warranty for the reality of our moral and religious ideas?

If the methodical analysis of language, of which we have attempted to give the outlines, have any truth in it, its bearing upon speculative or strictly philosophical truth, will certainly be even more important than all historical results. For the value of all historical truth depends upon the concordance between reason and reality, thinking and things. Such a concordance can evidently only be shown by our being able to explain the facts of nature and of mind. The physical universe exhibits the first, man and universal history the second. The Kosmos of mind must be more transparent to reason than that of nature. Now, in this Kosmos, language combines the advantages of mind and nature. For the general facts of language, as to its internal construction, rest upon so large a basis that they come before the mind with the constancy and power of natural phenomena. We may be mistaken as to facts depending upon the product of the individual mind, in arts or science or practical life: as to language, whether we have it living before us, or in written records, it is impossible not to discern its general organisation. At the same time, as language is the immediate product of the

intellect, it is necessarily a much more transparent organ and medium of thought than the phenomena of natural history, or of the so-called celestial bodies, the laws of which we may discover without understanding the reason of them.

It is impossible to conceal from ourselves the necessity of going beyond the evidence of language in confronting these questions, or to overlook the danger of losing the ground we have gained, if we enter into the labyrinth of pure speculation. We must not however suffer ourselves to be alarmed by that difficulty and by this danger. For the consideration of these questions alone can form the bridge from the philosophy of language to that of religion. It is only the solution of this problem which can fully justify our having brought them into juxta-position as the primitive phenomena of universal history. We must prove their internal unity. I hope, indeed, to have already shown that, on the one side, there is no possibility of attaining to a philosophy of religion without the philosophy of language, and, on the other, that the formation of language would be impossible, did there not exist in the mind, primitively, what we may call the rational principle of religion, which is the idea of cause and effect. Every word implies that assumption of a first cause, which is the assumption of all religion. What remains to be done is to connect the result of our linguistic researches with the analysis of religion, and with the last questions of metaphysical enquiry.

In endeavouring to introduce my readers to the labyrinth of metaphysical thought, I shall be guided throughout by the principal object of this book, and should we find that language and religion are the product of the human mind, and the result of a process the laws of which we can discover, I certainly may also hope to have furnished more proofs than any one before me has done, that the human mind acts by laws which can only be explained by assuming the divine reality of thought, as attested by the moral consciousness within, and the universe, both of nature and history, without us.

Our contemplation will be confined to the consideration of the three following questions:

FIRST. Is the evidence of language in favour of the priority of mind to matter?

SECONDLY. Can we discover objective truth by combining words as signs of thought?

THIRDLY. What is the mutual relation between language and religion?

I.

THE EVIDENCE OF LANGUAGE IN FAVOUR OF THE PRIORITY OF
THOUGHT TO MATTER.

THE opposite view presents itself, from the very beginnings of philosophy, in two forms.

Some philosophers have said, and still say, that human speech grew out of animal cries. Our words are supposed to have been originally imitations of natural sounds, or utterances of joy or pain, of anticipated good or evil, and this assumed fact is intended to constitute a proof either that thought is merely an affection of perishable matter (materialism), or that both are indiscriminately accidents of the one divine substance of the universe (pantheism).

According to the first view, human language was originally a complex of what is called onomatopoetic words and interjections. The idioms of savages were assumed to be essentially nothing more.

Now the evidence of comparative and historical philology is decidedly against that supposition. The primitive language is found to be strictly rational. It is inorganic, as not having, like all the languages of Europe, words as parts of speech; but every word in it is most clearly the product of a logical sentence. It necessarily implies the combination of an existing thing, classed according to a quality, with a certain mode of existence. It is neither a substantive nor an adjective nor a verb, because it is all together; and its actual sense must be understood from its position in speech and its tone in pronunciation. It is not a "part of speech," because it is a whole sentence, representing

subject, predicate and copula, according to its place and accent. Such a language may prove very inconvenient in the progress of time, but it is as philosophical as any other.

Substance and existence are categories of thought; so are the qualities by which we distinguish one thing from another. The animal affection produced by external objects contains in it no thought whatever: it is all sensation, produced, not by one of the qualities by which the object really exists, but merely by the impression it makes upon the animal soul according to the real or imaginary relation of this object to the affections of the perceiving subject, such as giving or promising joy or pain, or (as we may also express it) according to the bearing it is felt to have upon the instincts of the animal nature.

As to the animal languages of savages, they exist only in the imagination of those philosophers: they have disappeared upon the analysis of the languages even of the Botocudes and of the Bushmen.

Now it certainly may be said that the supposed primitive language of mankind has disappeared, and that we know it only in its second stage. But let us first mark the admission that the supposition upon which such persons proceeded is thus abandoned. They leave history to us: or rather, they are driven away by our facts from the ground of reality. Their suppositions not only find no support in facts, but the facts run directly against them. The Chinese is as far as the Greek is from being an imitation of natural sounds (a most absurd supposition in itself, as most objects have no sound whatever), and its origin can be explained from the primitive agency of thought much more satisfactorily than the Greek can, for all the words are substantive, and there exist no conventional expressions to denote the relation between one word and another. The contrivances used in Chinese to express thought are more complicated and less convenient than those employed in our languages, but they are all contrivances to express thought, not sensation.

The materialistic supposition is equally untenable, if we probe to the bottom the question raised by them as to the imitation of nature.

First, no imitation of nature exists in language any more than does expression of sensation. The interjections are no parts of speech, any more than the "clicks" of the Hottentots (passionate interjections) are articulate sounds. They are gratuitous interspersions of feeling between thought, and whenever they are connected with a real root in the language (as *ouä*, the Greek interjection analogous to oh! with *Weh*, the German word for pain, misfortune), they partake of the nature of all real, primitive words: they are objective and substantive. It is not that the sound is imitated, or the purely animal sensation expressed, but the object is indicated by the imitation of a quality by which the mind perceives it, and the instrument of this imitation is the primitive organ, both in musical and plastic art. The complex of the organs of speech, which we call the mouth, is, as it were, the instrument and symbol, indicating to similarly organized thinking beings the quality identified with the object. It does so in two ways: first, by the higher or lower note, the sinking or ascending voice, the sharp or protracted accent; and, secondly, by the gesture of speech. By the latter expression we mean the specific contingent configuration of the mouth produced by one of the possible organic combinations of the different organs—throat, palate, tongue, teeth, lips. The mouth is thus not only the primitive musical instrument, but also the original symbolical hieroglyphic, the primitive phonetic telegraph.

We see how the poetical key of language lies originally in the analogy between this configuration and a quality (hollow, close, extended, curbed, and so on), without any reference whatever to an analogy between the objects themselves, which may come under that hieroglyphic. The objects (such as mountain, sky, tree, lion, serpent) afterwards exercise a preponderant influence

over the transfer of qualities to things. Two things (as sky and tent, tooth and mountain) are denoted by the same word, because they have struck the mind by one and the same quality. In this second stage the substantives, or expressions of things, are generally reducible to adjectives, or expressions of quality (the lion is the red, or the springer, or the roaring). Finally, in a third stage of development, the objects become, as such, by their totality, the leaders, and the substratum in the transfer of a word to a new signification. Analogy, as the most ancient Greek philosophers already perceived in all stages, is the constant rule of language; but then its index changes, and history exhibits to us the phenomena of this change, as the phasis of a development founded upon natural laws. The leading analogy is, first, that of the imitative organ; then, that of the quality of a thing; finally, of the things themselves, as the subjects or bearers of qualities.

Thus our opposition to the materialistic view is no longer a negative, but a positive one, both as regards fact and reason. But the evidence of language may be summoned in favour of a similar view, by pointing to the fact that all intellectual, moral, and spiritual notions are found to be only the secondary signification of the respective words, their primitive sense being physical, sensual.

This fact had been doubted or contradicted, first by the theologians on the evidence of the Hebrew, and lastly by Frederic Schlegel on the strength of Sanscrit. The one has turned out to be as great a fallacy as the other. In surveying all the languages of which we have records, we find the constant phenomenon, that the physical sense is the substratum of the metaphysical; apparent exceptions can therefore only be considered, *primâ facie*, as the natural consequence of the imperfection of our knowledge. But, moreover, since the law of analogy has finally been applied to etymology, those apparent exceptions have almost entirely disappeared. The fact is so universal, that it must flow from an organic law; and this

law, indeed, is not only that of history, but also of nature in general, and is as universal as it is rational.

To assume the contrary, implies indeed an absurdity. To say that language is the organ of reason for the expression of notions by words, is identical with asserting that language is to express something intellectual (an idea) by something physical (its symbol or sign). The mind produces a word by the same function by which any work of art, in the ordinary sense of the term, is created; for the word is really nothing but the first or primitive and irresistible product of that creative instinct and faculty in man which impels and enables him to realize the infinite in the finite. The mind does the same in the later stage of development, by bringing before us either proportions (musical harmony and architectonical symmetry), or by reproducing the shape and figure of the objects themselves (sculpture, drawing, painting). Infinite thought cannot be expressed otherwise than by its symbol in the finite; and nothing but the object of thought, that is to say something existing and its mode of existence, is thus expressed.

If we follow out this idea more profoundly, we shall find that the mystery of the mind is the mystery of the creation of the universe. What is creation but the expression of the infinite thought of the whole in co-existing and successive finiteness? The analogy of the natural development which proceeds from inorganic to organic life, and in organic life from unconsciousness to consciousness and individuality, with the development of mind, as demonstrably exhibited in the progress of language, that is to say in the history of the deposit of mind, is certainly very striking. The primitive language is decidedly inorganic, like the crystal. Every one of its words has the power of a totality in it, though it is not affected by other formations. The secondary formation has all the distinctive peculiarities of vegetable nature: its words are parts of speech, and exhibit a power of change and development, according to genera and

species. Finally, the words of the spirit, denoting the relation of one thought and sentence to another, are developed, and give expression to the agency of the mind upon itself. Such is the history of language as a whole: on a small scale it is, more or less, observable in every given language. Can this be accidental? and if it cannot be, must it not be considered as a proof that nature and finite mind flow from one and the same divine thought, which is God? Its reason is the presupposition of nature, and the first cause of development in language; thus conscious reason, which is spirit, is the aim and end of all formations in either. This is the result of analytic philosophy, as knowledge of the True: realize it by believing your moral consciousness, which tells you that the True is the perfect Good, and the supreme reason eternal love, and your philosophy is complete and becomes religion. But upon this relation between language and religion, we shall have more to say in the concluding chapter.

The nearest empiric analogy to the origin and organism of language is poetry. Poetry reproduces the original process of the mind in which language originates. The coinage of words is the primitive poem of humanity, and the imagery of poetry and oratory is only possible and effective, because it is a continuation of that primitive process which is itself a reproduction of creation, and finitely represents the general law of creation, the law of the universe, the consciously or unconsciously implied axiom in all physical and astronomical enquiries and systems.

II.

THE EVIDENCE OF LANGUAGE IN FAVOUR OF THE OBJECTIVITY
OF TRUTH.

BUT, it may be asked, and it has indeed often been asked, is not this intimate connection between reason and language, between notion and word, a decisive argument in favour of the subjectivity of all truth? Protagoras appealed to language when he said, "The measure of all things is man," and Horne Tooke answered Pilate's question by appealing to etymology. Truth is what the word signifies, what a man troweth, that is to say, believes.

This doubt thrown upon the reliability of language, if it had any force, must evidently apply also to reason itself. As soon as it is proved that language expresses reason, the question is only whether reason is able to perceive the substance of things, or only experiences certain subjective affections produced upon the mind by the objects. If the qualities shadowed forth by words be not the real qualities, not notions but sensual affections, it is the delusive nature of reason, not of language, which is at fault. Language cannot supply the defects of reason, whatever they may be. Equally true is it that, if reason has a perception of the substance of things by a constant cooperation of object and subject, and the mutual working of reality upon thought and of thought upon its objects (the existing things), language will not stand in the way, but on the contrary most powerfully second and aid reason.

Such being the case, I maintain that a faithful observation of the phenomena which show the origin and progress of language,

and the application of the elementary principles of induction and analogy, furnish the easiest, as well as the most conclusive proof of the objectivity of reason, and afford us the comfortable assurance that we are not only equally right in trusting our reason as our senses, but that in investigating the nature of things we can trust our senses only so far as they are controlled by reason and her logical operations.

Objectivity is the really distinctive character of language. Words express not the subjective impressions, the affections of the mind, but the qualities of things. It is precisely this which distinguishes human speech from animal utterances, and impels and enables man to speak and to understand man. If we watch the gradual and organic growth and development of the language of mankind, the immense line of connected historical development presented by it exhibits so much constancy in the rational phenomena of language, as no history of any art or science, or even of philosophy itself, can furnish. In all such histories we have (as already intimated) great difficulty in distinguishing what belongs to the individual working of the mind, and what to the general, and therefore necessary, agency of reason, thought, and apperception. Language alone is so pre-eminently the product of common sense, in its true meaning, that is to say of universal reason, that the laws of its construction and development stand before us as general laws, unaffected by individual, and, it might be, arbitrary operations. If we consider this circumstance but superficially even, we shall come to the conclusion that the facts of language must be admitted to be as strong proof of the reality of reason, as the facts of geology and astronomy are of the existence of certain laws in nature.

From this point of view I think we may consider the result of our analysis of language, based upon connected facts and simple principles for their explanation, as tangible proof of the reality of reason. It is undeniable that the whole human race, in spite of all the differences of civilisation, is

enabled by language, and consequently by reason, to deal with reality, to connect not only the outward, but also the inward phenomena, under the guidance of their individual languages. Reasoning connects successfully what is based upon reason.

It may also be said with equal truth that we must believe in the evidence of reason, on the ground of our belief in language, as that, on the same grounds, we believe in the evidence of the senses: for language is the common product of both reason and the senses, and combines scientific intelligence and artistic productiveness.

If we follow out still further the striking fact of language being primitively the congenial organ of reason, we are forcibly led to the conclusion, that all our faith in the reasoning process by which we deal with reality, in short, that which prevents us from overstepping the boundary between reason and madness, rests upon the instinctive, and therefore originally unconscious assumption that reason and things, mind and nature, men and the universe, subject and object, are merely the two different poles of one and the same substance, the Absolute Being—Thought.

How could man be understood by man? how could primitive words be used in connection, by composition, derivation, or juxtaposition, were there not an original objectivity in the reasoning process? and how is that objectivity possible but upon the assumption that all reality, all nature, is the unconscious expression of thought, subject to the laws of development in space and time? that matter is nothing but the limitation of finite existence, a limitation impossible to explain except by assuming the infinite which is thought and will, as the first cause? And here we stand upon the confines of religion, as far as it is the expression of truth in the relation of the infinite to the finite.

If, again, our philosophy of religion should lead us to the conclusion, that a belief in reason, as the faculty by which we discover the connection between cause and effect, and that

between subject and predicate, implies the belief in reason as conscience, that is to say in truth as good, and in knowledge as the apperception of good and evil; the evidence of language would be of still greater importance as tangible evidence in favour of the reasonableness and objective truth of our religious faith. We shall conclude our present reflections by contemplating some of the results of the philosophy of language upon the philosophy of religion.

III.

THE MUTUAL RELATION BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
AND THAT OF RELIGION.

If language be the work of the human mind, religion is so likewise; because they are the two effects of the operation of one and the same faculty, directed, in language, to the manifoldness of things, in religion, to the unity of this manifoldness, or to the first cause of the universe. The advance from the individual object which strikes us through the senses to a notion which defines the species and genus, is a process which supposes the existence and primitive assumption of a first cause. Again, as no instinct can remain without its corresponding manifestation, the mind must produce language.

Descending to the sphere of simple history, we find that religion, whether it means truth respecting the relation of the soul to God, or the corresponding acts of worship and of the social life of worshippers, cannot exist without words. But moreover the highest media of the manifestation of religious truth are religious words and teachings, and their only safe records, sacred books. It follows from our philosophy of language, as the organ of reason and the depository of thought and of facts, that the proper tribunal for interpreting such a code is reason, so far as religion is the expression of truth, ideal or historical. Any non-rational interpretation of those records is, therefore, in itself as irreligious as it is irrational. It may be necessary for private interests, perhaps ennobled, at least strengthened, by practical purposes to employ an irrational interpretation, but in itself any such interpretation is either a proof of illogical perversity and ignorance, or an avowal of imposture and conscious unbelief.

Now the philosophical analysis of language shows what is requisite for discovering the real sense of a word in a given record. We must first try to understand the original meaning of the word, its inherent power as it were; and then its significance in that given period of language, which evidently implies that we know, at least, the relative age of the record. This enquiry leads us farther into all the various points of historical criticism. Here we meet with questions such as, whether Moses is to be supposed to have related the story of his own death, because we call certain books, the books of Moses, as we call others the books of Judges and Kings—and again, whether Isaiah, a prophet before Sennacherib, must be supposed to have spoken of Cyrus as his contemporary, for a similar reason. In all such questions, reason alone, perhaps, will not obtain a hearing, owing to the indifference to truth, and because the faith of many exists upon unreasonableness: but language comes in at the head of facts, which are not so easily disposed of. There may be unbelief connected with the promotion of such investigations, but there always is with the attacks upon them on theological grounds. Such enquiries may be conducted individually here and there without faith: but there is no faith worth having implied in an indifference to them. The seriousness and value of the religious belief of any class of men, or of any nation, so far as they are considered rational beings, will always bear a due proportion to the efforts they make to investigate these points, and to bring the problems connected with them before the tribunal of reason, in order to secure a solid basis for historical belief.

But the bearing of a philosophical analysis upon the philosophy of religion goes much farther. It dives down to the very foundation of every historical tradition.

The laws of development in language must be, and demonstrably are, the same as those of the evolution of any religion, whether conveyed by words and written tradition or not. The

meaning of a word changes the reality of things, and the word, as a living evidence, acts upon the imaginative as well as reasoning faculties of the mind. *Ecclesia*, as applied by the Christians to their meetings, signified (like synagogue, which means congregation) the assembly of the associated people, the people themselves. The Romanic nations adopted the term as *chiesa*, *église*, *iglesia*, applied however to the locality and to the governing body: a very sad fall indeed. The Germanic nations, who used for *ecclesia* the word *Gemeinde* (community), or others of the same meaning, adopted from the Byzantines the expression (*Church*, *Kirk*, *Kirche*), which originally referred to the place of worship as dedicated to the Lord (*Kyriake* from *Kyrios*). The popular element thus gradually disappears in the notion of government, the people in the ruler, and the word itself, in its intellectual application, refers to the governing body as a *priesthood*. What is *priesthood*?—the quality of being one of the Elders (presbyters) of the congregation, chosen to preside at their meetings, for worship as well as social administration, for meals (the love-feasts or agapes), the regulation of alms-giving, and so on. But what does priest mean conventionally?—a mediator between God and the people.

Thus words, which were originally rational and correct expressions, either became absurd or false. Are they then to stand in the way of truth, when they have lost their truth? This question might easily be answered, were it not that there are attached to the absurdity or to the lie institutions and interests, and all the passions by which these are surrounded and supported, hiding their hideous faces under heavenly masks.

There are two modes of proceeding open to a nation, anxious for truth and able to attain it, when it makes this discovery. Either the word may be given up, or the dictionary may be practically corrected, by recalling the original meaning. In the first case, it is dropped and replaced by one the meaning of which is unmistakeable. The Germans, at the Reformation, replaced *Kirche*

by *Gemeinde*, and thus made their language, by one word, an evangelical messenger of truth to the millions who spoke it. Mixed languages, however, with their numerous conventional words, cannot easily achieve such changes. Still they may correct the dictionary. If neither of these be done, it is because, there being no regard for the truth of the thing, there is none for the truth of the expression, and the conventional lie is continued. The Chinese, by using the word and sign for Heaven, the Firmament, to denote God, the Supreme Being, cannot but admit that by so doing they more or less identify the two, and that they cannot speak (and consequently not think clearly) of a conscious first cause of that Firmament. Indeed, they do not: for in their whole conventional civilisation, they confound the law which causes something to act, with the organ by which it acts, and which they call "Number One," or Principle. This they always did to Gützlaff, when speaking of the mechanism of the steam-engine, which they had copied without understanding the principle: "Number One," they insisted, was the same. But observe. No sooner is the mind of the Chinese roused to a higher consciousness of man, than he feels it impossible to use the word Heaven for God, and he invents or uses another. He will assuredly do the same in mechanics, when he studies the principle upon which the mechanism of a watch or a steam-engine is put in motion.

Etymology, however, cannot supply the place of philosophy and theology. What is *Prayer* (*prière*, *preces*, *Gebet*), but begging (bitten)? What is *Sacrifice*, but the making something sacred, as the corresponding German (or rather Latin) term, *Opfer*, signifies an offering, and the Greek, *Thysia*, something slain? All these symbols may be explained by the idea, but the idea cannot be discovered by the word; so it is with whatever belongs to the mystery of the mind. What is a *Sacrament*, but the Latin word by which, in the New Testament, the Greek *Mysterium* is rendered, and which originally was a sacred declaration on

oath? What is *Baptism*, but immersion? *Communion*, but communion, community? They were both originally symbols of a renewal of life, deliberately and freely pledged, and of a common offering up of the selfish will. What are they now? Mere words, in which there is scarcely any truth retained if you stick to the letter! Can etymology do more than explain the outward fate of the tragedy?

What is *Mass* (*missa*), but the unintelligible (and therefore sacred) corruption of the first of the three words by which the Christian people were dismissed (*Missa est ecclesia*)? What is *Sunday*, but the day of the Sun? *Friday*, but the day of Freya, the goddess of Beauty and Love? Yet the one is the Lord's day (*Dominica, domenica, dimanche*); while the other is connected with the most solemn recollections of Him who died on that day for mankind.

The christianised Germanic mind has been unable to furnish an honest indigenous word either for Sacrament or Religion itself. What is *Religio*, but a conscientious consideration, reflection of the mind? What is *Glaube*, the real German term for religion as the product of the mind, but the action of *lubere*, Ang. Sax. *geleafan, beleafan* (believe), Goth. *ga-laubjan*, to hold dear, trustworthy? What is *credere*, but cred-do, giving trust, (vedantic, *çrad*)? or *pisteuein*, but the effect of persuasion (*peithein*)? *propitiation*, but bringing near (*prope*), making helpful? What is *Sühne* or *Versöhnung*, but making a libation? Is it sufficient to know that *Atonement* is making two things as one, to understand the connection between a historical fact (Christ's death) and the peace of our soul?

What is *Faith* (*foi*) but *Fides*? and what is *Fides*, but that which one can trust? *Truth*, but what is trowed, believed, reputed certain? *Wahrheit* is what is perceived (*gewahrt, wahr-genommen*). The German word *Ewigkeit* (Old German, *ēwa*, Goth. *aivs, aīwv, ævum*) means that which is going on, proceeding. What is *to be*, in all languages, but the spiritualisation

of walking, or standing, or eating? *Æternitas*, Eternity, does not carry us further. And what is *God*? Not the Good: though its meaning is unknown. *Deus* (and all the cognate words, as shown in what precedes) is the bright Ether. This brings us back to the Chinese idea as to the substratum. It is well to bear in mind, that *Word* is the translation of *Logos*, which signifies Reason as well as Word, but we may add that the Hebrew word for *Logos* (*Debar*) signifies also Thing; and that *redlich*, which comes from *Rede*, and has now a moral sense, meaning honest, originally signified rational. But will all this antiquarian lore help an enquiring soul, or satisfy a thinking mind? Or is it a great discovery, that the Greek original for Regeneration may be better explained as the act of being regenerated, rather than of being born again? All this is ridiculously superficial, and indeed an absurd delusion, or abominable sophistry. The case is the same as to knowledge and science. What is *Wissen*, but to have seen (*oida* from *ειδω*, Sanscr. *veda*, Goth. *vait*)? what is *to know* (*gnosco*, *γινώσκω*), but to have embraced? what *scire*, *scientia*, but to collect, thence to think, thence to know?

It is equally illusory to point to historical tradition in order to come to an understanding of things divine. Historical tradition consists of words, and is no more a definition than a person as an abstract notion. Tradition, and consequently all historical religion, is a hieroglyphic as well as the words in which it is conveyed. It implies that the object itself is allowed to exist, and that all men know and somehow understand it within. A firm religious faith in a thinking man or nation can no more rest ultimately upon a history than upon a myth. Or shall religious tradition be explained by rites and gestures? These are mute hieroglyphics waiting for the word to explain them. Everything, in short, points to the mind as the complex of Reason and Conscience. Destroy these, if you can; or trust

them, and let them have free, sovereign sway : if not, declare yourselves Atheists.

The ultimate result of all this may be summed up in a few words, and all that follows may be considered as a commentary upon them, much that precedes as an introduction to them.

Words are the most intellectual symbols, and symbols are, at the best, words. Neither the words of language nor the symbols of religion are the basis and reality of thought or of worship; they have no reality but in Reason and Conscience, and are of no use but in so far as they express this reality and are so understood and applied.

In proceeding, then, to the philosophy of religion, and, in particular, to the philosophy of the true and universal religion, Christianity, we must not hesitate, if we have any regard for truth, that is to say, for ourselves, to dive down into the depth of the mind, aided by Scripture and by the heavenly light of objectively true Reason, and under the guidance of the divine instinct for everything that is good, namely, Conscience.

Language has furnished us the presumption, that religion must be at least as rational as itself, and also that it may become as conventional as the words which are employed to express its rites, symbols, and doctrines.

PART II.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

THE
NATURE AND PRINCIPLE
OF
DEVELOPMENT IN RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION.

GOETHE observed, as the writer heard at Weimar in 1811, that to “learn a modern language was to pick up a current coin in the street, but to master an old one was to search for a medal, buried, as it were on purpose to hide it, under the ruins of a house, upon which later ages had erected dwellings of their own, after having set fire to the old mansion.”

This simile seems very strikingly to illustrate the particular difficulties of every historical inquiry into remote antiquity. In antiquity the historian may meet with characters more perfect, with motives of action more pure, and with events more brilliant than those of his own time. The primitive ages of our nation, or of the human race, possess, at all events, a peculiar charm for the philosophical and poetical mind. They are divested of much of the conventional existence mixed up with what is real in the age and nation of the inquirer, and they therefore reflect more purely the image of humanity. The historian of antiquity has indeed before him a coin with a divine image stamped upon it: but the legend is obliterated, and the image, originally perhaps of matchless beauty, has its surface cor-

roded, and its expression distorted, so that the naked eye or superficial observer can scarcely distinguish it from its counterfeit. The characters of extinct ages speak an extinct dialect of humanity: so do their monuments, their religions, and their records. These may remain a mystery for a series of centuries, although the words of their language can be construed, their annals and songs translated, their myths and legends explained. Their words, however confidently translated by the unthinking and conceited, are found by the man of deep thought and honest research not to be identical with those of our modern languages. The circle of ideas in which they originated is different. The men who coined them received different impressions from the world without, and inherited different traditions from their fathers, and formed out of them different associations of ideas. From these associations, and many apparently accidental influences of climate and events, sprung their works of the fine arts, their systems of philosophy, their poetry, and their domestic, political, and religious life. It is a prophetic office to interpret these hieroglyphics of the past, to evoke the spirit hidden in the monuments and records of antiquity. But which is the system prophetic for all nations? and where is the magic formula capable of raising the dead, and of making them reply to our questions?

Of all the medals of antiquity, that of religion is most corroded: its legend is most difficult to interpret and to restore; and perhaps what we see and read at last is nothing but an overlying stratum, which could only be explained if we were able to discover the primitive coinage and to find out its ancient history. To do both the one and the other of these is generally impossible. All religion centres in worship; worship in words and acts called rites, which can only live by tradition, and are necessarily changed in this process. Religion and language certainly are found preexisting in every nation which enters upon the world's stage: but we can see their growth and their decay,

we may live to see their death: most of them die with the nation in which they were embodied. They must have had an origin, and cannot, even if revealed, have fallen ready made from heaven, like meteoric stones, which have no history upon earth. Even the Bethylia, the sacred stones, have their history in man's mind and thoughts and doings. Religion, more even than language, is and will continue to be connected with the inward life and consciousness of man. It must have its philosophy: and that philosophy must commence with an examination of the elements of which religion consists.

FIRST SECTION.

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS
OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF DEVELOPMENT.

PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS
OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF DEVELOPMENT.

FIRST CHAPTER.

GOD AND CREATION.

I. GOD.

GOD, the infinite Cause of the Universe, must both exist and be an intelligent Being. Or, to express it more philosophically, the idea of God in the human mind implies at the same time, as indivisibly united, the idea of the primitively existing Being and that of the primitive Intelligence or absolute Reason. The saying is as old as Aristotle (Metaph. Λ.), that Reason (*φρόνησις*) can only have Reason for its object.

The object of the Thought of an infinite Being can only be Thought itself as Existence.

We are thus obliged to distinguish in God the Consciousness or Thought of Himself (the ideality) from his Being (or reality). Hence we arrive at an original duality in the infinite Being. His thinking Himself, by an act of eternal Will, is identical with his establishing in His being, by this spontaneous act, the distinction of Subject and Object: the Subject being Reason, the Object Existence as such, as distinct from Thought.

But that divine act implies, at the same time, the Consciousness of the ever-continuing Unity of Subject and Object, of Existence and Reason.

Thus there is implied in the One Thought of God a threefoldness, centring in a divine Unity.

In its finite realization, this divine threefoldness of the mind reflects itself both in the psychological process, by which a perception or notion is formed in the human mind, and in the logical process, or in the formation of a logical proposition. Man cannot think himself, without first acknowledging in himself the difference of the Subject (he who thinks) and of the Object (he who is the object of that thought), and at the same time without being conscious of the Unity of his Being. It is only thus that he knows that the subject and the object are identical, and it is by this consciousness alone that he is "in his senses" (*compos sui*). Indeed, all the Japhetic words for *consciousness* express that there is within us this twofoldness in conscious unity: *Gewissen* means the same as *συνείδησις* or *conscientia*, *Bewusstsein*; for it originally signifies *Mit-wissen*.

In order to prove that this psychological fact has an ontological reality, and is the substance of the divine mind, Schelling and Hegel have employed a metaphysical chain of reasoning. There is, however, another method of establishing such a proof, by showing that all we know of the finite realization of mind, viz. Man and Humanity, bears such testimony to this truth as to oblige us to suppose that a unity in threefoldness exists in the divine mind. But this requires a previous examination of the ideas of Creation, of Man, and of Mankind.

The making the logical process not a finite type and a purely phenomenological reflex of the infinite, but the real essence and only reality of the consciousness of God, is the second error of Hegel: the starting from the abstract notions of Existence and Thought, and not from an infinite conscious Will, a conscious Being who wills, is the first.

It is a delusive proceeding, to unite metaphysical and theological arguments in order to prove a religious tradition to be metaphysically true, or speculative reasoning to be Christian or orthodox. Thus, in our own times, some endeavour to construct a metaphysical threefoldness out of three of the qualities of the Divine Being, and to identify this arbitrary combination of these

three qualities with the primitive Christian doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit, which, moreover, many of these writers most uncritically, not to say ignorantly, identify with its development into the theological doctrine of the Trinity. The attempt of De La Mennais, who constructs a Trinity out of Power (*la Force*), Reason (*l'Intelligence*), and Love (*l'Amour*), is not free from this defect. Whatever results are thus obtained must be surreptitious, and they neither exhaust the metaphysical and logical process, nor express the sense of the passages of Scripture upon Father, Son, and Spirit.

II. CREATION.

To consider Creation either merely as an infinite or merely as a finite act, is equally untenable. Creation is not an act performed once for all, either eternally or in a given moment of time. Although it must be founded on eternal thought, it continues in time as the finite evolution of the divine Being and Thought through immediate finite agency. But, on the other hand, this realization of God in the finite supposes the infinite process of Creation by the antithesis of Will and Reason in the divine Being; or, to speak theologically, the eternal generation of the Word, which is the Son in the highest, that is to say, in the infinite or ideal sense.

As there exists a Creation, it is evident that this outward manifestation of God must be connected with that inner or immanent process. In the same manner as the eternal Being manifests Himself in this Self-consciousness as Thought, and as Unity both in Existence and Thought, the divine mind in the Creation must be supposed to reveal Himself in a twofold reality.

The thought of God of Himself is a making objective the eternal Subject: indeed, the creation of this universe is a continued objectivizing of subjectivity, and thus the reflex of the immanent divine process, applied to the finite.

The primitive antithesis in God (God and Word), applied to

the Creation in time and space, or considered with respect to the demiurgic process which terminates in man, may be denoted as that of Father and of Son. The Son may in this respect also be called the eternal Thought of God.

III. MAN.

In every human soul there are, consequently, two factors ; the infinite, in so far as the soul is a part of the self-consciousness of God before all finite existence ; and the finite, in so far as man has the immediate or nearest cause of his existence in another created being, or (in the first instance) in the agency of an elementary power in earth.

The same twofoldness exists necessarily in the continued work of Creation or in the Development. There the finite factor manifests itself in the action of the outer world, or the Universe, including the action of other individuals and of society upon the individual.

The nature of the finite factor, in generation and development, may be explained by the nature of the parents, the tribe, the national character, the language, the spirit of the age, the climate, education, events, and all concurrent external circumstances. But the infinite factor is the enigma of every man's existence. It is incalculable and inexplicable, as is every thing which is neither finite nor the work of finite causes. "So is every one that is born of the Spirit." (St. John, iii. 8.)


The greatest difference between individuals consists therefore in the infinite factor. Although, theoretically, only a difference in degree, it may amount, practically, to a difference in kind. There is the animal pole, and there is the divine pole of existence, and there is the human will between them.

The highest degree of power of the infinite in man is, that the soul has in itself the consciousness, and, by an unselfish, self-sacrificing life, manifests the working of that divine element

which is in him. This, in so far as it is real, is an incarnation of holiness, and consequently a second birth, or new creation.

As far as moral perfection is concerned, such an elevation of the human into the divine life can never be separated from the self-responsible ethical action, which alone constitutes virtue, and alone gives ethical dignity. But this action is not the action of man as Self; that is to say, of the finite Being, as far as it is striving to become the centre of existence, and fancies itself its own cause as well as its own end. It is the action of the infinite factor in him, working undisturbed a life in God. This antithesis of Self and God, in the highly gifted mind, corresponds with what is called, theologically, the difference between Nature and Grace, "natural light" and "divine light."

The end of all ethical effort is, philosophically speaking, that Nature becomes Spirit; and the aim of creation is, that Spirit ends in becoming incarnate. For this is the process of the realization of the infinite in the finite, and man has to reproduce the very thought and act of creation, he being the finite mirror of the Infinite in the Universe. The following table shows the harmony between the Semitic expressions and the Japhetic terms of the philosophy of the mind:



SECOND CHAPTER.

MAN AND HUMANITY.

IN the intellectual world the finite expression of the Thought is the conscious individual, Man.

The privilege of man is his freewill, his power of free moral action. He is not bound to act by a cogent impulse from within or without, either of instinct or of the outer world, but is capable and called upon to act on the decision of his own reason and conscience, or, to express it more precisely, on an ethical resolution based upon conscience negatively, and upon reason positively. This freewill gives man the awful power of appropriating to Self what is God's, of substituting his self-interest and pride for the ideas of what is good, and just, and true. By being allowed to realize this power, which realization is *the* evil and *the* sin, his conscience tells him that he is self-responsible. Freewill imposes self-responsibility. Thus freewill includes necessarily the power of not following the will of God and the dictates of conscience and enlightened reason, but of acting according to that negation of the divine will potentially contained in Self. By divine necessity, what is the origin of evil becomes the impelling power of development in universal history. Evil exists only through man, but it exists as the condition of his free agency, and of the realization of the divine mind in finite nature.

The consciousness of the human mind in reality is, and always must have been, that suspension between the attraction to a centre and the falling away from it by its own momentum, which in nature produces planetary rotation. There is in

man the consciousness of the option left to him between the free life in God and the enslaving act which, instead of God, constitutes Self the centre of existence, and this double consciousness is the subjective element of individual religion.

But man is not only an individual : he is originally and necessarily a part of humanity. The first manifestation of this necessary manifoldness is in matrimony, thence in family, whence tribes and communities and nations spring. Its highest expression is humanity, or the totality of the human race, as considered in its development through the series of generations.

Mankind, or Humanity, is therefore as much a reality, and consequently as much a realization of divine Being and Thought in time, as the individual man is.

The most distinctive character of intellectuality is progress. The human race alone does not only continue to exist, like other animal races, by the succession of generations, but advances in and through them, by families, tribes, nations, and in ever-enlarging orbits of development.

Mankind advances according to the idea which is divinely placed in it, although it advances only through the instrumentality of individual men. All development has its first cause in individual progress, excellence, and power ; but this advance or progress receives its full realization by becoming a principle of life in the other members of the social body, and by being thus divested of individuality. Moreover the very idea of progress originates in the idea of humanity. No thought or action of an individual is progressive, except in so far as it agrees with that principle of human progress.

The principle of the progress of humanity, again, necessarily has its root in the law of divine self-manifestation.

It is the highest object of the philosophical history of mankind to exhibit this law. But the solution of this problem in a concrete form supposes a methodical organic union of three distinct operations. The first is the philosophical or speculative, as to

the leading principles and general method. The second is the philological, for sifting and previously organizing the facts contained in the historical records, of which language is not only the vehicle, but itself the principal and primitive monument. The third is the historical, which organizes these facts definitively, according to the principle of development.

The goal of humanity is a state of the world in which the society of man, although divided by tongues, nations, and governments, shall exhibit that incarnation of divine life which is called Semitically "the Kingdom of God," or "the Church," in the highest sense.

THIRD CHAPTER.

GOD, MAN, HUMANITY.

IF the infinite be the necessary cause of the finite, the key to the knowledge of the finite mind must be in the infinite mind. Now, as religion avowedly implies a connection between God and man, the realities concerned present, at first sight, a twofoldness, God and man ; but in fact, a threefoldness, God, man, humanity (or mankind). Or in other words : God, as manifesting Himself in and through man, manifests Himself in a twofold character—as the infinite cause of the individual man, and as the infinite cause of humanity.

Such a twofold manifestation, not being reducible to the peculiar nature of the finite, implies, as cause, a twofoldness in the primitive, eternal self-manifestation of God. Now the analysis of this twofoldness, as constituting the divine mind in infinite self-manifestation, has given us the following Triad :

I. EXISTENCE.	THOUGHT. (Reason.)	CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNITY OF BOTH.
II. GOD,	WORD,	SPIRIT,
as	as	as
the Absolute Being.	the Eternal Manifesta- tion in God.	Eternal Consciousness of Unity.

The triad of God manifesting Himself in the universe through man, or the triad of the infinite in the process of realization in time, is this :

GOD—MAN—HUMANITY.

If the threefoldness thus arising out of the union and co-operation of the infinite and finite, be demonstrably only the reflex of that ideal process of the self-consciousness of the divine mind, the metaphysical or ontological triad is proved to be the necessary prototype of the finite reality, and the key to the threefoldness of God in religion.

Man is in the finite, that is to say, in the visible universe, what the thought (or logos) is in the infinite divine mind; and humanity is to the individual, what the consciousness of the unity of existence and thought is to God—the complete form of the divine manifestation. For humanity, as such, does not exist in bodily reality; neither is it only the aggregate of individuals, for it has a principle of evolution independent of the individual. It can therefore only be explained by its organic reference, both to man and to God: to man, so far as he is the apparent reality of humanity; to God, as the eternal cause of all. The development of humanity has therefore its real centre in the eternal self-manifestation of the divine mind. In the divine mind the complete consciousness of unity implies the existence, having been made objective by thought (the objectivation). Thus, in the demiurgic process of the divine mind, humanity presupposes man.

The second, or demiurgic threefoldness, God, man, humanity, is the great reality in which the human mind finds itself placed; and it is this threefoldness, as based upon the eternal divine self-manifestation, which religion, or the God-consciousness in man, necessarily exhibits.

If this be true, every positive religion, so far as it is true, must acknowledge, more or less perfectly, that threefoldness, and express it in its own language, which is that of history or tradition, not of abstractions.

It follows with equal certainty that the true threefoldness will never be understood, unless the great reality in which we live be made an integral element of the religious system. This reality

is the Cosmos, and in particular, the intellectual Cosmos, or mankind's humanity. Speculation finds, not only its counterpoise, but also its directing compass in this reality.

Christianity could not be, as it is, the true religion, the religion of the world, if it did not require us, for the perfect understanding of it, to realize its speculative principles, honestly, however imperfectly, in all the spheres of human life, from individual and family life, to general, social, and political life. The incarnation means that Christ must become successively man, family, congregation, nation, state, humanity.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

NATURE OF RELIGION.

1. *Religion as Consciousness.*

MAN, as an intellectual being, has the inward consciousness of a ruling divine will and reason, as being the first cause and ruler of the universe, and of the intimate and immediate connection between his own will, his reason and whole existence, and that divine will. This immediate consciousness is called religion, or, in German, consciousness of God (*Gottesbewusstsein*). The religious consciousness, or religion as perception and feeling, is in man, as an intellectual being, exactly what instinct, the perception of the outer world in its relation to the animal life, is in the animal creation. The religious consciousness may therefore be called the highest instinct of humanity.

Like all other instincts, religious consciousness or feeling has both its sense (*Sinn*), as organ of perception, and its impulse (*Trieb*), destined to appropriate and make the perception its own by a corresponding action. Thus, to refer to an organic analogy in nature, the spider perceives, by its peculiar sense, the state of the atmosphere, and by its impulse regulates accordingly its mathematical work of self-preservation—the web.

The human reaction upon the perception is naturally an ethical one, and is controllable by reason and conscience. As man, by his mind, is the microcosm or mirror of nature, his sense and impulse are in contact both with the whole outer world and with its infinite cause.

As man's existence, from beginning to end, supposes two elements or factors working in him, the finite, or immediate, and the infinite, or mediate; this twofoldness must also operate in the origin and development of religion, both as perception and reaction.

The perception of the infinite factor by the religious instinct again contains two elements: the feeling of the connection of the soul with that first cause and ruling being, and the feeling of estrangement from the same. The religious consciousness feels connected but not united, estranged but not isolated: and thus revolves about the infinite in eternal dependence and separation, attracted by eternal love and impelled by inward longing.

The religious instinct perceiving the connection with the divine substance, is called beatitude; in German, God-blessedness (*Gottseligkeit*): the religious instinct perceiving the estrangement is called conscience (*Gewissen*). Conscience, subjectively, may be defined as the self-preservative feeling of moral horror or disapprobation of everything which causes an estrangement by the thought or action of the individual.

The religious impulse, immediately directed towards God, manifests itself also in a two-fold action; as thought, it is called *prayer*; as action, it is called *sacrifice*. The unity of prayer and sacrifice consists in this, that, in each, man dedicates his finite existence to the infinite, acknowledging this infinite to be the only true reality.

The religious instinct, directed towards God through the finite, is called the ethical instinct; and divides itself, subjectively, into the ethical instinct of the individual, and that of man as a member of humanity; objectively, as the perception of truth in the finite existence, and as the perception of goodness, or what is good, in that existence.

The religious impulse directed towards finite existence is in the same manner directed to the realization (or appropriation) either of truth or of goodness. The product of the one is knowledge,

and leads to science: the product of the other is virtue, and leads to holiness.

The instinctive feeling of the unity of the true and of the good is the sense of the beautiful; the manifestations of which are the works of the fine arts. It has its root in the religious feeling and impulse.

The end of all human development is to change instinct into conscious reason, and impulse into an active principle, as the spring of ethical action, realizing what is in the mind. This is the highest realization of the Divine mind in time, finite nature thus becoming the organ of infinite reason and goodness.

2. Religion as the Product of religious Consciousness.

As the consciousness of the rational unity of the outer world, brought into contact with the phenomena of that world around us, by instinctive, artistic reaction, produces language, so the religious consciousness, or the consciousness of the unity of the soul with God, and of its destination to realize the moral order of the universe, first in itself, then in mankind and nature, necessarily produces religion. In this sense religion is, with language, the primitive product of the human mind, and the basis of that social life which they both imply and promote. They are the primitive art and poetry of mankind, embodying primitive science.

All this therefore may also be called revelation, or manifestation of God, for it comes from God, and the purer it is, the more directly from God. But it has no other organ but man's mind, that mind thus divinely endowed, and placed in the universe with the awful liberty of shutting its eyes to the light in which it moves, by considering itself as its centre, and the good and the true and the beautiful as subject to its selfish will and arbitrary decision.

The circumstance whether this religious manifestation, or revelation, or realization, exists in rites alone, or in rites and doctrine, in knowledge only or in practice, constitutes the fundamental difference between different ages of religious life.

The merely external or the internal, essential and decisive connection of these sublime manifestations of the creative power of the mind constitutes the test of the lower or higher value of these manifestations.

The ritual prayer is to be the type of the thought, the ritual sacrifice the type of the action in real life. The degree of approximation to this standard, fixes the value of the religious system.

3. *Religion as Law and Government.*

As the consciousness of the unity between the soul and God is the bond of unity between men, and as the realization of religious consciousness is the sublimest product of the primitive social mind; religion, as a social institution, must fall under the category of law and government.

It will evidently be essential, in order to judge of the religious mind of a nation or age, to consider how far this law and this government are in harmony with the essential nature, both of its religious consciousness and of its objective product.

The means must evidently be subordinate to the end. Religion, law, and government ought not therefore to interfere with the end of all religion—namely, the advancement of the divine thought of the world, as intellectual and moral Cosmos. It ought, consequently, never to be considered as the essential, or as having any value in itself except as being instrumental and effectual for that purpose, being felt as the organic expression of the inward impulse and thought.

In the second place, it ought not to prevent, but to promote,

the development of that religious consciousness, which is the consciousness of the ethical laws of the intellectual universe.

In the third place, as the institution is necessarily a social one, it ought to be intimately connected with the other agencies of social life, whether in the family or in the state.

It results from the simple truths considered in this chapter, that, considering what human nature is, many powerful antagonisms must arise in the course of development of any religion.

SECOND SECTION.

THE
HISTORICAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS
OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF DEVELOPMENT IN RELIGION
GENERALLY.

THE
HISTORICAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS
OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF DEVELOPMENT IN RELIGION
GENERALLY.

INTRODUCTION.

PRIMITIVENESS OF RELIGIOUS MANIFESTATION, AND THE NATURE OF
REVELATION AND HISTORICAL TRADITION.

THE primitiveness of religious sense and religious manifestation is proved philosophically, first by the analogy of all instinctive perceptions and actions: secondly, by showing that the previous existence of that consciousness of God is necessary to all progress, and to the existence of all that forms human civilization.

The first manifestation of the human mind is generally said to be language. Certainly the manifestation of the religious feeling, both in the domain of worship and of practical ethical action in the world, beyond external acts and gestures, presupposes language as the perception of things manifested by articulate sounds. But language itself could never exist without the primitive religious consciousness. It is the distinctive nature of language, that it does not echo the impression made upon the mind, through sensation, by the external world, but that it expresses organically the reaction of the contemplative mind upon that impression. In other words, language does not express things as striking the senses, but things as represented

by qualities perceived in them by the mind. A word is originally the expression both of a quality contemplated in a thing, and of a thing contemplated in a quality: and therefore the original word implies necessarily a whole logical proposition; that is to say, subject, predicate, and copula—the copula being nothing but the implicit or explicit acknowledgment of the concordance of subject and predicate:

A	=	B
SUBJECT.	COPULA.	PREDICATE.
(Tree)	(is)	(green.)

This formula is nothing but the application of the primitive religious consciousness to individual things. The consciousness of the first cause is necessary to form any original word, and, more explicitly, to enunciate the unity of that which permanently *is* (substance), and that which is evolving (person or thing) or starting from one state of existence into another.

Finally, the primitiveness of religious consciousness can be proved historically, as strictly as any historical demonstration admits, by the fact, that it may be suppressed, and may be driven into madness, but can no more be extirpated than reason can. External or internal adverse circumstances may depress the human religious consciousness, individually and collectively, in a given family or tribe, to such an extent as to degrade the human mind to a loss of that consciousness: but that this state is abnormal, is proved by the collateral depression of the reasoning faculty, and by the circumstance, that both return when the depressing circumstances cease. That depression is nothing but a form of idiocy. The opposite degeneration of the religious consciousness, pantheism, in the form of man believing himself to be God, gives direct evidence, like every form of madness, of the existence of the normal consciousness, from which it is the exceptional aberration. Spinoza says somewhere: "*Remoto errore, nuda veritas remanet*" (Take away error, and naked

truth remains). It may be said with equal truth: "Remotâ insaniâ, ratio pura apparet" (Remove aberration of mind, and pure reason appears).

Civilization, in the highest sense, is nothing but the restoring of the depressed or savage state to the normal, by the action of a superior mind, or a higher and nobler race, upon that state of degradation. In this process of development the tribe may become extinct, as individuals may die in the process of organic development. But there are abundant instances of their surviving this development, and thriving better than before.

There never was brought forward a more crude and unphilosophical notion than that of the English and French deists of the last century respecting natural religion. Its most absolute formula is that of Diderot: "All positive religions are the heresies of natural religion." There no more exists a natural religion, than there exists a natural or abstract language in opposition to a positive or concrete language. What was called natural religion is, on the contrary, but the dross of religion, the *caput mortuum* which remains in the crucible of a godless reason after the evaporation of reality and life.

But this crude notion was the negative reaction against the equally untenable, unphilosophical, and irrational notion: that revelation was nothing but an external historical act. Such a notion entirely loses sight of the infinite or eternal factor of revelation, founded both in the nature of the infinite and in that of the finite mind, of God and man.

This heterodox notion became still more obnoxious, by its imagining something higher in the manifestation of God's will and being than the human mind, which is the divinely appointed organ of divine manifestation, and in a twofold manner: ideally in mankind, as object, historically in the individual man, as instrument.

The notion of a merely historical revelation by written records is as unhistorical as it is unintellectual and materialistic. It

necessarily leads to untruth in philosophy, to unreality in religious thought, and to Feticism in worship. It misunderstands the process necessarily implied in every historical representation. The form of expressing the manifestation of God in the mind, as if God was Himself using human speech to man, and was thus Himself finite and a man, is a form inherent in the nature of human thought, as embodied in language, its own rational expression. It was originally never meant to be understood materialistically, because the religious consciousness which produced it was essentially spiritual; and, indeed, it can only be thus misunderstood by those who make it a rule and criterion of faith, never to connect any thought whatever with what they are expected to believe as divinely true.

Every religion is positive. It is therefore justly called a religion "*made manifest*" (*offenbart*), or as the English expression has it, *revealed*: that is to say, it supposes an action of the infinite mind, or God, upon the finite mind, or man, by which God in His relation to Man becomes manifest or visible. This may be mediate, through the manifestation of God in the universe or nature; or a direct, immediate action, through the religious consciousness.

This second action is called *revealed*, in the stricter sense. The more a religion manifests of the real substance and nature of God, and of His relation to the universe and to man, the more it deserves the name of a divine manifestation or of revelation. But no religion which exists could exist without something of truth, revealed to man, through the creation, and through his mind.

Such a direct communication of the Divine mind as is called revelation, has necessarily two factors which are co-operating in producing it. The one is the infinite factor, or the direct manifestation of eternal truth to the mind, by the power which that mind has of perceiving it: for human perception is the correlative of divine manifestation. There could be no revelation of

God were there not the corresponding faculty in the human mind to receive it, as there is no manifestation of light where there is no eye to see it.

This infinite factor is, of course, not historical: it is inherent in every individual soul, but with an immense difference in degree.

The action of the Infinite upon the mind is the miracle of history and of religion, equal to the miracle of creation. Miracle, in its highest sense, is therefore essentially and undoubtedly an operation of the divine mind upon the human mind. By that action the human mind becomes inspired with a new life, which cannot be explained by any precedent of the selfish (natural) life, but is its absolute opposite. This miracle requires no proof: the existence and action of religious life is its proof, as the world is the proof of creation.

As to the preternatural action of the infinite mind upon the body and upon nature in general, two opinions divide the Christian world, both of which are conscientious. The one supposes any such action of the infinite to exist only by the instrumentality of the finite mind, and in strict conformity with the laws of nature, which, as God's own laws, it considers immutable. It therefore considers miracles, which appear to contradict these laws, as misunderstandings on the part of the interpreter, who mistakes a symbolical, poetical, or popular expression, for a scientific or historical one. This is now acknowledged to be the case as regards the celebrated miracle of Joshua and the sun. If the miracle has reference to the human body, the one view ascribes it either to the same misinterpretation, or to the influence of a powerful will upon the physical organization of another individual, or, lastly, to the operation of the mind upon its own body. The other sees the divine miracle in the alleged fact, that these laws have been set aside for a providential purpose. As the subject is primarily a historical one, the safest rule seems to be, to judge

every individual case, in the first instance, by the general rule of evidence. An unprejudiced philosophy of history, at all events, will not allow this question to be placed on the same level with *the* ever-living, self-proving miracle of history, which nobody in his senses denies, but rather say, with Hippolytus, in reference to the other miracles: "Such miracles are for the unbeliever, whom they often fail to convert, and must be considered as useless when unbelief ceases."

The second factor of revelation is the finite or external. This mode of divine manifestation is, in the first place, a universal one, the universe or nature. In a more special sense, it is a historical manifestation of divine truth through the life and teaching of higher minds among men. These men of God are eminent individuals, who communicate something of eternal truth to their brethren; and, as far as they themselves are true, they have in them the conviction, that what they say and teach of things divine is an objective truth. They therefore firmly believe that it is independent of their individual personal opinion and impression, and will last, and not perish as their personal existence upon earth must pass away.

The difference between Jesus and the other men of God is analogous to that between the manifestation of a part, and of the totality and substance, of the Divine mind. It is Semitically expressed by the distinction between Moses and Christ. According to Jewish theologians, not only a distinction was made between the decalogue and the ceremonial law, but the whole law was given through the instrumentality of angels, not through God directly. St. Paul adopts this view, and contrasts the Mosaic dispensation with the manifestation of God through Jesus, the Christ. In other words, the Christian religion is a manifestation of the very centre of God's substance, which is Love: it is the revelation of the Father by the Son, who is the incarnation of the eternal Word, and without Sin.

FIRST CHAPTER.

PRINCIPLES AND ANTAGONISMS.

THE more a religion is a revealed one, the more is it also a revealing religion; and the more it reveals or manifests of God's own positive Being in His relation to mankind, the more powerful the infinite or ideal factor in it must be. It must therefore leave to the agency of the Spirit all externals, instead of imposing a ready-made law-book or a ceremonial. That same power will also prevent the Spirit from ever being encroached upon definitively by such canons or rituals.

As a positive given form of religion lives, so it dies, by the power of the infinite factor. It is this element which gives the inward life and intellectuality to the historical revelation, and which destroys whatever is hostile to it in the composition.

The historical factor is, as to its external form, subject to all the limitation of the finite, but acquires its dignity by the union with the infinite. What is divine, if it is to be realized by divine law, must always have "the form of the servant," that is to say, conform itself to the laws of all finiteness. But this law in itself, so far from being an impediment to the infinite, is destined to become its highest triumph, finite realization being the end and aim of all divine development.

The difficulty arises in the progress of the work. In the development of religion, the superstructure often conceals for ever the foundation, and is in its turn again overlaid by progressive structures.

The rites, symbols, or sacred acts, with which this primitive drama of mankind commences, have their own laws of develop-

ment, and by their unchecked action they may develop themselves in entire opposition to the idea which they are meant to realize. They tend to formalism, whereas the idea itself has not only the power, but is conscious of the divine right and the sacred duty of breaking the form if it attempts to usurp the throne, instead of serving as a handmaid. In a similar way, the social arrangements which are to realize the idea of religious community and union contain, by their own special tendency, the germ of hierarchy and priestcraft. Thus every corporation has, by the selfish principle, a tendency to forget that it is only to be a means to an end, and that it is not itself the aim and end.

In like manner, whenever a religious idea is perverted and corrupted by formalism and hierarchism, its nature is threatened with a pathological metastasis, or change of centre. What was, in the first stage of pathological change, simply a sensuous misunderstanding, what appeared to the mind a weakness, an innocent child's play, has a tendency to be raised into a system, and canonized as the first article of a Creed. From that moment the once true symbol becomes the nail in the coffin of that form of religion.

The danger arising in this stage of development of the internal element, from the history of the religious feeling, is still greater. The rite expressed the originally religious idea which formed the centre of the religious consciousness of the family, tribe, or nation, when the rite was first instituted. It expressed that idea typically, artistically; and how could it do otherwise? Can we speak otherwise than by words? Can we express plastic ideas otherwise than by forms? Such a demand is like the craving of man to eat something better than wheaten bread. But what happens, when that centre of consciousness itself changes? If, for instance, instead of thankfulness to the Cause of all good, the rite is to express a dread of the unseen, hidden power, which conscience tells us we have offended? If, instead of expressing an internal act of the worshipping man, addressed to the Creator, it is to represent a historical act, perhaps a supposed external

one, relating to matter? Here the antagonism is absolute. The new consciousness will remodel the words or the form of the celebration of the rite, so as to make it expressive of the new centre of consciousness, and this inward change itself may be the natural effect of a gradual change which has taken place in the celebration of the rite. This may be physiological or pathological, evolution or dissolution; but who shall decide which it is? Authority or the general conscience? How can conscience decide what it no longer understands? How can authority operate upon conscience without reason, except by sanctifying what is contrary to reason, by canonizing an absurd supposition, by deifying the unreal?

There must be development in every stage of religion, which is not quite extinct: for life is development in time, as the world is development in space. But where is the test to prove that the development is a sound one? Every disease has its development, which is the course of pathological phenomena; but its end is death. Where is the criterion for discovering which is the physiological process of life, and which the pathological one of death? The mental struggle and agony of ages, the great tragedy of centuries, lies in that question.

First, certain bodies of men, called priests, dispute professionally and mystically about the rites; all claiming a divine vocation, a more or less infallible authority. Then comes the legislator and prescribes that you are to worship God according to the rites of your fathers and your fatherland. But men and women leave their fatherland and join another: is truth altered when you cross a river or a hill? And if both reason and conscience cry aloud, "It is not!" where is the solution? Not in the philosopher who says: "Take no heed of differences: the real truth is expressed by none; find out, if you like, what truth there may be in any of them." Not even if he adds: "Fear God, and above all do not transgress the laws about sacred and holy things."

If ritual religion once reach this stage, the complication be-

comes greater and greater ; scepticism arises, which is the greatest complication, for it despairs of solution. Worship, the practice of religion as such, becomes an indifferent form, perhaps a heavy burthen, to the philosopher, a superstitious or mystical rite to the great mass of the people and to women.

SECOND CHAPTER.

ANTAGONISMS IN RELIGIONS BASED UPON RECORDS.

RELIGIOUS records appear in the above tragical complication as a divine solution of the difficulty. They record what was the spirit of the primitive age and tradition. But they cannot record this fact except by words, and consequently by the letter. The written word appears at a late stage : and, besides, it is a letter. New difficulties arise with new complications : for the letter has its own inherent law of development, its own tragedy, which is even a more complicated one than the rite.

The tragical complication becomes greater as the development proceeds. The rites and hierarchical forms become embodied into ritual and liturgical rolls, and into canonical codes. With them is connected a sacred history of the origin of the people and of mankind : partly symbolical expressions of thought, partly historical traditions. Both histories, the ideal and the real, by the natural laws of the human mind, take the historical form. Hence originates the myth, by the same necessity as did the symbol. The one is necessarily as much the expression of an ideal truth as the other : and both are so by the same organic law from which language originates and progresses. The beginning of the world, the primitive union of the infinite and finite, cannot be expressed in other than the historical form, any more than the notion of a being can be embodied otherwise than in a substantive bearing a personal character. Myth is essentially the product of the organic transformation of thought into reality, of the infinite into the finite : it is the primitive philosophy and

poetry of mankind. But then the mythical element becomes obscured: it is mistaken for real, where it expresses a symbolical idea; or it is misunderstood as originally ideal, where it stands upon the ground of reality. Historical facts are mythicized: ideal facts assume a historical garb. A later age canonizes this twofold confusion, the religious idea is buried beneath its superstructure, like Tarpeia under her golden jewels, and sits benumbed and spell-bound in the sanctuary, as did the fair one of the Capitol in the cavern of the rock.

To this eternal law of all that exists finitely every historical tradition is subject. A special providence may give and preserve to one race of mankind the purest written traditions; but it cannot design to change the nature of its own eternal wisdom, by which every created thing operates according to the law imparted to it.

The written record always presupposes the unwritten law, the inward, eternal revelation made to the soul when by divine decree she was merged into time and space, and subjected to the laws of development in both. Yet the written law has a still greater tendency to set aside the unwritten, than had the rite and the hierarchy and the myth and all the offspring of oral tradition. It generally is ritual, or at least contains a strong ritual element. The rite preserves oral tradition: the record fixes it. But tradition has no right to fixity, except under temporal tenure, and thus any authority derived from it is only held under the condition, that it shall cease when tradition ceases to express the eternal idea. The tradition must be true, to a certain degree at least, objectively, and without restriction subjectively. It must be founded on some truth, and must be believed to be true, authoritatively true. It may be believed as true, either on the faith of the holy order which constitutes the living authority, or on the faith of the Sacred Record which is considered as the highest oracle of truth. It may finally be believed on the faith of the living voice of the conscience in self-

responsible and thinking men, supported by the spirit of collective wisdom and of the public institutions of the country. But it must always in good faith be believed to be true, and authoritatively true, and that by people who believe that there is truth.

It is most essential in every religion, and particularly in those founded upon records, that it contain something which is not regarded as the thought of individuals, but placed above all individuals: the acknowledgment of an objective, all-ruling authority. But it is no less essential, that this be an inward authority speaking to conscience and to reason, and responded to by both. There is no religion without reverence for some truth independent of individual feeling and arbitrary will, and of every thing connected with Self. This is equivalent to the full acknowledgment of a paramount authority, freely but explicitly consented to. There is no religion without reverence; no reverence without religion, not even self-reverence. But practice, as well as authority, must be responded to by reason and conscience.

All religions based upon historical records must moreover pass through another peculiar crisis. The records, as we have seen, necessarily contain two elements: the strictly historical events and deeds of men which they relate, and ideas which they proclaim, not only as true, but as authoritatively true, fundamental and normal. The more truly religious the records are, the more are these two elements intimately connected with each other. The facts will affect our inward life directly, that is to say, from their relation to the life of a holy man, without any intervention of nationality or conventionality. The general ideas contained in the records will be historical, as expressing the religious consciousness of the founder of the religion, or of those who carried out and committed to writing his life and teaching.

The primitive religious consciousness of a nation unites these two elements, without distinguishing between what is purely historical and what is purely ideal, between what is

history built upon an idea and what is an idea attached to history. This is the age of childhood.

Then comes the age of reflection. The inquiring minds (if there be any in the nation) look for the proof as to the idea, and for the evidence as to the fact. It is in the very nature of religious records to be historical in the idea, and ideal in the history. Ideal and real facts are not always distinguished; and, as to ideas, they are set down as true, as part of the historical or supposed historical, God-consciousness of him, or of them, who declared them to be true.

Prophets were needed in the former period to pronounce the will of the divinity whose oracle was consulted, and these prophets again required and had their interpreters, or hypophets, who clad the obscure words of the unconscious, clear-sighted seer in intelligible words. Now new prophets are needed; and, this time, conscious prophets, interpreters of their own visions.

At the same time two opposite schools will arise among the prophets and among the people. Some will cling to the letter, others to the spirit. They have each much to say for themselves. What is the letter without the spirit, in a subject essentially spiritual? And what is the spirit without the letter, in a record substantially historical? But again: Who is to decide what the letter is and means? Some say, the living priestly authority; some, the tradition of the learned of old; some, the present consciousness of men enlightened by study, thought, and earnest life.

Those nations who adhere to the letter and authority will in a progressive age necessarily fall, sooner or later, into scepticism. If every thing be true by authority, nothing is true. If every tradition is to be believed because it is recorded, nothing will be believed. The augur of philosophical Rome laughed when he saw himself in the mirror of his colleague: so does the dervish. But then the Greek philosopher and the Sufi have their laugh too; and, besides, they have their own reasoning which outlives both them

and their opponents. In the mean time, the faithful stand aghast. Some think there is an end of religion, if not of the world; others, that there is no truth. Thus a *caput mortuum* of theism or pantheism remains: general doubt prevails. The national faith dies away, at the very moment, perhaps, when people think there is a beginning of new life.

Those nations which make light of the letter, but cling to the spirit, have to pass through a great inward struggle, but they fare better on the whole. They may preserve the foundation of all religion: the belief that there is truth, that it is worth while, the worthiest object of life, indeed, to find it, and the highest duty and privilege to regulate the life of the immortal soul accordingly. But here also is the doom of death, unless the two elements which have been separated be re-united.

At this stage man begins to philosophize on his own religion, and on religion and human destinies in general. Then comes a stage of doubt, which, in the most serious minds, may be coupled with pious resignation. The expression of such a mind is the improved formula of the natural end of simply ritual religion: "Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man." Such is the last result of speculation in the Old Testament, the end of the Ecclesiastes, of the fourth or fifth century before Christ.

A similar critical stage of existence awaits the noblest tribes of men which outlive their youth without having outlived their strength. Few, however, have the courage to pass the gulf between childhood and manhood, without leaving faith behind them. Thus many reach the opposite shore with the much heavier load of scepticism, or at least without sufficient vitality to plant the tree of life under the scorching sun of knowledge, and in the volcanic soil of a lost paradise. Political nations, therefore, are apt to abandon the problem of finding a positive solution of the riddle of man's history and of revelation. They do not, however, by this escape decay and

finally death, whatever different means they may employ for cementing their shattered foundation: persecution or liberty, inquisition or inquiry, indifference or speculation, materialism or spirituality. By giving up the solution of the problem thrown into their way by destiny, which is Providence, they have signed their own death-warrant, leaving themselves only the option as to the mode of death. For what is the preservation of life in a mummy, but death intruding upon the living? a nuisance incorruptible, and therefore the more abominable to God and to men?

Is more religion, or less, required in such a state of things? Certainly, faith is required, and faith will be manifested, more than ever before. But with what dangers is the way beset which leads from the paradise lost to the paradise regained! from the blooming land of childhood to the fruitful land of promise, through the desert of doubt and close by the abyss of infidelity! Scepticism, armed with all the powers of civilization, comes to the marketplace and asks: Is not inspiration, frenzy? faith, superstition? are not rites, mummeries? histories, nursery tales? Is not the much-lauded divine medal, after all, an ordinary coin or a counterfeit? the tradition about it, a fiction and forgery? the artist who coined it, and perhaps the god or hero impressed upon it, an impostor or a dupe? So the philosopher asks: the learned critic is silent or nods assent; and the busy crowd round the market-place of life either burns the inquirer as an atheist and a disturber of public order and peace, or revenges itself upon its own credulity and submission by scorn and rebellion. A wide sea opens before poor humanity where a safe harbour had appeared as a refuge from the raging waves. The reaction is strongest where the moral or political constraint has been greatest. The most superstitious nations always end in being the most sceptical and irreligious; and frequently again, in melancholy turn, become superstitious when frightened by their own infidelity and unworthiness, and infidels when the iron rod

of superstition becomes intolerable. Slaves who have broken their chains, without carrying self-government with them, are doomed by divine judgment to be crushed by despotic sway. This is the agony of religion. But what becomes of religion herself?

THIRD CHAPTER.

ANTAGONISMS IN RELIGIONS BASED UPON RECORDS NOT NATIONAL.

THE religious development must pass through a peculiar crisis when the religious records cease to be national. The religious ideas were as essentially an integral part of the national life as language, forming the groundwork and necessary foundation of national life. Providence has destroyed this identity: and this destruction has become, and continues to be, the great lever of the history of the world. So far as the progress of the human race is concerned, universal history is nothing but the history of two marvellous tribes, or families of nations: the Aramaic and the Iranian, or the Semitic and Japhetic.

It is a striking, though not sufficiently appreciated fact, that the religious traditions by which, since the downfall of the Roman world, civilized nations have been governed, are all of Jewish origin, and centre in Abrahamitic, that is to say, primitive Semitic ideas and rites. Jews, Christians, and Mohammedan nations form, as Mohammed calls them, "the family of the book." Their religions have all written records, founded upon the most ancient Semitic traditions. These are the religions under whose banner the most powerful and governing nations of the world march on, carrying light and civilization into the remotest parts of the globe. But the ruling nations themselves, God's vanguard on earth, who have renovated and are renovating the face of the earth, have long ceased to be Semitic, and have become Japhetic, and in particular Iranian. The Jews have ceased to be a nation, unable

for eighteen hundred years, to call any part of the globe their own: but their national records form part of the sacred books of the Christians, whose own records are the last offshoot of life among the Jews themselves, and the founder of whose religion was a Jew according to the flesh. The Mohammedan nations which have snatched one half of their conquests from the ancient Christian world, and have rescued the other half from Oriental and African paganism, have discarded altogether the Jewish records, believing themselves to stand upon the primitive ground of Abrahamitic revelation, and believing that Mohammed only restored the purity both of the Mosaic and Christian faith. The Mohammedan creed was for a long time a national one, the religion of the Arab and cognate tribes. But after Constantinople fell by the sons of Turan, the ruling Mohammedan nations were no longer the nation of Mohammed. The change is therefore universal, and it has created a new difficulty, both in the religious progress and the historical understanding of religious antiquity.

Tradition speaks Semitic to the Christian nations who are in the van of civilization; but the Spirit within them speaks another language. Religious records having ceased to be national, religious life has lost one of the mainsprings of its vitality and sacredness. Expressed in the language of the philosophy of universal history, this implies that the problem has been raised higher: the nations which adopt the foreign traditions must perish, or elevate the religious consciousness to a higher life. Their nationality must become purified by the immortal part of another, now nationally extinct or effete. This again is identical with the problem that nationality must be elevated to pure humanity, and its faith to knowledge. But in this struggle many nations perish: much individual faith suffers shipwreck.

The Mohammedan nations have either decayed and are decaying more and more by the external formalism of their religion; or their inward life has operated in them merely as a

destructive power. The first is the case with civilized Turanism, the second with the Iranian Persians, who have either passed into a wild, mystical pantheism (Sufism), or sunk into that flat negativity which in Germany is called "*Rationalismus vulgaris*."

The Mohammedan religion has thus proved itself incompetent to become the basis of the religion of the world. It has not been able to bear the separation of its religious records from its national life and traditions, that of its religious consciousness from their political vocation and importance. "He who takes the sword, shall perish by the sword." Religious consciousness mixed up with conquest will perish with the conquest; the fire with the smoke: dead coals and ashes remain. There is no primitive and positive religious consciousness and spirituality in Mohammedanism.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

SPECIAL ANTAGONISMS OF THE SEMITIC AND JAPHETIC ELEMENTS.

THE religious complications to be solved become greater, and the problems to be realized more numerous, from the fact, that Christianity, starting with Semitic records, and on Semitic grounds, had no sooner formed the records of its foundation than it became the religion of Iranian nations. The antagonism between these two most noble families of mankind is all-pervading. The Semitic nations never possessed epic and dramatic poetry, which in philosophical history means that they never had the instinct, or felt the power of mind, to contemplate and represent the history of man as the mirror and realization of the eternal laws of God's government of the world. For that is what both the true Epos and the true Drama represent; monuments, most of the modern imitations of which call forth only painful recollections. The fact, that such a problem is taken up and solved by the national mind, is more important than even the imperishable beauty of the special contents of those monuments which exhibit the solution. The Epos and the Drama were the harbingers both of philosophical history and of historical philosophy. It was man sitting as conscious prophet over God's greatest mystery of reality: man and his destinies in the history of the world.

The history of Greek literature is nothing but the organic process of realization of this divine vocation, beginning with

the epic exhibition of Divine judgment upon nations and individuals, then proceeding through lyric poetry and the drama, and concluding with philosophical history.

When Æschylus embodied in his *Oresteia* the sublime Athenian myth, that the two Powers, the stern gods of necessity and immovable destiny, and the divinities of the human conscience, weighing the motives of the deed of the son of Agamemnon, had left the judgment, under the presiding auspices of Athene, the Goddess of Wisdom, to the Areopagus, he enunciated the mystery of the Hellenic mind: that God-conscious human reason is called upon to sit in judgment over the ages past, in order to show in them the eternal ways of God to the living generations. This right is indeed acknowledged by all nations; for all their judgments and opinions and verdicts are based upon the conviction, that reason and conscience cannot be severed, and that there is no appeal against their united judgment. To doubt their verdict would be blasphemy, punished by that madness which the gods inflict. The nation which first exhibited that truth in a form capable of becoming universal was, in this respect, the elect people of God.

Scarcely one generation later, Herodotus, now three and twenty centuries ago, sitting upon the rock of heroically defended independence and liberty, and addressing the aspiring and God-seeking race of Hellas, presented the picture of the past through the prophetic mirror of Nemesis, that true and divinely deep centre of Hellenic religiousness, and evolved before their eyes the destinies of mankind as the grand divine drama of eternal justice and retribution. This great and first review certainly was an incomplete one: but no additional materials could have enhanced the truth of the fundamental idea, and added to the immortal merit of this imperishable work. In that spirit Thucydides became the prophet of the great internecine Hellenic struggle, and of all civil wars; and Tacitus the prophet of imperial Rome, that prototype of all military despotism founded upon republican forms.

At the same time the mystery of the human form, as the image of God upon earth, was revealed to the Hellenic genius; which, thus inspired, produced the eternal ideal forms of every thing divine. This too is an element which, beyond the first rudiments, had proved inaccessible to the Semitic mind, and which has since fertilized all noble nations of the modern world.

The Hellenic mind again invented the art of deducing truth from principles by the dialectical process, and thus of proving that reason cannot err, although reasoning may, namely, by offending against reason. By this truly divine invention the history of the human mind and of religion has been more influenced than by any other Japhetic element.

Tradition announces philosophical truths, but does not announce them as such: Philosophy discovers religious truth, but not as religion. Greek philosophy was the translation of the instinctive consciousness of God into reasoning. After having fathomed the speculations of physical philosophy, the Hellenic genius, in the holy mind of Socrates, descended to the bosom of humanity, and looked for the reason of that consciousness in the laws of the human mind, as discerned by dialectical science. This again was an immense effort, world-historical for ever. The Hellenic mind, as Hegel remarks, discovered the mystery of the mythological Sphinx; the motto of which is *Man*. It arrived at this solution only after the wild physical orgies of the East, and after the animal disguise of the Gods in Egypt.

Japhet is the most powerful prophet of the human race. Hellenism Japhetized them; and they both universalized the Semitic elements in Christianity much more than Romanism did. These elements, on the other hand, gave to Hellenism its ethical earnestness, and raised it from the idolatry of Hellenic nationality to a purer feeling of brotherhood, from the intoxication of the cosmical powers to the primitive consciousness of the unity of the universe, that is to say, to the first cause, God, the Creator, Redeemer, and illuminating principle of man-

kind. The same Christian elements softened the pride of the Roman mind, and rendered it capable of respecting the image of God even in barbarians.

What were these elements, historically and philosophically, as to God, man, humanity? Let Christ and the Apostles speak for themselves, and let us attempt, reverentially and honestly, to translate Semitism into Japhetic language, tradition into thought, carefully respecting the dignity of each.

THIRD SECTION.

**CHRIST'S SOCIAL RELIGION,
HIS OWN
DECLARATIONS RESPECTING HIS RELATION TO,
GOD AND MANKIND,
AND THE
TEACHING OF THE APOSTLES ON THIS POINT.**

CHRIST'S SOCIAL RELIGION,
HIS OWN DECLARATIONS RESPECTING HIS RELATION TO
GOD AND MANKIND,
AND THE
TEACHING OF THE APOSTLES ON THIS POINT.

FIRST CHAPTER.

CHRIST'S GENERAL TEACHING AS TO THE NATURE AND WORKING OF
THE RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE.

THERE exists a moral government of the world, the eternal thought of divine love, to be realized through the divine element which is in man by that same unselfish, self-sacrificing love. Man is to love God, his Father, as the highest good, from his inmost heart, with a thankful mind, for God is the only good *, and he must prove that love to be true by loving mankind, his brethren, as himself. † The selfish principle in man is to serve as the first agent and natural measure of that into which it is to be transformed. God, man, humanity, are thus intimately connected with each other. Men, as God's children, are to do their Father's work on earth, not for any reward, but because

* Luke xviii. 19: "Why callest thou me good? None is good, save one, that is God." Compare Matth. xix. 16, 17: "What good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life? . . . What doest thou ask me about a good thing? One is good, God."

† Matth. xxii. 37-39: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Compared with 1 John iv. 20, 21: "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?"

this is their divine privilege and blessing, as being the will of God.* The power to do this, comes directly from God: there is no power in the elements of this world, much less any human power which stands between God and man.† Nor is this great plan of regeneration to be realized by any outward ordinance or rite, or within any caste, or for any society or association, but in and through those agencies which God himself has established as his natural order of the world. According to this divine order, there is first the individual soul, male or female. Every soul without distinction‡ is to become aware of the law of conscience, and to take upon itself that moral self-responsibility of which no observance of the law can supply the place§ (this law having been given to Moses as an intermediate and transitory ordinance||), nor any assurance of Priest or Scribe.

Secondly, there is the family. It rests upon the primordial unity of man and wife, based on that mutual love unto death, divinely expressed by the love which connects God and Christ with humanity.‡ All divorce, therefore, is wrong: unless it be that a man parasetes himself from an impure wife who has falsified paternity.¶ The woman is equal to man before

* John xvii. (see below), compared with 2 Cor. v. 14: "For the love of Christ constraineth us."

† Romans viii. 38, 39: "For I am persuaded, that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."

‡ Gal. iii. 28: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus."

§ Rom. iii. 20: "Therefore by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin." Compare Heb. ix.

|| Gal. iii. 23, 24: "But before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed. Wherefore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith."

‡ Eph. v. 22-33, v. 25: "Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it."

¶ Compare Matth. v. 32; xix. 9.

God.* Parents and children are likewise to be united by mutual affection and respect.†

Then follow the social relations. First, that between master and servant. They being equal before God and created to be brethren, this relation must and will be remodelled upon the principle of divine humanity. Liberty is the aim and end for which man was created; the slave, therefore, who can do so, may attain to it, after having been freed through Christ from the slavery of sin.‡ In the mean time, let him do his task cheerfully, and love his master out of love to God.§

But the process of regeneration is not to stop here. The governments of this world are now based upon the principle of evil, on selfishness, wickedness, tyranny: they are to become, and they will become, by the regeneration of the people, the governments of God.|| The kingdom of God upon earth is coming: the Apostles will see its entry.† It will come with the destruction, both of the Jewish hierarchy and the Roman

* 1 Peter iii. 7: "Likewise, ye husbands, give honour to the wife, as being coheir of the grace of life."

† Eph. vi. 1-4: "Children, obey your parents in the Lord: for this is right . . . And, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath, but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord."

‡ 1 Cor. vii. 21-23: "Art thou called being a servant? care not for it: but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. Ye are bought with a price, be not ye the servants of men."

§ Eph. vi. 5, 6, 7: "Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ; not with eye-service, as men-pleasers; but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart: with good-will doing service, as to the Lord and not to men."

|| Rev. xi. 15: "And there were great voices in heaven, saying, The kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ; and he shall reign for ever and ever."

† Luke xxi. 31, 32: "When ye see these things come to pass, know ye that the kingdom of God is nigh at hand. Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, till all be fulfilled."

empire * ; but the end will be God's glory all over the earth and the universe. †

In the mean time, while this process of renewal by inward regeneration is going on, let every one suffer patiently the wrong he cannot prevent. ‡ Let him individually resist no violence, unless it be that he is called upon to act against his conscience, to deny God and the truth which speaks to him through conscience.

The practice of this duty will bring the followers of Christ into much persecution, and lead them to death as it will have led their Master § ; but the "prince of this world," the principle of evil, is divinely judged, and its power broken by the conscious, free act of self-sacrifice for humanity which Jesus is destined to perform, and which He is resolved to consummate and to seal by death. || Jesus will do this work, not as a Prince or a Mighty

* Luke xxi. 24 : "And they shall fall by the edge of the sword, and be led away captive into all nations : and Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled."

† 1 Cor. xv. 24, 25 : "Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father : when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet."

‡ Matth. v. 39-41 : "I say unto you, That ye resist not evil : but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain." Compare Rom. xii. 19 : "Avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath : for it is written, Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord." And Pet. i. 19 : "This is thankworthy, if a man for conscience towards God endure grief, suffering wrongfully."

§ John xv. 20 ; xvi. 2 : "Remember the word that I said unto you, The servant is not greater than his lord. If they have persecuted me, they will also persecute you ; if they have kept my saying, they will keep yours also." "They shall put you out of the synagogues : yea, the time cometh, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service." Compare Matth. x. 17-26.

|| John xii. 31 (When coming in sight of Jerusalem on his last entrance) : "Now is the judgment of this world : now shall the prince of this world be cast out."

One, nor as a High Priest or Man of the Law, or even as a Jew: He does it as the simple Man, "the Son of Man." It is not the Jewish people, therefore, but mankind, who are the final objects of this redemption, of this freeing, emancipating salvation—mankind, without distinction of tribe or condition, of sex or age.*

This great work of God must therefore begin with blood and destruction: even God's temple of Jerusalem is doomed to be destroyed, never to be rebuilt: for henceforth the temple of God is man. †

God's own work upon earth will, however, become manifest in and through this destruction of the present world. The principle of inward justice will be acknowledged even by those who are condemned by it. ‡ The will of God will be done upon earth as it reigns supreme in God's eternal life. § This judgment upon the earth is now exercised by Him who, in the midst of misery and poverty and all unspeakable inward suffering, enjoys the consciousness of his eternal union with the Father, independent of, and anterior to, space and time. || This

* 1 John ii. 2: "He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." Compare Romans iii. 29: "Is he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also."

† 1 Cor. vi. 19: "Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?" Compare 2 Cor. vi. 16: "Ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them, and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people."

‡ John xvi. 8-11: "When the Comforter is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment: of sin, because they believe not on me; of righteousness, because I go to my Father, and ye see me no more; of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged." Compare Rev. xix. 1, 2: "I heard a great voice of much people in heaven, saying, Alleluia! Salvation, and glory, and honour, and power, unto the Lord our God: for true and righteous are his judgments."

§ Matth. vi. 10: "Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven."

|| Matth. xxviii. 18: "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." Compare Rev. i. 18: "I am he that liveth, and was dead; and behold

consciousness has become in Him his own nature and his real Self, and by that steadfast looking up to God's will which has made him overcome all temptations, that is, selfish thoughts. *

The same judgment will afterwards be exercised by his disciples and followers: they will have to judge humanity, and reign with Christ. †

This indissoluble union between God and man will henceforth not be carried on by a new individual teacher: nobody can lay a new foundation, after that union has once been declared to be the essence of religion. ‡ It will be carried on by that spirit of God which was in Jesus, and which by his being One with God through constant holiness, made Him the very mirror of the Father, of the eternal thought of divine love. §

That Spirit will carry on the work begun by Jesus; it will enlighten, and purify, and regenerate man and mankind, the individual and society. Through this Spirit, Christ's followers will do greater works ||, and produce greater effects than Christ

I am alive for evermore, Amen; and have the keys of hell and death." Compare Eph. i. 22: "He hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be the head over all things to the Church, which is his body, the fullness of him that filleth all in all." Compare John iii. 35: "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand."

* Heb. iv. 15: "He was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." Compare v. 7-9.

† Matth. xix. 28: "Ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Compare Rev. ii. 26, 27: "To him that overcometh, and keepeth my works unto the end, will I give power over the nations: and he shall rule them with a rod of iron; as the vessels of a potter shall they be broken to shivers, even as I received of my Father."

‡ 1 Cor. iii. 11: "Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ."

§ Heb. i. 3: "Who is the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person."

|| John xiv. 12: "He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do; because I go unto my Father."

did personally : for after He shall have fulfilled his task on earth He will live in the Spirit with the Father, humanity will be strengthened by having become the growing and conscious manifestation of God himself.* As Jesus has glorified the Father, so believing humanity will glorify the God.†

* John xvii. 22, 23: "The glory which thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one: I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one."

† John xvii. 1. 4. 10: "Father, glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee . . . I have glorified thee on the earth; I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do. And all mine are thine, and thine are mine, and I am glorified in them."

SECOND CHAPTER.

CHRIST'S TEACHING RESPECTING HIMSELF AND MANKIND.

INTRODUCTION.

THE SEMITIC AND JAPHETIC DICTIONARY OF THINGS SPIRITUAL.

SINCE the time that these words were spoken, the face of the world has been changed through them.

The Jewish hierarchy and state, and the mighty, almost universal empire of Rome, have perished—new empires and nations have arisen, these again have tottered and fallen, and others have arisen in their stead, through the same manifest agency of the eternal laws of God in the moral government of the world, first clearly seen and pronounced by Jesus. Divinized and civilizing humanity has prevailed over all these revolutions, and will assuredly do so in the great crisis which is evidently preparing. (April 1854.) The Spirit of Christ is audibly passing in these our days through the confused ranks of man.

To this Spirit Christ has left, with divine wisdom, which is human folly, all that in worldly religions constitutes their support and substance—the form of worship and the form of government. As regards the one, He had clearly announced that the temple-worship at Jerusalem would fall as well as that of Samaria (John iv. 21); as regards the other, He had only repeated: "the Spirit maketh free," as St. Paul said, a quarter of a century later, to the Corinthians (2 Cor. iii. 17.): "The Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." But St. Paul alone, of the Apostles, and his friend Apollos, thoroughly understood, as to the external world, that

the Jewish ritual was abrogated. The Spirit worked its own way among the believers. That Spirit made them recognize each other, in a free association, as brethren, without distinction of race and age, of sex and condition. This Spirit led them to institute the common meals of love, consecrated by Christ's last words and the remembrance of his death, and made these the germ of the mystery of all worship; the symbol of the sacrifice of self for the brethren, and of all for God in thankful love. The development, perversion, decay, and restoration of this idea of sacrifice and its correlatives (Priest, Priesthood, Church), form the centre of the spiritual history of the world during the last eighteen centuries.

Now what did He in whom all this originated say of Himself, and what do His disciples teach respecting His relation to God and mankind? We have no wish to answer these questions by dogmatical formularies, old or new, but would earnestly appeal to the conscience of our readers, and entreat them to reflect upon what they have heard read, and have read themselves for many years, about so-called mysteries, the charm of which consists in being inexplicable, and the sanctity of which is proved to them by logical contradictions.

In order to trace another path through this labyrinth, we subjoin the very words of the Gospel and of the Apostolic Epistles, and shall translate them from the Semitic language into Japhetic, that is to say, from the words of sacred and ever-living historical tradition and individual consciousness into the most adequate terms of abstract philosophy which we can discover. Upon this point, however, it will be necessary to offer a few previous remarks.

The Semitic mind transformed the figurative signs into simple letters, by the invention of the alphabet: the Japhetic mind translated the hieroglyphics of thought into simple notions by the invention of dialectical philosophy. The Semite had invented for mankind his twenty-two letters, the organ of all

human speech transmitted to writing; the Japhetite formulized, out of the categories of mind, the organon for dealing with both thought and reality. The historical, personal manifestation of the divine element appeared in the Semites: the Japhetite had and has to change history and myth and legend and vision into the heirloom of mankind by reason. But this reason was to be chastened by conscience, which is the organ for things divine to the Semite. Both the chosen people of God start from that great basis of all religion: "All things are divine and all things are human," which a tried Christian and theological veteran has, at the last celebration of Christmas, proclaimed again as his creed.* But the Semite sees in that science which is connected with divine life "the knowledge of good and evil" (Gen. i.), and finds in the pursuit of it the origin of sin, whereas the Japhetite discerns God principally as the source of truth, and strives to approach the Divinity by the knowledge of truth, in order to avoid error and delusion, which to Him is sin.

The historical expressions of the Semite for the infinite and its counterpart in the finite, are, without much difficulty, translated into the formularies of Japhetic ethics; but there must further also be found an adequate expression for that speculative element which those Semitic terms contain in an undeveloped historical form. For the belief that the good is true, and the true good, or that conscience and reason, will and thought, are primitively one, implies that there is an intellectual exponent for every ethical rule. Conviction must correspond

* Lücke, in his Christmas Programme 1853: "De eo quod nimium artis acuminisque est in ea quæ nunc præcipue jactatur S. Scripturæ, maxime evangeliorum interpretatione." p. 9. "Equidem in ea et fui semper et sum, atque ad extremum spiritum perstabo hæresi, ut meum faciam illud verbum: Πάντα θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων πάντα! Sane quidem id veterum Græcorum est. Idemque vero nonne quasi compendiosa evangelii vaticinatio vel divinatio est, immo factæ illius rei, de qua Joannes evangelista gloriatur magnifica voce: 'Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, in qua totius scripturæ summus vertitur cardo — plenior expositio vel etiam consecutio?"

with faith, philosophical truth with the ethical precept, the speculative term must be the correlative of religious expression. In proving such a harmony we prove nothing less than the fundamental assumption of Kant, who takes for granted the correspondence of pure reason and practical reason, but offers no proof of it. The bridge built for them through the doctrine of the Absolute by the two great philosophers of identity, Schelling and Hegel, would have been more solid, and the solution proposed more satisfactory, if they had bestowed the same attention upon the will as upon thought, on conscience as on reason, on ethics as on natural philosophy, on history as on abstraction. However, a bridge must be thrown over the abyss, in the very name of Christ, who is the way over it and the truth to which it leads, that is to say, which He manifests.

The most popular and practical form of such a juxtaposition appears to be that of a comparative Semitic and Japhetic dictionary for religious and intellectual objects, the union of which we express by spiritual. This form was adopted for the present chapter, as being the easiest mode of avoiding tedious paraphrases and repetitions. I have therefore ventured to prefix to the translation of the Christological passages into philosophical language, a specimen of such a comparative dictionary for some principal Semitic terms, which constitute, as it were, the alphabet of Christian divinity. These terms have become so familiar to us that we are scarcely aware of their Semitic nature and original meaning, and seldom connect with them a definite sense, because in most minds they are combined with the reasoning faculty only through more or less conventional phrases of scholastic divinity.

As regards these christological passages, however, they speak for themselves to the mind in its totality through a living Christianity. To this index, above all others, I refer the readers. The limits of this work will not permit me to give a thorough illustration of them, and add the explanations which might be

desirable. Our *Analecta*, however, commence with a corrected text of all the Christological passages in the New Testament; and some explanation will be found in "Hippolytus and his Age" on this inexhaustible subject, I mean, the teachings and speculations of the most pious men and most enlightened and powerful minds of the first seven Christian generations, with some occasional illustrations. I mention this for the benefit of such of my readers as are willing to enter more profoundly into this second subject, theologically or speculatively, but I would principally refer them to their own conscience and reason, and to the whole body of Scripture.

SPECIMEN
OF A
COMPARATIVE EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY,
SEMITIC AND JAPHETIC,
FOR THE EXPRESSION OF SPIRITUAL IDEAS.

JAPHETIC

SEMITIC TERM.

ETHICAL EXPONENT (CONSCIENCE).

1. THE WORD (*Logos*). 1. The Absolute, as consciousness of the Good, as eternal, loving Will.

2. The Infinite, willing the finite realization of Himself as Good.

3. The same as principle of divine Life in man and mankind.

II. THE FATHER.

1. The eternal Will of the realization of Good in man (eternal decree of election).

2. The same Will as finite free will.

III. THE SON.

1. Man, Mankind, (sons and children of God,) struggling with self for the realization of Good in time.

2. In an eminent sense: Jesus of Nazareth, as the conscious realization of God's goodness: perfect absorption of Self by the divine will by perfect Love (Holiness).

IV. THE SPIRIT OF GOD, THE HOLY SPIRIT.

1. God as the conscious identity of Good and Truth.

2. The divine ethical power in man, based upon the identity of conscience with reason.

V. THE WILL OF GOD.

The moral law of the world, as the consciousness and substance of Good, the supreme Good.

EXPONENT.

SPECULATIVE EXPONENT (REASON).

- I. 1. The consciousness of the absolute Existence (Substance), as Truth (Reason).

2. The Infinite, willing the finite realization of Truth.

3. The same as divine Intelligence in man and mankind.
- II. 1. The eternal Thought of the realization of divine Truth in the universe and in man.

2. The consciousness of finite Existence as Substance.
- III. 1. Man, as manifestation of divine Truth within the limits of time and space, conscious of the Infinite, which is beyond both.

2. In an eminent sense: Jesus of Nazareth, by the consciousness of divine existence as of his own nature.
- IV. 1. God as the eternal consciousness of the identity of Reason (pure, theoretical Reason) with Will (practical Reason), and of Substance with Thought.
2. The divine element in finiteness, as the principle of the progressive evolution of God in time.
- V. 1. The intellectual law of the universe, as the consciousness and substance of Truth.

CONTINUATION OF

VI. THE KINGDOM OF GOD.	The finite realization of the infinite Good by man in the development of human society.
VII. HEAVEN.	The complex of all the thoughts of the creative Love of God, in contradistinction to their imperfect realization in man.
VIII. ETERNAL.	1. What belongs to God as the eternal Thought of Love. 2. Endless duration of self-will (opposed to union with God).
IX. ETERNAL LIFE.	1. The divine element in man's ethical life, as union with God's will in time. 2. The same as the basis and condition of the immortality of the soul.
X. MAN, SON OF MAN.	The finite realization of the Spirit of God as good, in individual consciousness, developed in time.
XI. MANKIND, CHILDREN OF MEN.	The complex of this realization in the succession of generations, acting unitedly.
XII. FLESH, FLESH AND BLOOD.	Human nature, as subject to the influence of the selfish principle.
XIII. WORLD.	The complex of the selfish wills.
XIV. EVIL.	a. The absence of the divine Will in man's conscience, (<i>τὸ πονηρόν</i>, das Böse.) b. The consequence of this absence (<i>τὸ κακόν</i>, das Uebel.)

JAPHETIC EXPONENT.

VI. The finite realization of the infinite Truth by man as part of humanity.

VII. The complex of the divine ideas of truth, in contradistinction to their finite development in space and time.

VIII. 1. What belongs to God as Substance, considered in itself, and in opposition to its development in space and time.

2. Endless duration of finite existence.

IX. The infinite factor in man's intellectual life, independent of the finite.

X. The finite realization of the Spirit of God as individual reason, developed in time.

XI. Collective, evolving reason in history.

XII. Human nature, as ignoring the principle of divine Truth.

XIII. The complex of unspiritual thoughts in history.

XIV. a. The absence of divine Reason in man's reasoning on Good.

b. Its consequence.

CONTINUATION OF

XV. DEVIL.	The conscious negation of the divine Will as good, promoting unconsciously, the end of this divine Will by the very opposition to its manifestation. ("Diabolus Dei diaconus in terra." <i>Luther.</i>)
XVI. SIN.	Selfishness.
XVII. SALVATION, REDEMPTION.	God's infinite love directed towards mankind.
XVIII. PROPITIATION.	This love annulling the consequence of sin, which is separation from God.
XIX. FAITH.	The inward acknowledgment of the Will of God as the Good.
XX. RESURRECTION.	The awakening of the consciousness of this divine Life in the soul.
XXI. REGENERATION (NEW BIRTH, RENEWAL).	The power of acting with moral responsibility.
XXII. JUSTIFICATION.	The consciousness that the soul is in union with God, in spite of the imperfect manifestation of good in the finite.
XXIII. SANCTIFICATION (HOLINESS).	The actual union of the soul with God growing out of this consciousness.
XXIV. SPIRITUAL MAN.	Man as far as the divine life is predominant in him.
XXV. PRAYER.	The reference of the will to God, as the divine, only good Will.

JAPHETIC EXPONENT.

- XV. The conscious negation of the manifestation of infinite Truth as Good in the finite, opposing, and, by opposition, promoting truth. "Der dumme Teufel." (German term.)

- XVI. The assumption of infiniteness by finiteness.
- XVII. God's infinite love revealing truth obscured by the selfish principle.
- XVIII. This love annulling the consequence of the ignorance of the identity of Good and Truth.

- XIX. The inward acknowledgment of the manifestation of divine Truth, as such.
- XX. The first operation of this knowledge, as dispelling error.

- XXI. The faculty of considering all finiteness as having its root in infiniteness.
- XXII. The consciousness of the eternal reality in the manifestation of Thought in the finite.

- XXIII. The consciousness in the mind of the identity between the Good and the True.

- XXIV. Man as knowing this mystery of creation.

- XXV. The reference of the thought to God, the divine Truth and Substance, as the only Good, willing good.

CONTINUATION OF

- XXVI. SACRIFICE.** The willing reference of all finite existence, as good, to God, the infinite as the good, in thankful love.
- XXVII. THE BODY AND BLOOD OF CHRIST.** *a.* Christ's holiness and love as personal, substantial (objectively).
 „ *b.* The external sign and symbol of Christ's self-sacrifice for mankind, at the brotherly meal of (symbolically) believers.
- XXVIII. THE BODY OF CHRIST.** Redeemed, believing mankind, as the finite, successive realization of Christ's holy mind (subjectively).
- XXIX. THE CHURCH (CONGREGATION.)** Redeemed humanity as Government or Society.
- XXX. THE PEOPLE.** The same as the complex of divinely united individuals.

JAPHETIC EXPONENT.

- XXVI.** The consciousness that finite existence has no separate principle referred to God, the Infinite, as the Author of truth and the only real existence or substance.
- XXVII.** *a.* Objective meaning : Christ's mind as the perfect, substantial expression of truth. (S. John vi.)
- b.* Symbolical meaning : an external sign of this objective reality in partaking of the common social meal, as far as this partaking takes place with a true, inward union of the soul with God, and a sincere love to the brethren.
- XXVIII.** Divinized humanity.
- XXIX.** Mankind in the progressive realization of divine Truth in social life.
- XXX.** The individuals considered in social unity, as integral parts of the development of Truth in history.

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A.

J E S U S,
THE SON OF GOD AND MAN.

I.

**THE DECLARATIONS OF JESUS HIMSELF
RESPECTING HIS PERSON.**

THE FATHER AND THE SON ARE ONE.

I. *Jesus to the Jews, who persecute him for having healed on the Sabbath the cripple at the pool of Bethesda.* (St. John v. 17—54.)

“¹⁷My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.”

¹⁸Therefore the Jews sought the more to kill Him, because He not only had broken the Sabbath, but said also that God was his Father, making Himself equal with God. ¹⁹Then answered Jesus and said unto them: “Verily, verily, I say unto you, the Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do: for what things soever He doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise. ²⁰For the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth Him all things that Himself doeth: and he will shew him greater works than these, that ye may marvel.

“²¹For as the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. ²²For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son; ²³That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father. He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father, which hath sent Him. ²⁴Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my word, and believeth on Him that hath sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life.

AND ALL BELIEVERS ARE CHILDREN OF GOD.

As the work of God in creation is going on uninterruptedly, without any regard to the Sabbath, although the Sabbath is represented in the account of the creation as the day on which God rested (1 Gen. i.); thus He who is conscious of his union with the Father continues to work that good which the Father gives Him to do, on the Sabbath as well as on any other day. (Compare John ix. 4, 5, "I must work the works of Him that sent me, while it is day: the night cometh when no man can work. As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world.")

All the good which a man does, is the realization of the divine thought and goodness in a finite form. He can only work good so far as he is conscious of it being conformable to the nature of God. The belief in this divine goodness, as the law of the universe, to be realized by man upon earth, gives him the power of doing good, and makes his will God's will.

As God creates all natural life, and is the first cause of the universe, so the Son is, through faith in Him, the author of all spiritual life. As soon as the divine principle of goodness is acknowledged as that which is to become universal, the judgment concerning what is good and right will have to be pronounced by the Son, for the glorification of the Father. The conscience of mankind, now represented by Jesus of Nazareth, will be the judge of man, first as to individual conduct, and, in process of time, through faith in His Spirit, as to national affairs. Whoever believes in Jesus will have that divine consciousness and principle in himself; and if he strives sincerely to act upon it, he will not lose this principle, but live in communion with God. (Compare 1 John ii. 24—27.)

CONTINUATION OF

“²⁵Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of God, and they that hear shall live. ²⁶For as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself; ²⁷And hath given Him authority to execute judgment also, because He is the Son of Man.

“²⁸Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear His voice, ²⁹And shall come forth: they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation.

“³⁰I can of my own self do nothing: as I hear, I judge; and my judgment is just, because I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent Me. ³¹If I bear witness of Myself, my witness is not true. ³²There is another that beareth witness of Me; and I know that the witness which He witnesseth of Me is true. ³³Ye sent unto John, and he bare witness unto the truth. ³⁴But I receive not testimony from man: but these things I say, that ye might be saved.”

ST. JOHN V. 17—34.

This new period of mankind is now beginning: individuals first, of all nations, will be awakened to divine consciousness, and in process of time, this divine principle in man will become the principle of all social relations, governments, and states. (Compare Rev. xi. 15.)

The history of mankind will prove to be the judgment of God: nations will perish by this judgment, and new nations will arise, and the truth and justice of God will become manifest as well by the destruction of empires as by the awakening of new national life.

The beginning of all this is My life and My teaching, which has no other aim but that of speaking the truth and glorifying God. The evidence of the truth of what I say is in your own conscience and reason, which is the voice of God within you. This evidence is much greater and more convincing than that of John the Baptist, whom you asked about Me, and who bore witness of Me. (Compare below, 1 John v.)

THE SON IS THE FINITE REALIZATION OF THE

(St. John vii. 37, 38.)

"³⁷. . . If any man thirst, let him come unto Me, and drink. ³⁸He that believeth on Me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water."

(St. John viii. 12.)

"¹². . . I am the light of the world: he that followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."

Jesus to the Jews at the Feast of Tabernacles.

(St. John viii. 14. 18. 21. 23. 25—28. 51. 56—59.)

"¹⁴. . . Though I bear record of Myself, my record is true; for I know whence I came, and whither I go; but ye cannot tell whence I came, and whither I go . . .

"¹⁸*I am* He who is bearing witness of Myself, and the Father that sent Me beareth witness of Me. . . .

"²¹. . . I go My way, and ye shall seek Me, and shall die in your sins: whither I go, ye cannot come. . . .

"²³. . . Ye are from beneath, I am from above: ye are of this world, I am not of this world."

²⁵Then said they unto Him, "Who art thou?" And Jesus said unto them: "I am absolutely what I also say to you. ²⁶I have many things to say and to judge of you: but He that sent Me is true; and I speak to the world those things which I have heard of them."

²⁷They understood not that He spoke to them of the Father. ²⁸Then said Jesus unto them, "When ye have lifted up the Son of Man, then shall ye know that *I am He*, and that I do nothing of myself but as my Father hath taught Me, I speak these things. . . . ⁵¹If a man keep my saying, he shall never see death. . . . ⁵⁶Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day: and he saw it, and was glad."

⁵⁷Then said the Jews unto Him, "Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?" ⁵⁸Jesus said unto them: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, before Abraham was *I am He*."

⁵⁹Then took they up stones to cast at Him.

FATHER, ONE WITH HIM, AND OF ONE SUBSTANCE.

The divine principle which I represent and teach, and to which I invite all mankind, as many as are desirous of knowing God and life divine, is that which has its own evidence in it. He who receives it has this evidence in him (1 John ii. 26). If I, therefore, appear to refer to Myself, I refer to God, with whom I am One, and this is the only true evidence, and it is tested in the heart of every conscientious man. You, Pharisees, who ask Me who I am, do not acknowledge this divine power of the Spirit, and do not understand the real basis and source of what I say of Myself. You have nothing in you but the selfish principle, which is opposed to God, and knows nothing of things divine. But I am not to be judged by this worldly principle and by your conventional ordinances.

I am what I speak: my individuality and person is identical with my words. I teach what I live, and what I say to you and to the world is true, because it comes from God Himself. You should, therefore, attend to what I say of you, for what you hear from Me is the judgment of God.

After having put Me to death, you will know that I am One with God; and what I have spoken to you, God has spoken.

Whoever follows me and my doctrine has divine life in him, which is communion with God (John xvii. 3. Compare 1 John ii.), and therefore the physical death cannot affect him. When Abraham taught the only true God, he anticipated in his mind My appearance and teaching, and rejoiced in this prospect. Abraham, as well as those who followed him, and particularly John the Baptist who bore the same witness of Me (St. John i. 13), knew that divine principle, but none of them its personification. This personification is the realization of God's own nature, which is Love: this you see in Me.

THE WILLING SELF-SACRIFICE OF JESUS IS THE

(St. John x. 17, 18. 25—38.)

“¹⁷Therefore doth my Father love Me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. ¹⁸No man taketh it from Me, but I lay it down of Myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father.”

“²⁵I told you, and ye believed not: the works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of Me. ²⁶But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. ²⁷My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they they follow me: ²⁸And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand. ²⁹My Father, which gave them Me, is greater than all; and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand. ³⁰I and my Father are One.”

³¹Then the Jews took up stones again to stone him. ³²Jesus answered them, “Many good works have I shewed you from my Father; for which of these works do ye stone Me?” ³³The Jews answered him, saying, “For a good work we stone thee not, but for blasphemy; and because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God.” ³⁴Jesus answered them, “Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? ³⁵If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken; ³⁶Say ye of Him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God? ³⁷If I do not the works of my Father, believe Me not. ³⁸But if I do, though ye believe not Me, believe the works, that ye may know, and believe, that the Father is in Me, and I in Him.”

CAUSE OF HIS UNITY WITH THE FATHER.

God loveth me because, of my own accord, conformably with His will, I give up My life in order to declare His truth, and seal My declaration and self-sacrifice by My voluntary death. My death will give a new life to mankind : it will impart to those who believe in Me a world-conquering power. I continue to live in believing mankind. (Compare Luke xvii. 33 : "*Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life shall save it.*")

Those who receive My word sincerely, and resolve to act upon it have in themselves the evidence of truth, and therefore no human power or reasoning can shake their faith ; for the power of the divine element is greater than all. I am identified and One with God.

What I say of Myself, that I am One with God, is true of all men : they are all destined to be sons of God, and even are called gods. Why should I not say it of Myself, as God hath set Me apart for this work, and sent Me into the world for this purpose ? Even the wonderful works which I do should be a proof to you of the truth of what I declare of God, and of Myself, and of our Union.

THE SON IS THE VISIBLE REPRESENTATION OF

(St. John xiv. 6, 7. 10—12.)

Jesus to his Disciples, after the Last Supper.

[To Thomas.]

“6. . . I am the way, and the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father but by Me. ⁷If ye had known Me, ye should have known my Father also: and from henceforth ye know Him, and have seen Him.”

[To Philip.]

“¹⁰Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? the words that I speak unto you, I speak not of Myself: but my Father that dwelleth in Me, He doth the works. ¹¹Believe me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me: or else believe me for the very work's sake. ¹²Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on Me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do, because I go unto my Father.’

JESUS HAS GLORIFIED THE FATHER,

SO SHALL MANKIND GLORIFY HIM

(St. John xvii. 1—6. 11. 17—26).

[Christ's dying Prayer for the Church.]

“¹. . . Father, the hour is come; glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son may glorify Thee, ²as Thou hast given Him power over all flesh, that all Thou hast given Him He should give to them, eternal life. ³And this is life eternal, that they know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent. ⁴I have glorified Thee on the earth: I have finished the work which Thou gavest Me to do. ⁵And now, O Father, glorify Thou Me with Thine own Self, by

THE FATHER, AND THE LIVING DIVINE PRINCIPLE.

I do not teach outward ordinances, as Moses did, nor do I declare partial truths respecting divine things. What I teach is God Himself, the divine Spirit of all things, which is in you and guides you into all truth, if you will hear My voice, which is God's voice. My doctrine is truth, and My truth is a living, inward power, God Himself, and, therefore, the only way to the true knowledge of God and a god-like life.

I speak and do, not of Myself, but what God's Spirit bids Me to speak and to do. The works which you have seen Me doing, and which have astonished you, are only the external manifestations of the divine life in Me.

If you receive this life within you, you will have the same power ; even greater works will be done by you among mankind, because My Spirit will be with you, divested of all the bonds of earthly existence in which you have seen Me moving.

AND SHOWN HIS UNITY WITH HIM.

LIKEWISE THROUGH DIVINE LOVE.

Father, the hour is come when that divine element, which is in Me, is to become manifest : let it be manifested for the greater glorification of Thyself. Eternal life Thou gavest to Me, and I gave it to them, that is to say, the knowledge that Thou art the only true God, and that I am the true manifestation of Thy own nature. The work which thou entrustedst Me with is done : let Me return to that glorious existence which I enjoyed with Thee in that eternal consciousness which is anterior to, and independent of, all finite existence in time.

CONTINUATION OF

the glory which I had with Thee before the world was. ⁶I have manifested Thy name unto the men which thou gavest Me out of the world : Thine they were, and Thou gavest them Me ; and they have kept thy word. . . . ¹¹And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to Thee. Holy Father, keep them in that Thy name which Thou hast given me, that they may be one as We are. . . . ¹⁷Sanctify them through Thy truth : Thy word is truth. ¹⁸As Thou hast sent Me into the world, even so have I also sent them into the world. ¹⁹And for their sakes I sanctify Myself, that they also may be sanctified through the truth. ²⁰Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on Me through their word ; ²¹That they all may be one ; as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in Us : that the world may believe that Thou has sent Me. ²²And the glory which Thou gavest Me, I have given them, that they may be one, even as We are One : ²³I in them, and Thou in Me, that they may be made perfect in One ; and that the world may know that Thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as Thou hast loved Me. ²⁴Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with Me where I am, that they may behold My glory, which Thou has given Me ; for Thou lovedst Me before the foundation of the world. ²⁵O righteous Father, the world hath not known Thee ; but I have known thee, and these have known that Thou hast sent me. ²⁶And I have declared unto them Thy name, and will declare it : that the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may be in them, and I in them."

ST. JOHN XVII.

My prayer regards those whom Thou hast given Me to enlighten, and who have been faithful disciples, keeping the commandment I gave them. They will now be obliged to act by themselves : give them that consciousness of the eternal union of the human soul with God which I had and have, and keep them through life in that consciousness of unity which Thou hast given Me. Let their whole earthly existence be a sacrifice of thanksgiving to Thee, as My life has been. I have devoted and am sacrificing My life for them, that they may inwardly believe in the truth which I have announced to them as divine truth, and thus be made worthy and able to accomplish the same sanctification, which consists in a self-sacrificing life for the brethren out of thankful love to God. Render thóu, O Father, them, and through them the whole human race which will be taught and converted by them, able to accomplish this true sacrifice, which is pleasing to God, and which is the reality of all symbolical worship, the fulfilment of all shadows and types. I have planted in them the germ of that divine life which Thou gavest Me.

And when they have done their work, give them that perfect divine consciousness and blessedness which Thou hast given Me, and which is independent of space and time and all finite existence, because it is the manifestation of that eternal love which is Thy true own substance."

II.

THE TEACHING OF THE APOSTLES

ABOUT THE FATHER AND THE SON.

I. ST. PAUL'S TEACHING ABOUT

Philipp. ii. 5—11.

⁵Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus,
⁶Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to
be equal with God: ⁷But denied himself, taking upon Him
the form of a servant and being in the likeness of men,
⁸And being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself
and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.
⁹Wherefore, God also hath highly exalted Him, and given
him that name which is above every name: ¹⁰that in the
name of Jesus every knee should bow of those in heaven and
those on earth and those under the earth, ¹¹and that every
tongue shall confess that Christ is Lord to the glory of God
the Father.

THE FATHER AND THE SON.

PARAPHRASE.

Be like-minded as Jesus the Christ was. Although he was conscious of being the image of God (2 Cor. iv.; Col. i. 15, iii. 10. Compare Heb. i. 3), he did not think that he was to assume as his own the power he had in him to be equal with God. On the contrary, he annihilated entirely his own self (*entäusserte sich selbst*), and willingly took upon him the form of a servant and the likeness of man. Having thus willingly shared the fate of human existence, he humbled himself, and showed himself obedient, even so as willingly to suffer the most ignominious death. On account of this his abnegation of self (*Selbstentäusserung*), God has exalted him above all others, and has given him that name (Lord) which is above every name, that every act of adoration is to be offered by angels, and men, and departed spirits, in this his name, and that all nations shall confess in their language that Jesus the Christ is the Lord to the glory of God the Father.

SHORT PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION.

Jesus the Christ had, in Himself, the full consciousness of His divine nature, and of his being One with God, as God's eternal Thought of Himself in finiteness; but being placed in a human condition, He willingly took upon Him the hardest lot of humanity, and, far from considering His divine dignity as His own, He humbled Himself unto death, as following the will of God who had sent Him. Therefore He alone is the restorer of the union of man with God, abolishing the antagonism between the Infinite and the Finite, and is to be honoured as such.

II. ST. JOHN'S TEACHING CONCERNING GOD AND

(St. John i. 1—5. 14.)

¹In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. ²This Word was in the beginning with God.

³All things were made by Him, and without Him was not any thing made.

⁴What has been made in Him was Life, and the Life was the light of men. ⁵And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not. . . .

¹⁴And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. . . .

¹⁸No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him.

THE WORD, AND THE FATHER AND THE SON.

Before the visible Universe existed, there was in God the conscious Thought of Himself, as active Reason. This Thought was identical with God, the Substance of the Universe: it was God thinking Himself, making Himself objective to Himself. This then is the divine existence of the Word, as active Reason.

The creation of the Universe is the manifestation in space and time of the same Thought of God of Himself. There was nothing created which has not the principle of existence in that Thought of God of Himself.

The Universe thus created continues to have the principle of Life in this divine Self-consciousness: this principle of substantial existence is also the intellectual principle in man. In the progress of history this divine principle manifested itself as intelligence, as the enlightening principle, the principle of progress and development: but the selfish principle in man opposed itself to that divine principle. . . .

God's eternal Thought of Himself became personal in finite existence, in a Man, conscious of his divine nature. In this Man that divine Word lived amongst us, and we beheld in Jesus divine glory and truth. He alone, therefore, could declare to mankind the true nature of God, for that primitive consciousness lived in Him constantly and perfectly.

III. THE THREE EVIDENCES

THE TWO HISTORICAL AND THE

(1 John v. 4—12).

⁴Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, our faith. ⁵Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God? ⁶This is He that came by water and blood, Jesus the Christ, not by water only, but by water and blood: and it is the Spirit that beareth witness, because the Spirit is truth. ⁸For there are three that bear witness, the Spirit, and the water, and the blood: and these three agree in one. ⁹If we receive the witness of man, the witness of God is greater: for this is the witness of God: for He hath testified his Son. ¹⁰He that believeth in the Son of God, hath the witness in himself: he that believeth not God, hath made Him a liar, because he believeth not the witness which God hath testified about his Son. ¹¹And this is the witness, that God hath given us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. ¹²He that hath the Son, hath life: he that hath not the Son of God, hath not life."

FOR THE TRUTH IN CHRIST,
INWARD ONE, AND THEIR HARMONY.

He who believes in Christ receives by that internal act of his mind, which implies a solemn pledge to follow the unselfish life of Christ, a new, inward, divine power, by which he is enabled to overcome the selfish principle in him and outward temptations working through the same. No other principle gives this power, which alone comes from faith in Christ.

This belief in Christ rests upon three manifestations, or, as it were, evidences, of God. The first is the manifestation of God in Christ's baptism, as evidenced by John the Baptist: the second, God's manifestations in his death, as evidenced by the Apostles and Evangelists: the third evidence is that which the Spirit of God gives to every believer in his own mind. The first two evidences are, therefore, of a historical character, and comprise the whole life of Christ, including His death and resurrection. The third is an internal one, and this agrees with the two others, but it is higher than them, because it is God's own evidence, through His Spirit, in man's own conscience and reason. This Spirit of God is essentially truth itself, and he therefore who receives that evidence believes no longer the evidence and record of man, but a divine truth, directly manifested to him by God, that is to say, proved to be true by the constant test of thought and of experience.

Thus the evidence of the truth of Christianity is by no means simply historical, and therefore faith is not merely historical belief in the outward facts of Christ's life and sufferings. He who disbelieves Christ, therefore, disbelieves that which is the voice of God in him, both as reason and conscience. The nature of the internal evidence is in the peace of our conscience (notwithstanding the consciousness of our defects and sins—ii. 1, 2), as being united with God by having taken upon ourselves moral responsibility, in the firm belief that the divine principle in us has the power of making us overcome the world without and sin within, and will have the victory.

B.
THE BELIEVERS,
THE SONS OR CHILDREN OF GOD,
AND
THEIR DESTINY.

THE REGENERATION, AND HOW IT IS WORKED.

Jesus to Nicodemus.

(John iii. 3. 5—8. 12, 13—15.)

“⁵Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God. . . .

“⁶Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God. ⁶That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit.

“⁷Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again. ⁸The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit. . .

¹²If I have told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things? ¹³And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but He that came down from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven.”

THE ILLUSTRATION ADDED BY THE EVANGELIST.

¹⁴And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have eternal life.

THE DIVINE LIFE IN MAN, AND ITS CONDITIONS.

As long as man lives according to his selfish principle, doing whatever he does because it is his will and pleasure to do so, he understands nothing of the divine order of the world, either in himself or around him.

In order to understand this divine order of the world, he must acknowledge as the substance of his own being, as his destiny and his happiness, the will of God, the germ of which is in him through Reason and Conscience. He must acknowledge the divine supremacy of what is True and Good, not as an external law, but as that which really is his own life, and to which all selfish will ought to be made subservient. This acknowledgment ought to be public, as a solemn pledge of what he is willing henceforth to do. Such a sincere acknowledgment will then assuredly be followed by an inward power of overcoming the selfish principle which man finds in himself, and he will receive in reality a new life.

This new life cannot be explained as a development of the selfish principle: it is the working of a new principle, and of a new life which alone is true life, because it is conformable to the eternal will of God and the moral order of the world.

All this relates to the individual life of man, to the finite human mind: it is, however, intimately connected with the infinite Divine mind, or the eternal Thought of the Universe. The very consciousness of man of himself centres in the consciousness of God of Himself, which Thought of God of Himself is the cause and origin of the Universe. Only He who has that consciousness in him, and thinks and works accordingly, can explain to mankind their own nature, and show them the true way to eternal life which is the consciousness of God as Love. (John i. 18; 1 John iv. 8.)

Let every one, therefore, look upon Him who is the adequate expression of God's Thought of Himself, of His eternal love. Whoever fixes his mind steadfastly upon Him and His life of self-sacrificing love, will understand his own destiny and the moral order of the Universe, and living thus in God and with God will be immortal as is God and His Thought of Love.

II. THE ONLY MEANS OF REMAINING UNITED

IS TO MAKE HIS HOLY LIFE

Jesus to the Jews who had followed Him after the feeding of the five thousand.

(St. John vi. 47—63.)

“⁴⁷Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on Me hath eternal life. ⁴⁸I am the bread of life. ⁴⁹Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead. ⁵⁰This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof and not die. ⁵¹I am the living bread which came down from heaven* : if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever : and the bread which I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world† . . . ⁵²Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. ⁵⁴Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day. ⁵⁵For my flesh is true meat, and my blood is true drink. ⁵⁶He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in Me, and I in him. ⁵⁷As the living Father hath sent Me, and I live by the Father ; so he that eateth Me, even he shall live by Me. ⁵⁸This is that bread which came down from heaven, not as your fathers did eat manna and are dead. He that eateth of this bread, shall live for ever. . . .”

⁶⁰ Many of his disciples, when they had heard this, said, “This is an hard saying, who can hear it?” ⁶¹When Jesus knew in Himself that his disciples murmured at it, He said unto them, “Doth, this offend you? ⁶²What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before? ⁶³It is the Spirit that quickeneth : the flesh profiteth nothing : the words that I have spoken unto you, are Spirit and are Life.”

WITH CHRIST, AND HAVING ETERNAL LIFE,
OF SELF-SACRIFICE OUR OWN.

Eternal life being the knowledge of God and union with God, you cannot have it without believing in me and being united with me, who am the true and adequate manifestation of God, and who have brought to you from God that true intelligence. Nothing therefore short of such a union with me can make you partakers of divine life, and thus of immortality and eternal bliss. This is a union and intercommunion of divine life, by which that intelligence and that holiness which is in me becomes your own, is made, as it were, your own flesh and blood.

These expressions must be understood in the Spirit; thus understood, they ought not to offend you. You are offended also by my saying that I came from God: you shall see more than that, you shall see me return to my Father, to Him with whom I am united, and was united before all time, and shall be united without time, and you shall see the work prosper which I have begun.

* Compare the words said to Martha at the resurrection of Lazarus (St. John xi. 25): "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live."

† Compare the words at the Last Supper (St. Matthew xxvi. 27, 28; Mark xiv. 22, 23; Luke xxii. 19, 20): "This is my body which is given for you. . . ." "This is my blood, the blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many." [This is the cup, the new covenant in my blood which is shed for you].

THIRD CHAPTER.

THE CHRISTIAN TRINITY COMBINED WITH THE SPECULATIVE TRIAD.

THE historical formula, which is the theological, must flow, in order to be true, without any mixture of evidence with speculation, from the very words of Christ as recorded and commented upon by the Apostles. The philosophical formula of the triad—God, Man, Humanity—was obtained by the purely philosophical analysis of the mind. If we find them to agree with each other, our Christianity will appear rational, and our philosophy will be Christ's own.

The Christian triad exhibits in its simplest and purest form the three factors which are at work in religion. They are placed by apostolical Christianity in that perfect relation to each other which insures their harmonious action. We have only to translate the historical words into their simple philosophical exponents, and we shall perceive that the historical doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit harmonizes fully with the two philosophical triads, the eternal (infinite, ideal) and the demiurgic (finite, real). It connects them together, because it is itself in connection both with the higher, infinite sphere, or the triad of the infinite self-manifestation, and with the lower, finite sphere, or the triad representing the infinite Being in His finite realization. The positive form in which the three factors, Father, Son, and Spirit, appear in the apostolic records, expresses, more perfectly than any other, the intimate connection between the substance of the infinite divine Being, and the finite realization of the infinite in the universe.

It is a remarkable coincidence, that speculation cannot discover

any other term for the third factor but that which is consecrated by the apostolical records, namely, Spirit. In this third factor, indeed, the speculative analysis of the infinite mind and the demiurgic or mundane manifestation necessarily coincide. The Spirit is in every sense the connecting link. In the first place, the Spirit (agreeably to the origin of the word) connects, in each of the speculative triads, the two preceding factors, as their conscious unity. Secondly, the Spirit connects the two speculative triads with each other. Lastly, it connects them with the theological triad. In interpreting the Semitic expression for Spirit, it is not unessential to recollect that in Hebrew (and, therefore, in the language in which Christ spoke) the word is feminine, and that the Hebrew image of Spirit is that of Mother and Maternity. Christ selected, in explanation of the Hebrew word, a new term, the Paraclete; which Greek masculine had passed into the vernacular language of Palestine, in the sense of Advocate, Prolocutor (*Fürsprecher*), and may therefore be translated also Intercessor or Comforter. Hitherto Christ had been the Paraclete of his disciples: after his withdrawal they were to have their teacher and monitor—within themselves.

We may, therefore, sum up the whole Christian belief in the above exhibited historical formula, as being its simplest and at the same time its most authentic and highest expression. *Father* and *Son* are correlatives, so are *God* and *Word*, but the first term refers to the demiurgic sphere alone, whereas the correlatives of *God* and *Word* belong also to the ontological sphere. The Sonship refers as substantially as the Wordship to the divine mind, in so far as God is manifesting Himself finitely, and thinks this manifestation. The term *Word* differs only in this, that it applies equally to the manifestation within and without: it expresses the eternal thought of God of Himself, which thought includes the demiurgic process as a consequence of the evolution of the *Word*. In this consist the unity and the difference.

The very expressions *Father* and *Son* prove them to have

reference, necessarily, to the manifestation of God, not to his immanent, extramundane nature. The Son is the most natural expression, both of the finite realization, and of the divine thought of the same; as the Word is the most adequate expression for the immanent consciousness of God, as the eternal cause of all finite realization.

The following juxtaposition will render this result still more evident. In the subjoined table the two philosophical triads are placed at the top and bottom: and transversely is placed the historical triad, connected with, and presupposing both.

THE EXISTING. 'Ο Ων.	THE THINKING. (Word) Λόγος.	THE THINKING-EXISTING EXISTING-THINKING. Πνεῦμα.
THE FATHER.	THE SON. — Jesus the Christ. — The individual Christian, as individual.	THE SPIRIT PARACLETE. — The congregation of believers. — The totality of be- lievers in all ages. The Church.
God. Ideal. Infinite.	MAN. Real. Finite.	MANKIND. Ideally-real. Infinitely-finite.

It is clear from the preceding that every theological construction of a triad must fail, if the three different spheres be not kept entirely distinct in reasoning:

The ontological; or the contemplation of the Absolute in itself, as mirrored in finite Reason.

The cosmological, or demiurgic; or the consideration of God in connection with the visible creation.

The historical, or psychological: the contemplation of the realization of the Absolute in Man and Humanity, as finite Mind.

The analogy or identity of these spheres may be asserted or denied: the laws of reasoning do not permit us to mix together spheres of thought which present themselves to our reasoning mind as decidedly distinct.

The Evangelist may say that the Word became Flesh ; but dialectically we must not transport the Self-consciousness of God into the historical sphere, without having first done justice to the nature of the Finite, in its opposition to the Infinite. There we have to deal with space and time, with country and nations, as externally conditioning that individual which is called the personification of the Self-consciousness of God.

Otherwise we should not only fall into contradictions, but lose, upon cool reflection, either God or Man, and thus both. Jesus cannot cease to be historically a Man, like all other men, without becoming a spectre: and he cannot cease to be the impersonation of God as Reason and Self-manifestation without sinking into an imperfect philosopher, not to say an impostor.

It is the same with the Spirit. Here we lose, by confounding the spheres, not only the thread of the reasoning, but also the practical object, and make either the Spirit something outward to man, or degrade it to finiteness and human affection.

As to the reconstruction, I maintain the five following points.

First: There is not one word in Christ's declarations about Himself which justifies that confusion, and there is enough in them to explain and complete what two of his disciples taught on the ground of his declarations.

Secondly: The ancient Fathers began to speculate before the historical and the philosophical elements, poetically confounded in early traditions, were sufficiently separated, and they proceeded to their task, not only without a lucid, correct method, but fettered by remains and relics of Jewish and Hellenic symbols and speculations, and with a total want of physical science. The Councils made a system of this confusion.

Thirdly: The Byzantine and mediæval Romanic scholasticism idolized the confusion of the Councils, and operated upon it under the pressure of the metastasis of the ideas of Sacrifice, Priesthood, Church, which pathological process was going on for centuries, induced and supported by ritualistic and hierarchical institutions.

Fourthly : The Reformers established the true principle without carrying it out, and the reactionaries of the seventeenth century endeavoured to build up a new scholasticism, shorn of its poetry and condemned by the spiritual and biblical principles invoked by the reformed Churches.

Fifthly : It is this very system, this fag-end of a process, more than fully effete and exhausted, which the hierarchical party is endeavouring to re-establish, some with Rome, some without, or even, apparently, against Rome : in England, as insular Catholicism, national hierarchism, and mutilated mediævalism ; in Germany, as blind Lutheranism, coupled with jesuitical absolutism as regards politics, and a hatred of all thought as regards literature.

FOURTH SECTION.

THE

PRINCIPLE OF DEVELOPMENT

IN

THE POST-APOSTOLICAL PHASES OF CHRISTIANITY.

THE
PRINCIPLE OF DEVELOPMENT
IN THE
POST-APOSTOLICAL PHASES OF CHRISTIANITY.

FIRST CHAPTER.

THE APOSTOLICAL FATHERS, OR THE ANTE-NICENE PHASIS.

THE scriptural and apostolical doctrine of the Christian Church is that of Father, Son, and Spirit, substantially united. This doctrine is placed, as far as the first element is concerned, by the side of the strictest doctrine of the Unity of God. So far as the second, the Son, is considered, it always refers to Jesus, the Christ, and to believing man. Lastly, the Spirit is always treated with reference to the inward life of the believer, and therefore also of the congregation (*Ecclesia*), or to believing mankind. But, at the same time, He who is the Son is called the incarnation of the Eternal Word. In like manner the Paraclete (*John* xiv. 26) is considered as the Spirit coming from the Father after the withdrawal of Christ, who is also Himself called the Paraclete interceding with the Father for the believers (*1 John* ii. 1).

The three following points therefore were generally admitted to be the teaching of Christ and his Apostles, by all who accepted Scripture, that is to say, by all who did not deny the historical authenticity of the records of Christ's teaching.

First : The unity of God, as the eternal *Father*, is the fundamental doctrine of Christianity.

Secondly : The *Son* is Jesus the Christ, as the adequate mani-

festation, in the highest sense: every true believer is Son, in a state of diminishing imperfection, being brother to Christ in the Spirit. But Jesus alone is the incarnation of the Word (Logos). He therefore is called by St. John, "the only-begotten," *Unigenitus*, that is "only" Son; but all believers are Children of God in Christ, glorifying Christ as He glorified the Father.

Thirdly: The *Spirit* has not had, and is not to have, any finite individual embodiment: it is to the believer that same divine element of life, that same power of God which was in Jesus as entire individuality. Its highest manifestation is as the unity of many, and therefore, finally, as the totality of the believers, or the universal congregation of believing mankind, through all ages, called the Congregation (Church). This Spirit is, therefore, not the spirit of any human individual, or of any body of men, but the Spirit of God himself, as directly and really as the Word became manifest in Christ.

To accept and believe these announcements of Christ and this teaching of His Apostles, as the revelation of divine truth, this, and this alone, forms the doctrinal test of the Apostolical age, and is signified by the baptismal pledge being connected with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. To take this pledge, after having been instructed in the "good message," and to live accordingly as a member of the congregation of believers, is the paramount and universal test of fellowship with Christ. Those who accept this Biblical statement, who profess this belief before the congregation, and who lead a Christian life accordingly, may freely reason and speculate upon the connection of Father, Son, and Spirit, with dialectical thought and metaphysical analysis. They will do so successfully, according to the view of the apostolical age, in the same measure as they are good interpreters and philosophers. But no such philosophical system is considered as a test of churchmanship, of communion with Christ. The creed of the Churches, the baptismal pledge, is substantially nothing but the response to

the formulary of immersion (St. Matthew, xxviii.). Whoever admits and professes the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, in the words of that apostolical tradition respecting them which is contained in the Bible, is an orthodox Christian; whoever teaches it is an apostolical teacher; and all Churches which exhibit and realize that statement are apostolical Churches. For the Apostles taught and knew this much, and nothing more than, or different from it.

Thus far the Fathers and Churches of the second and third centuries are unanimous and apostolical; and this faith, and this liberty, constitute their importance to us. But beyond that simple and grand faith, and beyond this truly Christian principle of liberty, they neither pretend to apostolic perfection and authority, nor do they indeed exhibit a perfectly sound and complete development.

In their theological reasonings on the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, the men of the second and third centuries evidently do not distinguish sufficiently between the statement of the Bible (as it were, the historical element) and the speculative, or philosophical, element. Nor do they always distinguish, with sufficient clearness, between what belongs to the ontological Triad which is the self-consciousness of God of Himself within Himself, and the demiurgic Triad which is the manifestation of the divine mind in the Finite, or God, Man, Humanity. Lastly, they do not attend sufficiently to the difference between the Eternal thought of the finite manifestation, and its realization in time and space. Now, as remarked above, any confusion of this sort must lead to contradictions and erroneous formulas. If the historical element be not scrupulously sifted, philosophy will be found to be based upon a delusion. Every real fact is fit to become the object of speculation, for reality itself is nothing but the realisation of thought, and thought is the object of speculation. Philosophizing on a fact involved in mythicism is like the reasoning on the sea-serpent, or on the imaginary

curves of the supposed orbits of ancient astronomy. All Christian speculation, therefore, on anything but the historical Christ, the true Man, must lead to something monstrous, although it may embody great and profound ideas.

Again: any speculation confounding the ontological elements, or the philosophy of the divine nature, considered in itself, and the demiurgic elements, or the philosophy of the principles of the existence of the world, (the physical and the intellectual Kosmos,) can aspire to no higher triumph than the most complete and consistent accumulation of contradictions, and prove nothing but that the method employed is wrong.

The final cause of this fatal failure was the absence of national life, which, between national immorality and selfishness on the one hand, and military and police despotism on the other, had become extinct. During Christ's short life on earth, man became individually divinized in Him and through Him: the divinized human family arose in the first century out of concubinage, libertinism, and slavery: the divinized commonwealth was foreshadowed by the free Christian parish, emerging, in the second and third, out of slavish government, political and sacerdotal, by means of free constitutional Episcopacy, and passing through a fiery ordeal of bloody persecution and inhuman cruelty and oppression. Now the Church was in travail for bringing forth the Christian state: there was an empire opening for her, but without a nation, and she brought forth the accursed twins of imperial despotism, with its aides-de-camp and court intrigues, and hierarchial despotism, with its hierurgic scale of usurped authority, working itself up, by fatal necessity, from priestly power to episcopal ascendancy, and from this to the decrees of the Councils, and finally to the ordinances of the absolute Pope.

Since these formulas contain much evangelical truth, however imperfectly expressed, they may, if it be done freely and without constraint, have a disciplinary authority in a given Church, as commanding a respectful consideration in the schools of divinity, in a historical point of view.

The incipient defects in the method both of interpretation and of reasoning, in the second and third centuries became fatal absurdities. Scriptural facts, as well as scriptural divinity, were lost more and more in abstract notions, the hybrid offspring of unsifted facts and of speculations mixed up with heterogeneous elements. What rendered these defects fatal to Christianity was the circumstance of the doctrinal expressions on this subject being raised into tests of churchmanship, and imperial despotism being made the means of enforcing them.

In this respect the difference between the age of Hippolytus and the time of the Councils is immense ; the freer formulas of the former age become, relatively, commendable, and cannot be considered as imperfect Nicæanism and incomplete Councilism. This difference is of a twofold character, both as regards the contents of the formulas, and from the circumstance of Episcopal Christianity making these formulas doctrinal tests, whereas in the above age they possessed, at the utmost, a disciplinary and scholastic, not a dogmatic and exclusive authority.

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE COUNCILS AND THE POPES, OR THE BYZANTINE AND PAPAL CHURCHES.

THE fourth century, or the Constantinian and Theodosian Church, began to formulize the Christian faith with both these imperfections. The seventh century presented the complete system of a Christology which was without the historical Christ, and of a Pneumatology which was without the Spirit. The climax of the profound confusion into which the human mind was thrown by the combined power of one-sided and unmethodical speculation, of hierarchical intrigue and of Byzantine Imperialism, is exhibited in the so-called Athanasian Creed.

The hierarchy invented one other act fully as wicked or foolish, in addition to that formulary, by appending to it the clause that whosoever does not hold the faith expressed in it is to be excluded eternally from that salvation which Christ came to offer to all who believed his simple and intelligible teaching and followed his holy life.

THIRD CHAPTER.

THE MEDIEVAL PHASES AND THE APPRENTICESHIP OF THE
GERMANIC MIND.

ANCIENT Rome and Byzantium both died of Christianity, the one by persecuting it as its mortal foe, the other by attempting to confiscate it for the benefit of imperial and hierarchical despotism.

Christian Byzantium condemned itself to a slow but certain death by reducing the living Christian ideas to dead formalism, and a holy individual life to external discipline, invented for and by monks; and by substituting for the Christian people, for whom Christ had died, the absolute emperor and the imperial court, worthy successors of those who had crucified Him.

Christian Rome survived, both by traditional influence and practical wisdom, and through the instrumentality of a young and aspiring, barbarous, but fresh and noble nationality.

The Germanic tribes were the first race which was touched by Christianity in its youthful freshness. The Teutonic mind, in its primitive age, searched with deep earnestness and prophetic religious consciousness into the mystery of the intellectual universe, as the Edda attests. Their primitive poetry was heroic; their speculations were less cosmogonical than the Greek and Indian. They were directed chiefly towards the distant future: so was their destiny. After they had overturned the Roman Empire and subdued the Celtic tribes, they grew up under Christianity. Never had a noble nation more noble task-masters, Christianity and the Romanic nations. But an ap-

prenticeship it was, and a long one, this Germanic life in the middle ages; a period which national vanity and romanticism have considered, and to a certain degree still consider, essentially and originally Germanic, whereas the Romanic was the leading spirit of civilization, in language and religion, as well as in politics, arts, and speculation. The first thought and the best application were Romanic. The Germanic tribes received the Christianity of the Councils, ready made, from a close Roman and Romanic caste of priests. They struggled hard against it. Their genius was neither Alexandrian and Athanasian, nor Roman. Having finally accepted the doctrinal and hierarchical system, the tribe of the Franks, which had made the Romanized Gauls France, assisted the Romanic mind to form a philosophical system out of darkened records and confused rites. This scholastic system was based upon conventional assumptions, and centred more and more in the hierarchical government of Rome. The real Germanic genius was passive, although not inert, in this scholastic canonization of misunderstood rites and materialized ideas of primitive Christianity.

This apprenticeship, during which the popular poetry alone kept up, and the spirituality of individual devotion alone represented, the original nationality, lasted one thousand years.

It was only towards the end of these thirty generations, that the German mind, in the persons of the "Friends of God" (*Gottesfreunde*), partly laymen, partly priests, the Dominican friars, Eckart, Suso, Tauler, and the anonymous warden of the Teutonic order, the author of the "German Theology," spoke out the first great word about real Christianity since the days of the Apostles. This event happened soon after the Free Cities had reproduced the old Germanic nationality by divesting it of its feudal disguise, and about the same time that Dante's "Divina Commedia," and "Reineke the Fox," sounded, although in very different tones, the death-bell of mediæval Christianity. Dante, the Romanic prophet, did so by epicizing its

ideality, and by thus showing unintentionally the conventionality in the combination of facts and ideas, and intentionally, the inadequacy of the reality to the idea: Reineke, the organ of the popular Germanic mind, by satirizing its reality, and holding up to contempt, under the form of a fiction, the hollowness and hypocrisy of the social mediæval system.

The motto of that German school was, that, however much historical Christianity is to be believed, and however much rites ought to be devotionally performed, real religion consists neither in assenting to the one nor in practising the other, but that Christianity centres in man's innate God-consciousness, and its practice in man divesting himself, Christ-like, of the selfish principle, and making that life and death of thankful sacrifice his own, and thus manifesting the Christ within us. No sin but selfishness, and all selfishness sin, may be said to have been their practical motto: God not without Man, and Man not without God, their speculative creed.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

THE REFORMATION, AND THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT OF
THE ROMANIC NATIONS.

THE idea of the spiritual Germanic schoolmen is the deep metaphysical and ethical foundation of the work of the Reformation, which began six generations after Eckart. The deed and practical thought were Luther's, but all the genuine spiritual philosophy which was in him can be traced to the men of the fourteenth century. Luther (in that respect a true medieval German himself!) placed St. Augustine, the father of the Romanic philosophy of religion, and the founder of scholasticism, above, or at least on an equality with, the "Friends of God:" but Tauler and the "German Theology" in particular were undoubtedly his most enlightened human guides. Calvin was devoid of that element of positive and intuitive religious consciousness. His mind was throughout a reflective and a political one. Speculating one-sidedly and conventionally, although with Romanic acuteness and French precision, on the Divine foreknowledge, he produced a system in which the impartial philosopher can only see the distortion of a reflecting mind of the deepest ethical earnestness, overpowered by the logical consequences of Divine necessity, and untouched in this reflection by the central thought of Christianity, eternal Love.

The dogmatists among the followers and friends of Luther, although highly respectable, learned, and rigorously pious men, were as devoid of all deep philosophy, as they were of a sound feeling of living Christianity. They mistook divinity for religion, and conventional formalism for divinity.

The seventeenth century fell back into scholasticism, deprived of most of its depth, and as much alienated from the philosophy of the primitive Church, as it was from the medieval system. The consequence was, that the national spirit, wherever it could act, withdrew in disgust from theological controversies. The nations left divines to their narrow and exclusive systems, except in so far as they were connected with their national existence, and endeavoured to secure for themselves civil liberty, more fiercely than ever attacked by the despotism of three dynasties, and by papal encroachment. A war of extermination was waged: the Germanic nations came out of it in a state of deep exhaustion: Germany in ruins. One honest man arose at the end of the struggle; he was a Jew, was held to be an atheist, and had an unhistorical mind. One spiritual sect arose in the same terrible period; it was a Society which, after having spiritualized the form, formalized its own spiritual negation of form, and consequently never became national. Still it exhibits vitality in every great national crisis, and lives to see the triumph of those ideas of truly practical Christianity, and of the Christian dignity and liberty of man, for which its fathers became martyrs in the old world, and apostles in the new.

The philosophy of Spinoza, still more than the diplomatic idealism of Leibnitz, prepared the way for the restoration of philosophy on religion and on Christianity in particular, by Kant and Lessing, as the Society of Friends did for political discussions and movements. Between these two periods—the end of the seventeenth and the end of the eighteenth century—the Moravian Brethren, and John Wesley their disciple, had shown to the despairing world and to the dissolute or impotent Churches, what real living Christianity is, and to the reflecting Christian people how little of that effective Christianity was contained in national establishments and their crippled machinery.

With the great Romanic Revolution a struggle for life and

death commenced; we are in the midst of it. Romanicism is vainly endeavouring to obtain political liberty by an imitation of Germanic forms, coupled with anti-Germanic centralization. It still more vainly fancies that it is possible to regenerate society without regenerating its morals, and to restore national religion without faith, or faith without moral reformation. The Germanic nations have, more or less, been drawn into this struggle. The social sins of the higher and middle classes have made the political agitation a social one. Socialism and Imperialism are combined to crush Liberty: Atheism and Superstition to destroy Religion. But the principle of the movement is not to be ruined by abuse, nor to be set at rest by force. Civil liberty has been asserted, first by the struggle of the Germanic race for liberty of conscience, afterwards by the efforts of the Romanic nations for national freedom. Both principles are too firmly established to perish in the civilized world. Still they are only the groundwork, the formal conditions, of the great regenerating process of reconstruction. The divine figure of Christ alone stands preeminent, and rises majestically over the ruins of the greatest social fabric which the world has ever seen—the shattered house of the great European Christian family.

FIFTH SECTION.

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.

INTRODUCTION.

THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH, AND THE BYZANTINE, SCHOLASTIC, AND TRIDENTINE SYSTEMS.

FROM the day of the first Christian Pentecost, the human race lives in the age of the Spirit. This age stands upon the foundation of Christ and of His life, the only perfect, the only sinless, personal manifestation of the centre of the Infinite, which is Love. Yet, of the three articles of faith, the third, that of the Spirit, has hitherto received the least development. This development can only be founded permanently on the realities of social life, which are but three: the family, the nation, the human race. The ancient Church hallowed the first, narrowest circle, domestic life. As to the civil community, it only prepared the regenerated municipal system by the religious community, the parish, and foreshadowed the constitutional State by the constitutional Church. But its great definitive act was the new sanctification of marriage, as the symbol of the union between Christ and the Church, and the regeneration of the family, as the image of renewed humanity.

Between the family and humanity and the national life there is no real and permanent social relation. But a conventional link exists, a temporary, although highly important one: the

Corporation and the Caste. The expression of this provisional incorporation of the community of Life in God through Christ is the Priest-Church, or the Sacerdotal Church. In the political sphere it corresponds to dynastic dictatorship, which, in less noble or effete nations, becomes deified despotism. The necessity of the sacerdotal system arose from the absence of nations and national life. The existence of nations requires National Churches. These are superior to Sacerdotal Churches as standing upon a more solid basis of reality, but they require organic international communion to maintain the spirit of Catholicity.

The last word of God in history is not nationality, but Humanity, the substratum of universality. All united life is an incorporation of divine life in human life. Christian social life is, therefore, the social incorporation of Christ. This incorporation is real, in so far as the human is really elevated into the divine life, and this reality is parallel to the incarnation in the individual person of Christ. All nations are but members of that great and progressing divine incorporation which we call Humanity, and this is philosophically what is called, in Semiticism, the mystical Body of Christ. This body grows, this incorporation or embodiment advances, by the perpetual, never ceasing, never interrupted realization of Spirit. This realization is an appropriation of the divine substance by abandoning the selfish principle, by the sacrifice of Self in life for man as for a brother, for humanity as for God's image. Christian worship has no other spiritual centre, but the adoring expression and solemn vow of this ever-progressing divine life of thankful, loving humanity. In this sacrifice, Christ, as He was the Author and the Ideal, so is He everlastingly the Mediator, or High Priest.

Such was in reality the fundamental view of the time in which Hippolytus lived, and of the whole Apostolic age. In very truth, no one can thoroughly understand that

age, who approaches it with mediæval theology and scholastic assumptions, or with the formularies of the Tridentine decrees.

If Hippolytus and his age be not orthodox, who is? For the Nicene and Tridentine Councils claim infallibility and implicit acknowledgment of their authority, as being themselves expressions of that earliest and primitive Catholicity. But, if Hippolytus and his age be orthodox, what can the later Churches be, but, at best, conventionally orthodox? For to say that their formulas and institutions proceed from the religious consciousness of the ancient Church, is irreconcilable with historical truth.

This view must be carried out impartially by the philosopher. Certainly, if Hippolytus, and the age which he represents, be apostolical, and if the Athanasian system be only conventionally connected with that age and with those which preceded it, the mediæval system, carried to its logical and practical absolute conclusions, is untenable. But, if so, the doctrinal work of the Reformation of the sixteenth century, concerning Christ and the Spirit, must also be revised, and the dogmatical and ecclesiastical superstructure of the seventeenth century must be demolished, in order to enable the Christian people who are reformers, and not revolutionists, to rebuild their house upon better foundations, and to restore a living intercommunion with the Apostolic Church and the self-consciousness of Christ Himself.

FIRST CHAPTER.

ANTAGONISMS BETWEEN THE REFORMATION AND THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

THE antagonism between the Reformation and the mediæval Church is irreconcilable: not only because mediæval Catholicity has in the course of ages, and particularly through the Council of Trent, identified itself with Romanism: not only because Rome has constituted herself an absolute and infallible oracle, and because Romanism has finally identified itself with Jesuitism: not only because Jesuitism aspires to a monopoly of instruction and judgment upon science, and to the restoration of supreme hierarchical sovereignty over nations and governments. The real antagonism exists in respect of the early Greek as well as the mediæval Latin Church; the inmost principles of these Churches make it inevitable. First: the Reformation rejects the priesthood, both as holding a mediating office, and as governing the Church, or the spiritual community of the faithful. It rejects any infallible authority for making truth, whether as to the historical or the philosophical elements of Scripture; and these, as we have seen, cannot be separated entirely in the records. It thus leaves, as supreme judges of truth, under the paramount authority of the Sacred Code, first, the conscience of the self-responsible individual, and then the duly given and freely accepted verdict of the Christian community, represented by an assembly which must include both ministers and laymen. There is no tenable position between the Tridentine Council and this principle. Secondly: the Reformation, with divine instinct and innate consciousness of God, established as a guide and support

for the conscience of the believers, by the side of the normal authority of Scripture, the principle of moral self-responsibility; a principle which in Semitic language is called "Justification by Faith and by Faith alone."

These are the antagonisms of the reformed Churches with respect to the mediæval Churches. But there are also internal antagonisms in the reformed Churches themselves, contradictions between the principle of the Reformation and its logical consequences, on the one side, and the formularies and ecclesiastical institutions of the seventeenth century, on the other.

The *first internal contradiction* consists in this. The Reformation appealed to Scripture alone, and accepted only with a general reserve the Creeds of the Councils. This was instinctively right, as meaning originally, by that reserve, nothing more than that the Protestant Church has that faith in the Christian spirit, that there is no contradiction between the spirit of those Creeds, taken as a defence against the real or supposed errors of the day, and the Sacred Record spiritually interpreted. The Reformation accepted in a similar way Pedobaptism, although its leaders were more or less aware that it was neither Scriptural or Apostolic. But they felt that, if followed in mature age by Christian education, and by a spontaneous profession of faith, as the essential act of the individual, it was no longer in contradiction with the spirit, although it might be with the letter, of Scripture. The German Reformers, in particular, took this view in the bright days of Protestantism. They never meant to idolize articles, much less rubrics. The imperfect liturgical formularies which they revised imperfectly, were considered by them as purely provisional. Still less did the English Reformers do so. Thus qualified, the reception of those formularies could be justified, and the Churches could exist with them. But as soon as orthodoxy demanded their recognition as absolute truth, it signed its own death warrant. For the letter of the Creeds does not agree, and never can be

made to agree, either with Scripture or with the consciousness of the ancient Church: and Scripture cannot be invoked, even for what sprung out of it by the agency of the Spirit which it teaches, but does not forestal. Such, at least, has been the judgment of the most conscientious inquirers, and this judgment is confirmed by the lameness of the arguments brought forward on the other side. Bibliolatry, because irreconcilable with the historical conscience, became fully as great a nuisance as the idolatry of priestly authority and its decrees.

The *second antagonism* is this. The Reformation appealed to Christian reason, but Protestant orthodoxy considered reason as inconsistent with revelation, and declared it heretical, whenever reason condemned arbitrary acts; and with equal contradiction it rejected philosophy, bidding it speak Semitic, which it never had done, and never could do.

The *third antagonism* is this. The Reformation appealed to the universal conscience, and therefore, first of all, to the moral and religious conscience of the body politic in which it acted. Now such a conscience exists only under the ægis of civil liberty, as founded upon the sovereignty of reason and law over tyranny and material force. But everywhere, with the exception of some small countries, the hierarchical body remained indifferent to the application of reformed Christianity to the reform of civil society, and often assisted despotism on principle, by preaching a one-sided divine right of princes, inferior only to their own.

The *fourth antagonism* is this. The Reformation proclaimed that the totality of the believers, and not the clergy alone, is the Church; but it left the power of making laws, and giving judgment in the Church, either to the priests or to the temporal power. A Church where the people, organized congregationally and synodically, takes no part in such regulations, and, especially, in the appointment and judgment of their ministers, is not a Protestant Church, but remains so far unreformed, and either relapses into a Priest-Church or becomes a State-Church.

It has only to choose between Jesuitical Rome, or Russianized Byzantium, Pope or Czar.

With these four great antagonisms the eighteenth century drew near its close amidst those great political events and social revolutions in the Romanic world, which have now lasted more than sixty years without having come to a final solution. On the contrary, the revolutionary movement is breaking up deeper and deeper strata. The religious question lies at the bottom, as the deepest stratum, and, if there be a regeneration possible, religion, that is to say Christianity, will be the fundamental element of *a new and a better and durable social order*.

SECOND CHAPTER.

ANTAGONISMS BETWEEN APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY AND THE SYSTEM
OF THE REFORMED CHURCHES.

IF the consciousness of the mediæval Church in worship, as developed in the mediæval Church, and sanctioned by the Tridentine decree on the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ in the Mass, be incompatible with the original idea of the Christian sacrifice, that system cannot stand when attacked by the present arms of reason, erudition, and criticism. Neither can that system stand unreformed which was at first provisionally established by the reformers, and then reduced to a stereotyped dogmatical system by the orthodox divines of the seventeenth century. For it is less true in its positive, than in its negative part. It does not express, much less develop, the Apostolic idea of the Christian self-sacrifice, as the real sacrifice of thanksgiving in the Spirit of Christ; and it moves, against its will, within that very magic circle of mediæval confusion and scholastic fiction which the Reformation strove to break through. And what shall be said of the rest of its Sacramental doctrine? The theories respecting Pedobaptism, according to any of those systems, would be perfectly unintelligible to the ancient Churches, and cannot be brought into harmony with their consciousness and monuments, except by fictions and conventionalities. These fictions and conventionalities, however, are required for our own age, which, it cannot be denied, prove on the whole inefficacious and insufficient, and not satisfactory to the public conscience. Those who demur to this, evince as much

ignorance of the real state of the world as of the nature of Christianity.

If it be true that the ancient Church is no Priest-Church, the Canon Law of Rome, being simply the law of an absolutely governing corporation of priests called the Hierarchy, and based not only upon mistakes and all sorts of metastatic misunderstandings, but upon forgeries and impositions, it must fall to the ground, together with every hierarchical system raised upon such a foundation. If so, what is the philosopher of Church history to say of Churches in which the Christian people, that is to say, all the non-clerical members of any congregation, have, as such, no right to take part in the nomination of their pastors, no synodic action, no legal control and power of judgment in synods or by synodical tribunals? The antagonism of spiritual power and of temporal power, of Church and State, in the old sense, upon which the abettors of Priest-Churches continue to harp, is gone. It is not Cesar and the Supremacy of the State (whether acting by decrees of absolute princes, or by parliamentary laws) which are invoked against the sacerdotal claims, but the right of the Christian people, not in their individual and private capacity, but organized congregationally and synodically. As soon as the words, *Christian People*, *Christian Nation*, *Christian Synods*, are substituted for State, or Prince, or Consistorial Courts, the charm of priestly pretensions to government is broken, and broken for ever. These sacerdotal claims are victorious in noble minds and ages against a temporal co-usurper of Church government, against an opposition co-dictatorship of the State, but they are utterly impotent against the roused religious conscience of the people. What, then, becomes of purely Episcopal Synods? What of the claim to more than a veto, constitutionally defined, for the Bishop? What of the pretension to grant onesidedly ("octroyer") rights infinitely older than their claims? What is there of Apostolic in this? What is there that is not contrary to Apostolicity?

THIRD CHAPTER.

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE SECOND REFORMATION.

CHRISTIANITY was not born irrational, but divinely rational; not slavish, but free; and a consistent criticism of the Evangelical and Apostolical records does not show that the glorious building of the Church was founded upon coals, supposed to be gold, or upon sand, supposed to be rock, but it certainly does prove that it was erected on too contracted a scale, both for its divine founder and for humanity, to last for ever. The Apostolic and ancient Church is no more absolutely normal than any other; still it bears not only negative, but most positive evidence, of the comforting fact, that it agrees in all essential points with that which philosophical and historical criticism of Christianity must call the truth. Thus the modern critical and historical school (in which I do not mean to include the theology of Tubingen and the philosophy of Young-Hegelianism, in their peculiar negative and sometimes destructive views) has not found in Christianity less truth than its predecessors did, but more; and it must and will conclude, not by weakening, but by strengthening, Christianity. In judging its development and errings, it must not be forgotten, that the critical school of Germany found Christianity almost abandoned in the conscience of mankind, except as regards some good moral truths or a few solemn rites. It is a historical fact, that it has kindled a light both in the history and in the philosophy of Christianity, and shown a power of life in Scripture, of which the former irrational method had no idea, any more than the magician has of spirituality, or the fabulist

of history. What would have been the consequence, if the subject had been taken up by the whole of Christian Europe?

Christianity proves itself to be the religion of the world, by its power of surviving the inherent crises of development through which it has had to pass. The other historical proof is no less strong: that it has been able to bear a degree of political liberty unparalleled in the history of the world. No Athenian statesman, still less any Roman, would have believed it possible that the Temple, the House of the Divinity, could without profanation be thrown open to the worshipping people. No Jew would ever have imagined that religion could exist without a sanctuary, that there would be no Holy of Holies, beyond that which centres in the union of adoring souls; indeed, that the real Temple of God was to be the living Church, the faithful people. In the same manner neither St. Augustine nor St. Jerome would have thought it possible that Christianity could support controversy without anathemas, and Christian constitutions without religious exclusion and intolerance; or that an independent European literature could withstand public opinion and a free press without falling into unbelief or indifference.

But the strongest, the most convincing proof as to the past, and the only one which guarantees the future, is, that the Christian religion appears in the mind of its author as capable of infinite expansion. It presents in the records of His consciousness of Himself and of His divine nature, in the writings of the Apostles and their disciples, and in the whole development of the Apostolic system, the harmonious completeness of the only three not conventional factors which exist in the world: **GOD, MAN, MANKIND.**

Neither Paganism nor Judaism could effect such a harmony; they both produced the very opposite of what they were intended to exhibit. Hellenism, the highest form of the religions of nature, or of Paganism, had lost the consciousness of the divine Unity, by the variety of the ideals of humanity which it had embodied

in God-men or Men-gods; it had moreover lost the consciousness of humanity, by its very eminent humanization of nationality; and, lastly, the consciousness of the free agency of the mind over the sensual appetite, by its idolatry of divinized nature. Its apotheosis of man and of his godlike creative power was visited upon it by the apotheosis of an emperor, and of his blasphemous omnipotence, to which it was obliged to do homage. Judaism had adhered faithfully to that First Cause, obscured in the Hellenic consciousness; but the bondage of the Law and of its ceremonial usages had darkened its original spirit, and finally erected an insurmountable absolute barrier between God and Man, and thus between the Infinite and the Finite, Thought and personal Realization.

The belief in Incarnation is the full acknowledgment of the Hellenic idea of heroic dignity, divested of the fetters of physical necessity and fable. The Christian idea of incarnation appears, in St. John and in St. Paul, entirely independent of any preternatural procreation. The philosophical, or infinite, factor, is the principal, and may be the original.

The consciousness of Christ of Himself and His expressions upon that head (in chapters ii. viii. and xiv. of the Gospel of St. John) form the divine and historical groundwork for the metaphysical exposition contained in the words of the Prologue. This is the indestructible basis, inaccessible to any doubts of historical criticism, of the Christian doctrine of the Son, and of the whole second article of our faith. His life and death of self-devotion for mankind as His brethren, and as children of God, are the historical seal of that grand revelation.

The revelation which forms the basis of the third article centres originally in Christ's announcement of the Spirit, as teaching the mysteries of God, and explaining and maintaining His own doctrine to the end of all things. Its first great and wonderful manifestation and realization was the divine impulse which inspired one hundred and twenty believers, men and

women, Palestinian and foreign Jews, assembled at Jerusalem on the first Christian Pentecost, to burst out in the praise of God, not expressed in ritual formularies, nor in the extinct sacred language, but in the living tongues of the earth, which, on that day, became the organs of inward divine life and adoration.

Judaism died of having given birth to Him who proclaimed the Spirit of the Law. Hellenism met Christianity by its innate consciousness of the incarnation, and then died ; surviving only by eternal thought and imperishable art. Romanism taught young Christianity to regulate the Spirit in its application to the concerns of human society ; when, after it became powerful, it taught a religious corporation to resist a despotic and corrupt court, and to civilize barbarians.

The nations of the present day require not less religion, but more. They do not wish for less communion with the apostolic times, but for more ; but, above all, they want their wounds healed by a Christianity showing a life-renewing vitality, allied to the reason and conscience, and ready and able to reform the social relations of life, beginning with the domestic, and culminating in the political. They do not want negations, but positive reconstruction ; not conventionality, but an honest *bond fide* foundation, as deep as the human mind, and a superstructure, as free and organic as nature. In the meantime let no national form be enforced as identical with divine truth ; let no dogmatic formula oppress the conscience and reason ; let no corporation of priests, no set of dogmatists, sow discord and hatred in the sacred communities of domestic and national life. This end cannot be attained without national efforts, Christian education, free institutions, and social reforms. When these shall have been made, no zeal will be called Christian which is not hallowed by charity, no faith Christian which is not sanctioned by reason.

As to the future destinies of the world, the present civilization of Europe may perish ; the nations who have created it may make

way for new nationalities, as the Celtic element in Ireland is now visibly doing for the Germanic; but the holy longing of the human mind for seeing truth realized over the earth, will be satisfied sooner or later. The whole world will be Japhetized, which, in religious matters, means now pre-eminently, that it must be Christianized by the agency of the Teutonic element. Japhet holds the torch of light to kindle the heavenly fire in all the other families of the one, undivided and indivisible human race. Christianity at this moment enlightens a small portion of the globe; it cannot, however, remain stationary, but will advance, and is already advancing, triumphantly over the whole earth, in the name of Christ, and in the light of the Spirit.

CONCLUSION.

THE
PROSPECTS OF SCRIPTURAL, SPIRITUAL, AND FREE
CHRISTIANITY,
AND
THE TRUE MILLENNARIANISM OF OUR TIMES.

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INTRODUCTION.

CHRISTIANITY stands or falls with the person of Christ, as represented in the Gospels. If the account of his life were not historically so true, that it must be believed on evidence, or if, critically examined, it presented only the highest and purest instance of religious delusion, the superstructure, whether apostolic or gnostic, would be, at best, only a half-poetical, half-political shell, constructed out of a more or less conventional combination of facts and of thought, and concealing a myth beneath the surface. Were that the case, all that we call Christian religion would exist but upon sufferance, and be to us and to future civilized ages only an unavoidable evil, or a conventional vehicle for conveying moral ideas, and enjoining social duties. But, supposing this point to be settled satisfactorily, a mere admission of the historical truth of Christianity cannot make us Christian believers. Christ and Christianity may be an object of historical belief without being an object of faith. Faith, as the apostolic writer remarked, is, above all, a belief in the reality of the invisible world, and can no more be built upon a mere historical fact than it can upon a myth or a legend. Christ, to be an object of Faith, must be more than an historical model-man, commanding our respect: that which He was, and was conscious of

being, must be eternally, divinely connected with our own nature, as the soul is with God, so as to be blended with our highest religious aspirations, independent of all histories.

The best way to prove that this is really the case would be, to make the Life of Christ Himself, and the religious Life of Humanity in Universal History, the object of truly historical and philosophical investigation. Neither of these has hitherto been done, or even attempted. But, addressing as I do religiously disposed and thinking readers, I may assume that they assent in two great points to the propositions from which I start. First, that, wherever we examine its history frankly and boldly, we find that Christianity was born rational and free, and has been made conventional and unfree, partly by misunderstandings, partly from external motives. Secondly, that, wherever we compare its realization with Christ's intentions, Christianity, far from being exhausted and having outlived itself, has evidently become less effectual in European Society, because that character of universality and eternal thought, which manifests itself in Christ's person, and in His consciousness of Himself, has not been sufficiently understood, and faithfully realized. The germs deposited in His life, and even those which were planted expressly by His apostles, in the first Christian congregations, have not been organically developed. After having for more than a thousand years been crushed by Byzantine formalism and Roman hierarchism, their offshoot in the age of the Reformation was nipped in the bud, and their growth stunted by the despotism of princes, the bigotry or selfishness of priests, the debasing materialism of nations, and the godless speculations of despairing philosophers.

Scripture as the code, the history of the Church and of mankind as its commentary, and Universal Reason and Conscience as the Supreme Tribunal, are the only realities which remain to us, and the only hope for the future ages of the world.

Such was the aim of Christ's own teaching, such the inter-

pretation by His disciples, such the predominating spirit of ancient Christianity in the seven generations from Peter to Origen, such the voice of the noblest and deepest minds in the dark ages, such the solemn protest of the great apostolical men and martyrs in the glorious period of the Reformation, such, in the midst of persecution, of tyranny, and of wars, the yearning of the most pious, learned, and enlightened men of the last three centuries.

Such is at present the general longing of millions in the nations from Europe to China.

This longing is observed and followed up by governments and statesmen, by hierarchists and by philosophers, with an interest mixed with surprise and astonishment ; here with fear, there with hope ; here with embarrassed scepticism, there with enthusiastic expectations. It is only the blind who see nothing, and those who resolve to be deaf who hear nothing.

The religious mind of Europe is more than ever occupied with the future. As regards those who enter deeply into the subject, we see them divided into two hostile camps ; and it is the more necessary to look them in the face, because, for many reasons, the true views of each have either not been spoken out, or they have not hitherto found proper organs among the parties themselves.

I beg to be allowed to state them without reserve, as they appear to me.

I will call the one the philosophical, the other the millennarian view.

The real meaning and purport of the philosophical view may be formulized thus, with regard to the views and prospects held out in this work and in my Hippolytus.

“Suppose you prove Christianity to be rational ; suppose you demonstrate Scriptural history to present an unparalleled mirror of the working of the spiritual element in mankind, and especially in the great men and patriots of the Jews, from Abraham

to Jeremiah ; suppose, finally, that you convince people that what Christ has revealed of the union of God and man, and of the glorious destiny of mankind, is what the history of the world and reason itself proves to be truth : have you asked yourself honestly and clearly the last questions ? What is the Bible but the most remarkable of books ? what is Christ, but the holiest and wisest of men ? what is Christianity, but the most perfect and popular philosophy ? But what will become of religion when there is no more mystery ? what of the Church when knowledge is general, and self-responsibility the universal principle ? Worship will merge into philosophical meditation, the Church into the State, the Christian congregations into some of the free associations of national life. Be it for good or for evil, such is the naked truth. Now one of these two things must happen : either mankind can believe in God, and worship Him, and pray to Him in Christ's name, being at the same time fully conscious of their own divine nature ; can respect the Bible, although they distinguish between its letter and spirit ; and they will continue Church life, although it will be only considered as a part of the intellectual, social, and political life which engrosses their thoughts : or the contrary of all this will take place. We believe—and most thinking men, who, however, either do not wish or venture to speak out, or who are not quite clear upon the point, agree with us—that the latter will decidedly take place. The poetry of human life, the sanctification of our existence, can no longer have an objective form. The religious Iliad is closed. Let us then worship God in the Universe, in Art and Science, as honest Deists or Pantheists, and as good citizens ; and, if an outward worship and religious discipline be necessary for social purposes, or some strange instinct of human nature, let us cling to that system of mediæval hierarchy which is so intimately connected with our history, our art and poetry, and, if not with our thoughts, at least with the imaginations of our children, wives, and sisters, and with the social requirements respecting Birth and Death, Wedlock and Burial."

The other view is generally stated thus:—"It is quite useless to attempt any reform of the present desolate state of the Christian Church and society, and preposterous to speak of its prospects in this world of ours: there are signs of the times announcing the second coming of Christ, Who has declared that at the end of time, after a bloody struggle, and a divine judgment, He will take the government into his own hands, to form a kingdom of God on a new earth, and build up the new Jerusalem."

The one view is prevalent among the philosophical men and higher classes of the Roman Catholic countries and populations; the other is especially current among the religious people in England, Scotland, and the Eastern States of the American Union.

Each view, however, appears everywhere, in a great variety of forms. Jesuits and Puseyites act and teach as if the first, the sceptical view, were the true one: the German philosophers are all millennarians; few of them believe in positive Christianity, and most of them look with contempt or pity upon the English and American millennarians.

Both views appear, also, sometimes in a more or less strange combination with each other. They have, indeed, much more in common than would appear at first sight. The one view certainly is preponderatingly an unbelieving, the other a believing one. There is much reason and philosophy in the first, and much folly, ignorance, and delusion in the second. But while there is not much belief in the first, there certainly is something of unbelief in the other. In one point they agree: they both give up the present state of the world, at least in so far as its religious institutions are concerned; and even, if one looks a little deeper, in so far as regards the political and civil institutions of the present world. The prevailing element is despair as to what exists, either in politics or religion, or in both. A foreboding of great organic changes pervades human society. This despair and this foreboding existed, however, undeniably also among the Apostles, and throughout ancient Christendom:

and still faith, tested by a self-denying life and by martyrdom, co-existed with it, and was not disappointed in reality. The globe remained as it was, but the old world upon it perished—a new world came. Christianity destroyed the one, and nursed the other. Why should it not be so now? There are signs of corruption, of blindness, and delusions, both in governments and nations, fully as fatal and enormous as in the time of Nero, Domitian, Commodus, Caracalla, and Decius. In their time despotism at least was not made into a system, and certainly did not receive the sanction of Christianity. Liberty was not sought by great masses as the means of plunder; a bestial emancipation of the individual was not preached as its gospel. If superstition was idolized by crafty emperors, it was at least not in the name of Christ and the Spirit. Systematic, crushing intolerance and persecution were not practised under Nero. Christ could teach freely, surrounded by multitudes. Scripture was not quoted, nor the God of the Christians invoked, to sanction injustice. Promises were broken, and oaths violated, but no divine right of princes was claimed for doing so. There existed sorcerers and mountebanks, and slavery was legal; but there were no Mormons in the land of the Pilgrim fathers, and of Penn: and no law rendered the manumission of slaves impossible to the master in the Union founded by Washington upon the equality of men. The salt of the earth was wanting, but it had not lost its savour. Miracles, and warnings, and prophets were there: but have they been wanting in the modern world, and in our days, both to governments and to nations? There were martyrs then, and there have been martyrs for truth, without intermission, for more than three hundred years. At the same time, the Spirit of God evidently pervades society; and great and wonderful efforts are made in the name of Christ. All this looks very apocalyptic. May there not be, then, great folly in the apparent wisdom of the philosophy of despair, and much wisdom lie hidden in the hopes of millennarians? may not their very delusions be

the childish, unintelligent impressions received from a reality which is surely approaching?

I am convinced that this is so. I have no hesitation in declaring myself a millennarian. Certainly, my millennarianism differs from what is popularly called so, and what I cannot help considering as a rude and inadequate, and, above all, an unscriptural expression of the truth. I believe that great organic changes are impending over European society—changes which will be accompanied by violent convulsions and bloody destruction wherever timely penitence has not led to sincere healing reforms. But I believe also in Christ's word, that the judgment upon earth is left for ever unto Man, the Son of Man, in that mankind, in which His Spirit is indwelling, interpreting the law of universal conscience as written in the Bible, in the heart, and in history. I believe that man will have the same reason as well as the same conscience, and the same organic instincts, both of body and soul. He will therefore have the consciousness of evil and of sin, and the longing for the re-union of the soul with God; and prayer and sacrifice will not cease, but be realized as Christ willed it. Nor will religious symbols be wanting, any more than language, the symbol of thought. But symbols and words will be understood as such, and not identified with reality. Man will know that He is a Priest and a Sacrifice in one person, and that there exists no longer any other priesthood or sacrifice, whether by nature or by law. Mysterious rites will be more mysterious as well as more sanctified, because the subject of the mystery will not be in the elements of visible nature or in outward gestures and words, but in the soul and in the life.

And why is this to be so? Exactly because this is what Christ willed and predicted, and because the preparatory stages have been gone through, and have been found ineffectual. Christianity will exist in a more perfect form, because it can no longer exist in an imperfect one. Nothing can exist in a serious age, in an age of enquiry and progress, which is known by many

not to be true, and, if believed, is so only on outward authority, or by a maddening disruption of man into a reasoning and a believing being. A better state of society, founded upon a higher view of religion and Christianity, will arise out of the ruins of the old, because Christ has said so, and all prophets have said so, and the eternal laws of the government of the world say so. Men will worship God, because they respect the divine nature in Him. They will humble themselves before Him, because they believe in the divine mystery of their own being and destiny. They will venerate the Bible, because they will understand it as a part of God's revelations in history, and as a mirror of God's ways among mankind; for these ways are the mystery of mysteries, and the more we understand, the more we humbly adore them.

In this sense I am a millennarian, as Christ was, and his Apostles were, and the best among the ancient Fathers were. As to the time of the end, I know nothing; but I believe also on this point what Christ said, that the Father alone knows it, and that, if it cannot be found out by a rational and true interpretation, still less can it be so by ignorance and delusion.

Nor is my millennarianism an accidental and isolated point of my philosophical conviction and of my Christian faith: it is an integral, organic, necessary part, both of my philosophical view of universal history and of my theological belief. This is what I purpose to show in a series of concluding propositions, destined to express in clear, succinct, and popular sentences, with or without short explanations, what I consider the truth respecting the three great groups of practical questions, which are now uppermost in the heads and hearts of men:

The Word of God, the Bible and Inspiration.

The Church and her Infallibility, her Sacrifice and her Sacraments.

Church and State, Man and Mankind, the Millennium and Eternal Life.

I purposely abstain from entering again into the metaphysical points which I have endeavoured to clear up in the beginning of these outlines. I go straight to the last practical questions which serious Christians and philosophers, the English in particular, require to be answered. I know full well that an author who attacks conventional opinions on which prejudices and interests have been largely built, exposes himself to malignant attacks, mis-statements and misunderstandings, rather from what he says, than from his maintaining with prudent reserve complete silence upon such important questions. I cannot, however, see how such a reserve is to be justified, even on the purest motives, if we consider the gravity of our times and the sacredness of the public duty imposed on those who communicate their convictions upon such momentous subjects. I would venture to say, on my own behalf, after forty years of meditation and reserve or silence, that I know in whom I believe, and that I believe what I know and say. To those who are wedded to contrary opinions, or are restrained by doubts and fears, I wish the same internal conviction to which meditation and study have led me upon religious subjects, and the same peace of mind which has resulted from that conviction.

THIRTY THESES.

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I.

God reveals, that is to say, manifests, Himself directly to Mankind, by the Mind: this manifestation addresses itself to Man's rational Conscience, or to the Consciousness of Truth and Goodness. This direct manifestation is that of the Eternal Word or Reason, and is the key to the indirect manifestation of God to Man through the Creation and through History, or through the physical and intellectual Kosmos.

It follows that there can exist no enlightened belief in God, and therefore no sound religious life, without a faith in the corresponding divine element of the soul; and that Christianity can no more co-exist long, individually or nationally, with a materialistic philosophy, than it can with a principle of moral wickedness.

II.

The Soul perceives, by one and the same act, God as absolute Truth and as perfect Goodness ; and all religious faith is based upon the conviction that both are one in Him : while in and around himself Man finds both Reason and Conscience involved in antagonisms and apparent contradictions.

The belief in Truth is the supposition from which all reasoning starts ; and that in the existence of Goodness is the law and life of conscience. But there is Falsehood and Evil within and without, encumbering and obscuring more or less the Reason and Conscience, and warring against Truth and Goodness. This disharmony and antagonism draw the mind to seek a solution by turning to the first cause of existence : a solution which, as we know, cannot be found except by an act of faith followed by the assent of reason. This act is the acknowledgment of an eternal divine Will of Truth and Goodness, and the willing and thankful submission of self and self-will to that divine Will.

The inability of the Kantian system to show what it postulates, namely, the identity of the true and the good (in pure and in practical reason), is its acknowledged defect. To find a method of demonstrating that such a unity is indeed the supreme law of the reason and the first condition of our forming any notion and acquiring any knowledge, has been since, and must continue to be, the legitimate object of all speculative philosophy, and in particular of the philosophy of the mind.

III.

The contemplation of God in the history of mankind is the most natural and most universal means of strengthening the innate faith of the Soul in its own destiny; because this History is as much the realization of the moral order of the world, as the Universe is of the laws of gravitation and of light.

The law of the universe is a law external to the mind, although man also lives under it; the law of the History of his race is man's own law, that history itself his own history, placed objectively before him, and still as a part of himself. The voice of the conscience within him speaks to his contemplating mind out of the destinies around and before him; and his reason is led by that contemplation to the same results, as objectively true, which he found by self-contemplation. The subjective and the objective element support and supply one another. The history of past ages offers in large characters the solution of much which perplexes him in his own personal observation and experience; and, on the other hand, his inward ideal power enables him to divine the beginning and end hidden in history, and to understand primitive traditions, recollections of the past or of the nature of the soul itself. The microcosm spreads its mental light over the ages of history, and receives light and nourishment from them. Perceiving in all human things a beginning, a progress, a decay, and an end, the mind is able to discern in this development a working of the same laws which man discovers in himself. The laws of Truth and Goodness claim sooner or later their right in history, as they

do in Reason and Conscience; and Falsehood and Evil prove to be destructive to man and society. Has it always been so? Will it ever be so? Is the lot of humanity a common one in all respects?

The more this horizon is enlarged, and the more at the same time the phenomena are referred to their eternal centre—the divine laws of the intellectual and moral Kosmos—the more effectual a vehicle of progressive civilization and true enlightenment historical records will be. They will acquire the character of universality in the same measure as they exhibit humanity; and that of sacredness, the more they manifest the working of those laws as divine, eternal, not conventional or subject to arbitrary individual or national regulations. The highest ideal, therefore, would be such records as considered the whole human race as one—as a unity, and as having, like the human soul, the Infinite, as the beginning and the end of its finite existence. Without ceasing to be national, and embodying national peculiarities, such records would have an extra-national element, which would elevate and sanctify even those peculiarities, giving them in their general sense a typical or moral character for the rest of mankind.

IV.

The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament exhibit such a record of humanity, the only one existing, and at the same time the most adequate which can be imagined for the purpose. Bearing eminently the character of humanity, they are eminently prophetic, and therefore are, and always will be, more and more, the religious record of humanity.

The Jewish records open with a picture of the beginnings of mankind, divine or ideal, and human or terrestrial. They recite in sublime simplicity the reminiscences of the primitive world all illustrating the great fact that man, having in him the knowledge of good and evil, and a free agency to do the evil (which act, referred in conscience to God, constitutes Sin) is, in his selfish nature, inclined to use for selfish purposes that divine power of self-determination which is destined to make him a free agent of the good, which is the divine will.

The same history then pictures, after the natural catastrophe which desolated the primitive seats of mankind, the agency of the same conflicting elements, and exhibits the prevalence of idolatry as the consequence of the working of the selfish principle among the children of Shem.

It begins to present to us individual life with the history of him who first found God in his conscience, and thus, at peace in his mind and freed from the bonds of ignorance and selfishness, separated himself from the horrors of the most execrable bloody sacrifices, and became the founder of a distinct patriarchal

society, believing in one God, the God of man and of the universe, and keeping aloof from the surrounding impure tribes.

The history of Abraham, the friend of God, and of his descendants in the next two generations, is thus the sacred history of the God-conscious human mind. In the third this history becomes, through Joseph, connected with the political and religious life of Egypt and of the world.

Moses formed out of the Abrahamic tribe the Jewish nation, by making the law of the conscience not only the basis of its religion, but of its whole civil law. The wickedness and stubbornness of the people obliged him to surround this spiritual law (contrary to his original intention), with ritual and ceremonial regulations which, under the directions of a sacerdotal caste, necessarily obscured and impeded that spiritual law.

But inspired patriots, rising out of the ranks of the people, counteracted the hierarchical as well as the kingly despotism, and the sensuality and violence of the people.

Thus originated, in process of time, the side of the Law (then alone Scripture) and the sacerdotal religion, that prophetic, spiritual, and truly humane element, exhibited by the prophetic and poetical books of the Old Testament, which having been collected in later times were added to the Law (Thorah) as Scripture.

The calamities of Israel, from the disruption of the twelve tribes to the decline and fall of the kingdom of Juda, purified more and more the hopes of national restoration into a faith in the general, inward deliverance of the people and of the human race.

V.

Christ is the centre of the universal development typically exhibited in the Jewish records; and the Gospel therefore is the canonical book of the Canon, the key for the rest. It is the mirror and standard of Scripture, as Scripture is of universal history.

Much as has been said of the prophecies, and in particular of those which relate to the coming of the Messiah and of his Kingdom, it may safely be asserted that all that has been said and is now saying in England and the United States in this respect, gives scarcely any idea of the magnificence of this series of prophetic history which forms a connected chain through almost a thousand years. It is an elementary and exploded view to point to detached, and, moreover, generally misinterpreted passages, as Messianic, and to look for the prophetic element in petty externals; the whole history of the struggle of the spirit against the letter, of truth against falsehood, right against might, is prophetic, because it is human and divine. So there are not two or three, or four or five psalms, or ten or twenty verses in the prophets, Messianic: some are more, some less prophetic; but the most prophetic of all is the whole history, centring in Christ, of which they form a part.

A generation before the destruction of Jerusalem, Jesus of Nazareth declared Himself and his doctrine the end and regeneration of the Law, the fulfilment of the Prophecies. His teaching was universal and prophetic in the highest sense, because it flowed from a clear consciousness of his primitive and substantial union with God Himself, as eternal Love, a con-

sciousness tested by a life of self-sacrifice and abnegation, by a wonderful wisdom and by an unparalleled power over the minds of those who believed in Him. He addressed Himself to the Jews, not as a Jew, but as a Man. He sealed his life by anxiously resolving to die for the truth He had proclaimed.

Abraham had made the law of conscience the distinctive law of his family; Moses had coined out of it the ritualized law of that nation which he formed out of Abraham's descendants; Jesus proclaimed it the law of mankind by attaching it directly, without any national medium, to the consciousness of God Himself dwelling in Man and in Mankind. He divinized Man because He realized God. He opened the access of the soul to the Creator as to her loving Father, and based upon faith in her origin and destiny, upon moral responsibility, and upon the tranquillity of mind which results from that faith, the restoration of the whole social life of mankind.

That individuality could neither perish nor be replaced by another. It constituted an entirely new beginning as the operating, renewing spirit of humanity, and therefore soon spread itself over all nations and through all ages.

VI.

The history of the wonderful beginning of the social development in and through the Apostles, accompanied by a prophetic vision as to the future destinies of humanity (*Apocalypse*), is the necessary complement to the Gospel account of Christ's life and teaching.

Not only the Acts, but also the Epistles are histories; and so is even St. John's Apocalypse. It sees the future destinies of Christianity and of Mankind in the great events which were before the Seer, opening with the death of Nero and the Jewish war. The destruction of Jerusalem and that of Rome, are anticipations from that horizon, not as external facts, but as typical in the spirit for all ages to come.

VII.

These records are indefectible, first of all because the historical accounts are neither mythical nor poetical, and the more these accounts are sifted the purer their historical character and truth will come out.

The conviction of this historical truth is essential, because no universal and lasting faith can be built upon legends or myths. The slight discrepancies in the Gospels, and other imperfections in the letter, serve only to render more conspicuous the Unity of the Spirit. All the other difficulties have been created by ignorance and bigotry alone: the authenticity of some of the books has become doubtful only owing to these blunders and fictions; and historical criticism has restored and is restoring the basis for a sincere historical belief in this authenticity. This is especially the case with a part of what is called the Book of Isaiah, and with the Book of Daniel.

VIII.

The Scriptures are in this sense a Unity, that they centre in Christ as the centre of that humanity of which they give the sacred history. Their historical element is therefore sacred ; but they are pre-eminently the sacred records of mankind by the ideal element they contain, and by the ideal character of the persons and facts which they bring before us. As such, these persons and facts become typical or universal, as a type of humanity, and must be considered as being in an eminent sense a mirror of all human development, in so far as this development is referred to the centre of the consciousness of God in Man.

IX.

No faith in Scripture without faith in Conscience and Reason, and in their realization in Universal History and the Science of Thought. The History of the World is not typical because the Scriptures are ; but, on the contrary, they are typical because the whole History of Man and Mankind is necessarily typical as the manifestation of God in Mankind, of the Infinite in the Finite, of the Conditional in the Absolute. The Scriptures are pre-eminently typical, because they refer all, more or less, to the centre of human development, God and Humanity.

X.

The faith in the prophetical and apocalyptic element of Scripture rests also upon the general corresponding character of Universal History and of the Universe, only that Scripture is the purest mirror and most universal type of religious consciousness.

The Bible is the key to Universal History, but Universal History is the Dictionary for the perfect understanding of it.

XI.

The belief in the Inspiration of the Scriptures rests therefore upon the basis of all religious belief, namely the belief of mankind that the Spirit of God manifests itself in and through the human mind, the only true organ of God in Man.

XII.

The subjects of inspiration are in the first place the great heroes of scriptural history, preparatory to Christ, and Christ Himself. His person, superior to any individuality, preceding or following, connects the Old with the New, and His doctrine is normal for all national and social development of Christianity.

Neither Abraham nor Elijah, nor the Baptist, nor Jesus himself are recorded to have written any thing: the original writings of Moses constitute a very small part of what he did and was, and of what we know of him. These heroes, however, are the organs of the Spirit in the most eminent sense.

XIII.

The second subjects of the inspiring working of the Spirit are the authors of the writings which constitute Scripture: their inspiration must be in just proportion with what they undertake to represent, and with the measure of the Spirit which they manifest in treating it.

St. John's Gospel bears upon it, for both reasons, the stamp of the highest inspiration, and the Book of Esther that of the lowest. The historical accounts of the national history of the Jews are necessarily less spiritual than those which are occupied with pointing out in the national history, past and present, the progress of God's work among them: on the whole, therefore, the strictly historical books are less universal than the prophetic and poetical works. The Spirit in history is the spirit of humanity; and this spirit is divine, and, when referred to God, religious.

XIV.

Scripture, as the Code and Rule of faith, necessarily ends with Christ and those through whom we know Him. It is through these histories that faith is to develop and renew itself incessantly by the working of the Spirit.

All written or unwritten Christian ordinances, therefore, are to be judged by the Canon of Scripture. Since the first Pentecost, we live in the age of the Spirit, which manifests itself in the Church, that is to say, in the congregational and social life of the believers. Thus Scripture judges Scripture and realizes it, but does not produce Scripture. This is St. Paul's rule when he is giving advice.

XV.

The realisation of the truth of Scripture, as centring in Christ, is the history of mankind; and this history centres in the Church, that is to say, in the society of believers, or Christian states, as the embodiment of redeemed humanity. The Scriptures are infallible as a mirror of God, and prophetic as the centre of the history of mankind, which is a mirror of God's laws, and consequently prophetic. In like manner the Church is infallible, in so far as it represents the Universal conscience of mankind.

The belief in the infallibility of the Church, or in the inflexibility of the divine Spirit in that portion of mankind to which the Gospel of Salvation is preached, rests upon the faith in the Spirit and its power over the human mind. It is generally admitted that the conscious or unconscious faith in the reality of Creation, that is to say, the belief that the Universe is the manifestation of inherent and divine, eternal laws, is the basis of all physical science, from chemistry to astronomy, and our assent to mathematical demonstration rests upon the same foundation. But it is equally true, and ought to be still more readily believed, that the faith in the rationality of conscience, which is the basis of all religious belief, implies the belief that the Reason and Conscience of Christian mankind cannot belie itself, nor in the long run be belied by external authority.

Such a belief in the infallibility of the Church implies Scriptural Christianity, that is to say, the acknowledgment of the

Scriptures as an infallible Code. This article of Christian faith is consequently true only as being a complement of the Protestant principle of the paramount divine authority, and therefore divine truth, of the Bible. It is only when the Scripture is the divine Code, that the Universal Conscience of mankind can be said to be the divine interpreter of that Code and the judge of believing mankind.

Faith in the inspiration of the Scriptures, and faith in the infallibility of the Church, stand upon the same ground. In like manner as Scripture is divinely true only as to what it teaches on eternal life and truth, universal Reason is infallible only for the verdicts it pronounces as to the application of that teaching to the maintenance and promotion of the Kingdom of God. In other words, both are true, through the Eternal Word of God, which speaks out of them, and which is Reason. In both the letter is to be judged by the Spirit, and as being an expression of that Spirit, which is divine Reason manifested through Man. God never spoke to man except through Man or by Man's own spirit. But man's Spirit is the Spirit of God's Image, His own organ as well as manifestation. We know nothing more of the spiritual world than the three great realities: God, the eternal, conscious Thought and Will, Man, the individual, and Humanity, the collective, manifestation of this Thought and Will in Time: but these three realities constitute the indestructible power of inspiration.

Here also specific inspiration has its truth in general inspiration, and general inspiration again, its highest concentration and therefore its universal index in the scriptural records.

XVI.

The two great branches of the development of the Church which constitute her typical tradition, are contained in the two great holy and sacred acts of Humanity, her Worship and her Congregational life. Here, as in Scripture, it is the Spirit that constitutes the Unity, Universal Reason and Conscience the interpreter, Liberty the atmosphere and condition of development: but its Code is Scripture, in the Christian sense, as centring in Christ and His Spirit.

XVII.

Christian worship is rational, and therefore the worship of God alone. It is the act of a united people, founded upon the inward turning of the conscious finite spirit to its infinite source as conscious Thought and Will. This worship, therefore, necessarily consists of Meditation, and of Prayer and Sacrifice.

Meditation may consist in general silence, or in listening to the preaching of the word of God, or in the act of preaching.

Prayer and sacrifice are convertible terms: the one, however, moves rather in the Spirit of Thought, the other in that of Action. They constitute the reactive and culminating point of Worship, as the act prepared and impelled by meditation. This act appears as common prayer and as common sacrifice. Their nature is that of a vow or pledge addressed to God directly, to give up in free thankfulness the Finite Self to the Infinite in which is its real individuality, and in which its consciousness centres. The symbols connected with this prayer and this sacrifice are therefore the highest and most sacred symbolical acts, but must never be identified with the reality they represent, which is the Spirit of Prayer in intercourse with the world, and the realisation of Sacrifice in Life. These symbols can never cease, any more than Language, because they are as much the organic, necessary realisation of conscience as language is of Reason, and in their perfect form are called, as united with Reason, "reasonable worship." These pledges, on the other hand, must never be identified with ritual observances, which are the symbols of symbols, and the signs of signs.

XVIII.

The solemn pledge of the individual to whom the Gospel has been preached, and who believes in the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, to take upon himself or herself the moral responsibility for his or her own actions, is the essential part of the initiation into Christianity or the admission into the Church, prescribed by Christ, which we call Baptism.

That solemn pledge was called Baptism or Immersion, because it had its natural and significant symbol in the immersion of those who were admitted to take the pledge and make the vow, the emerging out of the water being the intelligible sign of the spiritual resurrection and inward renewal of life. Infant baptism is an innovation, or rather a new, not yet well understood and developed Sacrament of the Church, as a blessing of the new-born, and as a pledge of the parents for its Christian education. The real baptism of Christ and the Apostles is at present best represented by Confirmation, as understood in the German Evangelical Church, which is substantially baptism without the Jewish rite. As to this rite itself, false symbolism has led to the virtual abrogation of symbolical meaning, whether by preserving a dead rite as a living power, or by protesting against it as a superstition.

XIX.

The second primitive Christian symbol (Sacrament) of the consecration of Spiritual life to God, is the renewal of that pledge by continual thankfulness to Him, and the willing life of self-sacrifice which flows out of that thankfulness. The connection of this vow of love and sacrifice with the last supper is a significant one; but the celebration of the Communion is no sacrifice; and the Christian sacrifice, the centre of Christian worship, is quite independent of that celebration.

The connection between the renewed pledge and the celebration of the last supper is historically founded upon Christ's ordinance to his disciples, to remember His self-sacrificing death at their common brotherly meals, to which they were accustomed. And this connection is not merely historical. For the Christian vow of self-sacrifice is one of thankfulness; and this thankfulness to God centres in Christ's conscious sacrifice of His will to the divine will, out of love to mankind. Here also the perversion of Christianity has led more or less to the extinction of real symbolism, by making the misunderstood symbol the reality. The offering of the material signs of the sacrifice (the elements of bread and wine) having been made the principal act of worship, the spiritual sacrifice of thanksgiving appeared to the people, and was finally declared in the Council of Trent to be, a sacrifice of propitiation, the repetition of the redeeming sacrifice of Christ himself, as being in real presence latent in bread and wine. Thus the symbolic communion in the Roman and

the Byzantine Church may be, and generally is, without any communion, and the Christian symbolism ceases, the idea having, by a pathological metastasis, been changed into its opposite. The Protestant Churches restored the communion as the symbolical action, but not the idea of sacrifice, the real nature of which will never be understood till it is represented in its total independence of the symbolical act of remembrance of the redeeming and freeing act of Christ. Then alone the symbolical social meal will be restored to its spiritual reality, and will regain its influence on the mind, and on congregational and national life.

XX.

Next to these two scriptural Sacraments, or to the consecration of the spiritual life of the Christian, come the Sacraments of the Church for the consecration of the physical individual life from birth to burial. Their symbols are in part Jewish, in part Greek, Latin, or Germanic, and are not only capable of, but require, a wider extension as much as they do a greater spiritualisation. Here again the intellectual elements are the principal, and consist partly of meditation and admonition, partly of blessing, and prayer in general.

Noble germs of a universal symbolism are preserved in these acts of the ancient and modern Church, particularly in the remains of old national thoughts and customs, and symbolisms founded upon them. Thus, one of the most impressive portions of one of the noblest formularies in the English Liturgy, the mutual pledging of the bridegroom and bride, is an old Anglo-Saxon custom, and substantially to be found in Tacitus, as a Germanic custom and national faith. In general, the Japhetic element is predominant here.

XXI.

Social life in its different spheres, being the realisation of all vows and pledges given and taken in worship and with worship, is also to be consecrated, and may therefore have its symbols and sacraments. Its two branches of religious and civil life, the Church and the State, are equally capable of such a consecration.

The congregational sphere is the original, but not the complete, representation of this social consecration. To this branch belongs the blessing of the congregation over those who minister to the Church, and in particular the Ordination and Consecration of the teachers and rulers of the Church. The Coronation in monarchical states, or generally the blessing upon the heads of the civil government, is a social Sacrament of the civil sphere. Here we find many superstitious elements; but here also the poetry of Christianity may blend beautifully with the natural elements of national customs.

XXII.

As to constitution and government, the Church is necessarily an organised and free Society, and must as such have her organs and her assemblies, and her laws.

As the spiritual councils of a nation are no longer represented, either solely or pre-eminently, by its religious councils, and as these can still less be composed of ecclesiastics alone; so ecclesiastical councils cannot be now considered as the principal, still less as the exclusive, organs of the Catholic or universal communion of the Churches; that is to say, of Christian nations and tongues. The leading organs are, and will become still more, the free, national, and international associations and meetings, the communion in the literature of the world, and that public opinion which will rise more and more towards what it ought to be, the expression of universal conscience and reason.

XXIII.

The constitutional formation of a Church has two organic tendencies, that of becoming national, to represent a unity of national feeling and institutions in this sphere, and that of becoming universal, to express the universality of Christian life. Here also the degeneracy into something external has destroyed what was truth in the idea. The union in the Spirit may be more obscured by uniformity, national or catholic, than thrown into the background by separate government and by original rite; and the freeness of the Gospel, and liberty of the Spirit, are as irreconcilable with any political constraint and interference as with any Sacerdotal supremacy.

There must, of course, be organs for the peculiar (denominational or national) as well as for the universal (Catholic) manifestations of the conscience of mankind, as soon as this becomes a consciousness of the destiny of mankind. The first principle here must be, that no organ can be a truly Christian one, unless it be conformable with God's general order of the world. The Son did not change, and neither could nor would change, the natural order of the world of which He himself is the prototype and exponent, and which it is His intention to divinize. This is the national social order as constituted in families, tribes, nations, and states. These organs of the natural law of the world Christ purposed to raise into organs of Spiritual life, by making the natural life of man in the family and the state Spiritual.

The Christian Church is a Society, and therefore necessarily a Government, having its Councils and Tribunals. Such Councils and Tribunals must, in the first place, consist of believers; they must be free, and the obedience to them should be free also. Christ would have no successor of Caiaphas to lord it over God's own flock, and no successor of Pontius Pilate or Tiberius, whether unbaptized or baptized. He would not even that his disciples, all or one of them, should lord it over the Faithful: it was not for them, but for mankind, that He died; mankind with its laws and governments, which were to cease to be what they were, means of oppression and injustice, and to become what they were destined to be, organs of divine life. Christ found individuals; He found families; He found congregations governing themselves under Elders, with congregational rights. These individuals, families, and congregations, He knew, would be purified by faith in Him, and through obedience to His precepts: the end would be the destruction of the present world, and the rise of another, founded upon these transformed elements. Christ educated and formed regenerated individuals; but he contemplated regenerated families through reformed individuals, and reformed communities through regenerated families, and so at last regenerated nations and states. Now the Father having willed nations as well as families, and states as well as congregations, these states of the new world were to frame their national religious institutions, as they had framed their tongues and their political laws. But Christ, contemplating above all Humanity, also contemplated an international Christian law, and a free intercourse of nations, as integral members of His Church. But it follows from the natural order of God's world, that in this universality the national element must never be overstepped, and national independence never crushed under the pretext of catholicity. What in this respect can be done, must be done, from within, and not from without, and be accomplished in God's own good time, which time is known to the

Father alone. No Christian family can exist without the moral responsibility of every individual, and without an education to that end; no Christian community without the principle of self-government founded upon that moral responsibility; no reformed Christian state without a national tribunal of the conscience of Christianity; no universal Church not built out of independent nationalities: but likewise no national life worthy and capable of existing, which does not tend to Christianize, that is to say, to Divinize humanity, and to aid the consummation of the kingdom of God upon earth.

XXIV.

The first ruling principle, for the organic progress of religious social life, is that there be a constant mutual co-operation between the governing element and that of the free association.

The reasonable institutions which possess a vitality for such a progress, will necessarily be conservative, or gradually reconstructive, because the Spirit of God is a spirit of order; and they will be free or liberal, because that Spirit is freeing. The measure and proportion will differ according to the national character and history.

XXV.

The second principle is to preserve both the liberty of the individual mind in the society, and the influence of society and of its institutions upon the individual mind.

The agent is the individual Man ; the atmosphere in which he breathes and moves, is Society. The necessary condition for both elements is, therefore, a wholesome influence of the spirit exercised in society upon him ; and the communion of the individual member with society, even in the very recesses and mystery of his spiritual doings. No life of Christ and of the Spirit but individual—no sound individual life but in the community, and for the community. This community, in its highest sense, and as its last aim, is humanity : but it appeals to man's best instincts and affections by his family, parish, country, nation, language. The organic and harmonious mediation between the two is in the hands of ethical science and moral feeling.

XXVI.

The working of the complex of organic antagonisms and complements in a Christian Commonwealth constitutes the future development of the Church, and with it that of civilization, and of mankind.

The missionary element is, therefore, an important feature of our age, and a remarkable sign of the times; for it is the work of a general, active and self-sacrificing longing for the universality of the kingdom of God, and a preparation of new materials and agents in its promotion. The ever-increasing efforts towards the awakening or restoration of social religious life, in every sense, even in a destructive one, is another sign of a new epoch. Finally, the universal expectation of great civil and religious changes is an unequivocal sign of "the last times;" that is to say, of the approach of a new period of social life based upon religion, which is felt to be evolving, and which exists already when it is feared or hoped.

XXVII.

These facts, and in particular the anxious expectation of mankind, are the apocalyptic element of our times, and the infallible signs of the approach of great organic changes in the world, or of the millennium.

The millennarians of our times do not err much more as to the form in which the idea appears to them, than did the apostles and their disciples; but they do not possess the same spirituality as they manifested. Nor have they the same excuse for misunderstanding the words of Christ as the immediate disciples of Christ had. The true interpretation of Christ's prophetic words has since been written, by the history of the world, in such gigantic and flaming characters on heaven and earth, that everybody may read them by the glare of our revolutions, if he cannot discern them by the light of his reason.

XXVIII.

The apocalyptic element in Christ's revelation is no less positive than the historical element, and is as spiritual as it is positive. The end of human development is clear: the Kingdoms of this World are to become the Kingdom of God; the triumph of the divine principle upon this earth is to be manifest and universal. But great convulsions will accompany these changes, and precede this triumph; and there will be a Jerusalem and a Rome acting a part in them.

Jewish Jerusalem and imperial Rome are, in the Apocalypse, the types of the two-fold form of the Anti-Christian principle. Anti-Christ is conscious egotism rising in open opposition against the Divine Law in the one form or the other. Jerusalem was then the hierarchical, Rome the temporal despotism; they both called forth all the elements of destruction—war and revolutions. So will every Jerusalem and every Rome ever do. The spiritual despotism which Papal Rome is now exercising over mankind, in conjunction with her dynastic confederates, is greater than the temporal power which imperial Rome ever exercised over the world; and the pseudo-prophetic element in Judaism is co-operating with it more powerfully than that Anti-Christ who "gave power to the beast." In every conjuncture, however, hierarchical despotism is the Anti-Christian principle in its most accursed form, according to the Apocalypse. As then, so is it now this power which is giving strength to the tyrant, and summoning, as far as it is able, the men of faith and of liberty before the tribunals of

Princes, and delivering them to the scaffold, or to chains a thousand times more cruel than death ; while it dispenses with oaths and solemn promises given to nations, and at the same time sanctions rebellion and anarchy when strong enough to do so. It generates unbelief and is one of its forms. The Babylon of our days is therefore a Spiritual Babylon. So far the Reformers and the Evangelicals are perfectly right : and Christian Babylon is whatever bears the character of Popery. As regards the Jewish people, as a nation, there are no prophecies unfulfilled in the destruction of Jerusalem except those the fulfilment of which was prevented by that stubborn unbelief and blindness which led to this destruction of their nationality. But as an individual element, blended with Japhetism, the sacred branch of Semitism is already a great power in the world for good and for evil, and will decidedly become stronger when the great changes now impending approach their awful accomplishment.

XXIX.

The life of humanity is thus an ever-progressive manifestation of the divine principle, which is saving Truth, or the Truth as Goodness: and every soul has a vocation to work in it, as being an integral part, and in so far as it is conscious of being an immortal part.

Immortality in its perfect sense is eternal life—which is life with God. This conscious, individual, true, and divine immortality is clearly distinguished in the Bible from endless duration. “Time without End,” is only a continued negation of true Eternity, and the exclusion, or at least estrangement, from Life Eternal. “This is Eternal Life, that they may know Thee, and that Thou hast sent Me,” is one of Christ’s last words of revelation. Christ Himself is the warranty for the hope of immortality to every one who believes that our human nature was in Him truly divinized, in personal consciousness and unity. For the divine is necessarily immortal, and we are all Christ’s brethren, in so far as we are, like Him, children of God. We are called upon to live in Eternity; and we do so, in so far as we live in God, and for the brethren.

XXX.

The godly consciousness of the soul is the spiritual principle become personal, and this spiritual personality alone is immortal in the true sense.

The idea of the philosophers of the last century as to the general immortality of the soul is a delusion : this doctrine is as untenable in philosophy as it is in theology. Endless temporal existence is no more immortality, or life eternal, than ephemeral existence is. Christ says most unequivocally the very reverse : and so does a sincere and deep philosophy of the mind, confirmed by conscience.

SYNOPSIS

OF

THE THIRTY THESES.

- A. Theses on the Word of God, the Bible and Inspiration - - - - - I—XIV.
- B. Theses on the Church and her Infallibility, her Sacrifice and her Sacraments - - - - - XV—XXI.
- C. Theses on Church and State, Man and Mankind, the Millennium and Eternal Life - - - - - XXII—XXX.

- I. No revelation except through Man's mind.
- II. The fundamental faith is the Unity of the True and the Good.
- III. Historical revelation, or the manifestation of God in History.
- IV. The Scriptures the Record of Humanity.
- V. Christ and the Gospel the centre of Scripture.
- VI. The Apostolical doings and teachings the supplement of the Gospel.
- VII. The indefectibility of Scripture as historically true.
- VIII. The sacred character of Scripture is in its ideal element.
- IX. Scriptural History fully intelligible only as part of Universal History, as the manifestation of God's ways among mankind.
- X. Scriptural prophecies fully intelligible only from the prophetic nature of all History.
- XI. The universal intellectual basis of Inspiration.
- XII. The first subjects of Inspiration, Christ and the other Heroes of Scriptural History.
- XIII. The writers of the Life of these Heroes and of the history of the Jewish and Christian people, the second subjects of Inspiration.

- XIV. The Apostolical histories and the Apocalypse, the necessary end of historical revelation and conclusion of the canon of Scripture.
- XV. The infallibility of the Church the correlate of the supreme authority of the Bible.
- XVI. The two branches of Tradition, Worship and Congregational Life.
- XVII. The three manifestations of Worship : Meditation, Prayer, and Sacrifice.
- XVIII. Baptism, the pledge, the first symbol of the Consecration of Spiritual Life.
- XIX. Communion, the renewal, the second symbol of that Consecration.
- XX. The Consecration of Natural Life, or the Sacraments of the Church.
- XXI. The Social Sacraments, or the Consecration of Political Life.
- XXII. The constitution of the Church as of an organised free Society.
- XXIII. The National and the Catholic element in this Constitution.
- XXIV. Congregational Liberty and general Church-government.
- XXV. Individual Spiritual Liberty and social Influence.
- XXVI. The Incorporation of all Human Life in the Church.
- XXVII. The Apocalyptic element, or the last things.
- XXVIII. The Beast and Antichrist, Rome and Jerusalem.
- XXIX. The Individual Soul the integral element in the Kingdom of God.
- XXX. Immortality, Eternal Life and endless duration of Existence.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

GRIMM'S LAW, OR THE LAW OF TRANSPOSITION OF CONSONANTS.

WE give first the correspondence of the sounds themselves, according to Max Müller's exposition, first exhibited in his article on Comparative Philology, which opens the "Edinburgh Review" of October, 1851, and then some examples arranged according to this completed table :

1. *Greek* (and generally *Sanskrit*, *Latin*, and *Lithuanian*)

P corresponds with *Gothic* Ph (f) and *Old High German* B (v, f).

2.	" B "	" P (b)	" "	" Ph (f).
3.	" Ph (f, φ)	" B	" "	" P.
4.	" T "	" Th	" "	" D.
5.	" D "	" T	" "	" Th (z).
6.	" Th (f) "	" D	" "	" T.
7.	" K (c) "	" Kh (h, g)	" "	" G (h).
8.	" G "	" K	" "	" Kh (ch).
9.	" Kh (h, χ)	" G	" "	" K

EXAMPLES.

Sanskrit.	Greek.	Latin.	Gothic.	Old High German.
1. Pād, pādas (foot), Pitar (father), Upari (over),	πούς, ποδός πατήρ, ὑπέρ,	Pes, pedis, Pater, Super,	Fōtus, Fadar, Ufar,	Vuoz. Vatar. Ubar.
2. Śana-bisa, (	βαίτη (coat of goat-skin), κάνναβις,	Paida, Cannabis, Turba,	Hanpr, <i>Norse</i> , Thaurpa,	Pheit. Hanaf. Dorf.
3. Bhar (to bear), Kapāla (head), Nabhas (air, cloud),	φέρω, κεφαλή νέφος,	Fero, Caput, Nebula,	Baira, Haubith, Nibla,	Piru. Houpit. Nepal.

<i>Sanskrit.</i>	<i>Greek.</i>	<i>Latin.</i>	<i>Gothic.</i>	<i>Old High German.</i>
4. Tvam (thou), Trayas (three), Antara (other),	τú, τρεῖς, ἄλλος,	Tu, Tres, Alter,	Thu, Threis, Anthar,	Du. Dri. Andar.
5. Dvan (two), 'Asru (tear), Dyans, divas (sky),	δύω, δάκρυ, Ζεὺς, Διός,	Duo, Lacry-ma, Dies-(piter),	Tva, Tagr, Tius,	Zuei. Zahar. Zio.
6. Duhitar (daughter), Rudhira (red), Dvar (door),	δουγτήρ, έρυθρός, θύρα,		Dauhtar, Rauds, Daur,	Dohtar. Rot. Tor.
7. Hrid (heart), Pa'u (cattle), Svasura (father- in-law), }	καρδία, πάν, ἐκπύς,	Cor, cordis, Pecus, Socer,	Hairto, Faihu, Svaihra,	Herza. Vihu. Suehur.
8. Ganas (birth), Gnâ (to know), Mahat (great),	γένος, γινῶμι, μέγας,	Genus, Gnosco, Magnus,	Kunni, Kan, Mikils,	Chunni. Chan. Mihil.
9. Hansa (goose), Hyas (yesterday), Lih (to lick),	χήν, χθές, λείχω,	Anser, Heri, Lingo,	Gans, Gistra, Laigo,	Kans. Kestar. Lekom.

The Lithuanian follows generally the three classical languages, Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, only substituting, from its deficiency in aspirates, unaspirated for aspirated letters, for instance —

<i>Sanskrit.</i>	<i>Lithuanian.</i>
Ratha (waggon)	Rata (wheel).
Ka (who?)	Ka
Dadâmi (I give)	Dumi.
Pati (lord.)	Pats.
Pankān (five)	Penki.
Trayas (three)	Trys.

A few irregularities occur, such as Sanskrit *nakha* (nail), Lithuanian *nagas*, and not *nakas*, as it ought to be, according to the general law.

The *Zend* also ranges with the Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, only that, according to its euphonic laws, tenues are sometimes changed into aspirates by a following letter, in which cases it coincides apparently with the Gothic.

In the languages above compared there occur irregularities as

to the correspondence of consonants only in the middle and at the end of words. Thus the Latin *pater* ought to be Gothic *fathar* (parent), and the Old High German *vadar*, instead of *fadar* and *vatar*. Thus the Gothic *fidvor*, instead of *fithvor* (quatuor), Latin *sopio*, Gothic *slépa*, Old High German *slâfu*, &c. Nor do the grammatical inflexions always submit to these laws. For instance, the Latin *habet*, and Gothic *habeith*, is in Old High German *hapét*, and not *hapéd*.

At the beginning of words the law above exhibited is almost without exception for Greek, Latin, and Gothic.

APPENDIX B.

ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF SEMITIC ROOTS.

By Dr. PAUL BORTTICHER, of the University of Halle.

BEFORE we begin with a classification of the Semitic roots, we must first make up our mind to acknowledge the real identity of the following consonants :

lâmed and rêah : granted by every philological scholar of our days.

dâlet and zain (= Sanscrit d).

tâv and shîn (= Sanscrit t).

bêt and câdeh (= Sanscrit dh, Greek θ).

We find numerous instances of that identity, long noticed by nearly every lexicographer : compare the following words :

Syr. dahbo <i>gold</i> ,	Arab. ðahab ^{aa} ,	Hebr. zâhâb
dunbo <i>tail</i> ,	danab ^{aa} ,	zânâb.
dekro <i>male</i> ,	ðakar ^{aa} ,	zâkâr.
debho <i>sacrifice</i> ,	ðibh ^{aa} ,	zebâh.
d'kê <i>pure</i> ,	ðakiyy ^{aa} ,	zâki.
baddar <i>he scattered</i> ,	badara,	bâzar.
'dar <i>he helped</i> ,		'âzar.
	gaza ^{aa} ,	gâda ^a succidit.
gad <i>he cut off</i> ,	gadda,	gaz.
Syr. t'bar <i>he broke</i> ,	Arab. tabira,	Hebr. shâbar.
t'bo <i>breast</i> ,	tady ^{aa} ,	shad.
tawro <i>bull</i> ,	tawr ^{aa} ,	shôr.
talgo <i>snow</i> ,	talg ^{aa} ,	sheleg.
t'lot <i>three</i> ,	talât ^{aa} ,	shâlôsh.
t'mone <i>eight</i> ,	tamân ^{aa} ,	sh'môneh.
matlo <i>parable</i> ,	miṭl ^{aa} ,	mâshâl.
h'det <i>new</i> ,	hadiṭ ^{aa} ,	hâdâsh.
Syr. belolo <i>shadow</i> ,	Arab. bilâl ^{aa} ,	Hebr. çêl.
bephro <i>nail</i> ,	þuphur ^{aa} ,	çippôreh.
babyo <i>antelope</i> .	þaby ^{aa} ,	ç'bî.
	'ab'ala <i>piger fuit</i> ,	'âçal.
	hâib <i>wall</i> .	hûç.

It is but right to acknowledge the dominion of that rule, as extended throughout the language, and to say that every root in which *çâdeh* occurs, is but a regular alteration of another one, where *pêt* appears instead of *çâdeh*, and so on, so that the significations of both must be reduced to one common source.

This granted, we take the biliteral roots of the Semitic languages for the ground-work. We cannot go farther back safely, than to roots which consist of two consonants. In the Indo-germanic languages we sometimes find them consisting of only one consonant and a vowel, nay, even of a vowel only, such as *mâ* to measure, or *i* to go; and we may trace the pedigree of many an enlarged root back to such simple forms as, for instance, the Gothic *mitan* (English, to mete) to *mâ*. In Semitism, as long as we do not go down to a deeper stratum in the structure of language, we have no vowel necessarily forming a part of the root, as every vowel in Semitism finds its explanation in the grammar, and not in the dictionary.

Out of the biliteral themes some trilateral roots are deduced, but by no means all. This is a point which I must insist upon with peculiar force, that there are in Semitism trilateral roots which do not yield to any attempt to reduce them to biliterality; and, if we but consider the matter reasonably, we cannot expect it to be otherwise. If a government circulates what numismatics call *surfrappé* coins, money in which a new stamp is made over the old without melting the metal, it is very certain that the same new stamp is given to entirely new money also. So, if it were thought proper in the Semitic languages to make trilateral roots out of the biliteral ones previously used, we may expect that it also ~~formed~~ new roots which, from their very cradle, were trilateral. The old biliteral roots were sounds only by conventional agreement connected with some idea, which always existed before the word (mind, if we speak in *abstracto*!). We cannot tell for what reason *daç* means to bite, nor could the man who first used that sound in that signification. This faculty of the human mind, to couple a certain sound with a certain idea, was still alive when Semitism commenced a new cast of roots, and so we find even some trilateral themes modelled in that antique style of entire unconsciousness, whereas a great many of the trilateral roots are framed with a half-awakened mind. In the Hebrew *dâkâ*, the Aleph at the end admits something like an explanation; but *dak*, and its connexion with the idea of biting and destruction, always remain unintelligible.

Language, as well as every other thing in the world, has its inherent laws working with equal force in the beginning, the middle, and the end of its course. The hand of the watch goes on from midnight to noon, but is always moved by the same wheel. We, therefore, are required to find out the law according to which, in later times, the formation of roots goes on, if we want to know how roots were formed in the first age of the Semitic language. We may learn that law, first, from the common conjugation, which is nothing else but a regular quadriliteration of the trilateral, a trilateral of the bilateral theme; and, secondly, from the formation of the commonly called quadrilateral roots out of trilateral ones. Both must be looked at from the same point of view.

Our attention, while endeavouring a classification of the Semitic roots, is directed to the very period when language began to reject the manner of speaking by mere roots, when grammar was born, and the descendants of Sem, Cham, and Japhet began to go their own way. Such an immense change, though, like every work of genius, it arose from a depth where the light of human research is far too dim for distinct vision, could not fail to make a very deep impression upon the mind of the nations. They were not conscious of its reasons, but conscious they were of its existence. The natural consequence was, that the mind, as it bore with new energy upon a new point, after having gained new territory felt it necessary to secure the old dominions; that, while it made the first attempts to work out a grammar, would not lose the vocabulary hitherto used without grammatical forms, to convey the ideas of man to his brother. Thus we see at such times an alteration, or rather strengthening, of the roots always going on. Every people, when leaving the common home, feels obliged to keep what it has taken with it, as it has not yet experienced the force of its inborn genius, and of necessity, and does not know that it may itself easily create what it considers only as a gift of its predecessors. So we may expect that the vocabulary of the languages will be strengthened by any people emigrating and left to its own efforts, and so we find it everywhere. How very seldom German, Latin, and Greek roots entirely coincide with each other, and with Sanscrit themes! They generally show us one or two consonants more, only added to strengthen the resisting force of the root. The same would have taken place when Sem, Cham, and Japhet divided, and were no longer children of the same family, but chiefs of new separate houses.

And Semitism had, besides that, another reason to develop its roots. The principle of its grammar is to express every category of thought by the inherent vowels of the word, which it alters with a most absolute arbitrariness. But why between two consonants could so many vowels be put in as grammar required forms to be framed? If the deep shade of the passive, and the gay sunlight of the active, had been the only things which required painting, the changes of one vowel would, perhaps, have been found sufficient; but look at the many categories expressed in Semitic grammar, and you will easily understand that, if Semitism undertook to sing grammar instead of speaking it, it necessarily must add some more consonants, to gain room for vowels and their change, by which alone it chose to express the gentle gradation of its ideas. Just as in Sanscrit the conjugations are by no means intended to vary the signification of the verb, so also in Semitism what we now call conjugations originally did not imply an alteration of the sense of a root; they were not conjugations, but they made conjugation possible.

I. FORMATION BY A PREFORMANT, AFTERWARDS USED AS CAUSATIVES.

We put under this head the Aphel of the Aramæans, the fourth conjugation of the Arabic verb, and the Hiphil of the Hebrews :

'aqbêl='aqbala.
hiqbîl.

Secondly, the dental parallels of those conjugations, viz., Taphel, Shaphel, Saphel, all especially used in the Aramæan dialects :

taqbêl.
shaqbêl.
saqbêl.

A large number of trilateral roots owe their existence to the same powerful engine which, in the conjugations just mentioned, appears working even in the Semitism of our days. I select a few examples; but purposely, for the greater part here as in the following tables, such as had already been unconsciously stated by some former lexicographers. Only of the reflective formation, as far as I can ascertain, no one (except F. Hitzig) has had even a faint idea,

and surely no one has laid down the rule in its general complexiveness.

TABLE I.

X			
Syr.	ḡam ḡḡaḡe	-	Hebr. 'āḡam ḡḡaḡe.
Hebr.	būr septum	-	} " 'āḡar ḡḡaḡe.
"	ḡar pressit, colligavit	-	
Sanscr.	dhar ḡḡḡeiv	-	
"	raḡḡu rope	-	} " 'ārag ḡḡave.
Latin.	lig-are	-	
Coptic.	lōj ḡḡoskollāw	-	
"	lojlej ḡḡānwais	-	
Π			
Hebr.	ras he broke	-	Hebr. hāras συνέτριβε.
Ar.	marra fluxit	-	Ar. hamara fluxit cursu effuso.
Sanscr.	dav-ati he runs	-	} Hebr. hādāh, for hādāw (Isajas, 11, 8.)
Greek.	ḡḡ-veiv	-	
			he made enter; afterwards he led.
Π			
Ar.	baḡḡa he clove, he beat	-	} Hebr. hāḡaḡ he beat.
Sanscr.	vadh to beat	-	
Syr.	ḡam ḡḡaḡe	-	" hāḡam ḡḡaḡe.
Ar.	dāra he ran	-	Ar. hadara κατήγεν.
"	ḡār he digged	-	" haḡl ^m tillable land.
Hebr.	būr septum	-	Chald. ḡ'ḡar ḡḡaḡe.
Sanscr.	ram to be quiet	-	} Hebr. hālam somniavit.
Greek.	ḡ-ḡḡma	-	
Υ			
Ar.	baḡḡa he clove, he beat	-	Arab. 'abāḡa he clove.
Hebr.	ras he broke	-	Hebr. 'āras comminuit.
"	būr septum	-	} " 'āḡar παρενέβαλλε, ἐστεφάνωσεν.
Sanscr.	raḡḡ to make, to put ready	-	
			" 'ārak ḡḡoīmaḡe.
Π			
Arab.	pharra he clove, he broke	-	} Hebr. tāḡḡar he sewed.
Greek	veīḡew, whence ḡepónḡ	-	
Arab.	makka exsurit	-	Arab. tamaka succi plenus fuit.
Ψ			
Arab.	baḡḡa he clove, he beat	-	Hebr. shāḡaḡ he beat.
"	dāra he ran	-	Syr. sh'dar (Pael) he made run = he sent.
Hebr.	ḡar he burnt	-	Hebr. sh'ḡor ἀσέδḡ.
"	ḡam ḡḡoskaleto, ḡḡerḡḡḡḡḡ	-	Syr. sh'ḡam he was black.
Ar.	rāḡa he went	-	} Hebr. shālah he sent = he made go.
Sanscr.	ruh to go, compare ḡḡḡ-ḡḡḡai	-	

ⲉ ⲟ			
Syr.	ⲡⲁⲙ ⲉⲡⲣⲁⲧⲉ	- -	Syr. s'pam <i>he coerced, he bridled.</i>
Latin.	ligare, v. s.	- -	Hebr. sārāg ⲡⲁⲣⲁⲗⲉⲓⲥⲏⲩ.
Sanscr.	dhavati	<i>commovet, agitat</i>	- }
Greek.	ἄβω	- -	Ar. sabawa <i>impetum fecit.</i>
}			
}			
Sanscr.	sad	- -	- }
Latin.	sed-ere	- -	Heb. yāsad <i>posuit, sedem dedit.</i>
Sanscr.	dhār-ayati	<i>debet</i>	- -
"	pī	<i>to be full</i>	- -
Lithu.	pil-ti	- -	- }
			" waphara <i>he owed.</i>
			" waphara <i>multus fuit.</i>

II. MEDIAL FORMATIONS.

It would be a great error to say, that niqṣāl is the passive of qāṣal. The Arabs say, qutīla walā inqatala, which would be in Hebrew, qāṣūl hū' w'elō niqṣāl=they made the attempt to kill him, but he did not admit killing (er liess sich nicht toeten). Niphal, or the seventh form of the Arabic verb, is a medial form, and its Nūn occurs in many triliteral roots, which by its omission are easily reduced to biliterality.

TABLE II.

Hebr.	qab cavavit	- -	Hebr.	nāqab cavavit.
Arab.	dāra	<i>he ran.</i>	Syr.	n'dar <i>narreṣepora.</i>
Hebr.	qār	<i>he digged.</i>	Hebr.	nāqar <i>he digged.</i>
Arab.	tarra	<i>decidit</i>	Syr.	n'tar <i>decidit folium vel fructus.</i>
Chald.	shaph	<i>fricuit, contrivit</i>	Ar.	nasapha <i>comminuit, diruit.</i>
Hebr.	shal	<i>extraxit</i>	Hebr.	nāshal <i>extraxit.</i>
"	sāg	<i>sepivit. "cf. sōkēk teruit"</i>		
—Gesenius			Ar.	nasaga <i>teruit, plexit.</i>
Ar.	zāla	<i>abiit</i>	"	nazala <i>descendit, devenit.</i>
"	gāsha	<i>vehementius commotus fuit</i>	"	nagasha <i>excitavit, agitavit.</i>
Sansc.	dhā	- -	}	Hebr. nātha' <i>he put.</i>
Greek.	τι-θ-ναι	- -		
Sanscr.	day-ati	<i>he runs</i>	Ar.	nadaba <i>impulit ad eundem.</i>

III. REFLEXIVE FORMATIONS.

The Arabs have in their eighth conjugation, which is formed by the addition of Tāv after the first radical (iqtabala from qabala), a powerful engine to express the finer shades of signification. This conjugation seems to be entirely lost in Hebrew and Aramæan; but by the analogy in the formation of some triliteral roots, which are

reduced by dropping the Tâv, occurring as second consonant, it will be clearly seen, that it once was well known in every Semitic dialect.

TABLE III.

Ar. 'adda <i>paravit</i> - - -	Ar. 'atuda <i>paratus fuit</i> .
Hebr. kar <i>in orbem ivit</i> - - -	} Hebr. keter <i>corona</i> .
Arab. ikilil ^{aa} <i>corona</i> - - -	
Syr. kal (Pael) <i>coronavit</i> - - -	
Ar. sirr ^{aa} <i>mysterium</i> - - -	Ar. satara <i>obterit, velavit</i> .
" ghamma <i>mærore affecit pressit-</i> <i>que</i> - - -	" ghatama <i>pressit, suffocavit</i> .
Syr. lak <i>vafer factus est</i> - - -	Syr. l'tak (Pael) <i>dolose egit</i> .
" lamlem <i>balbutivit, vagivit</i> - - -	" l'tam (Pael) <i>murmuravit</i> .
" kaph <i>incurvatus est</i> - - -	} Hebr. kâtêph <i>humerus</i> .
Hebr. kaph <i>vola manus</i> - - -	
Arab. makka <i>exsuxit</i> - - -	Ar. mataka <i>sorpsit</i> .
Ar. phâqa <i>fregit</i> - - -	" phataqa <i>fidit, rupit</i> .
" phakka <i>fregit</i> - - -	" phataka <i>fidit, rupit</i> .

IV. INTENSIVE FORMATIONS.

The doubling of the second radical in the so-called Piel and Pael of the Hebrews and Aramæans, and in the corresponding Arabic forms, qabbala and qâbala, in the formation of roots, seems compensated by the insertion of guttural letters and liquids.

TABLE IV.

K	
Arab. pharra <i>he clove, he broke</i>	- Ar. pha'ara <i>he digged.</i>
Hebr. qâr <i>he digged</i> - -	- " qa'ara <i>he digged.</i>
Syr. dob <i>languit</i> - -	- Hebr. dâ'ab <i>languit.</i>
Hebr. lâp <i>abscondidit</i> - -	- } " lâ'ap <i>abscondidit.</i>
Greek. λαθ-ειν - -	- }
M	
Ar. gadda <i>studio et diligentia usus</i> <i>fuit</i> - -	Ar. gahada <i>studio et diligentia usus</i> <i>fuit.</i>
Hebr. râç <i>cucurrit</i> - -	Syr. r'hap <i>cucurrit.</i>
" nûr <i>lux</i> - -	Hebr. nâhar <i>illuxit.</i>
N	
Arm. lak-el } <i>to lick</i> - -	Hebr. lâhak <i>tinxit.</i>
Lithu. lak-ti }	
Chald. shaph <i>fricuit, contrivit</i> - -	- Arab. saḥapha <i>rasit.</i>
Arab. shaqqa <i>laceravit</i> - -	- Hebr. shâḥaq <i>fricuit, comminuit.</i>

y			
Arab. <i>bappa fidit</i>	-	-	} Ar. <i>ba'aba mactavit.</i>
Sanscr. <i>vadh to beat</i>	-	-	
Hebr. <i>qad kēpēv, kēsev</i>	-	-	} Syr. <i>q'ad procidit, genuflexit.</i>
Sanscr. <i>çad = Latin cadere</i>	-	-	
" <i>sad</i>	-	-	} Hebr. <i>sâ'ad fulsit.</i>
Latin. <i>sed-ere</i>	-	-	
Greek. <i>πρ-ίς-ειν for ἐπι-ίδσειν</i>	-	-	
y			
Sanscr. <i>sad, etc., as before</i>	-	-	Ar. <i>sanada nixus fuit.</i> (<i>misnad = wisâd pulvinar.</i>)
Hebr. <i>kaph vola manus</i>	-	-	Hebr. <i>kânâph ala.</i>
Syr. <i>koah collegit</i>	-	-	Chald. <i>k'nash congregavit.</i>
Hebr. <i>dûg liquefieri.</i>	After a conjecture of Gesenius, = <i>dâ'ag.</i>		Hebr. <i>dônag cera.</i>
y			
Hebr. <i>baq evacuavit</i>	-	-	} Hebr. <i>bâlaq inanem reddidit.</i>
Latin <i>vac-uns</i>	-	-	
Hebr. <i>dâsh contrivit, trituvavit</i>	-	-	" <i>dârash trivit (Prov. xxxi. 13).</i>
			Syr. <i>d'rash trivit, trituvavit.</i>
Ar. <i>dakka contudit</i>	-	-	Hebr. <i>dârak calcavit.</i>
Hebr. <i>gaz totondit</i>	-	-	{ Arab. <i>garada rasit.</i>
Ar. <i>gazza secuit</i>	-	-	
			Hebr. <i>gâraz secuit.</i>
□			
Ar. <i>gadda durus, molestus fuit</i>	-	-	Ar. <i>gamada duro animo et immiti fuit.</i>
Ar. <i>salla eduxit, extraxit</i>	-	-	" <i>samala eruit, expurgavit.</i>

V. FORMATIONS ANALOGOUS TO SOME SANSKRIT CONJUGATIONS.

It is very well known that the Indians divide their verbs into ten classes, according to the alterations or additions the root experiences in the Present and Imperfect. We have here, for reasons which it is not necessary to explain, only to do with the four following classes, and wave also the question about the so-called Guna :

IV.	adds	ya	:	naç-ya-ti <i>perit.</i>
V.	"	nu	:	âp-nô-mi <i>adipisceor.</i>
IX.	"	nâ	:	mrd-nâ-mi <i>mordeo.</i>
X.	"	aya	:	ved-aya-ti <i>scire facit.</i>

The very first example (*naçyati*), taken as it is from Bopp's Comparative Grammar, shows us a striking resemblance with a Semitic verb. The same *ya*, which in Sanscrit remains separable from the root, entered the root in the Semitic languages so as to form part of it. The Sanscrit *naç* is connected with the Greek *νέμω* and *νάσσει*

=*ῥῶσαι* (see my *Arica*, p. 84), with the Latin *necare* and *nocere*, as well as with *nancisci*. In Arabic we have *nakay(a) tutudit, affectit noxa*. Now, as *nakay(a)* is undoubtedly in close affinity with *naka'a* and *naka'a* (=he beat) with the Syriac *n'ko'*, whence *nekyon=noxa* and the Hebrew *nâkâh*, whence the Hiphil *hikkâh*, I think we are right to say, that if *ya* in *nak-ay(a)* is identical with the sign of the fourth Sanscrit conjugation, Aleph, He, Ain occur in Semitism as final additions of the root, analogous to the Sanscrit affirmatives of conjugation. But to Yod, Aleph, He, Ain we must add Vâv as next in kin to Yod, Hêp and Qôph as near relations of He and Ain; and, besides those, we have in correspondence with the Sanscrit syllables *nâ* and *nu*, all the liquids used in Semitism on the same behalf, viz., to strengthen and lengthen the root, which looks so old and naked when consisting merely of two consonants, and must be dressed a little. Concerning such additions no lexicographer entertained the slightest doubt, but the thing required was to explain the fact.

TABLE V.

N			
Sanscr. <i>naç=necare, nocere</i>	-	-	Arab. <i>naka'a verberavit, nocuit.</i>
" <i>jabh appetere</i> (compare Greek <i>γύμφορ</i>).	-	-	Syr. <i>g'bo' elexit</i> (compare Hebr. <i>'âgab amavit</i>).
N I'			
Sanscr. <i>vas</i>	}	<i>secare</i>	Ar. <i>wasay.</i>
Coptic. <i>bas, was, bisi</i>			
Greek. <i>βάλλειν</i>	}	<i>jacere</i>	Æth. <i>warrawa βίπτει.</i>
Coptic. <i>berbôr</i>			
Sanscr. <i>bha(n)j to break</i>	-	-	Hebr. <i>yâgâh (for wâgâh) συνέτριβε.</i>
Greek. <i>φάγειν to break with the teeth,</i>	-	-	
to eat	-	-	
Coptic. <i>wojwej μασσωσθαι, καταβλάν</i>	-	-	Hebr. <i>yânâh (for wânâh) κακοῦν, ἀλλεῖν, καταδυναστεύειν.</i>
Sanscr. <i>van to kill</i>	-	-	
Zend. <i>van to beat, to destroy</i>	-	-	
Armen. <i>van-el to fight, to conquer</i>	-	-	
N			
Sanscr. <i>bandh</i> (the Gothic <i>bindan</i> requires <i>bhandh</i>)	}	<i>to bind</i>	Hebr. <i>bâpah fudit.</i>
Latin. <i>fid-ere</i>			
Sanscr. <i>urana</i> (for <i>var-ana</i>)	-	-	Chald. <i>barhâ aries.</i>
Lithu. <i>bar-onas aries</i>	-	-	
Coptic. <i>barêit</i>	-	-	
Sanscr. <i>hu</i> (for <i>dhu</i>)	}	<i>sacrificare</i>	Hebr. <i>bâbah mactavit.</i>
Greek. <i>θύειν</i>			

Sanscr. naç = <i>necare, etc.</i>	-	-	y	Arab. naka'a <i>verberavit.</i>
Ar. ragga <i>movit, agilitavit, commotus fuit, tremuit</i>	-	-	}	Ar. raga'a <i>rediit, profecit, passum in incessu posuit camelus.</i>
Sanscr. raj = laj = rj <i>ire</i>	-	-		
" rēj <i>tremere</i>	-	-	□	
Ar. dakka <i>contudit</i>	-	-	-	Ar. dakama <i>trudit, contudit.</i>
Arab. ragga <i>movit</i>	-	-	-	" ragama <i>celerrime transivit currendo.</i>
Hebr. shak <i>demisit se, incurvavit se sub onere</i>	-	-	{	Hebr. sh'kem <i>humerus.</i>
	-	-		Æth. sakkama <i>bajulavit.</i>
Arab. hacca <i>fricuit, polivit, exploravit</i> (whence miḥkak <i>touchstone</i>)	-	-	}	Hebr. ḥākam <i>sapuit.</i>
	-	-		
Ar. gadda <i>magnus fuit dignitate</i>	-	-	75	Hebr. gādal <i>magnus fuit.</i>
Chald. s'kā <i>asperit</i>	-	-	-	Chald. s'kal <i>asperit.</i>
This word is identical with the Sanscrit root sach, which in Latin appears as sequi, in Gothic as saihvan to see (=assequi). Compare, in the Armenian, according to the Iranian law of permutation, ḥasanel <i>venire</i> , has-ov <i>adveniens, intelligens</i> (my <i>Arica</i> , p. 33.).				
Ar. qapḥa <i>secuit, fidit</i>	-	-	}	Hebr. qāḥal <i>interfecit.</i>
Sanscr. with transposition of the aspiration, ch'hid = <i>scindere</i> . Gothic skaidan requires ch'hidh	-	-		
Ar. gadda <i>magnus fuit dignitate</i>	-	-	-	Ar. gadura <i>dignus, idoneus fuit.</i>
Arab. kamay <i>texit</i>	-	-		Ar. kamana <i>delituit.</i>
Ar. shabba <i>adolevit puer juvenis evasit.</i>	-	-	-	" shabana <i>tener, mollis fuit adolescens.</i>
" dagā <i>tenebrosa fuit nox</i>	-	-	-	" dagana <i>nubilosus fuit dies.</i>
Ar. gadda <i>durus, molestus fuit</i>	-	-	2	Ar. gadib <i>gravis.</i>
" rakka <i>veravit</i>	-	-	{	" rakaba <i>aggressus fuit.</i>
Sanscr. ruç = riç <i>ludere, ferire</i>	-	-		

Ar.	gadda <i>resecut</i>	-	-	Ar.	gadapha <i>amputavit</i> .
Sanscr.	dru <i>currere, decedere</i> , whence				
	δρόμος and the German				
	triefen	-	-	"	darapha <i>defluxit, fudit</i> .

Let me add that, as in Sanscrit the small roots dhâ and bhû = *ri-thé-va*i and *phi-éiv* shortened into dh and bh often are added to the end of the roots to give them more resisting force; also in the Semitic languages, pêt, the equivalent of dhâ (compare nâtha' *posuit*) and its regular correspondent çade, appear at the end of the themes. Pharatha, or pharaça, for instance (*rupit*), owes its origin to a sort of composition of phar and tha, just as in Syriac and Arabic the substantive verbs are added before or after a full verb to express alteration of the mode: kâna qatala and q^êthal h^wo.

In our whole essay the original affinity of Semitic and Indo-germanic roots has been taken for granted, and, indeed, it will soon appear, that a great part of them entirely coincides. I give a few examples:

Arabic. p-d to run = Sanscrit pad.

Hebrew. b-r to choose = Sanscrit var, Latin vel-le.

Hebrew. q-d LXX. *πίπτειν* = Sanscrit çad, Latin cad-ere.

Hebrew. l-q to lick = Lithuanian lak-ti, Armenian lak-el.

Syriac. r-g *ἐπιθυμῶν* = Sanscrit raj, and Greek *ὁ-ρέγ-εσθαι*.

We may feel inclined to derive that coincidence from physiological reasons, or from chance; but, if there were only physiological reasons working, why, to explain the fact that so many other nations who partake of the same human nature as Semites and Japhetites, express the same ideas in a different way? whereas, if the inherent meaning of its sounds implies the signification of a root, over all the earth the same root would mean the same thing, which certainly is not the case. And, for being capable of an explanation from chance, the examples are far too numerous. Moreover, there exists a great argument, not yet used by anybody, in favour of the explanation of that most curious coincidence from a common descent of both Japhetites and Semites; viz., the coincidence also of substantives formed by the same additional letters out of identical roots, and the coincidence of derivated significations, which are not naturally enough derivated for admitting an explanation out of another thing than real communion of language in the remotest time of ante-historical antiquity. Here too I give a few examples to illustrate my words.

We have traces of an old theme, *kar*, in the Japhetic languages, the mother of the Latin *cur-vus*, Greek *σ-κολ-ιός*, Slavonic *kolo wheel*. That root means *to become crooked*, and is, by the by, identical with the Hebrew 'q-l, where *Ajin* is as well a prefix as *Sigma* in *σκολιός*. Hence we have:—

<i>Sanscrit.</i>	<i>krimi</i> for <i>kar-mi worm</i> .
<i>Chaldaean.</i>	<i>qal-ma</i> .
<i>Coptic.</i>	<i>kri-mi</i> .
<i>Lithuanian.</i>	<i>kir-mi-nis</i> .
<i>Irish.</i>	<i>cruí-mh</i> .
<i>Russian.</i>	<i>cher-vy</i> .
	even <i>Finnish</i> . <i>kär-me</i> .

Everywhere we see the same suffix *m* attached to the same root *k-r*, the euphonic well known changes of *k* in *ch*, and of *mh* in *v*, of course do not alter the matter. Compare the German phrase: *sich krümmen wie ein wurm*. In English, a derivate of the same word is, in common use, viz. *crimson*=*Sanscrit krimija what is born of a worm, cochineal*.

Another example is, the word for *horn*, whose root is *Sanscrit çar* to pierce=Greek *κείρειν*: compare Gothic *hairus sword*, whence the name of the *Cherusci, swordsmen*.

<i>Sanscrit.</i>	<i>çrin-ga horn</i> .
<i>Hebrew.</i>	<i>qeren</i> .
<i>Latin.</i>	<i>cornu</i> .
<i>Gothic.</i>	<i>hauru</i> .

Now, I give two examples of words, wherein, from a root common to Japhetites and Semites, significations are developed, which are not so obvious as to be able to arise naturally from themselves in different countries.

Sar is in *Sanscrit to walk*, the same in Hebrew *sûr* (Exod. 3, 4), which receives its sense *to recede* only by the, following preposition. Compare Coptic *sêr to go out*. The *s* is always the change of an original *t*; see my *wurzelforschungen*, pages 2 and 47. Hence

<i>Sanscrit.</i>	<i>sar-va all</i> .
<i>Zend.</i>	<i>haur-va</i> .
<i>Greek.</i>	<i>ῥλ-ος</i> for <i>hol-wos</i> .
[<i>Latin.</i>	<i>sal-vus</i> .]
<i>Arabic.</i>	<i>sâir</i> (a regular participle of <i>sûr</i>) <i>all</i> .
<i>Coptic.</i>	<i>têr all</i> , which still preserves the original <i>t</i> of the root.

Or, in another case from the above mentioned *çar* = *καίρειν* we have

Sanscrit. *çigira* for *kikira* *cold*.

And in the Arian languages, according to Burnouf's law :

Osethian. *säl-ün* to congeal.

Armenian. *sarh-il* to freeze.

And with the termination of the participle :

Zend. *çareta* *cold*.

Persian. *sard*.

Lithuanian. *szaltas*. Compare the German "schneidend kalt."

And so in *Hebrew*. *qor* *frost, coldness* from *q-r* to pierce.

GENERAL RESULT.

A.

In the beginning of a root the following consonants may be additional :

א י ו ע ח ה ש ת ס

To these may be added :

ל as rare euphonical change of י
 ק and ר " " ע
 ך " " ח

B.

In the middle of the root the following consonants may be additional :

א י ו ע ח ה ן ל ם ר ם ת

C.

At the end of the root the following consonants may be additional :

א י ו ע ח ה ן ל ם ר ם ב ק פ ץ

The following consonants are always radical :

In the beginning, כ ג ד ז ר ך ם ף ץ ק

In the middle, כ ג ד ז ר ך ף ץ ק ם ש

At the end, ג ד ז ר ך ם ש

That is the result which I am now able to reach. I am happy to have gone so far, and should be still happier if further inquiries should entirely cover, with the superstructure of a splendid and durable edifice, what, I know but too well, is only a foundation. For

the sake of exemplification, I insert here a pedigree of one root only, and not even a complete one. I have purposely omitted many roots, which I could not give without adding a commentary to prove such significations of them as are not found in the dictionary. I hope that

I. *Initial Extension.*

GAD ¹		
'ugad ²	magid ³	wigd ⁴

II. *Inner Extension.*

GAD				
ganad ⁵	gamada ⁶	ga'ada ⁷	gahada ⁸	gahid ¹⁰
	galmūd ⁹		guhadiiriyy ¹¹	gabdal ¹²
				galuda ¹³
				gulādih ¹⁴
				galandah ¹⁵
				guglanday ¹⁶

III. *Final Extension.*

GAD				
gada'a ¹⁷	gadib ¹⁸	gadapha ²⁰	gadama ²²	gadura ²⁴
	galdab ¹⁹	g unādiph ²¹		
				gādal ²³
				gandal ²⁵
				ga'dal ²⁶
				gunādjal ²⁷

this example will show how very much Semitic lexicography is simplified by my method of classification, and prove the existence of laws which allow us to reduce even very considerably amplified roots to two simple consonants.

¹ GAD = (a) resecuit. (b) durus et molestus fuit. (c) magnus fuit dignitate. (d) diligentia et studio usus fuit.

² Robustus, firmus (b)	¹⁵ Gravis, groesus (b)
³ Strenuus, animosus (b)	¹⁶ Durus (b)
⁴ Opulentia (c)	¹⁷ Mutilavit (a)
⁵ Terra salebrosa et lapidibus constans (b)	¹⁸ Gravis, desolata terra (b, c)
⁶ Duro animo et inimiti fuit (b)	¹⁹ Durus et vehemens (b, c)
⁷ Saxum; vir durus, fortis (b)	²⁰ Amputavit (a)
⁸ Durus, crassus fuit (b)	²¹ Immitis, magnus (b, c)
⁹ Diligentia ac studio usus fuit (Gahâd = terra dura et sterilis) (b, d)	²² Amputavit (a)
¹⁰ Crassus (b)	²³ Dignus, idoneus fuit (c)
¹¹ Magnus (b)	²⁴ Magnus fuit (c)
¹² Pinguis, validus (b).	²⁵ Terra arenosa (b)
¹³ Durus, robustus, alacer fuit (b)	²⁶ Fortis, robustus (b)
¹⁴ Longus (b)	²⁷ Vir pinguis, crassus (b)

The inscription of Abushadr

[illegible]

Alphabet.

[illegible]

Vowels.

$\hat{a}$ = Δ *connected as* Δ - la
 $\hat{e}, i$ = $\wedge$. . . $\vee$ - li
 $\hat{u}$ = 9 *unconnected as* 9 - lu

Lith by A. Petermann Q. Chas. N. Cross

APPENDIX C.

THE INSCRIPTION OF ABUSHADHR,

Explained by Professor FRANCIS DIETRICH.

I.

The Place where it is found, and the Country about it.

THE Inscription, communicated by Mr. Norris to Chevalier Bunsen, is one of several that were found and copied by the celebrated decipherer of Assyrian and Babylonian monuments on the classic ground of ancient Babylonian history.

Colonel Rawlinson in a letter to Mr. Norris, dated March, 4th, 1853, remarks upon it, that he has himself carefully transcribed it from "a roll of a thin sheet of lead, found in a sepulchral jar, among the Chaldean ruins of Abushadhr (or Abushudhr); the lines are complete, and the first line is the true beginning of the Inscription."

This Abushadhr is situated near the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, midway between the two rivers.

Eastward of Abushadhr lies the city of Kerka, on the banks of the river Kerkhan, which flows from the east into the united stream. To the south-west of the confluence we find the village Elhalab, and still more southward a place called Es-shadhr: northward, very near to that junction, is Kurnah. But the capital or metropolitan city of that country is Basra, situated somewhat more to the south, on the banks of the united stream.

The present name of the place is quite Arabic, and bears the mark of modern origin. The first part of it, *Abu*, is peculiar to Arabic for circumscribing a derivated noun; the word *shadhr*, written with the dotted D, means in Arabic little grains of gold, or glass, also pearls; the whole being suitable for ruins, among which shining little objects of that kind are to be found.

A few days' travel northwards by the Euphrates, south of Hillah, are found the ruins of Cufa, from which the oldest Arabic alphabet, the Cufic, derives its name.

If I endeavour now to read and to explain the Inscription, confessing at the same time that some points remain doubtful, I hope to be judged with indulgence by those who consider the extreme difficulty of establishing a new alphabet from one single Inscription, containing not more than a few short lines.

I shall first put together the traces in the writing itself, which lead to the discovery of the branch of the Semitic stock to which it must be attributed.

II.

The Nation to which the Writing and the Language of the Inscription belong.

As the country from the soil of which the jar and its leaden sheet have been dug out, is and was inhabited not only by Aramæan tribes, but also by Arabs, particularly in the lower regions down to the Persian gulf, an Inscription, found at Abushadhr, may as well be supposed to have issued from an Arabic family as from a Babylonian one.

Indeed, all Syriac alphabets which are known till now, are not sufficient to explain our Inscription. Several of its characters manifestly resemble more the Sinaitic, and even the Arabic characters, than any other. The very first letter is an Arabic Ajin: the He and Vau represent only the Arabic form.

This, and the contents likewise, might seem to make it probable, that we have before us an Arabic Inscription of a period when diacritic signs were not yet used. Also the proper names, and the contents of the last lines, seemed to favour this opinion.

Still, there are more decisive reasons for calling the alphabet an Aramæan one.

First of all, the greater part of the characters, known to us from Semitic alphabets, are old Syriac letters: and most of the new signs of our Inscription, stand at least nearer to the earlier Aramæan writing, than to the Cufic.

In the second place, a character which occurs almost in every line at least once, the small triangle, must be Aleph, denoting, particularly in the middle and at the end of words, the long vowel A. But only the Syriac and Chaldee, no other Semitic language, not even Arabic, uses this Aleph so frequently as to explain its occurring twenty-three times in twenty lines of so few letters. And, indeed, the two clear numerals in the eighth and ninth line, which already Mr. Norris had read as *khamsha* and *telâta*, bear manifestly as termination the same Aleph and A, which they have only in the Aramæan dialects.

Finally, I have discovered another vowel-mark attached to the left extremity of various consonants: a little hook, or acute angle

open below, which must be the sign of long I. This sign I find in the numeral at the beginning of the ninth line, which I read *telita*, because the simple Lamed is found without that hook (see first and sixteenth line). Now, this numeral, if the Inscription were Arabic, would be *teldt* (which means *tselâts*), corresponding with the Hebrew *shalôsh*. It is only in the Syriac dialect that *telita* is found together with *telâta*.

All this leads to the conclusion, that the writing and the language of the Inscription are Chaldee. We have come to this result independently of the account of Colonel Rawlinson, who calls the ruins Chaldean; and this gives to our Inscription a quite peculiar importance. Hitherto, not a line has been known of native Babylonian or Chaldee writing in Semitic characters, and for the Chaldee of Ezra and the Targums, even the name of Babylonian or Chaldee has been given up by scholars.

Now, whatever corrections later discoveries may supply to our interpretation, the fact will appear as certain, from what we have to state, that the language of Ezra and the Targums, or the so-called Chaldee, was the language of the southern neighbourhood of Babel, for the Inscription of Abushadhr can only be explained as Chaldee.

The inquiry into the alphabet itself will lead us to another important conclusion as to the history of Semitic writing in general, and of the Hebrew square character in particular.

III.

The Alphabet.

For the careful reviewer of the two accompanying plates, a few explanatory remarks will suffice to fix the nature and origin of the alphabet, and to justify the identification of the characters with the corresponding Chaldee letters.

1. Our alphabet of consonants stands nearest, among the several Syriac alphabets, not to the common Nestorian, but to the Palmyrene character. When we look over the table 5, in Gesenius' *Monumenta Phœnicia*, we shall soon observe the strong likeness between the two series of signs. Gesenius has often placed, side by side, three and more figures of the same sound; those which, under each letter, he places last, agree in general exactly with our Chaldee.*

2. The characters peculiar to our alphabet are not, however, entirely new. The Daleth and Resh have almost the Phœnician form, and are like each other, as they are almost in all Semitic alphabets; this circumstance is a strong evidence in favour of our interpretation. The curious large Nun is somewhat less different from the Palmyrene than from the Phœnician; the upper horizontal line is wanting in both. I have therefore doubted, whether it could not be a Peh, which it resembles in the Palmyrene table. But this supposition leads to words which cannot be Semitic. Indeed, our sign is proved to be Nun, by Maccabee coins in the British Museum.†

Another proof is the Mendæan form ‡ of Nun; the lower ex-

* Compare in particular the third Beth, the second Gimel, the third Vau, the first and second Zajin, the third Khet, the first, third, and fourth Jod, the third Kaph, the third Lamed, the third and fifth Mem, the first Samekh, the second and third 'Ajin, the second Sade, the second and third Kop, the fifth Sšin, the second Thau.

† Gesen. Mon. Phœn. Tab. 3. does not give all the forms of the Maccabee letters. I have seen a coin in the British Museum, where the name of *Simeon* (*Bar-Kochba*, probably) was written with a Nun of this kind. (This coin represents, on the other side, a temple over which a star is placed.)

‡ For Mendæan alphabet, see A. G. Hoffmann's *Grammatica Syriaca*, or, *Kopp's Bilder und Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 334.

tremity a little rounded off makes it almost the same character, receiving the sign of the vowel at the left *upper* extremity of the line; our Nun follows the same peculiar rule of taking the vowel A, as will be seen in the second, third, twelfth, fourteenth and sixteenth line.

There remain two doubtful characters: the He, more Arabic than Syriac, and the dotted Ajin, which as sound corresponds with the Hebrew Ssade, and as sign represents the older form of the Ajin, as on the stone of Carpentras.

3. Long vowels (not the short ones) are expressed in writing by the corresponding semivowels, Aleph, Jod, Vau, and those are *suffixed* to the most of the consonants.* Here we discover an analogy, not so much with the Æthiopian—which uses for denoting the vowels, besides its hooks and lines, also the shortening and the lengthening of the consonant-sign—but with the Zabean or Mendæan alphabet, which marks the vowels by signs occurring also *singly* as semivowels. In this Zabean or Mendæan alphabet also, as in that of Abushadhr, these semivowels are joined on *only* to the *end* of the consonant, whilst the Æthiopian often joins them on at the beginning of consonants.†

4. Our character is a cursive one, a running hand, like the Zabean, the Estrangelo, and in part the Palmyrene. This results already from the rounded-off character of the letters: on metal, we might have expected rather a character with sharp corners. Further, we discover several attempts to join two or more consonants. Thus, the B is always connected with the following letter: also K, M, N, and others. Vau is only connected with the preceding letter (see seventeenth line), as it is the law in common Syriac and Arabic. The very first sign is a connected one, containing 'Ajin and Zajin.

5. There is no trace of *final letters*. The Mem, Nun, Caph, present always the same shape, and this leads me to consider the sign, which runs out below the lines fifteen and eighteen, not as a Shin finale, but as Sade, as it is written in Palmyrene inscriptions also, at the

* This rule seems to have been applied very rarely for the Vau: in our Inscription we find this semivowel suffixed only to Ajin.

† This is the only analogy of our characters with the Zabean or Mendæan alphabet: for the letter Aleph, which is quite the same in both, can be deduced from the triangular Phœnician form; and some other resembling signs are still more cognate with the Palmyrene. A glance on Norberg's *Liber Adami*, or Hoffmann's *Syrian Grammar*, will convince our readers of the truth of this observation.

beginning of words. The whole, however, being a *scriptio continua*, connected letters may belong sometimes to different words, at least the end of the line must not necessarily coincide with the end of a word.

6. *Resembling* characters are Beth and Caph, Daleth and Resh, Mem, Koph, and Thau, and sometimes Lamed and Samekh. Therefore, a variety of interpretation may arise from reading in a certain case the one or the other. The following differences form the rule. The Beth has sharp corners, Caph round ones.—Daleth has a large and broad head and a short vertical; the head of Resh is more round and small. I believe the second sign of the fifth line to be a Daleth with an angular head, as it is in the Phœnician period.—The distinctive feature in Mem is the short flat basis on which its right vertical seems to rest.—Finally, the Samekh of the sixth and seventh line has a stronger inward curvature than the Lamed of the eleventh and thirteenth.

7. Most of the characters show a striking *symmetry* both in the size of the consonants within the line, and in the signs exceeding it upwards or downwards. The former take evidently the space of a square, like the characters of our Hebrew manuscripts.

We may advert, at this stage of our inquiry already, to the ancient tradition, that the *square* characters of the Hebrew alphabet are of Babylonian origin.

In the foregoing remarks we have confined ourselves to such conclusions, in fixing the value of each character, as the comparison with other Semitic alphabets seemed naturally to lead us to. Any preconceived notions as to the probable contents of the Inscription would have led us astray. Now, this laborious task being fulfilled, we may try whether or not the Inscription so read will give us words and good sense.

IV.

Transliteration and Translation.

If our alphabet is true, we have before us a family record. A father relates that his two daughters, and subsequently his wife, were buried here. He then speaks of three children who are still alive, and mentions in conclusion, that he has married a second time.

His name is not mentioned : it may perhaps be found on one of the other leaden sheets, discovered together with ours in the jar. But we do find two names of places : one, the native place of the persons here buried, the other, the present residence of the writer of this family record, which evidently is our modern Abu-shadhr.

The Inscription, transcribed into common Chaldee or Hebrew characters, and translated, gives what follows :—

1	עזבאלת	Asbâlatam
	ונאכבא	et Nâkebam
	עלא דונא גבא	juxta eam hæc fovea
	עמיק כסא	profunda sepelit.
5	עדה עמא עלא	Adah mater juxta
	הכסא	sepulta est.
	בסיכס (י) ליד'	In Sikes peperit(liberos)
	חמשא	quinque.
	חליחא עס'	Tres lab(orant)
10	כיד בי עתתא	manu tenus coram me. Uxorem,
	חלי ארלא	morbis hausit eam.
	ונאבתא	Et Nâbetam
	אבכיר ליהא	quæsi mihi hic-
	נא נסיפא	ce ductam
15	בכיצ ר	in Kikas ; et
	עלתא עאני	intravit grex mea
	מעון בתא	habitationem domus
	בכיצ ר	in Kikas ; et
	תומא עא	deinde grex
20	מרחבא	larga facta est.

i. e. "Asbâlat, and Nâkeba at her side, *them* this deep pit buries. Adah, *their* mother, is buried beside them. In Sikes she bore five *children*. Three do their handiwork beside me. My wife—illness carried *her* off. And I have taken to myself Nâbeta, whom I have married here in Kikas: and my flock has entered the habitation of my house in Kikas; and henceforth my flock has increased."

V.

Commentary.

The first two lines עֲזַבְאֵלָה וְנֶאֱכָבָה consist of two female proper nouns. The first has a very genuine Semitic sound; for the former part of it, עַז, means *might*, also *praise* (compare Ps. viii. 3.; xxix. 1.; lxviii. 35.), the latter part is the name of a Divinity especially worshipped at Babel, Βααλνῆς; in Hebrew, Bāalat and Bāalā. The name Ἀζβααλάρ corresponds to the Phœnician compound name of a man, Ἀζμελκός (עַז מֶלֶךְ), where Melekh (King) designates the Tyrian Hercules, the principal Divinity of the land, as in Melicertes, i. e. Melek-kerth. The meaning of the name exactly corresponds to the Greek, Αἰνεσθεος, the German, Lobegott, and Gottlob, the Hebrew, 'Uzzi-jâh and 'Uzzi.—The other name, Nâkebâ, has at least a true Semitic root and form. In Arabic, نَكَب is *invertit*, *impegit*; the derivative form of Nâkebâ is that of the Chaldee participle with the usual feminine termination.

Lines 3. and 4. עֲלָה רוּנָא גְבָא עֲמִיק כְּסָא. The writing עֲלָה, *juxta eam*, for עָלָה, or עָלֶיהָ, is merely an orthographical variety; in the Targum also the suffix of the feminine is often only written with נ, according to the ear.—Then דְּנָנָא, I take to be identical with the more common shorter form דְּנָנָא, *hic*; dû-nâ stands in the same relation to Hebrew zû, as de-nâ to Hebrew zê. The following word is the masculine גֶּב, *fovea, fossa, cisterna*, with the annexed article; גְּבָא occurs in the sense of tomb also in the Targum to Ps. cxliii. 7.—עֲמִיק, deep, is placed after its substantive גְּבָא, according to the rule; for âmîq, we should have expected âmîqâ, with the article, which, however, is not necessary. This derivation by î is exactly the Chaldee form for the Hebrew âmôq, to which it is corresponding Targum, Prov. xxii. 14.; xxv. 3.; Dan. ii. 22.—The verb כְּסָא, Hebrew, כָּסָה, *texit*, occurs also in the Targums; compare the participle passive, מְכַסָּא *occultum*, 2 Sam. xiii. 2.; we find it used of the covering with earth, and of burying, Numb. xvi. 33.; Job, xxi. 26.

Lines 5 and 6, עֲדָה עֲמָא עֲלָא הַכְסָא. The first word is a well known female name, for instance, one of Lamekl's wives, Gen. iv. 19. ; and of Esau's wife, xxv. 2. 4.—The noun עֲמָא appears to have been written inaccurately for אֲמָא *mater*.—In הַכְסָא the first letter can be doubted. If it is an ה, we have the passive of Aphel in the preterite tense, formed by ה, as it is in the Biblic Chaldaism, for the א commonly used. If it can be taken for a contracted כ, this would give us the participle passive, which we quoted above from the Targum of 2 Sam. xiii. 2.

Lines 7, and 8. בְּסִיכִם (י) לִיד' חֲשָׂא. The reading of the first word is certain; the letter following after ב is a ס, as in 6, 5.; 7, 7.; 13, 4.; 14, 5.; 15, 3.; 18, 3., with an annexed Jod, as it is in 9, 3. This word must be a proper noun, as it is introduced by the preposition ב, *in*. Its root is סָכַךְ, *textit, sepsit*, from which also a town in Judea was named סִכְכָּה. סִיכִם would be formed from סָכַךְ, as שָׁרֵשׁ, from שָׁרַר, or שִׁשָּׁשׁ, from שָׁמַם. The space between our proper noun and the next ל is so considerable, that I believe a consonant has been rubbed out, probably a Jod. This would give us יִלְיִד, Chaldee, *peperit*, abbreviated from יִלְיִדַת. The gender was not expressed, as understood from the context, an omission not unfrequent in inscriptions.

Lines 9.—11. תִּלְיִתָא עִם' כִּיד בִי עֲתָתָא חֲלִי אֲדָלָא. The numeral *telita* has been discussed above. The following 'עִם seems to be abbreviated from the very common Chaldee word עֲסָקִין, *laborantes, sc. sunt*, which could be understood from the next noun יַד, hand: כִּיד, *secundum manum*, means they do hand-work, or, they work according to their power. In the latter sense כִּיד is used, 1 Reg. x. 13.; Esth. i. 7.—עֲתָתָא for אֲתָתָא, as above, עֲמָא for אֲמָא, the usual word for wife, Hebrew אִשָּׁה.—אֲדָלָא, is præt. Aphel of Syriac, Chaldee, Hebrew, Arabic דָּלָא, *hausit*, metaphorically used, as in Prov. xx. 15.

Lines 12—15. וְנִאֲבָתָא אֲבִבִיר לִי הָאֲנָא נְסִיפָא בְּכִיבִץ. I have translated, *et Nabatam quæsi mihi hic ductam in Kithaç*. The proper name cannot be doubtful. The verb, if we insist upon בְּכַר, denominative from בָּכַר, or בָּכַרַח, would be *primitias sumsi*, as in Arabic, or *primiparam feci*. I will not say, that this rather strong expression could not have been used; but as

the orthography on tombstones is often not very correct—almost every runic stone proves the fact—I take it for אֲבִיקָר, אֲבִיקָר, *quasi-vi*.—The next group, if read לִינְאָנָא, gives no Semitic word. I suppose the sign exceeding the line below to be He, as it can be written in Arabic. The preceding character is not simply ל but לִי, *mihi*, as in חֲלִי, xi. 2. נְסִיפָא for נְסִיבָא, *ductam*, from נָסַב, the usual Chaldee word for sumere, *ducere in matrimonium*, Targum Exod. xxi. 10.; Deut. xxiv. 4.; Chron. v. 11.

Lines 16. and 18. וְעֵלְתָּ עֲאֲנִי מְעוֹן בְּכִיבָן. The Vau is to be carried over from line 15. עֵלְלָ is the Chaldee word for Hebrew בָּא, *ingressus est, venit aliquo*; if the א after ת is correct, we have a Hebrew form עֲלִיתָ instead of Chaldee עֵלְתָּ; but I rather think the semblance of an א to have arisen only from continuing the last sweeping line of the ת; compare the ת of line 5. sup.—The feminine of third person preterite, עֵלְתָּ is caused by עֲאִי, Hebrew עָא, Arabic عَا, which is a feminine in all dialects. As for the dotted y, see above, III. No. 2.; we find it in the same word, 19, 5. For the defective writing of בָּב instead of בֵּית, compare Ges. Mon. Phœn. p. 96. 105. and often.

Lines 19, and 20. וְתוּמָא עֲאֵן מְרַחְבָּא. The locative demonstrative, which in Hebrew is also used for designating Time, generally sounds תָּמָא, in Chaldee; our vocalisation, analogous with that of dūnā, 3, 4, is justified by Arabic tumma, *deinde*.—מְרַחְבָּא is the feminine of the passive participle to Aphel from the common verb, רָחַב, *amplus, latus fuit*. The causative is used of enlargement of dominion, Exod. xxxiv. 24.; Deut. xxxiii. 20.; Amos, i. 13. The Semite, when speaking of his herd, thereby designates his wealth and station, and its increase means that his affairs are in a thriving condition.

VI.

The Age of the Inscription.

The contents give only a very slight clue for guessing the age.

The name Az-bālat, as we have already shown, is a composition connected with the worship of Baaltis. Now, Arabia became acquainted with Christianity at the end of the second century (Basra, which is only at a day's journey from Abushadhr, was the seat of a bishop); Mesopotamia, the land of Abgarus, already before the middle of the second century. Now, a name, which so pointedly implies praise and service to the heathen goddess Baaltis would not have been given by a Christian father. We may, therefore, say, if the Inscription does not belong to the time before Christ, it must be attributed to one of the first post-Christian centuries, when the lands round the Euphrates were still heathen.

The history of the Semitic alphabets, on the other hand, seems not to allow us to go back very far into heathen antiquity.

The Semitic writing on the weights of the palace of Tiglath Pileser * is of strictly Phœnician character: many closed heads, both round and angular; the letters unequal, unconnected, and awkward. From this character, our Inscription differs considerably. It is more developed, more symmetrical and rounded off; the heads are mostly opened, and, in consequence, the characters shortened above: finally, the characters are frequently connected. In short, we have a cursive or running hand, later than the capitals of the Phœnician.

Now, this cursive character is most resembling that of the Palmyrene Inscriptions. As these extend from the year 49 to 250 of our era, and as those among their characters, which are *most* rounded off, are most resembling ours (see III. No. 1.), our Inscription might seem to belong rather to a younger than to an earlier period than the older Palmyrene.

But we meet also with some letters which bear a character anterior to the Palmyrene, having a more closed, compact shape. The absence of final letters also bespeaks a high antiquity. A running hand might

* On the well known Assyrian Lions in the British Museum, described by Layard, Nineveh, p. 601.

form itself much earlier in a trading country, near a great river and large cities, than in the interior. Now, Abushadhr lies in the neighbourhood of Kufa and Basra : the Kufic character, of which we know the antiquity to be very great, is also a cursive one.

On consideration of all these circumstances, we are inclined to think it most probable that the Inscription of Abushadhr reaches up to one of the last ante-Christian centuries.

Let us hope for more specimens of this important Babylonian writing.

APPENDIX D.

THE UNIVERSAL ALPHABET,

AND

THE CONFERENCES REGARDING IT

HELD AT THE RESIDENCE OF CHEVALIER BUNSEN, IN
JANUARY, 1854.

I.

THE LONDON CONFERENCES.

THE progress of the first part of the Outlines which I submit to the public, and some concurrent circumstances have suggested to me the idea of trying whether the publication of my work might not be made instrumental for advancing, and if possible bringing to some practical conclusion, the question of a universal alphabet. It appeared to me that the philologists in England and on the Continent, and more particularly in Germany and France, having come to an understanding on some leading principles, there was a good foundation for hoping that the time had come when the civilised nations of the world might by the irresistible verdict of enlightened public opinion be led to the adoption of a standard alphabet for transcribing words of foreign languages, always excluding those of Romanic and Teutonic Europe, and Greek. To arrive at some conclusions respecting the fundamental principles of such a universal means of analysing and defining the sounds of the leading languages of Europe themselves, and of transcribing all other alphabets according to a uniform system, seemed more than ever an urgent necessity. The researches of comparative philology have of late become a subject of general interest, and a work like the present showed by itself the defects of even the most approved methods, and the impediments which this confusion throws in the way of scientific researches conducted for the interest of the public at large.

The communications into which, on these considerations, I entered with my learned friends, and in particular with Professor Lepsius, Doctor Carl Meyer, and Professor Max Müller, confirmed me both in the feeling of this necessity and in the hope of advancing at this moment some steps at least in the important question at issue.

My proposals for a conference were kindly received, and what follows will best tell its own tale.

It is now for the enlightened public in Europe and America, and for the concurrence and practical spirit of those who, as comparative philologists, or as missionaries, are principally occupied with the subject, to bring to a practical conclusion a problem so intimately connected with the wonderful organisation of man, and with the grandest and most universal work of the great family of mankind, and so essential for the advancement of the highest theoretical and practical purposes. May the feeling of the sacredness of the subject in both respects always be present to those who seriously enter into these discussions, and lead to that sacrifice of individual predilections, not to say imaginations, and of national pretensions, without which, the great cause of Humanity, also in this neutral and peaceable field, cannot be advanced and secured.

FIRST CONFERENCE.*

Wednesday, the 25th of January, 1854.

ON the invitation of Chevalier Bunsen, some friends met at Prussia House, Carlton Terrace, on Wednesday, the 25th January, 1854, in order to take into consideration the important question whether or not a uniform system of expressing foreign alphabets by Roman characters could be devised and agreed upon. The gentlemen who met were Sir John Herschel, Sir Charles Trevelyan, Professor Owen; Revds. H. Venn, F. Trestrail, Chapman, William Arthur; Messrs. Edwin Norris, R. Cull, E. Underhill, Captain Graham, and Dr. Max Müller. These represented most of the Missionary, the Asiatic and Ethnological Societies. The Royal Academy of Berlin was represented by Dr. Pertz, the editor of the *Monumenta Historiæ Germanicæ*.

Chevalier Bunsen having been requested to take the chair, thus stated the object for which this conference had assembled:—

“I have to open the discussions for which I have taken the liberty of requesting your presence this day, as I shall have to close them, with my best thanks for the kindness with which you have granted that co-operation which, at the present conjuncture, I believe to be of the highest importance.

“Two great phenomena have occurred in the course of this century to urge upon Europe the importance and necessity of a universal alphabet, so powerfully called forth by Volney: the rise and wonderful advance of the science of languages, and of comparative philology, combined with universal ethnology, and the great Protestant missionary movement all over the globe. As to the first, it was particularly the British sway in India which opened the way. The study of Sanskrit, with its wonderful symmetric system of sounds and its living traditions of elocution, gave the enlightened statesmen and scholars employed in the administration of that vast empire a basis

* The following account is substantially taken from the article in the “Times” of Saturday, 25th January, 1854.

for a uniform Indian alphabet in Roman characters, and at the same time forced the scholars and philosophers of Europe to go out of the beaten track. The sounds of Sanskrit called for a comparison with those of the cognate languages, the Greek, the Latin, the Germanic. The theory of etymology showed itself inseparable from that of phonology.

“As to the great missionary work, we find that in the beginning almost every missionary who had to fix the sounds of tribes without an alphabet followed his own inspirations. The specimens of translations of the Bible into such languages, published by the great British and Foreign Bible Societies, exhibit a lively image of this variety. It was the evident necessity of some principle and the desirableness of uniformity which inspired the Rev. H. Venn some years ago with the idea of making the great experiment to see how the natives of Africa would receive what may be called a philosophical alphabet. Experience has shown that the natives of that interesting district where the Yoruba dialect is spoken are willing and able to understand their idiom if transcribed into such an alphabet.

“The proposed republication, in a much extended form, of my lecture on the philosophy of language, delivered at Oxford in 1847, has brought the great *desideratum* more forcibly before my mind in the course of the last six months. I found a different system of transcription adopted in every one of the contributions of my learned friends to that work, now in the press, destined to give the last results of the researches of comparative philology for the languages of Asia and Europe. By reading them and the great works of Bopp, Burnouf, and Humboldt, I was painfully reminded of the want of two great principles—I mean, a physiological one for the basis, and a practical one for the application. None of the systems I found, including that which I use myself, proved to be consistent as to its basis; none unobjectionable as to its application. This distressing state of things, and continued communication with my excellent and learned friend, the Rev. H. Venn, brought me at last to the resolution of calling upon those two of my younger friends who had for years occupied themselves with this problem, and who were, by universal consent, considered as men most particularly qualified to propose that definitive project of a universal alphabet to the civilised world which might

come before the public with some hopes of success. Both were disposed to bring their researches and speculations to a conclusion. One is present*, and his proposal is in your hands; the other, Professor Lepsius, has left Berlin this morning in order to be present at our discussions; and I hope you all here present will see and hear him at our next conference, for which I propose to fix next Monday, at the same hour, for Professor Lepsius will be obliged to return to Berlin on Tuesday.

"The course which I propose to follow in this first conference is to discuss, first, the physiological basis, then the principles of application, and, finally, the application followed out by Prof. Max Müller.

"Our discussion will have to pass through three stages.

"The first question is,—Are we enabled by the present state of physiological and mathematical research to define the nature of each sound in a given language so as to reduce it to its proper place? I think we are, in consequence of the profound and ingenious researches of Johannes Müller in his *Physiology* (made also the object of a lecture in the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin, printed in the *Transactions* of that Academy), and of the illustrious philosopher and astronomer who has honoured us this day with his presence. Prof. Müller* shows that he has placed himself upon the indestructible basis thus created, and the great luminary of physiology, my friend, Professor R. Owen, is ready to give us the benefit of his demonstrations for this purpose. If we have gained such a basis, the next question is, in examining any given proposal,—Is the system of expressing these sounds alphabetically consistent? And the third and last,—Has it been carried out in such a manner as to render it universally applicable?

"The greatest difficulty of the subject lies in the union of these three different lines of inquiry. But it is worth all possible efforts. Look to the missionary cause. We may hope to fix upon an alphabet which will be the basis of civilisation and literature for tribes growing into nations under the benign influence of Christianity. The same alphabet may, with immediate effect, serve to give to the 150,000,000 of your Indian empire a uniform alphabet. Such an alphabet will take

* Dr. Max Müller, of Oxford.

away a great bar to communication between such of the Indian populations as speak a very cognate language, and gradually with all; and, at the same time, bring them nearer to their European rulers, and the rulers nearer to them. But finally, that same alphabet will render it possible, not only for the scholar by profession, but for every friend of ethnology and comparative philosophy of language, to transcribe and to read the sounds, and to understand whatever belongs to the noblest branch of ethnology, whether published at London, or at Paris, or at St. Petersburg. And why not at Pekin and Nankin? For I am sure that the first step needful for the 360,000,000 composing the Chinese empire, before entering into the stream of the common civilisation of mankind, will be their adoption of an alphabet of sounds, to which, as experience has already shown, even that most abnormal language can be reduced. It is for such noble purposes, gentlemen, that I request your kind and enlightened support."

The conference was opened by a concise and lucid exposition of Professor OWEN. He exhibited several diagrams, illustrating from them the formation of voice. He expressed his entire agreement with the results laid down by Dr. Johannes Müller, and with their application as suggested by Prof. Max Müller in a paper which formed the subject of the present discussion. He had not obtained sufficient specimens to compare carefully the organs of speech in different races; but the chief difference already known to him was, that in the Australians the cavities for resonant air, known as the frontal sinuses, did not exist fully developed. Thence, perhaps, arose a certain want of resonance for which their voice was remarkable. He referred to a work by a German physiologist, Amman, *De Loqueld*, published in 1700, as almost exhausting the subject.

A desultory conversation then arose, in the course of which

Sir JOHN HERSCHEL made some interesting statements as to the formation of voice and vowels in particular. He held that the vowel sounds were practically infinite, on account of the amazing flexibility of the organs. In English he thought we had at least 13 vowels.

Mr. NORRIS observed that there were more; Mr. CULL, that he made out 17. Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN showed that in practice the tendency was, as society improved, to drop peculiar distinctions in the same language and conform to one standard. He gave an

interesting account of cases in which the Roman character had been applied to Oriental languages by himself and other gentlemen at Calcutta some 20 years ago.

Several remarks were made to show that the vowel sounds are not identical in different languages, even where so nearly the same as to require one graphic expression. There seemed to be a unanimous feeling that it would be useless and impossible to attempt to find for each possible variety of sound a different graphic sign; but that a sufficient number of typical signs being formed, each nation, or province, would attach to them their own shade of sound, while to other people they would represent the sound in their own language nearest to it.

Mr. ARTHUR stated that, on hearing the proposal of Prof. Max Müller to represent foreign alphabets by the Roman, using italics for certain modifications of both vowels and consonants, he at first thought it impracticable; but, resolving to test it by the Canarese alphabet, he found, to his surprise, that he could easily represent all Canarese letters. Mr. NORRIS stated the points where he agreed with Prof. Müller's physiological definitions and alphabetical proposals. He objected, however, to italics as ugly, and preferred dots, or other diacritical marks.

Mr. VENN made a most interesting statement as to how the Church Missionary Society wished, when introducing writing into African languages previously unwritten, to accept an alphabetic system now in use and successful. He objected to changes, unless they were absolutely necessary, and remarked that among the Cherokee Indians a syllabarium even had been found to serve so well that children did not require to have any time spent in teaching them to read, but learnt it in a morning. A letter was in existence written by a chief on the same day that he first saw writing.

Prof. MÜLLER, who was called upon to answer some objections that had been made to his proposals, said that one great point had been gained in the course of these discussions, the general agreement on the necessity of a physiological basis for a universal alphabet. He showed that the same view had been taken in grammars appended to the *Veda*, the sacred books of the Brahmans, and that the physiological definitions of the vowels and consonants, as given there, coin-

cided in some points almost literally with those of Johannes Müller and Professor Owen. This fact, might, therefore, be considered as agreed upon. In order to adapt the Roman alphabet to the typographical words and consonants, it would be necessary either to introduce Greek letters, or to cast new types with hooks and dots. Both these methods he showed to be objectionable ; and he recommended the use of italics to express certain modifications of the vowels and consonants, the formation of which he illustrated from diagrams of Professor Owen. He insisted on three points ; first, that no type should be recommended which did not exist in every English fount ; secondly, that modifications of certain consonants, such as *kirk* and *church*, *genus* and *gender*, *largus* and *large*, should be expressed uniformly, and, as he proposed, by italics ; thirdly, that the missionary alphabet should be as a segment of a more extended one, which would be useful for scientific purposes, and which had been tested by himself and other scholars, and found applicable to Indo-European, Semitic, and such of the Chinese family of languages as had received an alphabetic representation. Two objections were made to italics ; one says, they are too ugly and startling ; another says, they are not striking enough. On the one hand, they were not so ugly as to shock the æsthetic feelings of the Caffre ; on the other, they were sufficiently observable to fix the notice of the eye.

The conference lasted four hours, and was adjourned to Monday, the 30th of January.

SECOND CONFERENCE.

Monday, the 30th of January, 1854.

The members assembled at the first conference were also present at this, with the addition of Professor Lepsius, of the Royal Academy, at Berlin; Professor H. H. Wilson, of the E. I. C., and of Oxford University; and of Mr. Charles Babbage.

The chairman opened the conference by the following address:—

“The last time, gentlemen, that I had the honour of addressing you, I proposed to open the present conference with calling upon *Prof. Max Müller* to give, in illustration of his printed statement, the details respecting the application of his proposal; the general principles and method of application of which had formed the subject of our conversations in the first conference. After I proposed to request *Professor Lepsius*, whose arrival for our present meeting I was authorized to announce, to lay before you that comprehensive system which he has formed, during a long series of years, for the use of all possible scientific transcriptions, as well as for missionary purposes, and respecting which we were all anxious to hear his own statement.

“I have now the gratification of seeing Professor Lepsius among us, and I have to announce to you that Professor Müller has requested me to state that he begs to refer to his printed statement, and does not intend to take up any part of your time, desirous as he is that this conference should be entirely dedicated to the development of *the system of Professor Lepsius*. In now calling upon my friend to give us such a statement of that system of his as he thinks best adapted for the purpose, I cannot refrain from giving expression to my delight in seeing this striking proof of the progress of scientific intercourse and debates among the men of different countries. Here the member of a German university, most strenuously occupied with his lectures, and with preparing one of the most gigantic works of the age, the *Monuments of Egypt and their Explanations*, leaves, in

the midst of winter (and I may be allowed to add), under anxious domestic circumstances, his domestic hearth and his country, to be present at a scientific debate beyond the seas, 700 miles distant, and to return home after a few days. In the midst of many signs and events of the age which are of a nature to distress the observer of European affairs, and to create in his mind grave thoughts respecting the future, let us the more rejoice at this instance of free, unprejudiced, and friendly intercommunion between the men of science all over the world. Humanity, civilisation, and religion, require and demand such a co-operation, not less than science and literature; and no branch of it more than that which is most immediately connected with our debates,—ethnology, based upon comparative philology. I propose, therefore, that the expression of the thanks of the meeting be tendered to Professor Lepsius for his presence amongst us."

These thanks having been warmly expressed, and Professor Lepsius having acknowledged them, he entered into a lucid exposition of his system, for the details of which the public may now be referred to the printed exposition appended to this historical statement.

THIRD CONFERENCE.

Wednesday, the 1st of February, 1854.

The discussions and conversations to which the exposition of the system of Professor Lepsius had given rise in the last conference were continued in the present, and in particular to a reply of Professor Müller, in answer to the objections which had been raised against his own proposal, and to a criticism upon some points in the system of Professor Lepsius.

The time seemed now come to propose and consider some resolutions framed by the chairman, in order to fix the preliminary, fundamental points, on which all, or almost all, members present seemed to have agreed.

The following five resolutions were therefore successively submitted and recommended by the chairman.

RESOLUTIONS.

The conference, after having examined the proposals of Professor Müller and of Professor Lepsius, and after having taken into consideration the observations suggested by several of its members, has come to the following resolutions, to which it requires the adhesion of those who wish to continue the deliberations upon the subject, and which, it hopes, may gradually lead to a complete understanding.

First Resolution.

The object of the conference is to arrive, if possible, at a general understanding upon an alphabet capable of serving both for scientific and for practical purposes; that is to say, both for transcribing the works of all languages not using the Latin or Greek alphabet; and for constituting (as is the object of missionary labours) into a rational system the sounds of the languages of such tribes or nations as

possess no alphabet,—either having no writing at all, or not an alphabetical one.

Second Resolution.

The first basis of such an alphabet must be a *physiological* one; which includes the requisite that every sound which is to form part of the alphabet should be physiologically defined, and, if capable of such a definition, considered as an individual element, and to be represented by one letter.

Third Resolution.

That the second requisite is the *linguistic basis*, and that this requires an organic arrangement of the sounds of all languages which have been analysed philologically, and therefore presupposes a systematic arrangement of their sounds according to the organs of speech, and according to the organic affections to which some of them are liable.

Fourth Resolution.

That a *graphic system*, proposed upon this double basis, must be rational and consistent, and must answer the purposes of reading and writing, with a particular regard as to printing.

Fifth Resolution.

That the scientific alphabet, thus constructed, is to be considered as the *Standard Alphabet*; which, in its completeness, is to serve as a medium of general transcription of all languages not using a Latin alphabet; and that each *Missionary Alphabet* shall draw its resources from the same, with due consideration to the greatest possible economy of signs; or, at least, if in any respect deviations be admitted, such deviations should be specially noticed and explained, and should never interfere with the Standard Alphabet by employing its signs to represent any other sound than that which this alphabet prescribes.

After some discussions on these resolutions, the chairman proposed that he should lay them before the conference at its next meeting in an amended form, so as to render their unanimous adoption possible. This proposal was approved.

FOURTH CONFERENCE.

Friday, the 3rd of February, 1854.

Professor Lepsius was present, having prolonged his stay on purpose, with the understanding that the conferences should on this day be brought to a close.

The chairman opened the conference with the following address:—

“As this conference will, for the present, be our last, Professor Lepsius not being able to delay his departure any longer, and the presence of Professor Müller being required at Oxford, it appears to me evident that we must do what the Romans call ‘*contrahere vela.*’ Let us then quit as soon as we can the open sea of theoretical controversy, and steer straight for the port of a common understanding respecting the practical application. On this point, in particular, Professor Lepsius will, on this day, submit to the conference his final remarks, which undoubtedly will give rise to some concluding observations by Professor Müller.

“Before we proceed to these, I beg to be allowed to lay before the conference first a recapitulation of the results obtained, introductory to the amended form of the resolutions. I shall then endeavour to condense, in as few sentences as I can, what I consider the practical results already obtained by our deliberations, and conclude with the proposal of a compromise.”

Recapitulations.

It was the object of these Conferences to consider whether all the languages of the world, with the exception of Greek, Latin, and the Teutonic and Romanic languages of Europe, could be represented graphically by one uniform alphabet.

The discussion was naturally divided into two parts.

I. We had to consider the general principles which ought to guide us in the composition of such an alphabet.

II. We had to see how these principles could be carried out practically.

It was necessary to listen to the wishes of the scholar, the missionary, and the printer, and to weigh any objections that might be made by the one or the other. It was not intended to propose a system ready made and perfect in all its details, but rather to find out what system might prove most acceptable to all concerned in this matter, and competent to give an opinion on it. It was understood, therefore, that every one who took an active part in these conferences would be open to argument, and ready to waive those points on which he found himself at variance with the clearly expressed opinion of the majority.

The conference, after considering the proposals of Professor Max Müller and of Professor Lepsius, and after having taken into consideration the observations suggested by several of its members, has come to the following resolutions, to which it requires the adhesion of those who wish to continue the deliberations upon the subject, and which, it hopes, may gradually lead to a complete understanding.

THE FOUR AMENDED RESOLUTIONS.

First Resolution.

The basis of our alphabet must be a physiological one; that is to say, every sound must be defined physiologically before it can claim its own graphic exponent in our alphabet.

Second Resolution.

This physiological system, offering an infinite variety of possible sounds, must be checked and reduced by linguistic observation. The comparative philologist, by means of the most comprehensive induction, must determine which are the typical sounds employed in the various manifestations of human speech; and after discovering which sounds are primary or secondary, which simple or compound, he must fix the number of letters requisite for a universal alphabet.

Third Resolution.

The graphic system built upon this double basis must be rational and consistent, and must answer the purposes of reading and writing, with a particular regard to printing.

Coroll. The graphic exponents should in *the first place* be drawn from the *Roman Alphabet*. After this is exhausted, we should employ in *the second place*, modifications of the Roman types, and

A. Modifications supplied by common founts.

B. Modifications expressed by diacritical dots, lines, &c., and requiring new types.

Greek letters can only come in by way of exception. Arabic, Russian, or fanciful types must be excluded altogether.

Fourth Resolution.

The scientific alphabet thus constructed is to be considered as the *Standard Alphabet*, to which all other alphabets are to be referred, and from which the distance of each is to be measured. If scholars or societies, after following their own system of transcription in a number of publications, consider themselves pledged to it, it should be stated in what points their alphabet deviates from the common standard. These systems will then be considered as *Transition Alphabets*, which may in time be merged in a *Uniform Alphabet*.

These four resolutions, having been found to express the general opinion of the members of the conference, were consequently adopted, as bases of a further understanding.

It seemed now to remain for me to state how far an agreement had been attained respecting the real construction of such an alphabet. Having in the mean time consulted both Professor Müller and Professor Lepsius, I am enabled to lay before the conference the following statement as expressing the extent of the agreement hitherto obtained; and pointing out the differences of opinion which still stand in the way of a perfect understanding.

The following letters are to form part of the Standard Alphabet :

1. *Letters to which no objection has been raised as to the sound which they represent :*

K. (Gutturalis tenuis) as in *Kirk*.

G. (Gutturalis media) as in *go*.

T. (Dentalis tenuis) as in *town*.

D. (Dentalis media) as in *down*.

- N. (Dentalis nasalis) as in *no*.
- P. (Labialis tenuis) as in *post*.
- B. (Labialis media) as in *boat*.
- M. (Labialis nasalis) as in *man*.
- Y. (Palatalis semivocalis) as in *yes*.
- L. (Dentalis semivocalis or liquida) as in *low*.
- R. (Lingualis semivocalis or liquida) as in *row*.
- W. (Labialis semivocalis) as in *will*.
- S. (Sibilans dentalis asper) as in *sin*.
- Z. (Sibilans dentalis lenis) as in *zeal*.
- F. (Sibilans labialis asper) as in *find*.
- V. (Sibilans labialis lenis) as in *veil*.
- H. (Spiritus gutturalis asper, according to Müller, or Spiritus faucalis, or pectoralis, according to Lepsius) as in *hand*.

With regard to these letters no dissentient voice has been raised as to the sound which they ought to represent in a Standard Alphabet. The discussions to which they gave rise bore entirely on the technical nomenclature of these letters, and the proper physiological definition which should be given of them.

2. As to *linguals*, Professor Müller assumed that an agreement had been likewise arrived at which might be expressed in the following sentence :—That the lingual series (sometimes called cerebral) should have the same bases as the dental series, that is to say, T, D, N, S. Discussions arose as to the best manner of marking the difference of dentals and linguals. Dots, lines, accents, and italics were proposed.

Professor Lepsius, on the contrary, thought that there was no agreement on this point, and gave the following statement :—That there are two different series between the palatals and the dentals; the one exists in Sanskrit, and is known by the not correct but generally received name of *Cerebrals*; whilst the other series, which exists in Arabic, is called *Linguals*. It was proposed to distinguish the first series by dots or italics, the second by lines, the common basis for both being the dental signs, T, D, N, S, Z.

Against this statement Professor Müller observed in reply that the agreement with regard to linguals was perfect, because what Lepsius had added referred to another class of linguals or cerebrals in Arabic, about which nothing was asserted in the above statement.

3. With regard to the *Palatal* Series, two views were advocated :

According to the one they should be considered as modifications of the Gutturals, and therefore have the same bases, with modificatory marks, *k* or *k'*. According to the other view, their sound being peculiar and a simple one in Sanskrit, they should have their own exponents : *c*, *ch*, *tch*, &c.

If the former view be adopted, which is that of Bopp and Burnouf, we shall only have to agree on the modificatory marks to be added to the Guttural Series.

If the latter opinion prevails, which is advocated by Professor Wilson, Sir C. Trevelyan, and was that of Sir W. Jones, the exponents most likely to prevail are *ch* for tenuis, and *j* for media. Klaproth's proposal to adopt a Russian letter (*ч*) is against the general use, and is excluded by our third resolution.

If therefore we agree on the modificatory marks to be applied to Palatals and Linguals, nearly the whole of our object will have been achieved. Professor Müller proposes italics both for Palatals and Linguals ; Professor Lepsius proposes the acute accent for Palatals, the dots for Cerebrals, and the lines for Linguals. The former proposition removes, once for all, the practical objection so frequently urged as an excuse by scholars and missionaries, that either the dotted or the accented types not being at hand, some other expedient has been adopted to mark the palatal or lingual modification. The latter expedient has the advantage of looking better if the types are cast on one body, and is more congenial to the methods hitherto adopted, although never yet consistently.

It is evident, that the former of these two systems can only be carried out thoroughly under the supposition, that one and the same letter can never be affected by the palatal as well as the lingual modification. Professor Lepsius maintains that the *l*, being palatal and lingual, as well as dental, gives an instance of such being the case. Professor Müller denies that there exists a necessity of expressing in one and the same language more than two primitive *Ls*. But should it be shown that this is not sufficient, he allows (for such cases), by way of exception, the use of diacritical signs. For the guttural, palatal, lingual, and dental *n* also, he proposes *ṇ*, *ṇ̄*, *n*, and *n̄*.

If we compare the peculiar advantages of either of the two systems before us, we are led to the following observations :—

The system of Prof. Lepsius offers the advantage—and this for the *first time*,—that a given diacritical sign, a dot or point, above or below, is always the exponent of one and the same organic affection, and never anything else. The sign therefore impresses itself on the mind as the exponent of a given modifying affection, and thus is easily remembered and extremely instructive.

Prof. Müller maintains that no doubt can ever exist whether a modified *k* and *t* be meant for a lingual or palatal ; and therefore considers the admission of a distinct modificatory sign for each class as superfluous, and hence an impediment to our chief object—uniformity. But, admitting for argument's sake the view advocated by Lepsius, he fears that it will be difficult to invent a new sign to mark the syllabic accent, if the *accentus acutus* is made the exponent of palatality. This is met by Professor Lepsius with two observations : *first*, that generally, with the exception of the Sanskrit *r* and *l*, an accent is never used for consonants, but for vowels ; and, *secondly*, that the sign might be so modified as to distinguish it from the accent.

Prof. Müller misses the palatal accent on the palatal *y*. Professor Lepsius allows this, but he asserts that his system allows perfectly this modification being marked, if it should be found expedient.

Further, Prof. Müller adverts to the fact that the cerebral dot is used for different purposes under the vowels *e* and *o* (*e* and *o*). Finally, Prof. Müller denies the possibility of one local class, the *Dentals*, producing three sets of Orales fricativæ.

š ž	}	she, pleasure.
s z	}	sin, please.
š' ž'	}	thin, the.

After these statements, the chairman added the following remarks respecting the specified differences between the systems of Professor Müller and Professor Lepsius :—

“ Having thus, to the best of my ability, laid before the Conference what I consider to be an impartial historical exposition of the differences existing at present between my two learned friends, I beg, in conclusion, the permission to state in a few words my own personal view of the case.

"After mature consideration, I have come to the following conclusions and to a proposal of a compromise which I would recommend to the calm consideration of my two friends, and to all members of the conference present.

"Either system evidently has its advantages and its disadvantages, and these may be considered inherent to the nature of the systems of diacritical signs and of italics. Nor is this theoretical difference an absolute one : for even Professor Müller cannot entirely dispense with diacritical signs.

"It cannot be denied that the remaining theoretical differences are deserving of ulterior discussion. Supposing that such a discussion should not lead to a perfect agreement, it is well to bear in mind, that the points at issue are entirely theoretical, and that at all events it should be attempted to waive them as subordinate to the importance of the great practical object before us.

"As a basis of a common co-operation, I beg to propose the following compromise. It consists simply of two articles : —

" First Article.

"Professor Müller might adopt (and is ready to adopt, as far as physiological principles are concerned), the theoretical classification and nomenclature of Professor Lepsius for practical application, reserving to himself to lay before the public his objections as to some points of detail, if he cannot prevail upon Professor Lepsius to modify his theory respecting them.

" Second Article.

"Professor Müller is ready to propose his system of italics, as a supplementary one for those who have not the types required for the alphabet of Professor Lepsius, and as particularly useful for transliteration, that is to say, for translating any given sign of a given historical alphabet into one of the Roman Alphabet, ordinary and italic, which is of great importance and immediate use for all scientific purposes, as for instance, transcribing Sanskrit or Arabic texts.

"I think I may say, with the concurrence of all here present, and of the immense majority of all those who in Europe and in the United

States have made the problem of a universal and standard alphabet the object of connected, both physiological and philological, researches, that we have made one great step in advance.

"The two systems arrayed before us represent the two only systems which may be proposed with any hope of success, carried out as they both are with a depth of philological research and linguistic as well as philosophical consistency, as none of those hitherto proposed to the literary world.

"If we will adopt the system of *diacritical points*, Professor Lepsius comes before us with a proposal which is avowedly both *consistent* and *complete*. Every one of his diacritical points represents one great organic class of letters, and identifies itself in our mind with the same. Of his two classes of consonants, the explosive, and the continuous or frictive, either has its separate *basis*, no letter being used in both, and in each series one and the same diacritical distinction marks one and the same organic change.

"On the other hand, Prof. Müller has (with one or two, or no exceptions) only one means of expressing an organic change—the *italics*, affording thus the possibility of transcribing and printing alphabets merely with those Romanic types which exist everywhere.

"There are certainly some points of difference between these two learned men, which are not necessarily connected with the difference of the system, as just explained.

"I shall endeavour to define two of them which appear to me to be essential.

"Prof. Müller proceeds from the assumption, that the alphabet required is to serve not only for transcription, but also for transliteration. The object of transliteration, is to transfer every sign of the native (say Sanskrit or Arabic) alphabet into the Romanic. Professor Lepsius denies this, and maintains that a universal standard alphabet must be rational, and give one letter for one really simple individual sound, and therefore two signs for two sounds, whether in the native historical alphabet they be expressed (as philosophically they ought to be in such a case) by two letters or by one.

"Another question now arises, whether in giving up the principle of strict transliteration, we can distinguish such sounds as those ex-

pressed by the Hebrew Aleph, Ain, He, which, however considered identical or nearly identical in sound, are certainly immensely different etymologically."

The chairman then proposed, that the resolutions proposed in the last conference should be read in their improved form (as printed above), and adopted, which was done unanimously.

A final discussion having then taken place between Professor Lepsius and Professor Müller, on these and some other points, Professor Wilson, Sir John Herschel, and Sir Charles Trevelyan, expressed it as their opinion that it appeared impossible to attain, at this period, a definitive agreement between the two contending systems, and that they themselves did not intend to pronounce themselves definitively for the one or the other. They, as well as the majority of the other members present, renewed, however, their concurrence in the resolutions adopted, and it was unanimously resolved that the transactions of these conferences should be published as proposed by the chairman; and that the conferences themselves should be renewed next autumn, or early in the following year, in London or elsewhere, in order to endeavour to arrive at a definitive practical conclusion, after the whole had been submitted to mature deliberation, and public opinion allowed to take an active part in the subject on the basis laid down in the present conferences.

II.

LEPSIUS'

SUCCINCT EXPOSITION OF HIS UNIVERSAL STANDARD ALPHABET.

A COMPREHENSIVE exposition of the *physiological basis* would here be out of place. We must limit ourselves to facilitating the understanding of the system. This will be best accomplished by not separating the phonic from the graphic system, but by presenting the first immediately in its application to the latter. We do not enlarge, therefore, on the definition of voice and sound, of vowel and consonant, and other physiological explanations, and shall only refer to them as occasion offers.*

A. *The System of Vowels.*

There are three primary vowels, as there are three primary colours. Like the latter, they can be best represented by the analogy of a triangle, at the top of which is to be placed *a*, at the basis *i* and *u* (pronounced as in the German and Italian languages).



The other vowels are formed between these three, as all colours between red, yellow, and blue. In the most ancient languages only these three primary vowels were sufficiently distinct to be marked in writing even when short. The Hieroglyphical, Indian, oldest Hebrew, and Gothic systems of writing admitted either of no other vowels at all, or at least of no other *short* vowels; in Arabic writing, even now, none but these three are distinguished.

* On this subject I refer the reader to the larger volume, which will shortly follow the present pages, and in which the physiological part of the question will be developed at large.

Next after these were formed, the intermediate vowels *e* between *a* and *i*, *o* between *a* and *u*, and the sound of the German *ü* (French *u*) between *i* and *u*, also that of the German *ö* (French *eu*) between *e* and *o*. Thus arose the pyramid

a
e *ö* *o*
i *ü* *u*

The distance between *a* and *i* and that between *a* and *u* is greater than that between *i* and *u*. The intermediate vowels *e* and *o* were, therefore, divided each into *two* vowels, of which one was nearer to *a*, the other nearer to *i* or *u*; and in the same manner two sounds out of *ö* were formed. All these vowels exist in European languages, and compose the following pyramid:

a
 Fr. *ê* Fr. *eu* *o* Ital.
 (in peur)
 Fr. *é* Germ. *ö* au Fr.
i Germ. *ü* *u*

In some European languages and dialects other shades are found; we have, however, the less occasion to mention them here, as hitherto they have not been observed in any of the languages out of Europe that come here under consideration.*


We might have wished to maintain for the middle series of vowels the two dots over the *u* and *o*, on account of the generally known precedent in the German orthography, the French double letter *eu* not answering the simple nature of the sound. A practical objection, however, to this mode is found in the circumstance, that occasionally over every vowel the sign of long $\bar{}$ and short $\acute{}$, and also that of the accent of the word ' will be necessary, for which the whole space over the letter is required. We have preferred, therefore, to preserve the two dots, and to place them under the vowel, as *o* and *u*.

The distinction of the two modes of pronouncing *e* and *o* cannot be marked by the French accents, partly because the upper space is wanted for other signs too generally in use to be dispensed with, and

* The English vowels especially deviate throughout a little from those of other languages, there being a slight difference in the general formation of the mouth.

partly because the acute accent would not be distinguished from the accent of the word. We add, therefore, as others have done before us, a line below to mark the broad open vowel $\underline{e}$ and $\underline{o}$, and a dot below, to mark the pointed and closed vowel $\underset{\cdot}{e}$, $\underset{\cdot}{o}$, the shape of these marks offering an analogy to the pronunciation itself.

From these combinations, the following system results, including the indifferent intermediate sounds:



We must mention, however, one other vowel, which exists in almost all languages, and ought not to be neglected by linguists. This is the *indistinct vowel-sound* from which, according to the opinion of some scholars, the other vowels, as it were, issued and grew into individuality, and to which the unaccented vowels of our aged European languages often return, as in the English words *nation*, *velvet*; the German *lieben*, *Verstand*; the French *sabre*, *tenir*. This vowel comes among the clear sounding vowels next to $\underline{o}$, being itself a mixture of all the others*, but it is capable of various shades, and sometimes approaches nearer to $\underline{o}$, or to i and u . From all of these, however, as also from $\underline{o}$, it is distinguished by the absence of that clear resonance common to the others, which is lost by partially contracting the mouth or even closing it entirely: in the latter case it is heard through the nose.† This vowel is inherent in all soft *fricative* consonants, as well as in the first part of the *nasal explosive* sounds (see below); whence all these letters as $\underset{\cdot}{z}$, $\underset{\cdot}{n}$, $\underset{\cdot}{m}$, appear some-

* The $\underset{\cdot}{e}$ resembles in the pyramid of colours the brown colour, which equally arises from a mixture of the three prime colours, or of one of them with the opposite intermediate colour.

	<i>red,</i>	
	<i>orange, brown, violet,</i>	
<i>yellow,</i>	<i>green,</i>	<i>blue.</i>

† It may be compared to *grey*, which also does not belong to the series of individual colours.

times as forming syllables.* It assumes the strongest resonance, as may be easily explained on physiological grounds, in combination with *r* and *l*, which, as is well known, appear in Sanscrit as *ṛ* and *ḷ*, with all the qualities of the other vowels.† We express this indistinct vowel, which is almost always short, by the Greek character *ε*, as has been done already by *Ludolf* in his Ethiopic grammar, *Isenberg* in the Amharic, *Piccolomini* in the Otomi, and others. The vowel sound again, inherent in certain consonants, when forming a syllable, we mark by a small circle under the consonant as *ṛ*, *m̃*. Any Latin vowel sign ‡ would in a general alphabet only lead to mistakes. It is not advisable to go farther in the graphic distinction of the different shades of this indistinct vowel than, in case of need, to mark the open pronunciation by *ε*, the closed by *ε̃*, as with *o* and *e*.

Finally, the clear vowels are further capable of a peculiar alteration, that of *nasalisation*. This is produced not by closing nor even by narrowing the canal of the mouth, but by simultaneously opening the canal of the nose. There is no consonantal element brought into play (although the nasalisation is mostly caused by the dropping of a nasal consonant), but it is an alteration entirely within the vowel. As such it has been rightly understood by the Indian grammarians, who express the nasalisation (*anuswāra*) by a vowel-like sign, namely, by placing a dot over the letter. For the European alphabet, we choose the sign *~* placed over the vowel§, as the dot would be inconvenient in the case of the *i*, and write —

ũ, ẽ, ã, õ, ù, õ̃, ü̃.

The *length* of vowels is not expressed by the Greek sign *ˆ*, but by the line used in Latin prosody, which requires less space, and is more

* In the Chinese language, for instance, *z* is used as a vowel in the roots *sz, tsz.*

† I shall enter more fully into this subject in my larger volume. A similar remark applies to the English vowel, into which all clear vowels resolve themselves before *r* combined with a second consonant as in *steward*, *herd*, *bird*, *work*, *world*, *burn*, and so on; yet the Indian vowel is still different from these.

‡ As *e*, which has been often used for it (*Burnouf*, *Roger*, *Endlicher*, *Petermann*, *Edwards*), *ē* (*Bopp*, *Schñn*), *a* (*Macbrair*) or *ü*, which *Robinson* has adopted in his *Palestine*.

§ The same mark has occasionally been employed by *Burnouf* in his *Commentaire sur le Yaçna* (p. cxxiii. p. x. Tableau.)

easily combined with the accent $\bar{a}$, $\acute{a}$, $\acute{e}$, and so on. The shortness, if required to be specially expressed, is likewise, as in prosody, marked by $\smile$, $\check{a}$, $\check{e}$, $\check{i}$, etc.

A complete and accurate theory of transcription would require a distinction of *diphthongs*, as such, since two vowels united by accent into *one* syllable are pronounced otherwise than when placed unconnectedly by the side of each other, and forming *two* syllables; the German word *Mai* having a different sound from that of the Italian *mai*. The first might be marked *Mai*, the second *mai*. Practice, however, seems in most languages not to require any distinction.

The complete tableau of the vowels and their modifications is therefore the following :

	α		$\bar{a}$	$\bar{e}$	$\bar{i}$	$\bar{o}$	$\bar{u}$	$\bar{\bar{o}}$	$\bar{\bar{u}}$		ϵ	
	$\underline{e}$	$\underline{o}$	$\underline{o}$	$\check{a}$	$\check{e}$	$\check{i}$	$\check{o}$	$\check{u}$	$\check{\bar{o}}$	$\check{\bar{u}}$	r	l
	$\dot{e}$	$\dot{o}$	$\dot{o}$	$\tilde{a}$	$\tilde{e}$	$\tilde{i}$	$\tilde{o}$	$\tilde{u}$	$\tilde{\bar{o}}$	$\tilde{\bar{u}}$	m	n
i	$\ddot{e}$	$\ddot{o}$	$\ddot{o}$								η	ξ
	u											

B. THE SYSTEM OF CONSONANTS.

On the Division of Consonants.

The consonants may be divided on different principles. Two principles of division, however, are prevalent, and will therefore be here adopted: although the exact place of every sound in the physiological system can result only from a minute enquiry into all its qualities.

The first and most important division is that determined by the *place* in the mouth where the sounds are formed. The breath which forms the sounds issues from the larynx into the mouth, and is here modified in a manifold manner, until it passes the outward gate of the lips. Thus the breath on its way can be stopped in various places either by the lips or by the tongue. We are accustomed in our languages, like the Greeks and Romans, to distinguish *three* such stoppings, and thus to divide the consonants into three classes, *gutturals*, *dentals*, and *labials*, according as they are formed in the throat, at the teeth, or with the lips.

There is another essential difference in the pronunciation, in as far as either the mouth at the above-mentioned places is completely

closed and reopened, or the passage of the breath is only narrowed without its stream being entirely interrupted by closing the organs. The consonants formed by the first process we call *explosive* or *divisible* (*dividuae*), because the moment of contact divides the sound into two parts*, the others *fricative*, from their sound being determined by friction, or *continuous* (*continuae*) because this friction is not interrupted by any closing of the organs. The sounds *r* and *l* participate in both qualities, being *continuous*, and at the same time formed by a *contact*, which is vibrating in *r*, and partial in *l*.

We are thus enabled to give the following synopsis of the most generally known simple consonantal sounds.

The Simple Consonants of the European Language.

explosivæ or dividuae. fortis lenis nasalis			fricativæ or continuae. fortis lenis			ancipites.
Gutturales <i>k g. g. o. ng</i>			fortis <i>G. ch, h</i>	lenis Danish <i>g</i>	semivocalis <i>G. j</i>	gutt. <i>r</i>
Dentales <i>t d n</i>			Fr. <i>ch</i>	Fr. <i>j</i>		
			sharp <i>s</i>	Fr. <i>z</i>		<i>r l</i>
			Engl. <i>th(-in)</i>	Engl. <i>th(-ine)</i>		
Labiales <i>p b m</i>			<i>f</i>	Fr. <i>v</i>	Engl. <i>w</i>	

* It will, on examination, soon appear that we often pronounce only half of a consonant, as, for instance, in all cases in which a nasal consonant meets another explosive letter of the same local class. The full pronunciation of an explosive letter requires the closing and opening of the organ. In *anda* we close the mouth with *n* and open it with *d*, the reverse in *adna*, pronouncing thus only half the *n* and half the *d*, whilst in *ana* and *ada* we pronounce the whole of *n* and of *d*; the same in *ampa* and *anka*, and so on. It is a decided mistake, to reckon *m* and *n* among the *consonantes continuæ*; for in *m* and *n* it is only the vowel element inherent in the first half, which may be continued at pleasure, whilst in all the continuous consonants it is the consonantic element (the friction) which must be continued, as in *f, v, s, z*. When in a final *m* we do not reopen the mouth, we pronounce only half an *m*, not a whole one. The complete consonant is best perceived when placed between two vowels. It is evident that in *ama* closing and opening are as necessary to the completeness of *m*, as in *aba* to that of *b*. This has been correctly understood by the Indian grammarians. More on this in the larger volume.

Upon what principles are these sounds to be rendered in a general alphabet?

Of these sounds only 11, viz. *k, h, t, d, n, r, l, p, b, m, f*, have one and the same universally acknowledged value in the European alphabets, leaving aside a few minor differences. The others require to be specially defined. Even among these the simple signs, *g, s, z, v*, and *w* are already so generally introduced into linguistic books in the value indicated above, that we may safely use them without further discussion.

We meet with some difficulty, however, with respect to the sounds of the German *ng*, *ch*, and *j*, the French *ch* (or English *sh*) and *j*, the English sharp and soft *th*, the Danish *g*, and the guttural *r*. These 9 sounds have been represented in linguistic books by various means.

The inconvenience of the common way of writing them will be evident, when we refer to the *principles* upon which every alphabet, aiming at general application, must be grounded, and which are essentially as follows:—

I. *Every simple sound ought to be represented by a simple sign.* This excludes the combinations *ng, ch, th*.

II. *Different sounds are not to be expressed by one and the same sign;* contrary to which principle *ch, j, th* have been used each with a double value.

III. *Those European characters which have a different value in the principal European alphabets, are not to be admitted into a general alphabet.* To these belong especially *c* and *j*. The former is pronounced in German *ts*, in French and English *s* or *k*, in Italian *tš* or *k*, and when combined with *h*, in German like the Greek *χ*, in English *tš*, in French *ž*, in Italian *k*; *j* in German and Italian like the English *y* in *year*, in English *dž*, in French *ž*, in Spanish like the German *ch*, or Greek *χ*. No less different are the meanings of *x*. The characters *c, ch, j*, are therefore to be excluded entirely.

IV. *EXPLOSIVE letters are not to be used to express FRICATIVE sounds, and vice versâ.* On the contrary, the simple characters (bases) must form a separate series in each of the two great divisions; if not, inextricable confusion will inevitably arise. Consequently *c* (= *k, ts, ts*), being explosive, cannot serve as basis for the fricative sound *ch*. For

the same reason the *explosive c* is to be avoided in rendering the *fricative* French *ch*, as also the *explosive t* in the *fricative* English *th*.

If, then, we look for signs which can be applied to the sounds above indicated, so as not to violate these most important principles, we shall find the choice of letters more circumscribed than it would at first appear.

German ng.

In German and in English (as for instance, Germ. *enge*, Engl. *singing*) *ng* expresses the guttural *n**, for which linguistic use had very generally adopted *ñ*, particularly in transcribing the Sanscrit. It is evident that *n* must remain the basis, and there is no reason for introducing any other diacritical sign.

Guttural r.

The guttural *r* differs from the usual dental *r*, in as much as the *velum palati* is put in vibration instead of the tip of the tongue. It is often thus pronounced in different dialects of the German, French, and other languages. The point over the letter marking already the guttural pronunciation of *ñ*, no other diacritical sign will be chosen for the same purpose in *r*. We write it, therefore, *ṛ*.

German j.

The German *j* is the semi-vowel which, in English (*year*, *yes*), and sometimes also in French (*Mayence*, *Bayonne*), is expressed by *y*. As, according to rule No. III., we cannot retain the sign *j*, we write *y*, following here also the use generally adopted in linguistic books.

German ch.

The German *ch* in *lachen* is known to be the *fricative* sound, which arises from the throat, not being closed at the guttural point (which would give *k*), but only narrowed, so that the strong and continuous breath produces a friction, such as is heard at the teeth in *s*, and at

* In most other languages, as in Sanscrit, it appears only before other gutturals; Indian scholars, therefore, do not generally distinguish it from the dental *n*.

the lips in *f*. The English, French, and Italians, do not know the sound at all; in the Spanish language it is marked by *j* or *x*. In the Semitic languages (Hebrew פ, Arabic خ) it is very frequent. Of European alphabets only the Spanish and the Greek have a simple letter for the sound. The Latin language did not know the sound, and therefore did not express it. The signs hitherto used by linguistic scholars, *ch*, *kh*, *qh*, *k*, *x*, are in opposition to the inviolable principle that fricative sounds must not be rendered by explosive bases, such as *c*, *k*, *q* (above No. IV.), or are altogether improper, like *x*. The nearest applicable fricative basis would be *k*. But it will appear from the sequel that this sign would be used for six different sounds, if we do not confine it strictly to its proper meaning. The difficulty of finding an appropriate sign for this sound is therefore great, and has been long felt. We possess one, however, in a European alphabet, namely, the Greek, which is almost as generally known as the Latin. From this it has been adopted into the Russian alphabet; and the Spanish *x* owes its pronunciation, probably, rather to the Greek χ, than to the Latin *x*. The want of a new sign, which naturally could not be supplied from an Oriental alphabet, had already caused Volney to propose the Greek χ in his alphabet of 1795, and, after the mistaken experiment of substituting *k*, to reproduce it in his last alphabet of 1818. The same sign is used by *Joh. Müller**, *Rapp*†, *Bunsen*‡, and others.

We therefore consider it not only as an essential advantage, but even as the only means of solving all difficulties, to follow these precedents, and to receive the Greek χ as the representative of this sound in the general alphabet. Of the soft sound, which corresponds with the strong, we shall have to speak below.

English sh, French ch, German sch.

For the rushing sound of the English *sh* we should not hesitate to propose a new basis, and to borrow it, if necessary, from the Greek alphabet, if any such existed. But neither the Greeks nor the Ro-

* Handbuch der Physiologie, vol. ii. (1837), pp. 237, 238.

† Physiologie der Sprache, p. 65.

‡ Aegyptens Stelle in der Weltgeschichte, vol. i.

mans had this sound; and we must avoid recurring to the Oriental, or even the Russian alphabet, as few persons could be expected to follow us so far. Our only resource, therefore, is to content ourselves with the nearest basis *s*, and to qualify this by a diacritical mark. This has been done, moreover, by all those that sought a simple sign for this simple sound, except by Volney, who first proposed a newly invented sign *q̄*, and afterwards preferred *ç*, viz. the inverted *j*. Some used *s'* or *š*. More generally *s'* has been adopted, from the precedent of Bopp, who has used it since 1833. Others have preserved the combination *sh*, which not only offends against the simplicity of the sound, but has produced also the incorrect impression, that the rushing sound implied a stronger breath than the common *s*. We should adopt Bopp's *s'*, on account of the authority of the precedent and its reception by his school, if it did not meet with serious difficulties. The spiritus asper is, like *h*, a sign of aspirates, and from the analogy of the aspirates *k'*, *t'*, *p'*, one ought to read *s'* as *s-h*, pronounced separately, or, from the analogy of *h'*, *χ'*, etc. (see below), to suppose an augmentation of the breathing of the *s*. None of these is the case. It would be, therefore, introducing a new meaning of the spiritus asper, used only in this single case. Nor can we adopt *s'*, since the accent indicates the palatal series (see below), and the single precedent of *š* used by Schleiermacher has hitherto found no imitation.

We propose to write *š*, using a sign which, by its semicircular shape, recalls the position of the mouth proper to its pronunciation; a consideration, by which we have been led occasionally in the choice of diacritical signs, when more conclusive motives were wanting. It is an advantage, also, that the proposed mark over the *s* comes as near as possible to the widely extended method of Bopp. Finally, we may refer to the Serbian and the modern Bohemian alphabet, in which the slightly different *š* for our *š* has been in constant and general use.

French j.

This letter is the soft and vocalised sound, which corresponds to the strong French *ch* (German *sch*), and bears exactly the same proportion to it as the French *z* to the strong *s*. Volney retained the French *j*, which we cannot use even as a basis (see above), any more

than *zh*, which has been introduced by others. There can be no doubt, however, that the parallelism with our *ž* for French *ch* requires a soft *ž* for French *j*, which, following the same analogy, the Serbians write *ž*.

English strong th.

The English *th** offers exactly the same difficulties as the German *ch*. It is a *littera fricativa* or *continua*, and must not, therefore, have the explosive letter *t*, for its basis. The only Latin character of the fricative division, which might be applied to it, is *s*, and, for the soft sound, *z*. Both, however, have been already applied each to two uses, and would besides have the disadvantage of favouring the tendency, common to most European nations, to substitute the usual dental *s* for the peculiar lisping sound. In this case, also, it will soon (when frequent use shall have overcome the first-felt apprehension) be acknowledged as an advantage, if, instead of *s* with a diacritical sign, we adopt the universally known Greek character *θ* as a new and original basis. Nor is it without precedent, *θ* having been used for this purpose by many, among whom we may again mention *Volney* (1795) and *Fleischer* (1831).

We do not undervalue the evident and serious difficulty, that by the reception of two Greek characters, the generally required confinement to the Roman alphabet suffers an exception; and we foresee that many who do not sufficiently appreciate the great importance of the organic laws of the alphabet, may be shocked at first. A further consideration will, however, soon make it evident, that the peculiar poverty of the Latin language in fricative sounds and letters, and the general tendency of all languages to transform the explosive into fricative sounds†, have rendered the disproportion between the two great divisions of sounds, with respect to their graphic representation, already so great that an essential and lasting remedy is absolutely required. There are, indeed, eight bases for the above-stated nine

* The same lisping sound exists in the Arabic and many other, also in some African, languages.

† Instances of this tendency are generally known from the Romanic languages, and further proof will be given in the larger volume soon to be published. See also below, where the Palatals are considered.

explosive sounds, and only six for the twelve fricative sounds. An augmentation of the latter by introducing the two Greek signs χ and θ , is consequently almost unavoidable; and their absolute necessity will soon be still more evident when we come to consider the Asiatic sounds in addition to the European.

The soft English th, and the Danish g.

The sound of the soft English *th* (*thine, thou*) appears also in the Danish *d* and in the modern Greek δ ; the soft guttural corresponding to the strong German *ch* presents itself in the Danish *g* and the modern Greek γ .* It cannot be denied that it would be a real advantage if we had other bases for these soft sounds than χ and θ , as *z* differs from *s*, *z* from *š*, *v* from *f*; and when in future time the natural antipathy against the Greek characters χ and θ shall have given way to the conviction of their necessity, perhaps it may be less difficult to go still farther and to mark the corresponding soft sounds equally by the Greek letters γ and δ .† For the present we hesitate to make this proposal, although we might adduce the important precedent of Fleischer (1831), partly because the modern Greek pronunciation of γ and δ is less known than that of χ and θ , partly because we wish to depart from the general basis of Latin letters only in cases of extreme necessity. An easy analogy will lead us therefore, retaining the same basis, to express the strong and soft breathing by the spiritus asper and lenis respectively, writing the strong χ' , θ' , the soft χ , θ . The basis itself having been used in the Greek alphabet originally for the strong sound, and this sound being by far the more frequent, the spiritus asper may be omitted.‡

* The modern Greek γ passes, at least before *e*, *i*, *u*, into the fricative sound.

† There can be no doubt, that neither did χ and θ originally signify the fricative sounds substituted in a later time, but the aspirates *k'* and *t'*. The epoch of the altered pronunciation of χ , θ , and ϕ , cannot be accurately defined, but has been probably contemporaneous with the alteration of γ and δ , whilst β seems to have approached *v* in still earlier times.

‡ There may certainly be inconsistency in our using the sign ' , which otherwise indicates an interruption of breath, to mark a soft spiration; but this is unavoidable, and of no great practical importance in this case.

We are thus enabled to give the following tableau of the European sounds:

Alphabet of the European Consonantal System.

	explosivæ or dividua.			fricativæ or continua.			ancipites.
	fort.	len.	nasal.	fort.	len.	semivoc.	
Gutturales	<i>k</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>ñ</i>	<i>x'</i> (<i>x</i>)	<i>h</i>	<i>x'</i> (<i>γ</i>)	<i>y</i> <i>r</i>
Dentales	<i>t</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>š</i> <i>ž</i> <i>s</i> <i>z</i> <i>θ'</i> (<i>θ</i>) <i>θ</i> (<i>δ</i>)			<i>r</i> <i>l</i>
Labiales	<i>p</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>w</i>	

Enlargement of the Alphabet by the Addition of the Foreign Sounds of Oriental Languages.

The Asiatic languages, especially the Indian and the Arabic, possess, besides the sounds hitherto considered, others, which hardly exist at all in European languages, or at least are only fully developed in Asiatic languages, and, therefore, can only find their proper position in a more comprehensive system. Instead of the three European classes, we must distinguish *seven*, which we shall now consider separately.

I. THE FAUCAL CLASS.

h.

We are accustomed to reckon *h* among the gutturals. It is easily observed, however, that we pronounce this sound behind the guttural point, immediately at the larynx. When pronounced so softly as to be vocalised, i. e. so as to imply a vowel sound produced in the larynx (as with *z*, *v*, *θ'*, *ž*) the friction ceases to be audible, and only the vowel element is heard. This vocalised consonantal breathing, is, therefore, not peculiarly marked in any language. *h* belongs, therefore, to the unvocalised strong fricatives.

Arabic ١, *Hebrew* א, *Sanscrit* अ, *Greek spiritus lenis*.

By closing the throat and then opening it to pronounce a vowel, we produce the slight explosive sound which in the Eastern languages is marked separately, but not in the European, except in the Greek. We perceive it distinctly between two vowels which following each other are pronounced separately, as in the Italian *sarà 'a casa*, the English *go 'over*, the German *See-ädler*; or even after consonants when trying to distinguish, in German, *mein 'Eid* (my oath) from *Meineid* (perjury), or *Fisch-ärt* (fish species) from *Fischart* (a name), &c. We indicate this sound, when necessary, by the mark ', like the Greeks.

Arabic ع, 'ain.

The soft sound, just described, can be pronounced hard by a stronger explosion at the same point of the throat. Thus arises the sound which the Arabs write ع. We find it expressed by scholars generally by placing a diacritical sign over the following vowels, *â, à, á, ä, å*; sometimes below, *ɑ*. This method would suppose, from the analogy of all systems of writing, that the ع were only an indication of a change in the vowel. It is, however, a full consonant, preceding the vowel. We indicate it, therefore, with regard to its affinity to the soft sound, by doubling the spiritus lenis, ʔ.

Arabic ح, h'a.

The fricative sound corresponding to ʔ is not the common *h*, but a stronger aspiration, which requires a greater contraction of the faucal point, and is distinguished by the Arabs from the simple *h*. It has, therefore, been often indicated by *hh*. We write *h'* corresponding with *χ', θ'*, and have a precedent in the writings of Feischer (1831), Ewald (1831), Vullers (1841).

The absence of any nasal sound in the faucal series is necessitated by the physiological position of the faucal point, the contraction of which closes at the same time the canal of the nose.

The faucal series is confined, therefore, to the following four sounds, thus represented:

ʔ, ', h', h.

II. THE GUTTURAL CLASS.

As we have already excluded the *h* from this class, on account of its being pronounced *behind* the proper guttural point, we must, to be accurate, exclude the *y* also, and put it in the next following class, this sound being formed in the mouth *before* the guttural point.

Again we are obliged to comprise a sound peculiar to the Semitic languages, —

The Arabic ع and Hebrew ע qof,

which is formed at the posterior soft part of the palate, although this class has its place of formation a little more forward, at the point where the *velum palati* joins the hard palate. We indicate this sound by the sign which the Greeks and Romans substituted for it, although it cannot be proved that they pronounced it exactly in the same manner, viz. *q*.

We obtain by this addition the following complete guttural series :

h q g; ħ; χ χ' (γ); ṣ

III. THE PALATAL CLASS.

We find in the Sanscrit a class of sounds placed between the gutturals and dentals by the Indian grammarians, who indicate as the place of their formation the hard palate (*tālu*).

The first two sounds of this class being explosive, are pronounced by the natives, according to all descriptions, like the English *ch* and *j* in *choice* and *join*, or like the Italian *c* and *g* in *cima* and *giro*. These English and Italian sounds are, as no one that hears or pronounces them will doubt, compound sounds, beginning with a dental or lingual *t* or *d*, and terminating with *ś* or *ž*. But in the sacred Devanagri writing of the Indians, simple signs only represented simple sounds; and their language itself leaves not the least doubt that the sounds *च त क* were really simple, not compound sounds. This is proved, for instance, by their not rendering the preceding

syllable long, and by the possibility of doubling them.* These sounds were consequently pronounced originally in another manner than now, viz. as *simple* sounds. Even though we are not now able to define these sounds more accurately, we ought undoubtedly to indicate them in Sanscrit by a peculiar sign. For this purpose, Bopp and his school have introduced the mark ' over the letter. This we retain, and place it over all guttural letters when their palatal value is to be indicated. Thus we get the series

k' g' n' x̣ x̣ (γ) y.

A farther consideration of this phenomenon will show that a transformation of former gutturals into sibilant dentals has occurred also in other languages. The Greek *κοιλόν*, i. e. *koilon*, became in the Latin language *cælum*, i. e. *holum*, and is sounded in the modern Italian *cielo*, i. e. *tšelo*; the Latin *caseus*, German *Käse*, has become, in English, *cheese*, i. e. *tšize*; the Hebrew *gamal* (the camel), and the Arabic *gemel*, became *gyemel*† or *dyemel*, afterwards *džemel*, at last even *žemel*. Such transitions in the history of languages never take place suddenly, but always gradually. It is a very common phenomenon that the explosive letters first produce the corresponding fricative sounds

* It is evident that in no language a compound sound can be doubled. If, resolving the English *riches* into its component sounds *ritšes*, one intended to double this sound, one could not write *richches*, i. e. *ritššes* (for that would sound as in *which child*), but would only repeat the first element and write *ritchches*, i. e. *ritššes*. Compare what is said below on the doubling of the aspirates.

† To *t* and *d* also, in many languages, a slight sound of *y* is added, without producing the impression of a compound letter. If in certain languages it should appear convenient not to designate this secondary sound as a complete consonant, it would be very appropriate to introduce, for the sounds *ty dy* (or rather *ty, dy*) the palatal line, and to write *t'* and *d'*, as *y* is indeed of a palatal nature, and communicates the same to the *t* and *d*. In some languages, as for instance the Slavonic and the Chinese, it might appear even desirable, from etymological or other linguistic reasons, to deviate, in certain cases of affrication and sibilation, from the general principle of using simple signs only for simple sounds, and to employ simple signs for such double and, as it were, diphthongic sounds. In these cases, it would seem to us more convenient, instead of introducing new bases like *c* and *j*, to retain the same bases, modifying them by adding behind the letter a diacritical sign, writing instead of *ky, gy, ty, dy, tš, dž, ts, ds*, the following: *k', g', t', d', tš', dž', ts', ds'*. In the Slavonic assimilated *r*, the *r* and *ž* are so completely mixed, that the sound can be rendered only *ž*.

behind them, and afterwards pass entirely into them, and that at the same time the gutturals advance constantly towards the anterior part of the mouth.

In passing from the guttural to the dental point two other points may be distinguished, and have been fixed by several languages, namely, the *palatal* point and the *lingual* point. The former is situated almost in the middle of the hard palate. A *k'* or *g'*, pronounced at this point by pressing the broad middle part of the tongue on the palate, will be easily distinguished from the deep gutturals *q*, *k*, or *g*. Such a palatal *k'* is as different from the guttural *k*, as the German *ch* in *ich** from the *ch* in *ach* or *Buch*, or as the common German *ch* in *Milch* from the Swiss *ch* in the same word.

In most languages *k* and *g*, before the vowels *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*, approach the palatal pronunciation, whilst before *a*, *o*, *u* they remain more guttural, owing to the formation of these vowels. In the Sanscrit the guttural and palatal pronunciation were distinguished before all vowels.†

The palatal sounds have, as their physiological formation will explain, the peculiarity of easily assuming a shade of *y*, which appears most distinctly in the palatal *n'* and *l'*.‡ This slight shade

* This sound offers great difficulty to the English and French, who in hearing and speaking mostly substitute *ä*. It can hardly be doubted that the palatal sibilant *श्र* in the Sanscrit, either is now (for the descriptions of English scholars are not very accurate), or at least was originally, no other than this sound. It is now generally written *s'*, and this sign would not offend against the system; yet, as at the palatal point, no sound can be formed that resembles a simple *s*, but only a sound similar to *χ* or *š*; it is more accurate to write *χ* (or *š*), which ought to be introduced. If any one should think the designation too far differing from the usual one, he might perhaps prefer to write *ś* or *ž*, which would at least render the actual pronunciation accurately enough. More on this in the larger volume.

† With regard to *χ'* (German *ch*) Germans do the same. They pronounce, for instance, the *ch* in all diminutives, even after *a*, *o*, and *u*, not guttural as in *Aachen*, *ranchen*, *Kuchen*, but palatal, as in *Mamachen*, *Frauchen*, *Uhuchen* from *Mama*, *Frau*, *Uhu*. The guttural *ch* is pronounced after all vowels in Southern Germany.

‡ If, for instance, we pronounce the *n* and *l* in *ano*, *fulé*, so as to press the broad middle of the tongue upon the high middle part of the hard palate, we shall no longer hear the French words *anneau*, and *foulé*, but something very like *agneau* and *fouillé*, with this difference only, that in the modern French pronunciation

which at first accompanies the palatal sound so closely that a fine ear perceives it as well before as after the moment of closing the organ in uttering the explosive sounds, increases afterwards easily, so as to become independent, and to grow into a full subsequent *y*, next into a *χ'*, finally into a *ṣ*. Thus arises a series of compound sounds, which, from the palatal *k'* through *ky*, *k'χ'*, *tχ'*, *tṣ*, frequently pass into a simple *ṣ*, or even *s*.

In those languages in which, as in Sanscrit, the pure and simple palatal is found distinct from the gutturals, or in which the friction connected with the palatals appears to be so inherent that in the organic construction of the language it may be considered as still forming a simple sound, it seems advisable also to retain the simple signs of *k'*, *g'*, *n'*. But when the compound sound is manifestly marked in pronunciation, every consistent transcription ought undoubtedly to represent it by two signs. Of the peculiar case, when in a foreign alphabet these sounds are represented as simple from their being originally such, but which are now pronounced as compound, we shall have to treat below.

The series of pure palatal sounds will therefore be as follows:

k' g' n' ; ṡ χ (γ) ; y

It is to be observed only that *ṡ* and the semivowel *y* are so near to each other that the *ṡ* will hardly appear in any language as a peculiar sound by the side of *y*. It is self-evident that *y* need not assume the palatal mark, as there is no corresponding guttural sound.

IV. THE CEREBRAL CLASS.

This class, almost exclusively peculiar to the Indian languages, is formed by bringing the tip of the tongue backwards and upwards to the neighbourhood of the palatal point, so as to produce there the explosion or friction. For our ear, these sounds are nearest to the dentals. We retain for them also the diacritical sign introduced by Bopp and his school, viz. the dot under the letter, and write this Indian series

ṭ ḍ ṇ ; ṣ̣ ; ṛ̣.

we do not raise the tongue quite up to the palate, but only bring it near it, so that the sound is more and more dissolved in *y*, *ayean*, *fouyé*.

V. THE LINGUAL CLASS.

belongs as exclusively to the Arabic and cognate languages. In its formation, the breadth of the tongue either touches or approaches the whole anterior space of the hard palate as far as the teeth, its tip being turned below. It is consequently entirely different from the Indian *cerebrals*, although these, too, are frequently called *linguals*. It appears, therefore, suitable to confine this latter denomination to the Arabic sounds, and to retain the former for the Indian.*

The graphic representation hitherto adopted by Robinson, Caspari, Davids, and others, is a dot under the dentals, like that of the cerebrals. We have chosen instead of the dot, after the precedent of Volney, a small line, which conveniently indicates the broad position of the tongue of the Arabic linguals, in contradistinction from the cerebral formation, and yet is little different from the dot hitherto used. The Arabs have developed only four letters of this class, namely,

ث. د; س, ز.

VI. THE DENTAL CLASS.

exists complete in the European languages, and has been discussed above.

The essential distinction of the three fricative formations *š*, *s* and *θ*, together with the corresponding soft sounds *ž*, *z* and *θ'*, from the guttural and palatal *χ* and *χ'*, consists in the friction of the breath being formed and heard at the *teeth*. Modifications of this dental friction arise from the greater or smaller hollow space which the tongue leaves behind the teeth. When the tip of the tongue is placed at the very point of the friction, *θ* is pronounced; if it is laid against the lower teeth, whilst the upper side of the tongue is brought back behind the upper teeth, we have *s*; when the tongue recedes still farther, so that behind the upper and lower teeth a greater hollow space remains, this enlarged resounding space produces the sound *š*. It would be possible to bring the posterior termination of the resounding space still farther back as far as to the palatal, or even to

* *Cerebral* was the original English denomination, which arose indeed from a false translation of the Indian name *murdanya*, i. e. letters of the *dome* of the palate, but has not yet been supplied by a more appropriate one.

the guttural point; the cavity also of the canal of the mouth can be prolonged by means of the lips. This, however, produces no essentially distinct impression upon our ear, for which the purely dental element of the sound, i. e. the friction at the teeth, prevails decidedly.* The Indian cerebral $\tilde{s}$, however, receives from the peculiar flexion of the tongue, which produces a double cavity in the mouth, a somewhat different expression, indicated by the cerebral point.

The dental series remains, therefore, the same as above,

$t, d, n; \tilde{s}, z; s, z; \theta, \theta'(\delta); r, l$

VII. THE LABIAL CLASS.

is also known from European languages, and has been developed above,

$p, b, m; f, v; w$.

If we now comprise the seven classes in a general tableau, we obtain the following arrangement:

The Consonants of the general Alphabet.

	<i>explosive or dividue.</i>			<i>fricative or continue.</i>			<i>ancipites.</i>	
	<i>fortis.</i>	<i>lenis.</i>	<i>nasalis.</i>	<i>fortis.</i>	<i>lenis.</i>	<i>semivoc.</i>		
I. <i>Faucales.</i>	3	'	—	k' h	—	—	—	—
II. <i>Gutturales.</i>	k ^q	g	n	χ'	χ'(γ)	—	ṛ	—
III. <i>Palatales.</i>	k'	g'	n'	χ'	[χ'']	y	—	ṛ
IV. <i>Cerebrales.</i> (Indicæ)	t	d	n	ṣ	[ṣ']	—	r	l
V. <i>Linguales.</i> (Arabice)	t	d	[n]	s	z	—	—	—
VI. <i>Dentales.</i>	t	d	n	ṣ	ṣ	—	r	l
				s	z			
VII. <i>Labiales.</i>				θ	θ'(δ)	—	—	—
				f	v			

* The distinction of a double $\tilde{s}$ exists, as far as we know, in Slavonic languages alone; there the formation next to the teeth (Pol. s) may be marked as lingual, by placing the line under the letter $\tilde{s}$.

Examples of the Pronunciation of these Sounds in an Alphabetic Series.

We arrange these examples in an order which, in vocabularies of foreign languages, especially such as are rich in sounds, offers decided advantages over the usual one, viz. according to the *organs*. The Semitic alphabet, from which our common order is derived, had originally itself an organic arrangement, which in course of time has been almost obliterated.* At present the order of our alphabet appears utterly confused, and it seems as little justifiable, as it is inconvenient, to force the same confusion, or even a greater one, upon all those new discovered languages which are to be presented with the art of writing. The inconvenience will be at once felt, when a vocabulary is to be formed, especially with regard to the new signs ' ; χ and θ .

Our alphabetic tableau shows at first sight that an *organic* arrangement can be attained in a double manner, viz. by following either the *vertical* columns (as the Semitic and the oldest Sanscrit alphabets did essentially) or the *horizontal* ones, like the Devanagari. We should prefer the latter one, if it did not labour under the disadvantage of separating from each other those letters which in the different classes have the same bases. By following the vertical columns, we keep all those letters together, so that, without great inconvenience, the diacritical signs might even be entirely neglected in the alphabetical arrangement. Only χ and χ' , θ and θ' would be separated, if it should not be preferred to write γ and δ . In books, however, which are only destined for the European science, and in which few new characters or diacritical signs are to be employed, it is preferable not to alter the usual order of letters.

VOWELS.		$\ddot{e}$	g. <i>recht</i> , wenn.
$\bar{a}$	germ. <i>Vater</i> , fr. <i>dme</i> , ital. <i>caro</i> .	$\acute{e}$	engl. <i>vein</i> , fr. <i>donné</i> , g. <i>weh</i> , ital. <i>rè</i> .
$\bar{a}$	g. <i>Mann</i> , ital. <i>ballo</i> .	$\grave{e}$	engl. <i>men</i> .
$\bar{e}$	fr. <i>mère</i> , g. <i>Bär</i> .	$\grave{i}$	engl. <i>see</i> , g. <i>mir</i> , fr. <i>lit</i> .
$\bar{e}$	engl. <i>fat</i> , <i>man</i> .	$\grave{u}$	engl. <i>sin</i> , g. <i>mich</i> , fr. <i>fil</i> .
$\bar{e}$	ital. <i>scema</i> .	$\grave{o}$	engl. <i>all</i> , ital. <i>però</i> .
		$\grave{u}$	engl. <i>hot</i> , <i>not</i> .

* See the author's Essay: Ueber die Anordnung und Verwandtschaft des Semitischen, Indischen, Aethiopischen, Alt-Persischen und Alt-Aegyptischen Alphabets. Berlin, 1836-8.

ō	lat. <i>non</i> .	d	sanscr. ढ.
ö	g. <i>von</i> .	ḍ	arab. ض (dā).
ō	engl. <i>no</i> , g. <i>Ton</i> , fr. <i>faux</i> .	d	engl. <i>dear</i> , g. <i>der</i> .
ō	lat. <i>coma</i> .	b	engl. <i>by</i> , g. <i>bei</i> .
ū	g. <i>Ruhe</i> , engl. <i>rule</i> , fr. <i>nous</i> .	n̄	engl. <i>singing</i> , g. <i>enge</i> .
ū	engl. <i>foot</i> , fr. <i>ours</i> , g. <i>Null</i> .	n'	sanscr. न̄ ital. <i>gnudo</i> .
q̄	fr. <i>beurre</i> , cœur.	n	sanscr. न.
ō	engl. <i>but</i> , current.	n	engl. <i>no</i> , g. <i>nein</i> .
ō	g. <i>können</i> .	m	engl. <i>me</i> .
ō	g. <i>König</i> , fr. <i>feu</i> .	h'	arab. ح (h'a).
ū	fr. <i>fûmes</i> , g. <i>Güte</i> .	h	engl. <i>hand</i> .
ū	fr. <i>but</i> , g. <i>würdig</i> .	x	g. <i>Buch</i> , ach; pol. <i>chata</i> ; dutch, <i>goe</i> .
ai	engl. <i>mine</i> , g. <i>Kaiser</i> .	x'	sanscr. ख, g. <i>ich</i> , <i>recht</i> .
au	engl. <i>house</i> , g. <i>Haus</i> .	š	sanscr. ष.
ay	g. <i>Häuser</i> , <i>heute</i> .	š	pol. <i>swit</i> .
ei	span. <i>reina</i> .	s	arab. ص (sād).
ou	gr. ion. ωύρός, old germ. <i>boum</i> .	s̄	engl. <i>show</i> , fr. <i>chat</i> , g. <i>schon</i> .
oi	engl. <i>join</i> .	s	engl. <i>sense</i> , fr. <i>savoir</i> , g. <i>Ast</i> .
ā	fr. <i>an</i> , <i>en</i> .	θ (θ')	engl. <i>thin</i> , mod. gr. <i>θεός</i> .
ē	fr. <i>examen</i> , <i>Inde</i> .	f	engl. <i>fine</i> , g. <i>fein</i> .
ō	fr. <i>on</i> .	χ' (γ)	arab. ع (χaīn), mod. gr. <i>γέφυρα</i> .
ō	fr. <i>un</i> .	ž	pol. <i>pozno</i> .
ε	engl. <i>nation</i> , g. <i>Verstand</i> .	z	arab. ز (za).
ṛ	sanscr. र.	z	fr. <i>jeune</i> , pol. <i>bazant</i> .
ḷ	sanscr. ल.	z	fr. <i>zèle</i> , engl. <i>zeal</i> .
z	chin. mandar. <i>tsz</i> . 4	θ' (ð)	engl. <i>thy</i> , mod. gr. <i>δύσα</i> .
CONSONANTS.			
z	arab. ز (zain).	y	engl. <i>year</i> , fr. <i>Bayonne</i> , g. <i>ja</i> .
q	arab. ق (qaf).	w	engl. <i>we</i> .
k	g. <i>Kunst</i> , fr. <i>cause</i> .	r	g. <i>stark</i> , fr. dial. <i>grasseyer</i> .
k'	sanscr. क.	r	sanscr. र.
t	sanscr. ट.	r	ital. <i>rabbia</i> .
t	arab. ت (tā).	r'	gr. <i>ράβδος</i> .
t	engl. <i>town</i> , g. <i>Tag</i> .	l'	ital. <i>gli</i> .
p	engl. <i>pine</i> , g. <i>Pein</i> .	l'	welsh, <i>ll</i> .
'	arab. ا, hebr. א ('alef), gr. spir. len. '.	l	sanscr. ल.
g	fr. <i>gauche</i> , g. <i>Gold</i> .	l	eng. <i>low</i> .
g'	sanscr. ज, arab. <i>g'emel</i> .		

On the Aspirates and Consonantic Diphthongs.

Aspirates are those *explosive* sounds which are pronounced with a simple but audible breath. This class has been most fully developed in the Sanscrit, where the *fortes* as well as the *lenes* of all classes can be aspirated in this manner. In the ancient Greek only the *fortes* admitted of the aspiration, and these afterwards passed into the corresponding fricatives. The aspiration can only follow the explosion, not accompany it throughout, as it does the friction of the fricatives. Thus, a real composition takes place.* If, notwithstanding this, the aspirates are represented in the Sanscrit as simple letters, this is to be explained by the circumstance, that the spiritus unites itself more closely with the explosive letters than any other consonant, and is of so little weight, that it does not make the preceding syllable long, and is, properly speaking, no more than an increase of the breath necessarily inherent in every consonant. It is optional, therefore, whether we will regard the aspirates as simple consonants, or as compositions with *h*. In this case, we think it proper to follow the system of the different nations, retaining, for instance, in the Indian aspirates, the simple bases, with the additions of the diacritical spiritus asper, and writing *k' k' t' p' g' d' b'*, whilst in the Hindoostanee, where the aspiration is treated as a new and independent element, we shall write *kh, k'h*.

We call those combinations of consonants *consonantic diphthongs* in which an explosive sound is combined with the correspondent fricative, as in *kx, k'x', tš, dž, ts, dz, pf*, and others. The history of languages shows that these sounds are particularly easy of formation, and arise frequently out of the simple sounds by a subsequent friction. This etymology is the reason why they are often represented by simple signs, as the Italian *c* and *g* for *tš, dž*; the German *z* for *ts*; Greek *ζ* for *dz*. Our principles, however, will oblige us to resolve all such diphthongs into their simple elements, wherever the real pronunciation, not the etymological origin, is to be indicated. As for

* The best linguistic proof is, that no aspirate can be doubled; when a duplication is intended, the unaspirated sound is placed before the aspirate. From *ak'a* arises by reduplication not *akk'a*, but *akh'a*.

double consonants, it will readily be granted, that they ought not to be written, even after a short accentuated vowel, except in those cases where either the duplication (from the prolongation of the friction or of the moment of touching) is distinctly heard, as in the Arabic or Italian, or the double letter is justified etymologically, as originating in the assimilation of different consonants, or wherever nothing is intended, but a transcription of a foreign orthography, which makes use of double letters.

On the Application of the General Alphabet to the Alphabets of particular Languages.

It has been remarked above, that the general alphabet, when applied to particular languages, must be capable as well of simplification as of enlargement. All particular diacritical marks are unnecessary in those languages where none of those bases has a double meaning; and we write simply χ , $\mathfrak{z}$, ϵ , o . Where two sounds belong to the same basis, one only of the signs is wanted; and we may write χ and χ' , θ and θ' , ϵ and ϵ , $\bar{o}$ and o , $\underline{o}$ and $\ddot{o}$. Where, however, the intermediate or indifferent sound exists between the two contrasted sounds, both the diacritical signs are indispensable.* They are required also, when two or more languages are to be compared with each other, in which the indifferent or imperfectly known sound of the one is placed by the side of the developed contrast in the other.† Again, the same diacritical marks may be used in connection with other than the above-mentioned letters, whenever in particular languages such variations appear.

If further essential differences should be shown, which are not yet represented in the general alphabet, and cannot be expressed analogically, nothing will prevent the selection, or, if necessary, invention of other new diacritical signs, without deviating from the principles above developed.

* In the German (compare Grimm, Gramm. i. pp. 78, 79.) the contrast is developed only in the long $\bar{e}$ and $\bar{e}$ and the long $\bar{o}$ and $\bar{o}$, to which a short ϵ and δ correspond. In most languages the short vowels are not so accurately differenced as the long ones; this is the reason why the former were not indicated at all in the most ancient languages.

† For instance, when the Latin, or Greek, or Gothic e and o is to be compared with the French $\bar{e}$ and $\bar{e}$, the Italian $\bar{o}$ and o .

Among these latter cases we may reckon, for instance, the *clicks* of the southernmost African languages, which are formed, not by throwing out the breath, but by drawing it inward. We often produce the same clicks by the same movements of the tongue, but do not use them as articulate elements of speech.

In the Hottentot language there are four clicks, in the *Zulu* and other languages of the great African branch only three. When isolated, these sounds are not difficult to pronounce.

The first, which had been written hitherto *q*, is made by pressing the tongue closely upon the middle palate and withdrawing it suddenly, and from the place of its formation is to be reckoned among the *cerebrals*. The second (found principally in the Hottentot, but, according to Boyce*, also in some words of the Kaffir language), arises from placing the breadth of the tongue in the *palatal* position, and withdrawing it with a suction. The third, generally written *c*, is in the same manner *dental*, as only the tip of the tongue smacks against the upper teeth. The fourth is formed at the side of the tongue, by drawing in the air towards the middle of the mouth from the right or left side. It has been called *lateral*, therefore, and generally rendered by *x*.

The pronunciation of these sounds becomes difficult only when they are connected with other sounds. Whilst the anterior part of the tongue is smacking, the throat can open itself for a *g* or *ñ*, so that these latter sounds are pronounced almost at the same time with the click, or immediately after it.† It is incorrect to write the gutturals *before* the clicks, as they can never be pronounced before them.

At the same time, the choice of *c*, *q*, and *x*, as signs of clicks, appears to be inconvenient, since they are taken from the European alphabets, in which they express well known sounds, not bearing any relation to the clicks. Essential to the latter is the peculiarity of stopping in

* Grammar of the Kaffir Language, p. 4. He writes it *qc*. I myself heard it pronounced by Zulu Kaffirs.

† Boyce distinguishes only two accompanying gutturals, which he writes *g* and *ñ*; Appleyard and Gront mention three, *g* and two nasals, *ɲ* and *ng* (*ñ*). The author himself could only distinguish two gutturals, *g* and *ñ*, as connected with clicks by the Zulu Kaffirs, who in the beginning of 1854, sojourned for some time in Berlin.

part, and even drawing back the breath, which appears to be most easily expressed by a simple bar |. If we connect with this our common marks for the cerebral or the palatal, a peculiar notation is wanted only for the *lateral*, which is the strongest sound. We express it by two bars ||. As the gutturals evidently do not unite with the clicks into one sound*, but form a compound sound, we make them simply to follow, as with the diphthongs. Thus we get the tableau :

Palatals	(qç)		—	—
Cerebrals	(q)	!	g	ñ
Dentals	(c)		g	ñ
Laterals	(x)		g	ñ

The difficulty of transcription is greatest in those systems of writing which, originating in an earlier period of the language, and fully developed, have been retained unaltered, whilst the pronunciation has undergone a change, as also in those in which several reformations have left their traces. An instance of this kind has already been mentioned in speaking of the Sanscrit palatals. The differences of European orthography have mostly arisen from similar circumstances. Some such difficulties, however, are presented by almost all existing alphabets which are not of modern formation. As the object of a standard transcription is to avoid, as much as possible, all such incongruity of sound and sign, no other course remains open in such cases than to fix upon a distinct period of the language in question, and to adapt its transcription to the different purposes of rendering either the *actual* pronunciation, or the *ancient* one which had been expressed by the alphabet, and which may be deduced from it by linguistic researches. The difference is generally found to be greater in the vowels than in the consonants, the former being, in all languages, the more changeable element.

The *Arabs* write only three vowels, but pronounce these three letters very differently, according to distinct rules: in a like manner,

* We cannot, therefore, assent to Grout, who, instead of the former notation, proposes the following :

q̃	,	q̇	,	q̄	,	q̈
c	,	ċ	,	c̄	,	c̈
x	,	ẋ	,	x̄	,	ẍ

a certain number of consonants have a different pronunciation in different dialects, although in literature they are expressed by means of one and the same written letter. Eli Smith and Robinson (in the work on Palestine) propose to render the actual pronunciation in the country, and their endeavours are to be highly prized*; but the linguistic scholar will prefer to follow the written system fixed by literature, and to neglect the varying deviations and shades of modern pronunciation. The *Armenian* alphabet has also undergone peculiar alterations of pronunciation, which may be historically proved.† The greatest difficulties, however, are met with in transcribing the *Hebrew* system of punctuation, which, having only in after times been grafted upon the alphabet inherited from former ages, appears to be inconsistent in itself. The labours of modern scholars, in elucidating the historical development of these signs, and comparing it with the traditional and actual pronunciation of the Jews, have not yet led to results on which a complete and well-founded system of transcription might be based.

In conclusion, we present the reader with a number of alphabets transcribed after our own system. We are aware that in many instances further researches must correct and complete our labours. We have followed the best and latest investigations to which we had access in each individual language. The attempt is intended to show the easy applicability of our alphabet to the most different languages; and to induce scholars to follow in the same way, and eventually to correct and improve the details.

* Compare also the excellent essay of *Lane* on the modern pronunciation of the Arabic vowel, inserted in the publications of the German Oriental Society.

† See Petermann, *Grammatica Armenica*.

HIEROGLYPHIC.

LEPSIUS.

(ε)

		h			
a	k - -	χ			
i u	t - n	s l			
p b m	f				

COPTIC.

LEPSIUS.

(ε)	h			—\	Ϸ		
a	h g (ñ)	χ	[k']	Δ	κ γ (π)	Ϸ	(χ)
e ē o ð	k' g' (n')	š (y)		ερ οω	σ χ (π)	Ϸ (ι)	
i	u t [d]	n s rl	[f]	ι, ϣ οϣ	τ [Δ] π c	p λ	(θ)
	p b m	f (w)	[p']		π ϩ ρ ϣ	(οϣ)	(φ)
ai au ei oi				ΔΙ ΔΥ ΕΙ ΟΙ			
	hs ps	[dz]			Ξ Ψ	(ζ)	

ETHIOPIC. (*Ge'ez*).

LEPSIUS.

ε	;	' -	h' h			
α ā	k g -	χ -	y	k'		
ē o ō		š -				
ii uū	t d n	s z	r l	č'		
	p b m	f -	w	p'		
	ts	ts'				

T. LUDOLPH, Gram. Æthiopica.
Frankf. a. M. 1702.

ε	 -	h h			
α α	k g -	h -	y	k'	
e o		s -			
ii uu	t d n	s z	r l	č'	
	p b m	f -	w	p'	
	ts	tz'			

HEBREW.

With Points.

LEPSIUS.

ε	;	h				ע	מ	ה
a ā	q	χ χ'				פ	ח	נ
e ē	o ō	k g -	χ' -	y	ע	א	ב	כ
	z	z -			(ע)	ט	ש	-
i ī	u ū	t d n	s -	r l	י	ד	ת	ס (ש)
		θ θ'			(י)		ת	ד
	p b m	f v	w			פ	מ	ב
ε								
a a								
	o ō							
e ē								
i ī	u ū							

LEPSIUS.				ARABIC.			
<i>a ā</i>	<i>ɜ' -</i>	<i>h' h</i>		ا ا	ع -	ح	س
<i>i i a ū</i>	<i>q</i>			و -	ق		
	<i>kg -</i>	<i>χ χ' y</i>		ي -	ج -	خ	ی
<i>a i u u</i>	<i>t d -</i>	<i>s z</i>		و -	ض ط	ظ ص	
		<i>š</i>				ش -	
	<i>tdn</i>	<i>sz</i>	<i>rl</i>		ن د ت	ز س	در
		<i>θ θ'</i>				ذ ث	
<i>- b m</i>	<i>f -</i>				م ب -	ف -	و

ELI SMITH, on the Pronunciation of the Arabic, in Robinson's Palestine, vol. iii. Pt. II. pp. 832. sqq. (German edition, Halle, 1842.)

<i>a ā</i>	<i>ɜ' -</i>	<i>h' h</i>	
	<i>kg</i>		<i>y</i>
<i>i t u ū</i>	<i>h g, j -</i>	<i>hh gh</i>	
<i>ai au</i>	<i>t d, dh -</i>	<i>s z, dh, d</i>	
		<i>sh -</i>	
	<i>t d n</i>	<i>sz</i>	<i>rl</i>
		<i>th, t, s</i>	<i>dh, d, z</i>
<i>- b m</i>	<i>f</i>		<i>w</i>

ARABIC, according to actual pronunciation.

LEPSIUS.				ELI SMITH.			
<i>ɜ</i>	<i>ɜ' -</i>	<i>h' h</i>		<i>ū</i>	<i>ɜ' -</i>	<i>h' h</i>	
<i>a ā</i>	<i>q</i>			<i>a d</i>	<i>h</i>		
<i>e ē o o ō</i>	<i>kg -</i>	<i>χ' χ'</i>		<i>ei ō o ō</i>	<i>kg -</i>	<i>hh gh</i>	
<i>i i u u ū</i>	<i>h g' -</i>	- -	<i>y</i>	<i>i t y u ū (ch) j -</i>	- -	- -	<i>y</i>
<i>ai āi au</i>	<i>t d -</i>	<i>s z</i>		<i>ai āi au</i>	<i>t d -</i>	<i>s z</i>	
		<i>š</i>				<i>sh -</i>	
	<i>tdn</i>	<i>sz</i>	<i>rl</i>		<i>tdn</i>	<i>sz</i>	<i>rl</i>
		<i>θ θ'</i>				<i>th dh</i>	
<i>- b m</i>	<i>f -</i>	<i>w</i>		<i>- b m</i>	<i>f -</i>	<i>w</i>	

PERSIAN.

FLEISCHER, in his German edition of
the Persian Grammar of Mirza Mo-
hammed Ibrahim. Leipzig. 1847.

LEPSIUS.							
<i>a ā</i>	<i>ǰ</i> -	<i>h' h</i>		<i>a d</i>	' -	<i>h' h</i>	
<i>i ī u ū</i>	<i>q</i>			<i>i t u ū</i>	<i>h</i>		
	<i>h g</i> -	<i>χ χ'</i>	<i>y</i>		<i>h g</i> -	<i>h' g'</i>	<i>j</i>
<i>ai au āi ūi</i>	<i>t d</i> -	<i>z z'</i>		<i>ai au di ūi</i>	<i>t z</i> -	<i>s z</i>	
		<i>š ž</i>				<i>š ž</i>	
	<i>t d n</i>	<i>s z</i>	<i>r l</i>		<i>t d n</i>	<i>s z</i>	<i>r l</i>
		<i>θ θ'</i>				<i>s z</i>	
	<i>p b m</i>	<i>f</i> -	<i>w</i>		<i>p b m</i>	<i>f</i> -	<i>w</i>
	<i>tš dž</i>				<i>c' g'</i>		

SANSKRIT.

LEPSIUS.

a ā
i ī u ū
ṛ ṝ ḷ ḹ ā ā̄ ī ī̄, etc.
ai (ē) āi au (ō) āu aṛ aṝ

	<i>h :</i>		
<i>h g n</i>	ॠ		<i>h' g'</i>
<i>k' g' n'</i>	ॡ (ॢ)	<i>y</i>	<i>k' g'</i>
<i>t d n</i>	ॣ	<i>r ḷ</i>	<i>t' d'</i>
<i>t d n</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>t' d'</i>
<i>p b m</i>	॥	<i>v</i>	<i>p' b'</i>

अ आ
 इ ई उ ऊ
 ए ऐ ओ औ अं इ̣ etc.
 ए ऐ ओ औ अर् आर्

	<i>h :</i>		
क ग ङ	ॠ		ख घ
च ज ञ	ॡ	<i>y</i>	झ ण
ट ड ण	ॣ	<i>r</i>	ठ ड
त द न	॥	खळ	थ ध
प ब म	॥	व	फ भ

SANSKRIT, HINDI, MARATHI, AND BENGALI.

BOPP, Vergleichende Grammatik.
Berlin. 1833.

a ā
i ī u ū
ṛ ṝ ... an ān in, etc.
ē di ō du ar dr

	<i>h h'</i>		
<i>h g n</i>	...		<i>k' g'</i>
<i>c' g' n</i>	<i>s'</i>	<i>y</i>	<i>c' g'</i>
<i>t d n</i>	<i>s'</i>	<i>r ...</i>	<i>t' d'</i>
<i>t d n</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>t' d'</i>
<i>p b m</i>	...	<i>v</i>	<i>p' b'</i>

According to a communication
of H. H. WILSON. 1854.

a ā
i ī u ū
ṛi ṛī ... an̄ in̄, etc.
e ai o au

	<i>h h'</i>		
<i>h g n</i>	...		<i>kh gh</i>
<i>ch j n</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>y</i>	<i>chh jh</i>
<i>t d n</i>	<i>sh</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>th dh</i>
<i>t d n</i>	<i>s</i>	<i>l</i>	<i>th dh</i>
<i>p b m</i>	-	<i>v</i>	<i>ph bh</i>

ZEND.

LEPSIUS.

ε	q' -	h	ξ	ϕ	ω
u ā	h g n̄	χ χ'	ω ω	ϑ ρ ς	ω ρ
e ē o ō	k' g' n'	χ' - y	ξ ρ	ϑ ρ	ω - ρ
i ī u ū	t d -	s z	ι ρ	ϑ ρ	ω ϑ
ā etc.		š ž	κ κ		ω ω
ai au	t d n	s z r	ω ω	ρ ρ	ω ρ
		θ θ'			ω ρ
	p b m	f v w		ω ρ	ω ρ

E. BURNOUR, Commentaire sur le
Yaçna. 1893.

BOPP, Vergleichende Grammatik.
Berlin, 1893.

e	q g -	h	ē	kh ...	h -
a d	k g ng	kh gh	a d	k g n	- gh
ē ē o ō	tch d'j ng	y - y	e ē o ō	c' g' -	y - y
i t u ū	t t -	sh j	i t u ū	t - -	- sh
ā ñ		ch s	an n		s s
ē do	t d n	ç z r	ē do	t d n	s z r
		th dh			t dh
	p b m	f w v		p b m	f w v
hm					

ARMENIAN. According to the ancient pronunciation.

LEPSIUS.

e		h				l		ſ j		
a	k g -	χ χ'		k'		u	q l -	tu ʔ		ʔ
e ē o ō	k' g' -			k'	h ʔ n o					
		š ž y						z ʔ h		
i	u t d -			t'	h	l q u				
	t d n	s z	r r' l	t'			u	q	r n l	ʔ
	p b m	f -	w	p'			ʔ u ʔ	ʔ l	q	ʔ

PETERMANN, Grammat. linguæ Armenicæ. Berolini, 1837.

e		h			
a	g h -	ch g'		k'	
é é ő ő	g' c' -			j	
		š j	j		
i	u d t -			z	
	d t n	s z	r r' l	t'	
	b p m	f -	w	p'	

ARMENIAN. According to the actual pronunciation.

e		h' h				e		k' h		
a	k g -	χ χ'	y	k'		a	k g -	ch g'	j	k'
e ē o ō		š ž				é é ő ő		š j.		
i	u u t d n	s z	r r' l	t'		i ü u t d n	s z	r r' l	t'	
ai au	p b m	f v	w	p'		ai au	p b m	f v	w	p'
		tš tš dz ts ts dz						č' g' j' t d z		

CHINESE.

According to an oral communication of the Missionaries, Rev.
THOMAS M'CLATCHIE and Rev. FREDERICK GOUGH.

ε				k' h		
a	k	g	n	χ -		k'
e o	k'	g'	n'	χ' -	y	k'
e o o	ł (tš)	d (dž)	-	š ž		ł (tš)
i u u	ł (tš)	d (dž)	-			ł (tš)
				s z	l	
ñ m r z	t	d	n			t'
ai ei au eu	p	b	m	f v	w	p'
ã ē ī ũ ñ						

an en in on un on (or an, en, etc.) (For the representation of the compound sounds
š, dž, etc., by simple letters, see above p. 414.)

ENDLICHER, Anfangsgründe der Chinesischen Grammatik.
Wien, 1845.

e			k h		
a	k k	'			k'
ē o	c' c'	'n	g' -	y, i	c"
i u	tc' tc'	-	sh sh		tc"
ai ei ao eu	ts ts	-			ts'
			ss s	l	
an en, etc.	t t	n			t'
ang eng, etc.	p p	m	f f	w, u	p'

III.

MAX MÜLLER'S

PROPOSALS FOR A MISSIONARY ALPHABET.

THE want of a standard system of orthography has been experienced by all persons engaged in the study of languages, written or unwritten. The philologist, the historian, the geographer, and more than all the missionary,—he whose message of good tidings is to all nations,—are harassed in their labours by the diversity of alphabets; and the difficulties hence arising may be judged second only to those caused by the diversity of language:—that main barrier, we may confess with Humboldt and with St. Augustine, against the establishment of the Civitas Dei, and the realisation of the idea of Humanity.

Whatever may be thought of the practicability of finally supplanting all existing alphabets by one uniform system of notation, it is at least our duty, and for the members and directors of Missionary Societies a sacred duty, not to increase the existing diversity, but to do all in our power towards preparing the way for the accomplishment of that highest, though as yet indefinite, aim of society towards which Christianity has from the first been striving.

For the practical solution of the problem, "*How to establish one uniform system of notation which shall be acceptable to the scholar, convenient to the missionary, and easy for the printer,*" we must consider three points:—

I. *Which are the principal sounds that can be formed with our organs of speech, and therefore may be expected to occur in any of the dead or living dialects of mankind?*

This is a physiological question.

II. *How can these principal sounds, after proper classification, be expressed by us in writing and printing so as to preserve their physiological value, without creating new typographical difficulties?*

This is a practical question.

III. *How can this physiological alphabet be applied to existing languages, and*

a. *to unwritten dialects;*

This depends on a good ear.

b. *to written dialects;*

This depends on philological research.

Coroll. III. a. In the application of the physiological alphabet to languages not yet fixed by writing, the missionary should be guided entirely by ear, without paying any regard to etymological considerations, which are too apt to mislead even the most accomplished scholar.

III. b. In transcribing languages possessed of an historical orthography, and where, for reasons best known to the archæologist, one sign may represent different sounds, and one sound be expressed by different signs, new and entirely distinct questions are involved, such as must be solved by archæological and philological research. We shall, therefore, discuss this part (III. b.) separately, and distinguish it by the name of "Transliteration," from the usual method of "transcribing" as applied to unwritten tongues.

I.

Which are the principal Sounds that can be formed with our Organs of Speech, and therefore may be expected to occur in any of the dead or living Dialects of Mankind?

On the first point, which must form the basis of the whole, we have the immense advantage that all scholars who have written on it have

arrived at results almost identically the same.* We are here still in the sphere of physical science, where facts are arranged by observation, and observation may be checked by facts so as to exclude individual impressions and national prejudice. The classification of vowels and consonants proposed by modern physiologists is, so far as general principles are concerned, exactly the same as the one contained in Sanskrit grammars composed in the fifth century before Christ, and appended to the different collections of the sacred writings of the Brahmans, — the four Vedas. These grammatical treatises, called “*Prātisākhyas*,” exist in manuscript only, and have not hitherto been published. The classification established by physiologists, as the result of independent research, would receive the most striking confirmation by a translation of these writings, now more than two thousand years old. But, on their own account also, these phonetic treatises deserve to be published. Their observations are derived from a language (the Vaidik Sanskrit) which at that time was studied by means of oral tradition only, and where, in the absence of a written alphabet, the most minute differences of pronunciation had to be watched by the ear, and to be explained and described to the pupil. The language itself, the Sanskrit of that early period, had suffered less from the influence of phonetic corruption than any tongue from which we can derive our observations; nay, the science of phonetics (*Sikshā*), essential to the young theological student (who was not allowed to learn the Veda from MSS.), had been reduced to a more perfect system in the schools of the Brahmans, in the fifth

* In a very able article by Professor Heise, in *Hoefer's Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft der Sprache*, iv. 1. 1853, the following authorities are quoted:—

Chladni, *Über die Hervorbringung der Menschlichen Sprachlaute*, in *Gilbert's Annalen der Physik*. vol. lxxvi. 1824.

A. J. Ribbeck, *Über die Bildung der Sprachlaute*. Berlin, 1848.

K. M. Rapp, *Versuch einer Physiologie der Sprache*. Stuttgart, 1836.

H. E. Bindseil, *Abhandlungen zur Allgemeinen Vergleichenden Sprachlehre*. Hamburg, 1838.

J. Müller, *Elements of Physiology*. London, 1842. vol. ii. p. 1044.

W. Holder, *Elements of Speech: an Essay of Inquiry into the natural Production of Letters*. London, 1669.—This is one of the earliest and best works on the subject.

An excellent account of the researches of the most distinguished physiologists on the human voice, and the formation of letters, is found in Ellis, “*The Alphabet of Nature*.”—A work full of accurate observations and original thought.

century before Christ, than has since been anywhere effected. Our notions on the early civilisation of the East are of so abstract a nature that we must expect to be startled occasionally by facts like these. But we now pass on to the general question.

CONSONANTS AND VOWELS.

If we regard the human voice as a continuous stream of air, emitted as breath from the lungs and changed into vocal sound as it leaves the larynx, this stream itself, as modified by certain positions of the mouth, would represent the vowels. "The vowels," as Professor Wheatstone says, "are formed by the voice modified, but not interrupted, by the various positions of the tongue and the lips." In the consonants, on the contrary, we should have to recognise a number of stops opposing for a moment the free passage of this vocal stream. These consonantal stops, against which the waves of the vowels break themselves more or less distinctly, are produced by barriers formed by the contact of the tongue, the soft palate, the palate, the teeth, and the lips with each other.

CONSONANTS.

Gutturals, Dentals, and Labials.

According to an observation which we find already in Vaidik grammars, the principal consonantal stops in any language are : —

- the guttural (k),
- the dental (t),
- the labial (p).

The pure *guttural* sound, without any regard as yet to its modifications (whether *tenuis*, *media*, *aspirata*, *nasalis*, *semi-vocalis*, or *flatus*), is produced by stopping the stream of sound by means of a contact between the root of the tongue and the throat, or, more correctly, the soft palate, or the *velum pendulum*. The throat is called the "place," the root of the tongue the "instrument," of the guttural.

The pure *dental* sound is produced by contact between tongue and teeth. Here the teeth are called the "place," and the tip of the tongue the "instrument."

The pure *labial* sound is produced by contact between the upper and lower lip; the upper lip being the "place," the lower the "instrument."

All consonants, excluding semi-vowels and sibilants or flatus, are formed by a complete contact between the active and passive organ.

Formation of the Tenuis.

If the voice is stopped sharp by the contact of the organs, so as to allow for the moment no breath or sound to escape, the consonant is called *tenuis* (ψιλόν), hard or surd (k, t, p).

Formation of the Media.

If the voice is stopped less abruptly, so as to allow a kind of breathing to continue after the first contact has taken place, the consonant is called *media* (μέσων), soft or sonant (g, d, b). The soft consonant does not arrest the sound at once, but allows it to be heard during a moment of resistance.

The difference between a surd and sonant consonant is best illustrated by a speaking-machine. "The sound p," as Professor Wheatstone says, "was produced by suddenly removing the left hand from the front of the mouth, which it had previously completely stopped; the sound b, by the same action; but instead of closing the mouth completely, a very minute aperture was left, so that the sound of the reed might not be entirely stifled." This coincides fully with the description given by Mr. Ellis. "In pronouncing ba," he says, "the vowel is uttered simultaneously with the act of relieving the lips from contact, or rather *before* they are quite released. If we separate them before the vowel is uttered, allowing the breath to be condensed during a very brief space of time, the sound pa is heard. There is a similar distinction between ab and ap: in the former the effect of the voice remains throughout the consonant, and we may feel a slight tremor of the lips while it is being produced; in the latter the vowel, properly so called, entirely ceases before the contact is completed."

Formation of Semi-vowels.

If there is only an approach or a very slight contact between the

organs, and the voice is slightly stopped or compressed as it reaches the point of contact, the consonants are called half-consonants or semi-vowels. They are sonant like the media, owing to the process of their formation here described ('h, l, w).

At the end of words and before a tenuis the semi-vowels are frequently pronounced as a flatus, or they become evanescent. In the Dutch 'dag,' we have the nearest approach to a guttural semi-vowel. If a Saxon pronounces the same word, he changes the *d* into *t*, and the guttural semi-vowel into the guttural flatus asper, like *ch* in 'loch.' In other parts of Germany, the final guttural is sounded as a media or as tenuis, while in the English 'day' the guttural semi-vowel has become evanescent. The same applies to French "sou" instead of "sol," and "vaut" instead of "valet." In Sanskrit no semi-vowel is tolerated at the end of words or before a tenuis.

Professor Wheatstone's researches prove that a distinguishing mark of the semi-vowels consists in their having no corresponding mutes. This applies not only to *y, r, l*, but also to *w* and '*h*.' It should be remarked, however, that, in the guttural and palatal series, the semi-vowel and flatus lenis can hardly be distinguished except in theory.

Formation of Sibilants (flatus).

If there is no contact at all, and the breath passes between the two organs without being stopped, still not without giving rise to a certain friction on passing that point of contact where guttural, dental, and labial consonants are formed, we get the three sibilants, or the "winds," as they are more properly called by Hindu grammarians. These are, the pure breathing, without even a guttural modification, commonly called spiritus asper and lenis; the thick guttural flatus, as heard in "loch;" the sharp and soft *s* for the dentals; and the sharp and soft *f* for the labials. The sibilants or flatus are distinguished from all other consonants by this, that with them a breathing is really emitted, while the consonants are only so many stops which preclude the emission of vocal sound. A candle applied to the mouth will at once show the difference between the labial flatus asper, as in "find," and the consonantal stops, such as *p, b*,

or even the labial semi-vowel, as heard in "wind." In this respect the sibilant flatus approaches nearer to the vowels than even the semi-vowels.

As we distinguished between tenuis and media in the consonants, we must admit a twofold intonation for the flatus or the sibilants also. A flatus or sibilant cannot be modified exactly in the same manner as a consonant produced by contact; but, by an analogous process, it may become either "asper" or "lenis," rough or soft. We are best acquainted with this distinction in the primitive and unmodified breathing which necessarily precedes an initial vowel. The spiritus asper and lenis in Greek are modifications of that initial breathing which is inherent in every vowel sound at the beginning of a word or of a syllable. It comes out freely as the spiritus asper in Homer and *ῥος*, frontier, while it is tempered and to our ears hardly audible in 'Aristotle and *ῥος*, hill. In ancient languages the spiritus asper is frequently represented by the dental flatus (s), and the spiritus lenis by a semi-vowel, as, for instance, the Digamma Æolicum.

The dental flatus, as a tenuis or rather as flatus asper, is heard in sin and seal; while the media or lenis is frequently represented by the English z, as in zeal and breeze.

The sharp labial flatus is the pure f, which the Greeks could not pronounce, and which we hear in "find" and "life." The flat corresponding sound is heard in "vine" and "live." This also is a difficult letter to pronounce, and is therefore avoided by many people, or changed into b, as Scaliger said,

"Haud temere antiquas mutat Vasconia voces,
Cui nihil est aliud vivere quàm bibere."

Strictly speaking, and in accordance with our own definitions, every consonant at the end of a word, unless followed by a slight vocal exhalation such as is heard in drug, loud, sob, must become a tenuis. Now, if we take words where the final consonant is a flatus, but where, by the addition of a derivative syllable, the flatus ceases to be really final, we shall see distinctly how the flatus asper and lenis interchange. The sharp dental flatus is heard in "grass" and "grease." Here the s is really final, although an e is put at the end of grease. If we form the two verbs, to graze and to grease, we have

the corresponding flat *s*, the common German *s*. Exactly the same grammatical process applied to the labial flatus changes "life" into "live," i. e. the sharp labial flatus into the flat.

Some languages, as, for instance, Sanskrit, acknowledge none but sharp sibilants; and a media followed by a flatus is changed in Sanskrit into a tenuis.

Formation of Nasals.

If, in the three organs, a full contact takes place and the vocal breathing is stopped, not abruptly, but in the same manner as with the sonant letters, and if afterwards the vocal breathing be emitted, not through the mouth, but through the nose, we get the three full nasal consonants *n*, *n*, and *m*, for the guttural, dental, and labial series. A speaking-machine leaves no doubt as to the manner in which a tenuis may be changed into a nasisonant letter. "M," as Professor Wheatstone says, "was heard on opening two small tubes representing the nostrils, placed between the wind-chest and the mouth, while the front of the mouth was stopped as for *p*."

In most cases the peculiar character of the nasal is determined by the consonant immediately following. In "ink," the *n* is necessarily guttural; and if we try to pronounce it as a dental or labial, we have to stop after the *n*, and the transition to the guttural *k* becomes so awkward that, even in words like to "in-cur," most people pronounce the *n* like a guttural. No language, as far as I know, is fond of such incongruities as a guttural *n* followed by any but guttural consonants, and they generally sacrifice etymology to euphony. In English we cannot pronounce em-ty, and therefore we pronounce and write emp-ty. In the Uraon-Kol language, which is a Tamulian dialect, "enan" is *I*, and the possessive prefix is "in," *my*. But in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal we find "im-bas," *my father*; but "ing-kos," *my child*. Cicero alludes to the same where he speaks of the *n* adulterinum. He says, that "cum nobis" was pronounced like "cun nobis."

At the end of words and syllables, however, the three nasal sounds, guttural, dental, or labial, may occur independently; and as it is necessary to distinguish a final *m* from a final *n* (*dyaθón*, *bonum*), it will be advisable also to do the same for a final guttural nasal, as the French

“bon,” “Lundi,” or the English “to sing.” It is true that in most languages the final guttural nasal becomes really a double consonant, i.e. n + g, as in “sing,” or n + k, as in “sink;” still, as the pronunciation on this point varies even in different parts of England, it will be necessary to provide a distinct category, and afterwards a distinct sign, for the guttural nasal.

In some languages we meet even with an initial guttural nasal, as in Tibetan “nga-rang,” *I myself*. Whether here the initial sound is really so evanescent as to require a different sign from that which we have as the final letter in “rang,” is a question which a native alone could answer. Certain it is that in the Tibetan alphabet itself both are written by the same sign, while Csoma de Kőrös writes the initial guttural n by ṅ, the final by ng; as “ṅa-rang.”

We have now, on physiological grounds, established the following system of consonants:

Tenues.	Mediæ.	Semi-vocales.	Flatus asperes.	sibilantes: lenes.	Nasales.
Gutturales: k (cap)	g (go)	ʿh (dag)	ʿh (loch)	ʿh (tag)	n. (sing).
Dentales: t (town)	d (do)	l (low)	s (seal)	z (zeal)	n (sin).
Labiales: p (pint)	b (bring)	w (win)	f (life)	v (live)	m (sum).
Spiritus asper: ʿ	or h (hear).				
Spiritus lenis: ʾ	(ear).				

Formation of Aspirates.

According to Sanskrit grammarians, if we begin to pronounce the tenuis, but, in place of stopping it abruptly, allow it to come out with what they call the corresponding “wind” (flatus, wrongly called sibilans), we produce the *aspirata*, as a modified tenuis, not as a double consonant. This is admissible for the tenuis aspirata, but not for the media aspirata. Other grammarians, therefore, maintain that all mediæ aspiratæ are formed by pronouncing the mediæ with a final ʿh, the flatus lenis being considered identical with the spiritus; and they insist on this principally because the aspirated sonants could not be said to merge into, or terminate by, a surd sibilant. Accepting this view of the formation of these aspirates, to which we have no corresponding sounds in English, we may now represent the

complete table of the chief consonantal sounds possible in any dialect, as follows:—

	Tenuis.	Tenuis aspir.	Media.	Media aspir.	Semi- vocales.	Flatus sibilantes.	Nasales.
Guttural:	k	k ^h	g	g ^h	'h	'h 'h	n.
Dental:	t	t ^h	d	d ^h	l	s z	n
Labial:	p	p ^h	b	b ^h	w	f v	m

It should be remarked that in the course of time the fine distinctions between *k^h*, *g^h*, and *'h*, between *p^h*, *b^h*, and *f*, become generally merged into one common sound. In Sanskrit only, and in some of the southern languages of India, through the influence of Sanskrit, the distinction has been maintained. Instead of Sanskrit *t^h* we find in Latin the simple *t*; instead of *d^h*, the simple *d*, or, as a nearer approach, the *f* (*d^huma* = *fumus*, &c.). The etymological distinction maintained in Sanskrit between "*d^hna*," *to put, to create*, and "*da*," *to give*, is lost in Persian, because there the two initial sounds *d* and *d^h* have become one, and the root "*da*" has taken to itself the meaning both of creating and giving. Whatever objections, therefore, might be raised against the anticipated representation of the tenuis and media aspirata by means of an additional *h* or *h*, they would practically apply only to a very limited sphere of languages. In Sanskrit no scholar could ever take *kh* for *k*+*h*, because the latter combination of sounds is grammatically impossible. In the Tamulian languages the fine distinctions introduced into their orthography have hardly found their way into the spoken dialects of the people at large.

Modifications of Gutturals and Dentals.

From what has been said before on the formation of the guttural and dental sounds, it must be clear that the exact place of contact by which they are produced can never be fixed with geometrical precision, and that by shifting this point forward or backward certain modifications will arise in the pronunciation of individuals, tribes, or nations. The point of contact between the lips is not liable to the

same changes, and the labials are, therefore, the most constant sounds in all dialects.

A. *Dialectic Modifications of Gutturals and Dentals.*

Where this variety of pronunciation is only in degree, without affecting the nature and real character of a guttural or dental consonant, we need not take any notice of it. Gutturals from a Semitic throat have a deeper sound than our own, and some grammarians have made a new class for them by calling them pectoral letters. The guttural *status asper*, as heard in the Swiss "ach" is deeper, and as it were more pectoral, than the usual German *ch*: but this is owing to a peculiarity of the organs of speech; and whatever letter might be chosen to represent this Swiss *ch* in a phonetic alphabet, it is certain none but a Swiss could ever pronounce it. Sanskrit grammarians sometimes regard *h* as formed in the chest (*urasya*), while they distinguish the other gutturals by the name of tongue-root letters (*gihvamuliya*). These refinements, however, are of no practical use; because, in dialects where the guttural sound is affected and diverted from its purer intonation, we generally find that the pure sound is lost altogether; so that the two hardly ever co-exist in the same language.

B. *Specific Modifications of Gutturals and Dentals.*

1. *Palatals as Modifications of Gutturals.*

But the place of contact of the gutturals may be pushed forward so far as to lie no longer in the throat, but in the palate. This change has taken place in almost all languages. Latin "*cantus*" is still "*canto*" in Italian, but in English "*chant*." In the same manner, the guttural *tenuis* in the Latin "*vocs*" (*vox*) has been softened in Sanskrit into the sound of the English *ch*, at least where it is followed by certain letters. Thus we have:

"vachmi," *I speak*,
but "vakshi," *thou speakest*,
"vakti," *he speaks*.

The same applies to the media. Latin "*largus*" is Italian "*largo*,"

but English "large." The Latin guttural media g in "jungo" is softened in Sanskrit into the sound of the English j. We have Sanskrit "yuga," Latin "jugum;" but in the verb we have:

yunaj + mi, *I join.*
 yunak + shi, *thou joinest.*
 yunak + ti, *he joins.*

The identity of many words in Latin and Sanskrit becomes palpable at once, if, instead of writing this modified guttural, or, as we may now call it, *palatal* sound, by a new type, we write it by a modified *λ*. Sansk. "chatvar," or as some write "tschatwar," does not look like "quatuor;" but Lithuanian "keturi" and Sanskrit "katvar" speak for themselves. Sanskrit "cha" or "tscha" does not look like Latin "que;" but Greek "κε" and Sanskrit "ka" assert their relationship without disguise. Although, therefore, we are forced to admit the palatals, as a separate class, side by side with the gutturals, because most languages retain both sets and use them for distinct etymological and grammatical purposes, still it will be well to remember that the palatals are more nearly related to the gutturals than to any other class, and that in most languages the two are still interchangeable.

That the pronunciation of the palatals may vary again, like that of the gutturals, requires no explanation. Some people imagine they perceive a difference between the English palatal in "church," and the Italian palatal in "cielo," and they maintain that no Englishman can properly pronounce the Italian palatal. If so, it only proves what was said before, that slight modifications like these do never co-exist in the same language; that English has but one, and Italian but one palatal, though the two may slightly differ. But even if we invented a special letter to represent the Italian palatal, no one except an Italian would be able to pronounce it, not even for his life, as the French failed in "ceci" and "ciceri" at the time of the Sicilian Vespers. All consonants, therefore, which are no longer gutturals, and not yet dentals, should be called palatals. That palatals have again a tendency to become dentals, may be seen from words like "réscapes" instead of "katvaras" or "keturi."

Frequently the pronunciation of the palatals becomes so broad that they seem, and in some cases really are, double consonants. Some people pronounce "church" (kirk) as if it were written "tchurtch." If this pronunciation becomes sanctioned, and we have to deal with a language which has as yet no historical orthography, it must be left to the ear of the missionary to determine whether he hears distinctly two consonants, or one only though pronounced rather fully and broadly. If he hears distinctly the two sounds $t + ch$, or $t + sh$, he should write both, particularly if in the same language there exists another series of letters with the simple palatal sound. This is the case, for instance, in Tibetan and its numerous dialects. If, therefore, the missionary has to deal with a Bhotiya dialect, which has not yet been fixed by the Tibetan alphabet, the simple palatals should be kept distinct from the compound palatals, tsh , dsh , &c. In the literary language of Tibet, where the Sanskrit alphabet has been adopted, an artificial distinction has been introduced, and the compound sounds, usually transcribed as tsh , $tsh\dot{a}$, and dsh , are distinguished by a diacritical mark at the top from the simple palatals, the sound of which is described as like the English ch in *church*, and j in *join*. How this artificial distinction should be rendered in transliteration, will have to be considered under III. *b*. If we have once the palatal tenuis, the same modifications as those described above give us the palatal media, the two aspiratæ, the nasal, the semi-vowel, and the sibilant.

The sound of the tenuis is given in the English "church;" of the media, in "to join." The semi-vowel we have in the pronunciation of "yea." The nasal again hardly exists by itself, but only if followed by palatals. We have it in "inch" and "injure." Where the Spaniards use an $\tilde{n}$, they write a double by a simple sound; for the sound is the nasal followed by the corresponding semi-vowel, ny . The French express the same sound in a different manner. The French "besogne," if it occurred in an African language, would have to be expressed by the missionary as "bezonye."

As to the palatal flatus or sibilant, we must distinguish again between its sharp and flat sound. The sharp sound is heard in "sharp," or French "chose." The flat sound is less known in English, but of frequent occurrence in French; such as "je," and "joli," very

different from the English "jolly." It is a sound of frequent occurrence in African languages.* The difference between the hard and soft palatal flatus may best be illustrated by a reference to the modern languages of Europe. A guttural tenuis in Latin becomes a palatal tenuis in English, and a palatal sibilant in French; *cantus*, the chant, *le chant*. Here the initial sibilant in French is a tenuis or *asper* like the English *sh* in "*she*." A guttural media in Latin becomes a palatal media in English, and a palatal sibilant in French; *elegia*, the elegy, *l'élégie*. Here the sibilant sound of the French *g* is the same as in "*genou*" or "*je*;" it is the soft palatal sibilant, sometimes expressed in English by *s*, as in *erasure* and *pleasure*.

It should be remarked, however, that the proper, and not yet assibilated sound of the palatal flatus *asper* is not the French *ch* as heard in "*Chine*," but rather the German *ch* in "*China*," "*mädchen*," "*ich*," "*könig*." Both sounds are palatal according to our definition of this term; but the German might be called the simple, the French the assibilated palatal flatus. Ellis calls the former the "whispered guttural sibilant," and remarks that it is generally preceded by a vowel of the *i* class. The corresponding "spoken consonant" or the flatus *lenis*, was discovered by Ellis in such words as "*kön'ge*."

2. *Linguals as Modifications of Dentals.*

While the pure dental is produced by bringing the tip of the tongue straight against the teeth, a peculiarly modified and rather obtuse consonantal sound is formed if the tongue is curled back till its tip is at the root, and the dome of the mouth then struck with its back or under-surface. The consonants produced by this peculiar process differ from the dentals, both by their place and by their instrument, and it has been common in languages where these peculiar consonants occur to call them "linguals." Although this name is not quite distinct, the tongue being the agent in the palatals and dentals as well as in these linguals, still it is preferable to another name which has also been applied to them, *Cerebrals*—a

* See the Rev. Dr. Krapf's "Outline of the Elements of the *Kisúáheli* Language:" Tübingen, 1850, page 23.

mere mistranslation of the Sanskrit name "Murdhanya." * These linguals vary again in the degree of obtuseness imparted to them in different dialects, and which evades graphical representation. All letters that cease to be pure dentals by shifting the point of contact backward from the teeth, must be considered as linguals; and many languages, Semitic as well as Arian, use them for distinct etymological purposes. As with the palatals, we have with the linguals also a complete set of modified consonants. The lingual *tenuis*, *tenuis aspirata*, *media*, *media aspirata*, and *nasal* have no corresponding sounds in English, because, as we shall see, the English organ has modified the dental sounds by a forward and not by a backward movement. The semi-vowel is the lingual *r*, produced by a vibration of the curled tongue in which the Italians and Scotch excel, and which we find it difficult to imitate. The English and the German *r* become mostly guttural, while, on the contrary, the Semitic guttural semi-vowel, *hain*, takes frequently the sound of a guttural *r*. It might be advisable to distinguish between a guttural and a lingual *r*; but most organs can only pronounce either the one or the other, and the two therefore seldom co-exist in the same dialect.

The lingual sibilant is a sound peculiar to the Sanskrit; and as, particularly in modern Indian dialects, it interchanges with the guttural *tenuis aspirata*, its pronunciation must have partaken of a certain guttural *flatus*.

There is a peculiarity in the pronunciation of the dental *tenuis aspirata* and *media aspirata*, which, though it exists but in few languages, deserves to be noticed here. In most of the spoken idioms of Europe, although a distinction is made in writing, there is hardly any

* "Murdhanya," being derived from "murdhan," *head* or *top*, was a technical name given to these letters, because their place was the top or highest point in the dome of the palate, the *σῆμας* of the Greeks. The proper translation would have been "Cacuminals." "Cerebrals" is wrong in every respect; for no letter is pronounced by means of the brain, nor does "murdhan" mean brain. It is not advisable to retain this name, even as a technical term, after it has been proved to owe its origin to a mere mistranslation. It is a word which has given rise to confused ideas on the nature of the lingual letters, and which ought therefore to be discarded from philological treatises, though the mistranslation and its cause have hitherto failed to attract the observation of either Sanskrit or comparative grammarians.

difference in the pronunciation of *t* and *tʰ*, or *d* and *dʰ*. The German "thun," *to do*, the French "théologie," are pronounced as if they were written "tun," "téologie." In the Low German and Scandinavian dialects, however, the aspiration of the *t* and *d* (according to Grimm's law, an organic aspiration) has been preserved to a certain extent, only the consonantal contact by which they are produced takes place no longer between the tongue and the inside of the teeth, but is pushed forward so as to lie really between the tongue and the edge of the teeth. This position of the organs produces the two well-known continuous sounds of *th*, in "think" and "though." There is a distinct Runic letter to express them, þ; and in later MSS. a graphical distinction is introduced between þ and ð, *tenuis* and *media*. The difference between the *tenuis* and *media* is brought out most distinctly by the same experiment which was tried for *f* and *v*. (page 442.). We have the *tenuis* in "breath," but it is changed into *media* in "to breathe."

We may consider these two sounds as dialectical varieties of the real *tʰ* and *dʰ*, which existed in Sanskrit, but which, like most aspirated sonant and surd consonants, have since become extinct. To many people the pronunciation of the English *th* is an impossibility; and in no dialect, except perhaps the Irish, does the English pronunciation of the *th* coexist with the pure and simple pronunciation of *tʰ* and *dʰ*. Still, as their sound is very characteristic, it might be desirable to mark it also in writing, so that even those who do not know the peculiar accent and pronunciation of a language, should be able to distinguish by the eye the English sound of the *th* from the usual *tʰ* and *dʰ*.

The principal consonantal sounds, without any regard as yet to their graphic representation, may now be classified and defined as follows. Where possible, the approximate sound is indicated by English words.

	a. <i>Tenuis.</i>	b. <i>Tenuis aspirata.</i>	c. <i>Media.</i>	d. <i>Media aspirata.</i>	e. <i>Nasalia.</i>	f. <i>Semivocalia.</i>	g. <i>Fistula (cithara).</i>
1. Gutturals -	kite	- -	gate	- -	sing	dag (<i>Dutch</i>)	loch, tag
2. Palatals -	church	- -	join	- -	Fr. signe	yet	sharp, Fr. je.
3. Dentals -	tan	(breath)	dock	(breathe)	not	let	grass, graze.
4. Linguals -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	run	- -
5. Labials -	pan	- -	bed	- -	man	will	life, live.

VOWELS.

The Physiological Scale of Vowels.

If we recall the process by which the semi-vowels were formed in the three principal classes, and if, instead of stopping the vocal sound by means of that slight remnant of consonantal contact or convergence, which characterized the formation of the semi-vowels, we allow the full volume of breath to pass over the point of contact and there to vibrate and sound, we get three pure vowel sounds, guttural, palatal, and dental, which can best be expressed by the Italian *A, I, U*, as heard in psalm, ravine, flute.

Formation of the Labial Vowel.

Let us pronounce the labial semi-vowel, the English *w* in woe, and, instead of stopping the vocal sound as it approaches the labial point of contact, emit it freely through the rounded aperture of the lips, and we have the vowel *u*. Here also the experiment of the candle will elucidate the process that takes place, but of which we are hardly conscious. The mere semi-vowel *w*, not followed by any vowel, should not produce any disturbance in the flame; at least not more than might be occasioned by the motion of the lips, which is the same for all consonants. The labial flatus, *f*, on the contrary, will disturb the flame considerably, and the vowel *u* may extinguish it.

Formation of the Palatal Vowel.

The same process which changes *w* into *u*, changes the guttural semi-vowel *h* into *a*, and the palatal semi-vowel *y* into *i*. Let us pronounce the *y* in yea without any vowel after it, and it only requires the removal of that stoppage of sound which takes place between tongue and palate, in order to allow the vowel *i*, as in ravine, to be heard distinctly.

Formation of the Guttural Vowel.

Let us pronounce the guttural semi-vowel as heard in the Dutch dag or the Hebrew 'hain, and, if we try to change this semi-vowel gradually into the vowel a, we feel that what we effect is merely the removal of that stoppage which in the formation of the semi-vowel takes place at the very point of guttural contact.

The vowels, as was said before, are formed by the voice modified, but not interrupted, by the various positions of the tongue and the lips. "Their differences depend," as Professor Wheatstone adds, "on the proportions between the aperture of the lips and the internal cavity of the mouth, which is altered by the different elevations of the tongue."

Succession of Vowels, natural and artificial.

The organic succession of vowel sounds is the same as for consonants,—guttural, palatal, labial, a, i, u. The succession of vowel sounds produced by the gradual lengthening of a cylindrical tube joined to a reed organ-pipe, as described by Professor Willis*, is an interesting experiment as to the scale of vowels in the abstract. It gives, or, at least, is reported to give,

i,	e,	a,	aw,	o,	u.
beat,	bait,	bath,	bought,	boat,	boot.

But as these pipes are round and regular, while the construction of the pipe formed by larynx, throat, palate, jaws, and lips is not, the succession of vowels given by these pipes cannot be expected to correspond with the local succession of vowels as formed by the organs of speech.

Kempelen states that if we pay attention to the successive contraction of the throat only, we shall find, indeed, that the aperture of the throat is smallest if we pronounce the Italian i, and that it gets gradually larger as we pronounce e, a, o, u; while if we pay attention to the successive contraction of the lips, which is quite as essential

* Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, vol. iii. paper 10. 1828-29.

to the formation of the vowels as the contraction of the throat, the scale of vowels is a different one. Here the aperture of the lips is largest if we pronounce the *a*; and it gradually decreases as we go on to the *e*, *i*, *o*, and *u*.

Hence, if we represent the opening of the lips by Roman, and the opening of the throat by English figures, taking the smallest aperture as our unit, we may, according to Kempelen, represent the five vowels in a mathematical progression:

$$i = \text{III. 1.} \quad e = \text{IV. 2.} \quad a = \text{V. 3.} \quad o = \text{II. 4.} \quad u = \text{I. 5.}$$

It has been remarked by Professor Purkinje, that the conditions for the formation of some of the vowels, particularly of *a* and *e*, as heard in *far* and *name*, have not been quite correctly stated by Kempelen. The production of both these sounds depends principally on the form of the cavity of the throat between the root of the tongue and the larynx; in both cases this space is large, but largest in the pronunciation of *e*. The size of the opening of the mouth is the same in the two cases; not different, as Kempelen states. The position which he ascribes to the lips in pronouncing *o* is also unnecessary.*

The experiments of Professor Willis show that, if we look on the instrument by which the vowels are formed as a vibrating membranous tongue, with one tube prefixed, and another added below the tongue, the shortest length of the tube gives *i*; the longest, *u*; and an intermediate one, *a*. But as the human organ of speech is not a regular tube, we must insist on this, that in the mouth the shortest length is indicated by the point of palatal contact, the longest by the point of labial, and the intermediate by the point of guttural contact; and that here, by the simultaneous operation of the guttural and labial aperture, the vowels *i*, *u*, and *a* are formed.

The Lingual and Dental Vowels.

Besides the three vowels struck at the guttural, palatal, and labial points of contact, the Sanskrit, in strict analogy, forms two peculiar vowels as modifications of the lingual and dental semi-vowels. *R* and *L*, subjected to the same process which changes *'h* into *a*, *y* into

* See J. Müller, *Elements of Physiology*, p. 1047.

i, and w into u, become ri, li, or rě and lě. At least these sounds ri and li, approach as near to the original value of the Indian vowels as with our alphabet we can express it. According to their origin, they may be described as r and l opened and vocalised.

Unmodified Vowels.

If we attempt in singing to pronounce no particular vowel, we still hear the vowel-sound of the Italian a. This vowel expresses the quality of the musical vibrations emitted from the human larynx and naturally modified by a reverberation of the palate. But if we arrest the vibrations before they pass the guttural point of contact — if, either in a whispered or a vocalised shape, we emit the voice without allowing it to strike against any part of the mouth — we hear the unmodified and primitive sound as in but, bird, lull. It is the sound which, in Professor Willis's experiments, "seems to be the natural vowel of the reed," or, according to Mr. Ellis, "the voice in its least modified form." We hear it also if we take the larynx of a dead body, and blow through it while compressing the chordæ vocales.

In these experiments it is impossible to distinguish more than *one* sound; and most people admit but *one* unmodified vowel in English. According to Sir John Herschell, there is no difference in the vowels of the words spurt, assert, dirt, virtue, dove, double, blood. Mr. Ellis considers the u in cur as the corresponding long vowel. Other writers, however, as Sheridan and Smart, distinguish between the sounds of bird and work, of whirl'd and world; and in some languages this difference requires to be expressed. It is a very delicate difference, but may be accounted for by a slight palatal and labial pressure, by which this obscure sound is affected after having escaped the guttural reverberation.

In English almost every vowel is liable to be absorbed by this obscure sound; as beggar, offer, bird, work, but. It is sometimes pronounced between two consonants, though not expressed in writing; as el-m, mar-sh, schis-m, rhyth-m. Here it is the breath inherent in continuous consonants. In French it is the e muet, as in entendre, Londres. In German it is doubtful whether the same sound exists at all, though I think it may be heard occasionally in such words as leber, leben.

Quantity of Vowels.

All vowels may be short or long, with the exception of the unmodified breathing (Rapp's "Urlaut"), which is always short.

The sound of the long a we have in psalm, messa (*It.*); short, in Sam.

 " " i " neat, Italia; " knit.

 " " u " fool, usarono (*It.*); " full.*

The sound of ě we have in bird.

 " ǿ " work.



DIPHTHONGS.

From the organic local succession of the three simple vowels a, i, u, it follows that real compound vowels can only be formed with a, as the first and most independent vowel, for their basis. The a, on its onward passage from the throat to the aperture of the mouth, may be followed or modified by i or u. It may embrace the palatal and labial vowels, and carry them along with it without having to retrace its steps, or occasioning any stoppage, which of course would at once change the vowel into the semi-vowel. In Sanskrit, therefore, the palatal and labial vowels, if brought in immediate contact with a following a, relapse naturally into their corresponding semi-vowels, y and w, and never form the base of diphthongs. The vowels i + a, or u + a, if pronounced in quick succession, become ya and wa, but they will never coalesce into one vocal sound, because the intonation of the a lies behind that of i; the vocal flatus has to be inverted, and this inversion amounts in fact to a consonantal stoppage sufficient to change the vowels i and u into the semi-vowels y and w.


The four Bases of Diphthongs.

According to our definition of diphthongs, their basis can only be guttural; but as the guttural a may be short or long, and as the two unmodified vowels (ě, ǿ) lie even behind the guttural point of contact, we get really a four-fold basis for diphthong sounds. Each

* The examples are mostly taken from Ellis, who distinguishes between the short a in messa and the stopped a in Sam; a distinction which, though essential in a theoretical analysis, does not require to be expressed in alphabetical notation.

of the four vowels (ă, â, ȳ, ȳ) being liable to a palatal or labial modification, we may on physiological grounds expect eight different compound vowels.

This can best be represented by a diagram :



Diphthongs with ă as base.

If the short *a* is quickly followed by *i* and *u*, so that, as the Hindus say, the guttural is mixed with the palatal and labial vowels like milk and water, we get the diphthongs *ai* and *au*, pronounced as in French. They correspond in sound to the Italian *e* and *o*, and to the English sounds in sailor and home.

Diphthongs with â as Base.

If the *a*, as the first element, retains more of its independent nature, or is long, then *a* + *i* pronounced together give the German diphthong *ai*, as in pie and buy; *a* + *u* give the German diphthong *au*, as in proud.

Diphthongs with ě as Base.

If, instead of the short or long a, the base of the diphthong becomes ě, we get the combinations ei and eu, both of rare occurrence except in German, where the sound of ei (English isle), is thinner than that of ai (English ire). In eu, the two vowels are still heard very distinctly in the Italian Europa. In German they coalesce more, and almost take the sound of oy in boy.

Diphthongs with ō as Base.

In the diphthong oi also, the pronunciation may vary according to the degree of speed with which the i follows the ō. O and u, on the contrary, coalesce easily, and form the well-known deep sound of ou in bought, or of a in fall.

Different Kinds of Diphthongs.

Although the sounds of the Italian e and o are here classed together, as diphthongs, with the English sounds of i and ou, this is not meant to deny a difference in degree between the two. The former might be called monophthongs, because the ear receives but one impression, as when two notes are struck simultaneously. It is only by theoretical analysis that we can detect the two component parts of e and o — a fact well known to every Sanskrit scholar. The âi and âu, on the contrary, are real diphthongs; and an attentive ear will perceive ah + ee in the English "I," ah + oo in the English "out." Sir John Herschell compares these sounds to quick arpeggios, where two chords are struck almost, but not quite simultaneously.

In African dialects, as, for instance, in Zulu, some Missionaries say that two vowels combine for the formation of one sound, as in hai (no), Umcopai (a proper name); others, that there are no diphthongs, but that, whenever two vowels meet, the separate power of each is distinctly marked and preserved in pronunciation.* This may depend on a peculiar disposition in the organ of hearing as well as in the organ of speech.

Objections are likely to be raised against our treating the vowel in "bought" and "fall" as a diphthong. There is, however, a

* An Essay on the Phonology and Orthography of the Zulu and kindred Dialects in Southern Africa, by L. Grout, p. 441.

diphthong sound which stands to au (proud) in the same relation as oi (voice) to ai (vice). I imagine to hear it in the English broad, which has the same vowel as all, bawl, Paul, nor, war; and we certainly have it in the Swedish ä. The labial element, no doubt, is very slight; still, let any body pronounce â and ou (far and bought), and a looking-glass will tell him that he adds a distinct labial pressure in order to change the â into ou.

Vowels broken by x or l.

In some languages we find that certain vowels are modified by an inherent ě, or, as some say, by i. The vowels most liable to this modification are a, o, u.

The a, with an inherent e, becomes German ä, as in väter, very nearly the same sound as in the English substantive bear. O, by the same influence, takes the German sound of ö in König, or that of the French eu in peu. U, in German, becomes ü, the French u in jurer.

To many organs these sounds are so troublesome that they are sometimes avoided altogether, as in English. Their pronunciation varies in different dialects; and the German ä sounds in some places like e, the French ü like u.

If we remember how the simple vowel sounds were represented by Kempelen in a mathematical progression according to the amount of aperture of the throat and lips required for their formation, we shall see that what takes place, if an a is changed to ae, an o to oe, and an u to ue, is in each case a diminution of the guttural aperture. While the pure a is formed by 5 degrees of labial and 3 degrees of guttural aperture, the ae is produced by 5 degrees of labial, but only 1 degree of guttural aperture. Thus, in the pronunciation of oe, the labial aperture remains at 2 degrees, and in the pronunciation of ue at 1 degree; but in either case the guttural aperture is respectively reduced from 4 degrees and 5 degrees to 1 degree. We may, therefore, represent the broken vowels (Grimm's Umlaut) in the following manner:—

ae=V. 1;

oe=II. 1;

ue=I. 1.

There is one class of languages, the Tataric, where these broken sounds are of frequent occurrence, and of great importance. The "harmony of vowels" which pervades these dialects would be lost

altogether (as it is, to a great extent, if Tataric languages are written with Arabic letters), unless to these vowels a distinct category were assigned. Besides the broken or softened a, o, and u, the Tataric languages have a fourth vowel, a softening of the i, which we hear in "will." Thus we have, in Yakute :

Hard vowels a, o, i, u. Heavy vowels a, ä, o, ö,
Soft vowels ä, ö, ĩ, ü. Light vowels i, ĩ, u, ü.

All the vowels in a Yakute word depend on the first. If the first is hard, all following vowels must be hard ; if soft, all become soft. Again, if the vowel of one syllable is heavy, that of the next can only be the same heavy vowel, or its corresponding light vowel. If it is light, that of the next syllable must be the same light vowel, or its corresponding heavy vowel. For instance, if the first syllable of a word has a, the next can only have a or i ; if ä, ä or ĩ ; if o, o or u ; if ö, ö or ü.

The vowels would, therefore, come under the following physiological categories : —

Guttural	a,	short, as in <i>Sam</i> ; long, as in <i>psalm</i> .		
"	ö	" "	<i>work</i> }	" <i>cur</i> (?)
"	ě	" "	<i>bird</i> }	"
Palatal	i	" "	<i>knot</i> ;	" <i>neat</i> .
Labial	u	" "	<i>full</i> ;	" <i>fool</i> .
Gutturo-palatal	ai (e)	" "	<i>debt</i> ;	" <i>date</i> .
" "	ai	" "	"	" <i>ire</i> .
" "	ei	" "	"	" <i>ice</i> .
" "	oi	" "	"	" <i>voice</i> .
Gutturo-labial	au (o)	" "	<i>not</i> ;	" <i>note</i> .
" "	au	" "	"	" <i>proud</i> .
" "	eu	" "	"	Ital. <i>Europa</i> .
" "	ou	" "	"	" <i>bought</i> .
Lingual	rě	" "	<i>fiery</i> ;	" <i>reach</i> .
Dental	lě	" "	<i>friendly</i> ;	" <i>leach</i> .
A broken, as in <i>Väter</i> .		I broken, as in <i>Diener</i> .		
O	"	<i>König</i> .	U	" <i>Güte</i> .

It has frequently been remarked that the short vowels in English (hat, bed, pit, pot, full) differ from their corresponding long vowels,

not merely in quantity, but in quality also. As they mostly occur in unaccented syllables, they have lost that vocal timbre which the short vowels in German and Italian have preserved. Still it is not necessary to invent new signs for these surd vowels, because in origin they correspond exactly to the short vowels in other languages, only that they are uniformly modified by a peculiarity of pronunciation inherent in the English tongue. The English language has lost the pure short vowels altogether; and it is not by the eye, but by the ear only, that foreigners can learn the peculiar pronunciation of the short vowels in English.

II.

How can these principal Sounds, after proper Classification, be expressed by us in writing and printing, so as to preserve their physiological Value, without creating new typographical Difficulties?

The results at which we have arrived in the first part of our inquiry are those on which, with very slight and unimportant exceptions, all may be said to agree, who, whether in India or Europe, have attempted to analyse scientifically the elements of human speech. There are, no doubt, some refinements, and some more accurate subdivisions, as will be seen in the extracts given from the *Pratisakhyas*, which it will be necessary to attend to in exceptional cases, and particularly in philological researches. But, as far as the general physiological outlines of our phonetic system are concerned, we hardly expect any serious difference of opinion.

Widely different opinions, however, start up as soon as we approach the second question, how these sounds are to be expressed in writing. Omitting the different propositions to adopt an Oriental alphabet, such as Sanskrit or Arabic, or the Greek alphabet, or newly invented letters, whether short-hand or otherwise, we shall take it for granted that the Latin alphabet, which, though of Semitic origin, has so long been the armour of thought in the struggles and conquests of civilisation, has really the greatest and most natural claims on our consideration.

There are two principles regulating the application of the Latin

alphabet to our physiological sounds on which there has been a general agreement since the days of Halhed and Wilkins :

1. *That each sound shall have but one representative letter, and that therefore each letter shall always express the same sound.*

2. *That each simple sound shall be expressed by a single letter, and compound sounds by compound letters.*

If with these two principles we try to write the forty-four consonants of our physiological alphabet by means of the twenty-four consonants of the Latin, it follows that we must add to the latter diacritical signs, in order to make them answer our purpose.

Now, in the adoption of diacritical signs, another principle should be laid down :

"That the same modification should always be expressed by the same diacritical mark."

In a theoretical system we might even go a step beyond this, and lay it down as a principle that the same diacritical mark should always express one and the same modification. The advantages which would result from the adoption of such a principle are palpable ; but the variety of diacritical marks which it would entail upon us, and the number of new types which would have to be cast to carry it out consistently, must strongly militate against it, particularly in the construction of a Missionary alphabet. Here, as in all branches of Missionary labour, it must be our aim to obtain the greatest results by the smallest means.

Guttural, Palatal, and Dental Tenués.

The guttural, dental, and labial tenués are naturally expressed by k, t, p.

Guttural, Palatal, and Dental Mediæ.

The modification which changes these tenués into mediæ should consistently be expressed by a uniform diacritical sign attached to k, t, p. For more than one reason, however, we prefer the Latin letters, g, d, b.

It is understood that *g*, after once being chosen as the representative of the guttural media, like *g* in *gun*, whatever vowel may follow, can never be used promiscuously both for the guttural and the palatal media, as the English *g* in *gun* and *gin*.

How to express Aspirates ?

The aspirated *tenuēs* and *mediæ* in the guttural, dental, and palatal series, which, according to the description given above, are not compound, but simple though modified sounds, should be written by simple consonants with a diacritical mark of aspiration. This would give us:

k', *t'*, *p'*, *g'*, *d'*, *b'*.

These types have been cut many times since Count Volney founded his prize at the French Academy for transcribing Oriental alphabets, and even before his time. They exist at Berlin, Paris, Leipzig, Darmstadt, Petersburg, and several other places. They have been cut in different sizes and on different bodies. Still the difficulty of having them at hand when required, making them range properly, and keeping always a sufficient stock, has been so great even in places like London, Paris, and Berlin, that their adoption would defeat the very object of our alphabet, which is to be used in Greenland as well as in Borneo, and is to be handled by unexperienced printers even in the most distant stations, where nothing but an ordinary English font can be expected to exist. In our Missionary alphabet we must therefore have no dots, no hooks, no accents, no Greek letters, no new types, no diacritical *appendages* whatsoever. No doubt, Missionary Societies might have all these letters cut and cast on as many sizes and bodies as necessary. Punches or fonts might be sent to the principal Missionary stations. But how long would this last? If a few psalms or catechisms had to be printed at Bangkok, and if there were no hooked letters to represent the aspirated palatal sound by a single type (*k'*), is it likely that they would send to Calcutta or London for this type, which, after it arrived, might perhaps be found not to range with the rest? It is much more likely that, in the absence of the type prescribed by the Missionary Societies at home, each missionary would find himself thrown on his own resources, and different alphabets would again spring

up in different places. Besides, our alphabet is not only to be an alphabet of missionaries. In time it is to become the alphabet of those tribes and nations whose first acquaintance with writing will be through the Bible translated into their language and transcribed in a rational alphabet. Fifty or a hundred years hence, it may be the alphabet of all the civilised nations of Africa, Australia, and the greater part of Asia. Must all the printers of Australian advertisements, the editors of African newspapers, the publishers of Malay novels or Papua primers, write to Mr. Watts, Crown Court, Temple Bar, for new sorts of dotted and hooked letters? I do not say it is impossible; but many things are possible, and still not practical; and these new hooked and dotted types seem to me decidedly to belong to this class.

In questions of this kind, no harm is done if principles are sacrificed to expediency; and I therefore propose to write the aspirate letters, as all English and most French and German scholars have written them hitherto, by

kh, th, ph, gh, dh, bh.

What do we lose by this? The spiritus asper (') is after all but a faintly disguised H, changed into h and -h, for asper and lenis, and then abbreviated into ' and '. Besides, the languages where these simple aspirates occur are not many; and in India, where they are of most frequent use, the phonetic system is so carefully arranged that there no ambiguity can arise whether kh be meant for an aspirated guttural tenuis or for k followed by the semi-vowel h. If the semi-vowel h comes in immediate contact with k, k+h is changed into g+gh, or a stop (*virama*) has to be put after the k. This might be done where, as in discussing grammatical niceties, it is desirable to distinguish between kh and k-h. The missionary, except in India will hardly ever suffer from this ambiguity; and if the scholar should insist on its being removed, we shall see immediately how even the most delicate scruples on this point could be satisfied.

There is still, if we examine the alphabets hitherto proposed or adopted, a whole array of dots and hooks, which must be eliminated, or at least be reduced, as far as possible; and though we might, after gaining our point with regard to the h, get through gutturals, dentals, and labials, we still have new and more formidable enemies to encounter in the palatals and linguals.

How to express Palatals ?

Palatals are modifications of gutturals, and therefore the most natural course would be to express them by the guttural series, adding only a line or an accent or a dot, or any other uniform diacritical sign to indicate their modified value. So great, however, has been the disinclination to use diacritical signs, that in common usage, where the palatal tenuis had to be expressed, the most anomalous expedients have been resorted to in order to avoid hooks or dots. In English, to represent the Sanskrit palatal tenuis, *ch* has been used ; and as the *h* seemed to be too much in the teeth of all analogy, the simple *c* even has been adopted, leaving *ch* for the aspirated palatal. On the same ground, the Germans write *tsch* for the palatal tenuis, and *tschh* for the aspirate. The French write *tch* and *tchh*. The Italians do not hesitate to use *ci* for the tenuis, though I do not see how they could express the corresponding aspirate. The Russians recommend their *ч* ; and the Brahmans would probably recommend a Sanskrit type. Still all, even the German *tschh*, are meant to represent simple consonants, which, as in Sanskrit, would not make a preceding short vowel long. That in English the *ch*, in Italian *ci*, and in German *tsch*, have a sound very like the palatal tenuis, is of course a mere accident. In English the *ch* is not always sounded alike ; and its pronunciation in the different dialects of Europe varies more than that of most letters. Besides, our alphabetic representative of the palatal sound is to be pronounced and comprehended, not by a few people in Germany or Italy, but by all the nations of Africa and Australia. Now to them the *ch* would prove deceptive ; first, because we never use the simple *c* (by this we make up for the primary alphabetical divorce introduced by the *libertus* of Spurius Carvilius Ruga), and, secondly, because the *h* would seem to indicate the modification of the aspirate.

The natural way of writing the palatals, so as not to obscure their close relationship to the gutturals, would be, *ḳ*, *kḥ*, *g̣*, *gḥ*.

But here the same difficulty arises as before. If the dots or marks are printed separately, the lines where these dots occur become more distant than the rest. For one such dotted letter the compositor has to compose a whole line of blanks. These will shift, particularly when there are corrections, and the misprints are endless.

In Turnour's edition of the Mahavansa, which is printed with dotted letters, we get thirty-five pages quarto of errata to about a hundred pages of text. But they might be cast on one body. True, they might be — perhaps they will be. At all events they have been; and Volney offered such types to anybody that would ask for them. Still, when I inquire at a press like the University press of Oxford, they are not forthcoming. We must not expect that what is impossible in the nineteenth century at Oxford, will be possible in the twentieth century at Timbuktu.

Now the difficulty, so far as I can see, was solved by a compositor to whom I sent some MS., where each palatal letter was marked by a line under it. The compositor, not knowing what these lines meant, took them for the usual marks of italics, and I was surprised to see that this answered the purpose, saved much trouble and much expense, and, on the whole, did not look badly. As every English font includes italic letters, the usefulness of these modified types for our Missionary alphabet "springs to the eyes," as we say in German. They are sufficiently startling to remind the reader of their modified pronunciation, and at the same time they indicate, as in most cases they ought, their original guttural character to the reflecting philologist. As in ordinary books italics are used to attract attention, so also in our alphabet. Even to those who have never heard the names of guttural and palatal letters, they will show that the *k* is not the usual *k*. Persons in the slightest degree acquainted with phonetics will be made aware that the *k* is, in shape and sound, a modification of the *k*. All who admit that palatals are modifications of gutturals would see at once that the modification intended by *k* could only be the palatal. And as to the proper pronunciation of the *k*, as palatal tenuis, in different dialects, people who read their own language expressed in this alphabet will never hesitate over its pronunciation. Others *must* learn it, as they now learn the pronunciation of Italian *ci* and *chi*, or rest satisfied to know that *k* stands for the palatal tenuis, and for nothing else. Sooner or later this expedient is certain to be adopted. Thus we get, as the representatives of the palatals,

k, kh, g, gh.

Now, also, it will appear how we can avoid the ambiguity before

alluded to,—whether the *h* of aspirated consonants expresses their aspirated nature or an independent guttural semi-vowel or flatus. Let the *h*, where it is not meant as a letter, but as a diacritical sign, be printed as an italic *h*, and the last ground for complaint will vanish. Still this is only needful for philological objects; for practical purposes the common *h* may remain.

In *writing*, the dots or lines under the palatals will have to be retained. Still they take too much time thus employed to allow us to suppose that the Africans will retain them when they come to write for themselves. They will find some more current marks; as, for instance, by drawing the last stroke of the letter below the line. In writing, however, anybody may please himself, so long as the printer knows what is intended when he has to bring it before the public. As a hint to German missionaries, I beg to say that, for writing quickly in this new alphabet, they will find it useful in manuscript notes to employ German letters instead of italics.

An accidental, though by no means undesirable, advantage is gained by using italics to express the palātals. If we read that Sanskrit *vāch* (or *vāch*, or *vātsch*) is the same as Latin *vox*, but that sometimes *vāch* in Sanskrit is *vāk* or *vāc*, the eye imagines that it has three different words to deal with. By means of italics, *vāk* and *vāc* are almost identical to the sight, as *kirk* and *kūrē* (church), would be if English were ever to be transcribed into the missionary alphabet. The same applies to the verb, where the phonetic distinction between *vakmi*, *vakshī*, *vakti*, can thus be expressed without in any way disguising the etymological identity of the root. It would be wrong if we allowed the physiological principles of our alphabet to be modified for the sake of comparative philology; but where the phonetic changes of physiological sounds and the historical changes of words happen to run parallel, an alphabet, if well arranged, should be capable of giving this fact clear expression.

If the pronunciation of the palatals is deteriorated, they sometimes take the sound of *tch*, *ts*, *s*, *sh*, or even *th*. *Cælum* (καῖλον) becomes Italian *cielo*; where the initial sound is the same as in *church* (*kirk*). In old Friesic we have “*tzaka*” instead of English “*check*.” In French, “*ciel*” is pronounced with an initial sharp dental *s*; “*chose*,” with an initial sharp palatal *s*. In Spanish, the pronuncia-

tion of a c before e and i is that of the English th. In these cases when we have to deal with unwritten languages, the sounds, whether simple or double, should be traced to their proper phonetic category, and be written accordingly. It will be well, however, to bear in mind that pronunciation may change with time and vary in different places, and that the most general representation of these sounds by palatals or italicized gutturals will generally prove the best in the long run.

It must be clear that, with the principles followed hitherto, it would be impossible to make an exception in favour of the English j as representative of the palatal media. It would be a schism in the whole system, and would besides deprive us of those advantages which comparative philology derives from a consistent representation of modified sounds: that Sanskrit yuga (युग) is derived from "yug," to join, would be intelligible to everybody; while neither the German, to whom j is y, nor the Frenchman, nor the Spaniard would see the connexion between j and g.

The wish to retain the j is natural with Missionary Societies. It would enable us to spell uniformly the name of our Lord—and in all the translations of the Bible which the pious zeal of the mother country is now sowing over the virgin soil of Africa, Australia, and Asia, that one name at least would stand unaltered and uncorrupted in all tongues and all ages. But we may consider this from another point of view. As with other words, and with many of the most sacred in our own language, their full and real meaning seems to grow more clear and distinct the more the material body of the words changes and decays, and the more their etymological meaning becomes dim and forgotten, so will it be with the name of our Lord. Let the name grow and change and vary in all the tongues of the earth, and the very variety of the name will proclaim the unity of Him who has promised to all tongues the gift of His Holy Spirit. And would it avail, even if now we insisted on this point? A thousand years ago, and all the nations of Europe wrote and pronounced this name uniformly; but at the present day there are hardly two languages where the name is pronounced exactly alike; and in several the spelling has followed the pronunciation. It will ultimately be the same in Africa, whatever we do at present. But if

an exception is here to be made, let it be a single exception, while we retain the regular notation for every other word in which the pure palatal media occurs.

How to express Linguals ?

The linguals, as modifications of the dentals, have been hitherto written by common consent as dentals with dots or lines. In writing, this method must be retained, though no doubt a more current form will soon grow up if the alphabet is used by natives. They will probably draw the last stroke of the *t* and *d* below the line, and connect the body of the letter with the perpendicular line below. The linguals, therefore, will be, *ṭ*, *tḥ*, *ḍ*, *dḥ*; only here also the printer will step in and convert the dotted or underlined letters into italics, *ṭ*, *tḥ*, *ḍ*, *dḥ*.

I am at a loss how to mark that peculiar pronunciation of the dental aspirate, whether tenuis or media, which we write in English simply by *th*. It is not of frequent occurrence; still it occurs not only in European, but in Oriental languages,—for instance, in Burmese. If it occurs in a language where no trace of the pure dental aspirate remains, we might safely write *th* (and *dh*) or *ṭḥ* (and *ḍḥ*), as we do in English. The Anglo-Saxon letters *þ* and *ð* would be very convenient; but how few fonts, even in England, possess these forms! Again, *ʃḥ* and *ẓḥ*, and even *ʃ'* and *ʒ'*, have been proposed; but they are liable to still stronger objections. Where it is necessary to distinguish the aspirated *th* and *dh* from the assibilated, I propose for the latter a dot under the *h* (*tḥ* and *dḥ*). But I think *th* and *dh* will, on the whole, be found to answer all practical purposes, if we only look to people who have to write and read their own language. Philologists, whatever we attempt, cannot be informed of every nicety and shade in pronunciation by the eye. They must learn from grammars or from personal intercourse in what manner each tribe pronounces its dental aspirate; and comparative philology will find all its ends answered if *th* represents the organic dental aspirate, until its pronunciation deteriorates so far as to make it a flatus or a double consonant. In this case the Missionary also will have to write it *ts*, or *ss*, or whatever sound he may happen to hear.

The five principal classes of physiological sounds would, therefore, have the following typographic exponents:—

	Tenuis.	Tenuis asp.	Media.	Media asp.
Guttural	k	kḥ	g	gḥ
Palatal	ḱ	ḱḥ	ḡ	ḡḥ
Dental	t	tḥ (tḥ)	d	dḥ (dḥ)
Lingual	ṭ	ṭḥ	ḍ	ḍḥ
Labial	p	pḥ	b	bḥ

How to express the Nasals ?

In each of these five classes we have now to look for an exponent of the nasal.

Where the nasal is modified by the following consonant, it requires no modified sign, for reasons explained in the first part of our essay. The nasal in *sink* and *sing* is guttural; in *inch* and *injure*, palatal; in *hint* and *bind*, dental; in *imp* and *dumb*, labial.

But where these nasals occur at the beginning of words or at the end of syllables, each must have its own mark. Let the dental nasal be *n*, the labial nasal *m*, the lingual nasal *ṇ*. Where the guttural nasal is really so evanescent as not to bear expression by *ng*, we must write *n* and a dot after it (*n̄*), which makes no difficulty in printing, and will very rarely occur. What we call the palatal *n* is generally not a simple but a compound nasal, and should be written *ny*. For transliterating, however, we want a distinct sign, because the palatal nasal exists as a simple type in Sanskrit, and every single type must be transliterated by a single letter. Here I should propose the Spanish *ñ*.

The lingual *n* occurs in Sanskrit only. Its character is generally determined by lingual letters either following or preceding. Still, where it must be marked in Sanskrit transliterations, let it be represented by an italic *ṇ*.

How to express the Semi-vowels ?

The Latin letters which naturally offer themselves as the counterparts of the semi-vowels, are 'h, y, r, l, and w.

The delicate sound of the guttural semi-vowel occurs very rarely in Arian languages. In Semitic dialects, however, the *y* has usually been considered as the guttural semi-vowel. In Hebrew it is sometimes not pronounced at all, or, as we should say, it is changed into the flatus lenis; whence, in the Arabic alphabet, to remove this ambiguity and to show in every word the full or weak pronunciation of the guttural semi-vowel, the *y* was split in two: the one, the *ξ*, little more than the flatus lenis; the other, the *ξ̣*, the hollow guttural semi-vowel which only a Semitic throat is able to utter, and which comes very near to the guttural flatus asper as heard in "loch."

The palatal semi-vowel is usually transcribed in Germany by *j*, which, as far as archæological arguments go, would certainly be the most appropriate sign to represent the semi-vowel corresponding to the palatal vowel *i*. As, however, the *j* is one of the most variously pronounced letters in Europe, and as in England it has been usual to employ it as a palatal media, it is better to discard it altogether from our alphabet, and to write *y*.

The lingual semi-vowel is *r*; if in some dialects the *r* is pronounced very near to the throat, this might be marked by an italic *r*, or *rh*.

The dental semi-vowel is written *l*. The *mouillé* sound of *l* may be expressed by an italic *l*.

Where the labial semi-vowel is formed by the lips, let it be written *w*. More usually it is formed by the upper lip and the edge of the lower teeth. It then becomes what the Hindus call a labio-dental semi-vowel, but is hardly to be distinguished from the labial flatus lenis.

How to express the Flatus (Sibilants)?

As the unmodified flatus, or, as it should more properly be called, the spiritus asper and lenis, can only occur before a vowel, the printer will find no difficulty in representing these two sounds by the usual signs ' and ' placed before or over the vowel which follows. At the beginning of words there could be no reasonable objection to this mode of representing the very slight and hardly consonantal sound of the spiritus asper and lenis. But it will take some time before our eyes are accustomed to it in the middle of words. In such cases the Greeks did not mark it. They wrote *ἄρμα*, chariot,

but *εὐάγματος*, with beautiful chariots; they wrote *ἄνθρω*, man, but *εὐανδρία*, manliness. Nor in fact does there seem to be any necessity for marking the spiritus lenis in the middle of words. Every vowel beginning a syllable has necessarily the spiritus lenis; as going, seeing. As to the spiritus asper, which we have in "vehement," "vehicle," I fear that "ve'ement," "ve'icle," will be objected to by the printer. If so, we have still the *h* as a last resource to express the spiritus asper in this position.

The guttural flatus asper, as heard in loch, might be expressed by an Italic *h*. The flatus lenis cannot be distinguished in pronunciation from the guttural semi-vowel, and has therefore never received an alphabetical exponent. If it should be necessary, however, to assign a type to this physiological category, we should be obliged to write the flatus asper by '*h*', and the flatus lenis by '*h*'.

The dental flatus sibilans, pronounced sharp as in "sin" or "grass," has, of course, the best claims on the letter *s* as its representative. Its corresponding soft sound, as heard in please or zeal, is best expressed by *z*; only we must take care not to pronounce it like the German *z*. The more consistent way of expressing the sonant flatus would be to put a spiritus lenis over the *s*. This, however, would hardly be tolerated, and would be against the Third Resolution of our alphabetical conferences, where it was agreed that only *after* the Roman types, and the modifications of Roman types as supplied by common fonts (capitals, italics, &c.), had been exhausted, diacritical signs should be admitted into the standard alphabet.

As all palatals are represented by italics, the palatal sibilant would naturally be written with an italic *s*. This would represent the sharp sound as heard in "sharp" or "chose." The soft palatal sibilant would have the same exponent as the soft dental sibilant, only changed into italics (*z*). This would be the proper sign for the French sound in "je," "genou," and for the African soft palatal sibilant, which, as Dr. Krapf, Mr. Tutschek, and Mr. Boyce remark, will never be properly pronounced by an adult European.

Where it is necessary to express the original, not yet assibilated, palatal flatus, which is heard in *könig* and *kön'ge*, an italic *y*, with the spiritus asper and lenis, would answer the purpose (*y* and *y*).

The labial flatus should be written by *f*. This is the sharp flatus,

as heard in "life" and "find." The soft labial flatus ought consistently to be written as *f* with a spiritus lenis. But here again I fear we must sacrifice consistency to expediency, and adopt that sign with which we are familiar, the Latin *v*. As we express the labial semi-vowel by *w*, the *v* is still at our disposal, and will probably be preferred by the unanimous votes of missionaries and printers.

The lingual flatus is a sound peculiar to Sanskrit, and, owing to its hollow guttural pronunciation, it may be expressed there, as it has been hitherto, by *s* followed by the guttural *h* (*sh*). The Sanskrit knows no soft sibilants; hence we require but one representation for the lingual *sh*.

The different categories of consonantal sounds which we represented at the end of the first chapter by means of English words may now be filled out by the following graphic exponents:—

	<i>a.</i>	<i>b.</i>	<i>c.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>e.</i>	<i>f.</i>	<i>g.</i>
	Tenuis.	Tenuis asp.	Media.	Media asp.	Nasalis.	Semi- vocalis.	Flatus sibilans. asp. len.
I. Guttur.	<i>k</i>	<i>kḥ</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>gḥ</i>	<i>n.</i>	<i>ʼh</i>	<i>ʼḥ ʼh</i>
II. Pal.	<i>k</i>	<i>kḥ</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>gḥ</i>	<i>ñ</i>	<i>y</i>	<i>s z</i>
III. Dent.	<i>t</i>	<i>tḥ</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>dḥ</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>l (l)</i>	<i>s z</i>
IV. Ling.	<i>t</i>	<i>tḥ</i>	<i>d</i>	<i>dḥ</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>r (r)</i>	<i>sh -</i>
V. Labial.	<i>p</i>	<i>pḥ</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>bḥ</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>f v</i>

Spiritus asper : '.

Spiritus lenis : '.

Although these exponents of the physiological categories of articulated sound have not been chosen because their present pronunciation in English, or French, or German is nearest to that physiological category which each has to represent, still, as we have avoided letters of which the pronunciation fluctuates very much (such as *c*, *j*, *x*, *q*), it will be found, on the whole, that little violence is done by this alphabet to the genius of any of these languages, and that neither an Englishman, nor a German, nor a Frenchman will ever feel much hesitation as to how any one of our letters should be pronounced.

Vowels.

The pronunciation of the vowels is more liable to change than that of the consonants. Hence we find that literary languages, which

retain their orthography in spite of changes in pronunciation, have no scruple in expressing different sounds by the same sign; or, where two originally different vowels have sunk down to one and the same intermediate sound, we see this same sound expressed often by two different vowels. In the selection, therefore, of letters to express the general vowel sounds of our physiological alphabet, we can pay less attention to the present value of each vowel sign in the spoken languages of Europe than we did even with the consonants. And as there it was impossible, without creating an unwieldy mass of consonantal signs, to express all the slight shades of pronunciation by distinct letters, we shall have to make still greater allowance for dialectical varieties in the representation of vowels, where it would be hopeless should we attempt to depict in writing every minute degree in the sliding scale of native or foreign pronunciation.

The reason why, in most systems of phonetic transcription, the Italian pronunciation of vowels has been taken as normal, is, no doubt, that in Italian most vowel signs have but one sound, and the same sound is generally expressed by one and the same vowel. We propose, therefore, as in Italian, to represent the pure guttural vowel by a, the pure palatal vowel by i, and the pure labial vowel by u.

Besides the short a, we want one, or according to others, two graphic signs to represent the unmodified sound of the vocal breathing, which may be deflected from its purity by a slight and almost imperceptible palatal or labial pressure. These are the sounds which we have in "birch" and "work," and which, where they must be distinguished, we propose to write ɛ and ɔ. As we do not want the signs of ˘ and ˘ to mark the quantity of vowels, we may here be allowed to use this sign ˘ to indicate indistinctness rather than brevity.

In most languages, however, *one* sign will be sufficient to express this primitive vowel; and in this case the figure 0 has been recommended as a fit representative of this undetermined vowel.

Among the languages which have an alphabet of their own, some, as, for instance, Sanskrit, do not express these sounds by any peculiar sign, but use the short a instead. Other languages express both sounds by one sign; for instance, the Hebrew Shewa, the pronunciation of which would naturally be influenced, or, so to say, coloured either by the preceding or the following letter. Other idioms again,

like Latin, seem to express this indistinct sound by e, i, o, or u. Besides the long e in *res* and the short e in *celer*, we have the indistinct *ě* in words like *adversum* and *advorsum*, *septimus* and *septumus*, where the Hindus write uniformly *saptama*, but pronounced it probably with vowels varying as in Greek and Latin. Besides the long o in *odi*, and the short o as in *moneo*, we have the indistinct o or u in *orbs* or *urbs*, in *bonom* or *bonum*. In Wallachian, every vowel that has been reduced to this obscure, indefinite sound, is marked by an accent, *à, é, ì, ò, ù*; but if Wallachian is written with Cyrillic letters, the 'Yerr' (*ѣ*) is used as the uniform representative of all these vowels. In living languages one sign, the figure O, will be found sufficient, and in some cases it may be dispensed with altogether, as a slight Shewa sound is necessarily pronounced, whether written or not, in words such as *mil-k*, *mar-sh*, *el-m*, &c. The marks of quantity, *˘* and *ˉ*, are superfluous in our alphabet; not that it is not always desirable to mark the quantity of vowels, but because here again, as with the dotted consonant, a long syllable can be marked by the vowel in italics, while every other vowel is to be taken as short. Thus we should write in English *bath*, *bar*, but *ass*, *bank*; *ravine*, and *pin*; but (i.e. *boot*), and *butcher*. We should know at once that *a* in *bath* is long, while in *ass* it is short.

All compound vowel sounds should be written according to the process of their formation. Two only, which are of most frequent occurrence, the guttural short a, absorbed by either i or u, might perhaps be allowed to retain their usual signs, and be written e and o, instead of ai and au. The only reason, however, which can be given for writing e and o, instead of ai and au, is that we save a letter in writing; and this, considering how many millions of people may in the course of time have to use this alphabet, may be a saving of millions and millions of precious seconds. The more consistent way would be to express the gutturo-palatal sound of the Italian e by ai, the a being short. The French do the same in "*aimer*," while in English this sound is expressed by ey in *prey*, by ay in *pray*, by a in *gate*, and by ai in *sailor*. The gutturo-labial sound of the Italian o should be written au, which the French pronounce o. For etymological purposes also this plan would be preferable, as it frequently happens that an o (au), if followed by a vowel, has to be pronounced

av. Thus in Sanskrit *bhū*, to be, becomes *bhau* (pronounced *bho*), and if followed by *ami*, it becomes *bhav-ami*, I am.

The diphthongs, where the full or long guttural *a* is followed by *i* and *u*, should be written *ai* and *au*. "To buy" would have to be written *bai*; to bow, *bau*. Whether *au* coalesce entirely, as in German, or less so, as in Italian, is a point which in each language must be learned by ear, not by eye.

Most people would not be able to distinguish between *ai* and *ei*. Still some maintain that there is a difference; as, for instance, in German *kaiser* and *eis*. Even in English the sound of *ie* in "he lies" is said to be different from that of "he lies." Where it is necessary to mark this distinction, our diagram readily supplies *ai* and *ei*.

The diphthong *eu* is generally pronounced so that the two vowels are heard in succession, as in Italian *Europa*. Pronounced more quickly, as, for instance, in German, it approaches to the English sound of *oy* in *boy*. According to our diagram, we should have to write *ēi* and *ēu*; but *ei* and *eu* will be preferable for practical purposes.

The same applies to the diphthong *ōi*. Here, also, both vowels can still be heard more or less distinctly. This more or less cannot be expressed in writing, but must be learned by practice.

The last diphthong, on the contrary, is generally pronounced like one sound, and the deep guttural *o* seems to be followed, not by the vowel *u*, but only by an attempt to pronounce this vowel, which attempt ends, as it were, with the semi-vowel *w*, instead of the vowel. In English we have this sound in *bought*, *aught*, *saw*; and also in *fall* and *all*.

The proper representation of these diphthongs would be *ōi* and *ōu*; but *oi* and *ou* will be found to answer the purpose as well, except in philological works.

For representing the broken sounds of *a*, *o*, *u*, which we have in German *väter*, *höhe*, *güte*, in the French *prêtre*, *peu*, and *une*, but which the English avoids as sounds requiring too great an effort, no better signs offer themselves than *ä*, *ö*, *ü*. They are objectionable because they are not found in every English font. For the Tataric languages a fourth sound is required, a broken or soft *i*. This, too, we must write *ī*.

The Sanskrit vowels, commonly called lingual and dental, are best expressed by *ri* and *li*, where, by writing the *r* and *l* as italics, no ambiguity can arise between the vowels *ri* and *li*, and the semi-vowels *r* and *l*, followed by *i*. Instead of *i*; *ë* also or the figure 0 may be used.

Thus have all the principal consonantal and vowel sounds been classified physiologically and represented graphically. All the distinctions which it can ever be important to express have been expressed by means of the Roman alphabet without the introduction of foreign letters, and without using dots, hooks, lines, accents, or any other diacritical signs. I do not deny that for more minute points, particularly in philological treatises, new sounds and new signs will be required. In Sanskrit we have Visarga and the real Anusvara (the Nasikya), which will require distinct signs (*h*, *m*) in transliteration. In some African languages, clicks, unless they can be abolished in speaking, will have to be represented in writing. On points like these an agreement will be difficult, nor would it be possible to provide for all emergencies. It is an advantage, however, that we still have the *c*, *j*, and *x* at our disposal to express the dental, palatal, and lateral clicks. Further particulars on this and similar points I must reserve for a future occasion, and refer the reader, in the mean time, to the very able article of the Rev. L. Grout, alluded to before. But I cannot leave this subject without expressing at least a strong hope that, by the influence of the Missionaries, these brutal sounds will be in time abolished, at least among the Kaffirs, though it may be impossible to eradicate them in the degraded Hottentot dialects. It is clear that they are not essential in the Kaffir languages, for they never occur in Sechuana and other branches of the great Kaffir family.

If uniformity can be obtained with regard to the forty-four consonantal and the twenty-four vocal sounds, which are the principal modulations of the human voice fixed and sanctioned in the history of language, so far as it is known at present; if these sounds are always accepted, as defined above, solely on physiological grounds, and henceforth expressed in those letters alone which have been allotted to them solely for practical reasons, a great step will have been made towards facilitating the intellectual intercourse of mankind and spreading the truths of Christianity.

But the realisation of this plan will mainly depend, not on ingenious arguments, but on good-will and ready co-operation.

III.

How can this Physiological Alphabet be applied to existing Languages?

a. *To unwritten Languages.*

After the explanations contained in the first and second parts, there is little more to be said on this point.

The missionary who attempts to write down for the first time a spoken language, should have a thorough knowledge of the physiological alphabet, and have practised it beforehand on his own language or on other dialects the pronunciation of which he knows.

He should put from recollection, as much as possible, the historical orthography of German, English, French, or whatever his language may be, and accustom himself to write down every spoken sound under the nearest physiological category to which it seems to belong. He should first of all endeavour to recognise the principal sounds, guttural, dental, and labial, in the language he desires to dissect and to delineate; and where doubtful whether he hears a simple or a modified secondary sound, such as have been described in our alphabet, he should always incline to the simple as the more original and general.

He should never be guided by etymological impressions. This is a great temptation, but it should be resisted. If we had to write the French word for knee, we should feel inclined, knowing that it sounds *ginokyo* in Italian and *genu* in Latin, to write it *gěnu*. But in French the initial palatal sound is no longer produced by contact, but by a sibilant flatus, and we should therefore have to write *zěnu*. If we had to write down the English sound of knee, we should probably, for the same reason, be willing to persuade ourselves that we still perceived, in the pronunciation of the *n* the former presence of the initial *k*. Still no one but an etymologist could detect it, and its sound should be represented in the Missionary alphabet by "ni."

Those who know the difficulty of determining the spelling of words according to their etymology, even in French or English, although we can follow the history of these languages for centuries, and although the most eminent grammarians have been engaged in analysing their structure, will feel how essential it is, in a first attempt to fix a spoken language, that the writer should not be swayed by any hasty etymological theories. The Missionary should give a true transcript of a

spoken language, and leave it to others to decipher it. He who, instead of doing this, attempts, according to his own theories, to improve upon the irregular utterance of savages, would deprive us of authentic documents the loss of which is irreparable. He would act like a traveller who, after copying an inscription according to what he thought, ought to have been its meaning, destroyed the original; nay, he may falsify unawares the ethnic history of the human race.

Several sentences having been once written down, the Missionary should put them by for a time, and then read them aloud to the natives. If they understand what he reads, and if they understand it even if read by somebody else, his work has been successful, and a translation of the Bible carried out on these principles among Papuas or Khyengs will assuredly one day become the basis for the literature of the future.

Although the basis of our Standard Alphabet is purely physiological, still no letter has been admitted into it, which does not actually occur in one of the well known languages of Asia or Europe. The number of letters might easily have been increased, if we had attempted to represent all the slight shades of pronunciation, which affect certain letters in different languages, dialects, patois, or in the mouth of individuals. But to increase the number of letters is tantamount to diminishing the usefulness of an alphabet.

It may happen, indeed, as we become acquainted, through the persevering labours of Missionaries, with the numerous tongues of Africa, Polynesia, and Asia, that new sounds will have to be acknowledged, and will have an independent place allotted to them in our system. But here it should be a principle, as binding as any of the principles which have guided us in the composition of our alphabet, that

"No new sound should ever be acknowledged as such, until we are able to give a clear and scientific definition of it on physiological grounds."

We are too prone perhaps to imagine, particularly where we have to deal with languages gathered from the mouth of a single interpreter, or in the intercourse with a few travellers, that we hear sounds of an entirely new character, and apparently requiring a new sign. But if we heard the same language spoken for a number of years and by a thousand speakers, the natural variety of pronunciation would make our ears less sensitive, and more capable of appreci-

ating the general rule, in spite of individual exceptions. We are not accustomed to pay attention to each consonant and vowel, as they are pronounced in our own language; and if we try for the first time to analyse each word as we hear it, and to write down every vowel and consonant in a language we do not understand, say Russian or Welsh, we shall be able to appreciate the difficulties which a Missionary has to overcome, if he tries to fix a language alphabetically, before he himself can converse in it freely. It has happened, that travellers collecting the dialects of tribes in the Caucasus or on the frontiers of India, have brought home and published lists of words gathered on the same spot and from the same people, and yet so different in their alphabetical appearances, that the same dialect has figured in ethnological works, under two different names. Much must be left to the discretion of Missionaries; for in most cases it is impossible to control the observations which they have made in countries hitherto unexplored, and in dialects known to themselves alone. But it will be found that Missionaries who know their language best, and have used it for the greatest number of years, familiar thus with all its sounds and accents, are least clamorous for new types, and most willing to indicate, in a general manner, what they know can never be represented with perfect accuracy. Too much distinction leads to confusion, and it shows a spirit of wise economy in the Phenician, the Greek, the Roman, and Teutonic nations, that they have contrived to express the endless variety of their pronunciation by so small a number of letters, rather than invent new signs and establish new distinctions. Attempts have been made occasionally, at Rome and elsewhere, to introduce new letters; but they have failed; and though *we* may feel no scruple to introduce new signs, and marks and accents into the African alphabets; though *we*, with our resources, may succeed for a time in framing an alphabet of our own where each letter, besides its simple value, has two or three additional values expressed by one, two, or three accents piled one upon the other,—common sense, without appealing to history, should teach us, that Africa will never bear what Europe has found insupportable.

The following alphabet, taken out of the general system of sounds, defined physiologically and represented graphically in the preceding pages, will be found to supply all that is necessary for the ordinary

purposes of the Missionary, in his relation to tribes whom he has to teach the writing and reading of their own spoken language, pronounced inevitably by them with shades of sound that no alphabet can render. In philological works intended for a European public, the case will be different. Here it will be necessary to represent the accents of words, the quantities of vowels, and other features essential for grammatical purposes. Here the larger alphabet will come in; and it will always prove a reserve-fund to the scholar and Missionary, from which they can draw, after their usual supply of letters has been exhausted.

It should be borne in mind, that although in this smaller alphabet it would be easy to suggest improvements, no partial alteration can be made with any single letter, without disturbing at once the whole system of which it is but a segment.

Missionary Alphabet.

1.	a, a	Sam, psalm.	22.	z	zeal.
2.	b	bed.			—
3.	d	dock.	23.	g	join, gin.
4.	e, e	debt, date.	24.	k	church.
5.	f	fat.	25.	ng (n')	English.
6.	g	gate.	26.	ny (ñ)	España, new.
7.	h (')	hand.	27.	h ('h)	loch.
8.	i, i	knit, neat.	28.	s	she.
9.	k	kite.	29.	z	pleasure.
10.	l	let.	30.	th	thin.
11.	m	man.	31.	dh	the.
12.	n	not.			—
13.	o, o	not, note.	32.	o (ø, ö)	but, birch, work.
14.	p	pan.	33.	ai	ire.
15.	r	run.	34.	au	proud.
16.	s	sun.	35.	oi	voice.
17.	t	tan.	36.	ou	bought.
18.	u, u	full, fool.	37.	ä	Väter.
19.	v	vail.	38.	ö	König.
20.	w	will.	39.	ü	Güte.
21.	y	yet.			

If we compare this list of letters with the Anglo-Hindustani alphabet, so ably advocated by Sir Charles Trevelyan, the differences between the two are indeed but small; and if we had only to agree

upon a small alphabet sufficient to express the sounds of the spoken Hindustāni, there is no reason why the Anglo-Hindustāni alphabet should not be adopted. It expresses the general sounds which occur in Oriental dialects, and it employs but five dotted letters, for which new types would be required.

The defects of this system become apparent, however, as soon as we try to expand it; and we are obliged to do this even in order to write Hindustāni, unless we are ready to sacrifice the etymological distinction of words by expressing **ا** and **ح** by h, **س**, **ث**, and **ص** by s, **ت** and **ط** by t, and **ز**, **ذ**, **ض**, and **ظ** by z. If distinct types must be invented to distinguish these letters, the array of dotted letters will be considerably increased. Even in Hindustāni we should have to use different diacritical marks where we have to express two, three, or four modifications of the same type; and it would become extremely perplexing to remember the meaning of all these marks. Our difficulties would be considerably increased if we tried to adapt the same letters to more developed alphabets, like Sanskrit and Arabic; and if we went on adding hooks and crooks, crosses and half-moons, dots and accents, &c., we should in the end have more modified than simple types.

These modified types might, no doubt, be reduced to a certain system; and, after determining the possible modifications of guttural and dental consonants, each diacritical mark might be used as the exponent of but one modification. A glance at the comparative table of the different systems of transliteration will show how this has been achieved by different scholars more or less successfully.

But it is only after this has been done, after all letters have been classified, after their possible modifications have been determined, after each modification has been provisionally marked by a certain exponent — such as the accent for expressing the palatal, dots for expressing the lingual modification, — it is *then* only that the real problem presents itself: “How can all these sounds be expressed by us in writing and printing, without sacrificing all chances of arriving in the end at one uniform and universal alphabet?” It is clear that every type that has to be compounded or cast afresh is an impediment in the progress of uniformity, because those who have once provided themselves with diacritical types will not change them for

others, and those who have but a common English font at their disposal will express the necessary modifications as best they can. The question, then, that must be solved, is not whether we should take dots or hooks, but whether it is possible to express all essential modifications in such a manner as to take away all excuse for individual crotchets, by proposing an expedient accessible to every one. This can be done if we avail ourselves of the resources of our fonts, which invariably contain a supply of one class of modified letters—italics. Many scholars, from Halhed down to Ellis, have seen the use to which these letters could be put in transliterating Oriental languages; but they have not hitherto been employed systematically. The principle by which we have been guided in making use of italics is this :

As in each language most letters are liable to but one modification, let that modification, whatever it be, be expressed by italics.

We thus reduce the number of letters, in our physiological alphabet, that require diacritical marks, on account of their being liable to more than one modification in the same language, to two; and while our Missionary alphabet is thus accessible in every part of the world, we reserve our few diacritical dots to the purposes of transliteration, where, as in Arabic, we may have to represent the same type with more than one diacritical mark.

b. *To written Languages.*

Though this is a question which for the present hardly falls within the compass of Missionary labours, still it may be useful to show that, if required, our alphabet would also be found applicable to the transliteration of written languages. Besides, wherever Missionary influence is powerful enough, it should certainly be exerted towards breaking down those barriers which, in the shape of different alphabets, prevent the free intercourse of the nations of the East.

The philologist and the archæologist must, indeed, acquire a knowledge of these alphabets, as in the case when their study is a language extinct, and existing, perhaps, in the form of inscriptions alone. But where there is no important national literature clinging to a national alphabet, where there are but incipient traces of a reviving civilisation, the multiplicity of alphabets—the worthless remnant of a bygone

civilisation bequeathed, for instance, to the natives of India — should be attacked as zealously by the Missionary as the multiplicity of castes and of divinities. In the Dekhan alone, with hardly any literature of either national or general importance, we have six different alphabets — the Telugu, Tamil, Canarese, Malabar, Tuluva, and Singhalese — all extremely difficult and inconvenient for practical purposes. Likewise, in the northern dialects of India almost every one has its own corruption of the Sanskrit alphabet, sufficiently distinct to make it impossible for a Bengalese to read Guzerati, and for a Mahratta to read Kashmirian letters. Why has no attempt been made to interfere, and recognise at least but one Sanskritic alphabet for all the northern, and one Tamulian alphabet for all the southern, languages of India? In the present state of the country, it would be bold and wise to go even beyond this; for there is very little that deserves the name of a national literature in the modern dialects of the Hindus. The sacred, legal, and poetical literature of India is either Arabic, Persian, or Sanskrit. Little has grown up since, in the spoken languages of the day. Now it would be hopeless, should it ever be attempted, to eradicate the spoken dialects of India, and to supplant them by Persian or English. In a country so little concentrated, so thinly governed, so slightly educated, we cannot even touch at present what we wish to eradicate. If India were laid open by highroads, reduced by railways, and colonised by officials, the attempt might be conceivable, though, as to anything like success, a trip through Wales, and a glance at the history of England, would be a sufficient answer. But what might be done in India, perhaps even now, is to supplant the various native alphabets by Roman letters. The people in India who can write are just the men most open to Government influence. If the Roman alphabet were taught in the village schools — of late much encouraged by the Government, particularly in the north-western provinces — if all official documents, in whatever language, had to be transcribed into Roman letters to obtain legal value; if the Government would issue all laws and proclamations transcribed in Roman characters, and Missionaries do the same with their translations of the Bible and other works published in any dialect of India, I think we might live to see one alphabet used from the “snows” to Ceylon.

Let us see, then, how our physiological Missionary alphabet could

be applied to languages which have not only an alphabet of their own, but also an established system of orthography.

We have here to admit two leading principles :—

First, that in transliterating written languages, every letter, however much its pronunciation may vary, should always be represented by the same Roman type, and that every Roman type should always represent the same foreign letter, whatever its phonetic value may be in different combinations.

Secondly, that every double letter, though in pronunciation it may be simple, should be transliterated by a double letter, and that a single letter, although its pronunciation be that of a double letter, should be transliterated by a single letter.

If these two principles be strictly observed, everyone will be able to translate in his mind a Canarese book, written with Roman letters, back into Canarese letters, without losing a tittle of the peculiar orthography of Canarese. If we attempted to represent the sounds in transcribing literary languages, we should be unable to tell how, in the original, sounds admitting of several graphic representations were represented. In written languages, therefore, we must rest satisfied with transliterating letters, and not attempt to transcribe sounds.

This will cause certain difficulties, particularly in languages where pronunciation and spelling differ considerably. In Arabic we must write al ra'hman, though we pronounce arra'hman; and even in Greek, if we had to transliterate ἐγγύς, we should, no doubt, have to write 'eggus, though none but a Greek scholar would know how to pronounce this correctly ('engüs). But if, instead of imitating the letters, we attempted to represent their proper pronunciation at a certain period of history, how should it be known, for instance, in transcribing the French of the nineteenth century, whether "su" stood for "sou," halfpenny, or "sous," under, or "soul," tipsy. In historical languages the system of orthography is too important a point to be lost in transcribing, though it is a mistake to imagine that in living languages all etymological understanding would be lost if phonetic reforms were introduced. The change in the pronunciation of words, though it may seem capricious, is more uniform and regular than we imagine; and if all words were written alike according to a certain system of phonetics, we should lose very little more of etymology than

we have already lost. Nay, in some cases, the etymology would be re-established by a more consistent phonetic spelling. If we wrote "foreign" "forĕn," and "sovereign" "soverĕn," we should not be led to imagine that either was derived from "reign," regnum, and the analogy of such words as "Africĕn" would point out "foranus" or "foraneus" as the proper etymon of "forĕn." But although every nation has the right to reform the orthography of its language, with all things else, where usage has too far receded from original intention, still, so long as a literary language maintains its historical spelling, the principle of transliteration must be to represent letter by letter, not sound by sound.

Which letter in our physiological alphabet should be fixed upon as the fittest representative of another letter in Arabic or Sanskrit, in Hindustāni or Canarese, must in each case depend on special agreement. If we found that  in Sanskrit had in most words the nature of the guttural spiritus, we should have to write it ' or h, even though in some respects it may represent the guttural semi-vowel. If y in Hebrew can be proved to have been originally the simple guttural semi-vowel, it will have to be written 'h, even though it was pronounced as semi-vocalis fricata ('h), as guttural flatus asper ('h), as guttural media aspirata (gh), or not pronounced at all. Likewise, if English were to be transliterated with our alphabet, we should not adopt any of the principles of the "Fonetic Nus;" but here also, if the letter h had been fixed upon as on the whole the fittest representative of the English letter h, we should have to write it even where it was not pronounced, as in honest.

It will be the duty of Academies and scientific societies to settle, for the principal languages, which letters in the Missionary alphabet will best express their corresponding alphabetical signs.

The first question, taking a type, for instance, of the Sanskrit alphabet, would be, "What is its most usual and most original value?" If this be fixed, then, "Is there another type which has a better claim to this value?" If so, their claims must be weighed and adjusted. When this question is settled, and the physiological category is found under which the Sanskrit type has its proper place, we have then to look for the exponent of this physiological category in the Missionary alphabet, and henceforth always to transliterate the one by the other.

The following lists will show how some of the Arian, Semitic, and Turanian languages have been transliterated, and how all these alphabets and their transcriptions can be expressed by means of the Missionary alphabet. Objections, I am aware, can hardly fail to be raised on several points, because the original character of several Hebrew, Arabic, and Sanskrit letters has been so frequently controverted. If the disputed value of these letters can be clearly settled by argument, be it so; and it will then never be difficult to find the exponent of that physiological category to which it has been adjudged. Failing this, the question should be decided by authority or agreement; for, of two views which are equally plausible, we must, for practical purposes, manifestly confine ourselves to one.

TEXT OF A HYMN OF THE RIGVEDA,

TRANSCRIBED WITH THE MISSIONARY ALPHABET.

(A Translation is given in Vol. I. p. 140.)

Na-asad asin, no sad asit tadanīm, na-asid rago, no vyoma paro yat,
 Kim avarivaḥ ? kuha kasya sarmann ? ambhaḥ kim asid gahanam gabhiram ?
 Na mrityur asid, amritam na tarhi; na ratrya ahna asit praketaḥ —
 Anid avatam svadhaya tad ekam, tasmad dha-anyam na paraḥ kimā na-asa.
 Tama asit, tamasa gulham agre 'praketaḥ salilam sarvam a idam,
 Tukṛyena-abhv apihitam yad asit tapasas tan mahina-agayata-ekam.
 Kamas tad agre samavartata-adhi, manaso retaḥ prathamam yad asit,
 Sato bandhum asati niravindan hridi pratiṣṭha kavayo manisha.
 Tiraskino vitato rasmir esham adha evid asid ? upari svid asit ? —
 Retodha asan, mahimana asant, svadha avastat, prayatiḥ parastat.
 Ko addha veda, ka iha pravokāt, kuta agata kuta iyam visriṣṭiḥ ?
 Arvag deva asya visarganena-atha ko veda yata ababhava ?
 Iyam visriṣṭiḥ yata ababhava, yadi va dadhe yadi va na,
 Yo asya-adhyakṣaḥ parama vyomant, so anga veda—yadi va na veda.

Oxford, Christmas, 1853.

THE END OF "OUTLINES."

LONDON:

A. and G. A. SPOTTISWOODS,
 New-street-Square.

SOME OF THE CHIEF SYS'

				Missionary Alphabet	SANSKRIT.	Halbed.	Gilchrist.
Gutturals							
1.	tenuis	-	-	-	k	क	k
2.	„	aspirata	-	-	kh	ख	k,h
31.	„	aspirata	-	-	g	-	-
32.	flatus asper,	1.	-	-	s	स	s
33.	„	2.	-	-	f	-	-
34.	„	lenis	-	-	z	-	z
35.	„	asprerrimus	-	-	ḥ	-	-
36.	„	„	diacrit.	-	ḥ	-	-
Lingualis							
37.	tenuis	-	-	-	t	ट	t
38.	„	aspirata	-	-	th	ठ	t,h
39.	media	-	-	-	d	ड	d