THE
SÁNKHYA KÁRIKÁ,
OR
MEMORIAL VERSES ON THE SÁNKHYA PHILOSOPHY,
BY
ÍSWARA KRISHNA;
TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSKRIT
BY
HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ.

ALSO
THE BHÁSHYA OR COMMENTARY OF
GAURAPÁDA;
TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,
BY
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TO

SIR GRAVES CHAMNEY HAUGHTON, M.A. F.R.S.

AS TO ONE

WHO WAS THE FRIEND AND ADMIRER

OF THE LATE

HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE;

WHO IS QUALIFIED,

BY HIS CONVERSANCY WITH THE SANSCRIT LANGUAGE

AND METAPHYSICAL INQUIRIES,

TO APPRECIATE THE CORRECTNESS WITH WHICH

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS

IS REPRESENTED IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES;

AND

WHO HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN UNITED WITH THEIR AUTHOR

IN STUDIES, SENTIMENTS, AND FRIENDSHIP;

THE PRESENT WORK IS INSCRIBED,

AS A PUBLIC TESTIMONY OF ESTEEM AND REGARD,

BY

HORACE HAYMAN WILSON.
ONE of the works earliest announced for publication by the Oriental Translation Fund Committee was the *Sánkhya Káriká*, a text book of that system of Hindu philosophy to which the term *Sánkhya* is applied, and which had been translated from Sanscrit into English by that eminent Sanscrit scholar the late Henry Thomas Colebrooke. The accession of the lingering illness which finally terminated in his decease prevented Mr. Colebrooke from conducting his work through the press, and from adding to the translation those explanations and illustrations which the text required, and which he was most competent to supply. Upon my return to England from India, therefore, in the beginning of 1833, I found that no progress had been made in the publication, and that the Translation of the text alone was in the possession of the Committee.

Being desirous of redeeming the pledge which they had publicly given, and of accomplishing the purpose which they had announced, the Committee thought it desirable that the Translation, in its then existing form, should be printed; and conceived that, as its extent was insufficient to constitute a separate work, it would be advisable to print it in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society. With this view the manuscript was placed in my hands, that I should render such assistance as I might be able to afford in the correction of the press.

Conceiving that the appearance of the Translation in the pages of the Transactions would be equally incompatible with the views of the Translator and the original intention of the Committee, I ventured to recommend that their purpose should be adhered to, and
that the Translation should be printed, as at first designed, as a separate work; offering at the same time to supply such annotations as the text might seem to require, to be rendered sufficiently intelligible and explicit. The Committee approved of the suggestion, and Mr. Colebrooke's concurrence was readily obtained.

In the meantime, in the interval that had elapsed since the work was announced, other translations of the Sánkhya Káriká had appeared. The Sanscrit text, and a version of it in Latin by Professor Lassen, had been printed at Bonn; and the text in Roman characters, with a French translation, had been published at Paris by Mons. Pauthier. Many of the verses of the translation had been also embodied in Mr. Colebrooke's general view of the Sánkhya philosophy; and it appeared to me expedient, therefore, to make some such addition to the work as should give it at least more novelty than it was otherwise likely to possess. It seemed also to be a favourable occasion for offering to Sanscrit students an exemplification of the mode in which philosophical works are illustrated by native commentators; and I accordingly procured the consent of the Translation Committee to print, not only the text and translation of the Sánkhya Káriká, but the text and a translation of the oldest, and perhaps the best, commentary upon the Káriká, the Bhásyā of Gaurapāda. In order likewise to fulfil the object of attempting to render the doctrines of both text and comment as clear and explicit as it was in my power to represent them, I further added to the translation of the Bhásyā a comment of my own, deriving my elucidations however, to a very great extent, from the works of native scholiasts, and giving the original passages at the foot of the page.

The scholia which have been used for this purpose are the

Sānkhyā Tatwa Kaumudī of Vāchespati Misra, and the Sānkhyā Chandrikā of Nārāyana Tīrtha. The Sānkhyā Kaumudī of Rāma Krishna has been also consulted, but it is almost word for word the same as the S. Chandrikā, and is therefore in most instances superfluous. I have occasionally referred to the Sānkhyā Sāra, a separate tract on the doctrines of this school by Vijnāna Bhikshu; but another work by the same scholiast, the Sānkhyā Pravachana Bhāshya, a commentary on the Sūtras or aphorisms of Kapila, the first teacher of the Sānkhya, according to tradition, has been of particular service, and will be found often cited. Copies of these different commentaries, as well as of the text, exist in the library of the East India Company, and the Sānkhyā Pravachana Bhāshya was printed at Serampore in 1821. I have, however, followed a manuscript copy, as I did not obtain a copy of the printed work until my translation was finished.

There was little need of the labour of collation, after the very accurate text of Professor Lassen. I have not failed, however, to compare the reading of the different copies, and have noticed a few of the variations: none of them are of any great importance. Where collation was most wanted, it was unfortunately not practicable, there being but a single copy of the Bhāshya of Gaurapāda in my possession. The manuscript was luckily tolerably correct, but it was doubtful in some places, and clearly faulty in others; and I may not have always succeeded in rightly correcting, or in accurately interpreting it. With regard to typographical errors in the present edition of text and comment, I trust they will not be found very inexcusable, especially when it is known that the work was for the greater part necessarily carried on at a distance from me, during my absence in London, and that it is the first publication in Sanscrit printed at the Press of the University of Oxford.

Not having made the Sānkhya philosophy a subject of study in India, I have executed my task without the advantage of previous
preparation. The subject indeed is but little cultivated by the Pandits, and during the whole of my intercourse with learned natives I met with but one Brahman who professed to be acquainted with the writings of this school. Opportunity was wanting to benefit by his instructions, and I cannot therefore venture to claim exemption from those liabilities to error to which the unassisted study of Sanscrit literature in Europe is exposed, especially when directed to topics sufficiently obscure and difficult in themselves, and rendered still more so by the sententious and elliptical style in which they are treated. It is the fashion with some of the most distinguished Sanscrit scholars on the continent to speak slightingly of native scholiasts and Pandits, but this is the consequence of measuring their merits by a wrong scale, and censuring them for venial inaccuracies which often proceed from too entire a familiarity with their subject. In all studies which native scholars professedly pursue, they have the advantage of traditional tuition, of a course of instruction, coming down, through successive generations, from the founder of a system, or the author of a book, to the individual who explains the one or illustrates the other, and from whose interpretation we may therefore reasonably expect to learn what it was originally meant to teach. There are also in all philosophical works, especially, brief hints and conventional allusions, which without such aid it is not possible to decipher, and for the proper understanding of which a native explanation is indispensable. Without therefore in the least degree undervaluing European industry and ability, I cannot consent to hold in less esteem the attainments of my former masters and friends, the Sanscrit learning of learned Brahmans.

The translations to which I have above referred are highly creditable to the translators. That of Professor Lassen in particular is of great merit and accuracy, and is illustrated by annotations, in which he has successfully cleared up many of the obscurities of the original text. I have taken the plan of his notes as in some degree the
model of my comment; and although I do not always concur in his interpretations or explanations, I have found them always entitled to attention and respect. In one or two instances, and especially in regard to the first stanza, where I have most widely differed from him, I have sought rather to vindicate the accuracy of Mr. Colebrooke, than to impugn that of Professor Lassen. Variety of interpretation in such a case as that of a difficult work, on an abstruse subject, is no more than may be expected from different interpreters; and occasional misapprehension implies no want of either competency or care.

In the course of my attempts to elucidate the text, I have in a few instances pointed out what seemed to me to offer remarkable coincidences with the doctrines of classical philosophers. That an intimate connection exists between the metaphysical systems of the Hindus and those of the Greeks is generally admitted, although its extent has not yet been fully made out. We are scarcely yet indeed in possession of the means of instituting an accurate comparison, as the text books of the Hindus have not been printed or translated, and general dissertations, however comprehensive or profound, are insufficient for the purpose: The present publication will go some way, perhaps, towards supplying the deficiency, and may afford, as far as it extends, authentic materials for the use of those better qualified classical scholars who may be curious to ascertain in what degree the speculations of Plato and Aristotle correspond with those of Kapila and Gautama, or how far the teachers of one school may have been indebted to those of another. That the Hindus derived any of their philosophical ideas from the Greeks seems very improbable; and if there is any borrowing in the case, the latter were most probably indebted to the former. It has been objected to this conjecture, that the total want of chronology in Hindu writings renders it impossible to pronounce upon their date, and that it is probable that many works regarded as ancient are really very modern, as they may
have been composed long after the æra of Christianity; the notions which they inculcate being in fact acquired from the Greeks of Alexandria, through the intercourse between India and Egypt. That this intercourse may have exercised a mutual influence upon some parts of the philosophy of both countries in the first ages of Christianity—that resemblances, respectively interchanged, may be detected in the notions of the new Platonists or Platonic Christians and of the more modern Védantis, or in the eclectic pantheism of the Pauraniks—is not impossible; but the Greek philosophy of that period can scarcely have suggested the severer abstractions of the Sánkhya, and we must go back to a remoter age for the origin of the dogmas of Kapila. In truth, the more remote the period, the closer the affinity that seems to prevail; and as far as we are acquainted with the tenets of the Ionic and Italic schools, it is with them that Hindu philosophy, unalloyed with pantheism, seems to claim kindred, rather than with the mysticism of Plato, or the subtleties of Aristotle. The metempsychosis itself is an important feature in this similitude: for this belief is not to be looked upon as a mere popular superstition; it is the main principle of all Hindu metaphysics; it is the foundation of all Hindu philosophy. The great object of their philosophical research in every system, Brahmanical or Buddhist, is the discovery of the means of putting a stop to further transmigration; the discontinuance of corporeal being; the liberation of soul from body. That such was the leading principle of the philosophy of Pythagoras we learn from ancient testimony, and it essentially influences the speculations of Plato. Concurrence in this principle involves agreement in all the most important deductions from it, and establishes, if not a mutual interchange, at least a common origin, for much of the oldest philosophy of the Greeks and the Hindus. This is a subject, however, to which I can here but thus briefly allude, and to which I would rather invite the attention of some of the eminent scholars of whom the University of Oxford has reason
to be proud, than impair its interest by my own less competent attempts at its elucidation.

The whole scope and leading tenets of the Sánkhya philosophy have been most accurately described by the late Mr. Colebrooke, in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, from various original authorities, including that now published, the Káriká, or rather Kárikás, of the Sánkhya system; the term designating a collection of memorial verses, of apothegmatical stanzas, in which the chief tenets of the school are textually and dogmatically stated. The Sánkhya philosophy is so termed, as Mr. Colebrooke has mentioned, because it observes precision of reckoning in the enumeration of its principles, Sánkhya being understood to signify 'numeral,' agreeably to the usual acceptation of Sankhyá, 'number;' "and hence its analogy to the Pythagorean philosophy has been presumed." The term is also explained, however, as Mr. Colebrooke proceeds to mention, to denote the result of deliberation or judgment, such being one sense of the word Sankhyá, from which Sánkhya is derived.

Agreeably to the purport of the word Káriká, 'a technical or memorial verse,' the following work consists of a series of stanzas systematically arranged, though not always obviously connected; and asserting principles, rather than discussing arguments. The tract opens with an explanation of the object of this and of all philosophy, ascertainment of the means by which the pain of corporeal existence may be finally and absolutely remedied, and the soul freed for ever from body: this is declared alone to be philosophy, or the knowledge of the real nature of all that is, agreeably to the Sánkhya enumeration of things. These things, in number twenty-five, are briefly indicated with reference to their relative character, as producing or produced; and the work then pauses to explain the means by which they may be known, or perception, inference, and authority. Repeating then to such of the twenty-five things or principles as are imperceptible, especially to the first material cause, and to soul,
logical proofs of their actual existence are adduced, and the points in which they agree or differ with other things, and with each other, are described. We have then an explanation of the three essential qualities of things; purity or goodness; imperfection, foulness, or passion; and indifference, stupidity, or darkness. The existence of a general, imperceptible, unseparated, universal cause, the substance of which all is made, the eternal matter of the Greek cosmogonies, is then argued; and, as a consequence of its existence, that also of a spiritual nature, or soul, is asserted. The properties of soul are then detailed. We have next the twenty-five Tatwas, 'categories or principles,' of the Sánkhya philosophy severally described. These all resolve themselves, as may be inferred from what has preceded, into but two, matter and spirit, nature and soul; the rest are all the progeny or products of nature, evolved spontaneously through the necessity of nature's providing for the two purposes of soul, fruition and liberation. These products are, intelligence; egotism or individuality; eleven senses, ten external and one internal, or mind; five rudimental elements, or elements of elements; and five gross or perceptible elements, ether, air, water, fire or light, and earth. The description of these different categories, of their mode and objects of acting, of their modifications, and of their effects, occupies a considerable number of Kárikás. We have then a general account of bodily condition of two kinds, subtile and gross; the latter perishing at death, the former accompanying and investing soul through all the migrations to which the various conditions of the intellectual faculty, or virtue and vice, subject it. Those conditions are then detailed at length, and in all their modifications, constituting what is called intellectual creation, or life, consequent upon conduct, originating with the intellect. But, to give effect to these modifications, form, as well as life, is said to be necessary; and hence results personal or bodily creation of various descriptions. Bodily existence, however, is described as confinement and pain, from which soul is anxious to
be exempted. Nature is said to labour also for soul's liberation, and to supply the means, in the display which it makes of its products, until soul, fully possessed of their real character and tendency, is represented as casting away all notions of individuality and self, and is no more condemned to bodily incarceration. The work closes with stating that these truths were taught originally by Kapila to Ásuri, and by him to Panchasikha, from whom it descended, through repeated generations of disciples, to Íswara Krishna, the author of the Kárikás. The date of this writer is not known, but Mr. Colebrooke considers Gaúrapáda, the scholiast on the Káriká, to be the same as the preceptor of the celebrated teacher Sánkara Áchárya, whom there is reason to place in the eighth century. How long anterior to this the Kárikás existed in their present form, we have no means of knowing, but they were avowedly subsequent to other standard compositions of the school, and evidently represent doctrines of high antiquity, doctrines exhibiting profound reflection and subtle reasoning; although, like all the efforts of human intellect to penetrate unaided the mysteries of existence, wholly unavailing, and too often ending, as Cicero complains, in doubt and impiety: "Cogimur dissensione sapientum Dominum nostrum ignorare."

Some excuse is perhaps necessary for having delayed to publish the present work so long after the Committee of the Oriental Translation Fund had sanctioned its publication. The work, as it is now offered to the public, was ready for press in the course of the year following that in which it was undertaken. Being desirous, however, of printing it at Oxford, where the University had liberally resolved to provide its Press with two new founts of Devanagari letters, I was under the necessity of awaiting the completion of the types. As soon as one fount was supplied, the text was printed. It was my wish to have employed the other and smaller fount for the citations which accompany my Comment; but that fount being not yet cast,
I have thought it preferable to incur no further delay. It is scarcely doing justice to types of the size here employed to place them in juxtaposition with characters so much smaller as those of the English alphabet; but looking at them by themselves, in the pages of the text, I think they will be found to wear a more genuinely Oriental aspect than any that have yet been fabricated in Europe.

Oxford,
July 1, 1837.
SÁNKHYA KÁRIKÁ.

I.

The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment: nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.

BHÁSHYA.

Salutation to that Kapila by whom the Sáňkhya philosophy was compassionately imparted, to serve as a boat for the purpose of crossing the ocean of ignorance in which the world was immersed.

I will declare compendiously the doctrine, for the benefit of students; a short easy work, resting on authority, and establishing certain results.

Three sorts of pain.—The explanation of this Añya stanza is as follows:

The divine Kapila, the son of Brahmá indeed: as it is said, “Sanaka, Sanandana, and Sanatana the third; Asuri, Kapila, Borhu, and Panchasikha: these seven sons of Brahmá were termed great sages.” Together with Kapila were born Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power: for he being born, and observing the world plunged in profound darkness by the succeeding series of worldly revolutions, was filled with compassion; and to his kinsman, the Brahman Asuri, he communicated a knowledge of the twenty-five principles; from which knowledge the destruction of pain proceeds. As it is said; “He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated (from existence): of this there is no doubt.”

The inquiry is in consequence of the embarrassment of the three sorts
of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1. (ādhyātmika) natural and inseparable; 2. (ādhibhautika) natural and extrinsic; and 3. (ādhi-
daiwika) non-natural or superhuman. The first is of two kinds, corporeal and mental: corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm; mental is privation of what is liked, approximation of what is disliked. Extrinsic but natural pain is fourfold, according to the aggregation of elementary matter whence it originates; that is, it is produced by any created beings, whether viviparous, oviparous, generated by heat and moisture, or springing from the soil; or in short, by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles, gnats, musquitoes, lice, hugs, fish, alligators, sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may be called superhuman, daiwika meaning either divine or atmospheric: in the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.

Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the embarrassment of the three kinds of pain, to be made? Into the means of precluding them. This is the inquiry. Nor is the inquiry superfluous. That is; if this inquiry be (regarded as) superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of pain being obvious (seen); as for example; the internal means of alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, bitter, and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of those objects that are disliked, and accession of those that are liked; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes is protection and the like; and these means being obvious, any (farther) inquiry is superfluous: if you think in this manner, it is not so; for absolute, certain, final, permanent, obstruction (of pain) is not (to be effected) by obvious means. Therefore inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of prevention which are absolute and final.

COMMENT.

The first verse of the Kārikā proposes the subject of the work, and not only of that, but of the system to which it belongs, and of every philosophical system studied by the Hindus; the common end of which
is, ascertainment of the means by which perpetual exemption from the metempsychosis, or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained: for life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of pain and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from which finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational existence cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities of his nature, and the accidents of his condition: and the primary object of philosophical inquiry therefore is, the means by which the imperfections flesh is heir to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to their right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means are not conducive to this end; such, namely, as obvious but temporary expedients, whether physical or moral.

Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first number of his Gymnosophista, containing the translation of the Karikā, has given a version differing in some respects from Mr. Colebrooke’s. He thus renders it: “E tergeminorum dolorum impetu oritur desiderium cognitionis, qua ii depellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet in visibilibus rebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter absentiam absoluti, et omni superstitis remedii.”

In the first member of this sentence, the translation of abhīghāta by ‘impetus’ is irreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the doctrine laid down is ‘impediment, embarrassment, the prevention of liberation by worldly cares and sufferings.’ So the same word abhīghātaka is immediately used to mean ‘preventing, removing,’ ‘depells.’ Professor Lassen’s text, it is true, reads apaghātaka, but this is not the reading followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of the text given in the S. Bhāṣya or S. Kaumudi; it is that of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and S. Chandrikā, and although in itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable variation. At any rate there can be no question that the word abhīghāta may be used in the sense of ‘depellere,’ and that sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior member of the hemistich. So in the Bhāṣya of Gaurapāda we have ādhībhautikasya rakṣā-dīna abhīghātah; ‘The prevention of extrinsic pain is by protection and
the like.' It would not be possible here to render abhīghāta by 'impetus.' By Vāchespati the term abhīghāta is defined 'the confinement of the sentient faculty (explained to mean here 'life'), through the impediment opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit.*' Nārāyana interprets it more concisely asūkṣa sambandha†, 'intolerable restraint.' 'Embarrassment' therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstructions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious to be free.

This variation, however, is of no great consequence: the more important difference is in the second portion of the stanza; and as Professor Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr. Colebrooke, it is necessary to examine the passage more in detail. The following are his reasons for the version he has made:

"Hæc posterioris versus (drish्या etc.) interpretatio, sicuti scholiastarum suffragis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, ne levi­ter rationem, a Colebrooke, V. summō, in hoc versus enarrando initam desersisse censear. Is enim: 'nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist: for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.' Sed vereor, ne vir summus constructionem particulae chēt sententiam claudentis et a negatione excepte male intellex­erit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. prom. d. 28. Ex interpret. Colebrook. construendum esset: drish्या sc. sati (i.e. yadyapi drish्यam vidya tē) sā (jijnāsā) apārthā na ekānta—abhāvat.† Sed ut omittam, particulae chēt nullum omnino reliquii locum in sententia, na inopportuno versus loco collocatum esse, non potes quin concedas. Male omnino se habet tota sententia et claudicat. Equidem construo: drish्या sā (jijnāsā) apārthā (bhavati) chēt (tathāpi) na (apārthā bhavati) ēkānta—abhāvāt.‖ Prorsus similiter dicitur nābhāvāt infr. v. 8. Ablativum igitur ēkāntayantoh

* दुःखवेषांत:करायवसिना प्रतिकूलतया चेतनाशक्षेरभिसंवयोंभि

† असाहसवचः। † हेत्ते तति (यद्यपि हेत्ते विखते) सा (जिज्ञासा) अधारणो न एकः—भावात्। † हेत्ते सा (जिज्ञासा) अधारणो (मवति) चेत्

(तथापि) न (अधारणो भवति) एकः—भावात्।
abhāvāt, non ad drṣṭē refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad negationem, quae cum supplementis suis apodosin constitut. Nam quae post chānēna sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere semper observavi. Quam grammatica postulare videtur, patitur praeterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo melior evadit sententia. Ad drṣṭē enim relatis istis verbis, id tantum dicitur, rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi posse philosophiā finem, liberationem absolutam et perpetuam a doloribus; mea posita enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc: finem istum posse attingi, licet alio cognitionis genere. Tres omnino positiones altero he- mistichii versus continetur: philosophiā (id enim valet gignāsā, i. e. cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam et omne tempus transagredientem; deinde ad eum non perveniri ea via quae primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensibilibus rebus petitorum ope; denique ea remedia cognoscendi desiderium posse expleri. Sed alter atque Colebrookius hasce sententias inter se conjungit noster, et per conditionem effert, quod ille per negationem enuntiat."

In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refinement that does not belong to it, and which is not Indian: arguments are often elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit dialectics, but one position at a time is usually sufficient for even Brahmanical subtlety. The only position here advanced is, that the cure of worldly evil is not to be effected by such remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as they can only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemption from calamity, if it involves the obligation of being born again.

The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon his notion of the grammatical force of the expression chānēna or chēt, 'if,' na, 'not:.' the former he would refer to the prior member of the sentence, the latter to the subsequent expressions. But this division of the compound is not that which is most usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an elliptical negation of a preceding assertion, chēt referring to what has been said, implying, 'if you assert or believe this;' and na meeting it with a negatur, 'it is not so:' then follows the reason or argument of the denial. Thus in the Muktāvalli: 'But why should not Darkness be
called a tenth thing, for it is apprehended by perception? If this be said, it is not so (iti chén-na); for it is the consequence of the non-existence of absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate it amongst things*.'

So in the Nyāya Sūtra Vritti: 'If by a disturbance in the assembly there be no subsequent speech, and through the want of a reply there be defeat; if this be urged, it is not so (iti chén-na), because there has been no opportunity for an answer †.' Again in the Sāṅkhya Pravachana Bhāṣya. Sūtra:—'If it be said that Prakriti is the cause of bondage, it is not so, from its dependent state‡.' Comment:—'But bondage may be occasioned by Prakriti. If this be asserted, it is not so. Why? Because in the relation of bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will be explained in the following precept ‖.' Also in the Vedānta Sūtra Vivriti: 'If in consequence of such texts of the Vedas as “let sacrifice be performed as long as life endures” their performance is indispensable, and constant and occasional rites must be celebrated by those engaged in the attainment of true knowledge; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of true knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies; then a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew the world. If this be asserted, it is not so (iti chén-na), from the compatibility of severality with union, as in the case of articles of khayar or other wood.§:'

* । ननु दशं दशं तम: कुन्ती नीलक्ष्य तत्सि प्रयंत्येति गृहस्त इति चेच ज्ञाव स्वरूपानि भावेनोपपति द्रष्टार्क्रमवस्या ज्ञामयानात्। । सभाक्षी भाविना वेदान्तवेशमेव उपायसिप्तस्य चेदम्भित्वाति चेच उपयवस्या भावात्। । । प्रकृतिविवङ्गाविष्ठ वस्या भापि पारार्थः। । । ननु प्रकृत
तिनिविन्वायती भवित्व चेच यत्रस्या भापि वस्या संयोगार्थः मुच्छरसुची वस्याक्षारान प्रकृतिः। । § ॥ ननु यक्षाणां यावजीवं वाकेनाव
र्यक्ष्यतयतया प्राप्तानां विविधार्थे निवादनिवित्यसंयोगः प्रसज्जेत यदि च विविधार्थे यक्षायुक्तानामपरमित्वत तत: संसारस्यावृक्षस्य धिनिनुषान
स्वादित्चेच सादिरादित्व संयोगपञ्चकोपपसेः।
may be selected from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous form used affirmatively; as, ‘But how by the efficacy of knowledge, after the dissipation of ignorance, in regard to the object (of philosophy), can the true nature of the essentially happy (being) be attained? for as he is eternally existent, knowledge is not necessary to establish his existence. If this he asserted, it is true (iti chét; satyam). Brahme, one essentially with felicity, is admitted to he eternal, but in a state of ignorance he is not obtained; like a piece of gold which is forgotten (and sought for), whilst it is hanging round the neck*. Here it would be impossible to refer satyam to the succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis being separated from it, not only by the sense, but by the particle api. Passages of this description might be indefinitely multiplied, but these are sufficient to shew that the construction in the sense adopted by Mr. Colebrooke is common and correct.

Accordingly his version is uniformly supported scholiastarum suffragii. Thus in the S. Bháshya, as we have seen, the passage is explained, drishíe sá apáthá chét évam manyásé na ekánta, &c.; ‘If by reason of there being obvious remedies, you think indeed the inquiry superfluous, no (it is not so), from their not being absolute and permanent.’ So in the S. Tatwa Kaumudí, after stating the objection at length, the commentator adds, nirákaroti, na iti; ‘(the author) refutes it (by saying), no, not so’: kutah, ‘why?’ ekántatyantatoh abhává†. The S. Chandriká is to the same effect, or still more explicit: ‘There being obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous, the conclusion being otherwise attained: if (this be urged) such is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it; no, it is not so ‡. This commentator giving the very reading, drishíe sati, which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke’s version would errone-
ously require. The remaining scholiast, Ráma Krishna, adopts the com-
mment of the Chandrika word for word, and consequently the commentators
are unanimous in support of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke.

With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lassen as esta-
blishing the connexion of the negative with the latter member of the
sentence, instead of its being absolute, it will be seen at once that they
are not at all analogous to the passage in our text. They are declaratory,
not argumentative; and the terms following the negative particle are the
parts or circumstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it is
grounded. Thus in the Hitopadesu: 'What will not be, will not be; if it
will be, it will not be otherwise.' So in v. 8. of the Kariká: 'The non-
apprehension of nature is from its subtlety, not from its nonentity.' In
neither of these is there any reference to a foregone position which must
be admitted or denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for
denial, as is the case in our text.

These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate, what it was
scarcely perhaps necessary to have asserted, Mr. Colebrooke's accuracy;
and they are now also somewhat superfluous, as I have been given to
understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his
interpretation. The commentary of Gaurapada distinctly shews that
nothing more is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse
to visible or worldly expedients for the relief or removal of worldly pain.
In subjoining therefore the gloss of Váchespáti Misra, with a translation,
it is intended rather to illustrate the doctrines of the text, and the mode
of their development by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the
correctness of the translation.

† But verily the object of the science may not need inquiry, 1. if there
be no pain in the world; 2. if there be no desire to avoid it; 3. if there
be no means of extirpating it. The impossibility of extirpating it is

* यद्भावि न तद्भावि भाविचेतसदन्ग्यि । ✡ सीत्यात्सनुपत्तचि
नेत्रमानवाति । ✡ एवं हि न शास्त्रविषयो नित्यायेत यदि हूँसं नाम
जगति न स्याति । सहा न जिहासितं । जिहासितं स्यात्सात्सं सभुक्षेत् ।
twofold; either from the eternity of pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviation: or, though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledge which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its removal; or again, there may be some other and more ready means. In the text, however, it is not said that pain does not exist, nor that there is no wish to avoid it. *From the embarrassment of the three kinds of pain.*—A triad of pain, three kinds: they are the ādhyātmika, ‘natural;’ ādhibhautika, ‘extrinsic;’ and ādhidaiivika, ‘superhuman.’ The first is of two kinds, bodily and mental: bodily is caused by disorder of the humours, wind, bile, and phlegm; mental is occasioned by desire, wrath, covetousness, fear, envy, grief, and want of discrimination. These various kinds of pain are called inseparable, from their admitting of internal remedies. The pain that requires external remedies is also twofold, ādhibhautika and ādhidaiivika. The first has for its cause, man, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; the second arises from the evil influence of the planets, or possession by impure spirits (Yakshas, Rākshasas, Vināyakas, &c.). These kinds of pain, depending upon the vicissitudes arising from the quality of foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cannot be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned by the three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment, or...
confinement of the sentient faculty. The capability of knowing the impediment occasioned by such pain, is considered the cause of the desire to avoid it; for though pain may not be prevented, yet it is possible to overcome it, as will be subsequently explained. Pain then being generated, inquiry is to be made into the means of its removal. Tad apaghātakē: tad refers here to the three kinds of pain, tad having the relation dependent upon its being used as a subordinate (relative) term. The means (hetu) of removing.—These are to be derived from philosophy, not from any other source: this is the position (of the text). To this a doubt is objected; As there are obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous; if so—. The sense is this: Be it admitted that there are three kinds of pain; that the rational being wishes to escape from them; that escape is practicable; and that means attainable through philosophy are adequate to their extirpation; still any investigation by those who look into the subject is needless; for there do exist obvious (visible) means of extirpation, which are easily attainable, whilst the knowledge of philosophical principles is difficult of attainment, and to be acquired only by long study, and traditional tuition through many generations. Therefore,
according to the popular saying, “Why should a man who may find honey in the arka flower, go for it to the mountain?” so what wise man will give himself unnecessary trouble, when he has attained the object of his wishes. Hundreds of remedies for bodily affections are indicated by eminent physicians. The pleasures of sense, women, wine, luxuries, unguents, dress, ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental distress. So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating it exist in the skill acquired by acquaintance with moral and political science, and by residing in safe and healthy places, and the like; whilst the employment of gems and charms readily counteracts the evils induced by superhuman agency. This is the objection. (The author) refutes it; it is not so. Why? From these means not being absolute or final. Ekānta means the certainty of the cessation of pain; atyanta, the non-recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of relief there is) the non-existence of both these properties; the affix tasi, which may be substituted for all inflexions, being here put for the sixth case dual;—as it is said; “From not observing the (invariable) cessation of pain of various kinds, in consequence of the employment of ceremonies, drugs, women, moral and political studies, charms, and the like, their want of certain operation (is predicated); so is their temporary influence, from
observing the recurrence of pain that had been suppressed. Although available, therefore, the obvious means of putting a stop to pain are neither absolute nor final, and consequently this inquiry (into other means) is not superfluous.” This is the purport (of the text).

The Sánkhya Chandríká and S. Kaumúdi are both to the same effect, and it is unnecessary to cite them. The original Sútras of Kapila, as collected in the S. Pravachana, and commented on by Vijñyána Bhiushnu, confirm the view taken by the scholiasts.

Sútra:—'The final cessation of the three kinds of pain is the final object of soul*.'

Comment:—'The final cessation of these three kinds of pain, the total cessation of universal pain, whether gross or subtle (present or to come), is the final, supreme object of soul †.'

Sútra:—'The accomplishment of that cessation is not from obvious means, from the evident recurrence (of pain) after suppression ‡.'

Comment:—'The accomplishment of the final cessation of pain is not (to be effected) by worldly means, as wealth, and the like. Whence is this? Because that pain of which the cessation is procured by wealth and the like is seen to occur again, when that wealth and the rest are exhausted.'
II.

The revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

BHÁSHYA.

Although the inquiry is to be directed to other than to obvious remedies, yet it is not to be directed to such as are derivable from revelation, as means of removing the three kinds of pain. Anusravati, 'what man successively hears;' ānusravika, 'that which is thence produced, revealed mode;' that is, established by the Védas: as it is said; "We drank the juice of the acid asclepias; we became immortal; we attained effulgence; we know divine things. What harm can a foe inflict on us? How can decay affect an immortal?" (This text of the Véda refers to) a discussion amongst Indra and other gods, as to how they became immortal. In explanation it was said, "We were drinkers of soma juice, and thence became immortal," that is, gods: further, "We ascended to, or attained, effulgence, or heaven; we knew divine, celestial, things. Hence then, assuredly, what can an enemy do to us? What decay can affect an immortal?" dhurti meaning 'decay' or 'injury;' 'What can it do to an immortal being?'

It is also said in the Védas, that final recompense is obtained by animal sacrifice: "He who offers the asvamedha conquers all worlds, overcomes death, and expiates all sin, even the murder of a Brahman." As, therefore, final and absolute consequence is prescribed in the Védas, inquiry (elsewhere) should be superfluous; but this is not the case. The text says, the revealed mode is like the temporal one—drishiavat; 'like, same as the temporal;' drshiéna tulya. What is that revealed mode, and whence is it (ineffectual)? It is impure, defective in some
respects, and excessive in others. It is impure from (enjoining) animal sacrifices; as, “according to the ritual of the asvamedha, six hundred horses, minus three, are offered at midday.” For though that is virtue which is enjoined by the Védas and laws, yet, from its miscellaneous character, it may be affected by impurity. It is also said; “Many thousands of Indras and other gods have passed away in successive ages, overcome by time; for time is hard to overcome.” Hence therefore, as even Indra and the gods perish, the revealed mode involves defective cessation of pain. Excess is also one of its properties, and pain is produced by observing the superior advantages of others. Here, therefore, by excess, atisaya, is understood the unequal distribution of temporal rewards, as the consequence of sacrifice; the object of the ritual of the Védas being in fact in all cases temporal good. Therefore the revealed mode is like the temporal one. What then is the preferable mode? If this be asked, it is replied, One different from both. A mode different from both the temporal and revealed is preferable, being free from impurity, excess, or deficiency. How is this? It is explained (in the text: It consists in a discriminative knowledge, &c. Here, by perceptible principles, are intended Mahat and the rest, or Intellect, Egotism, the five subtlest rudiments, the eleven organs (of perception and action), and the five gross elements. The imperceptible one is Pradhána (the chief or great one). The thinking soul, Purusha (the incorporeal). These twenty-five principles are intended by the (three) terms vyakta, avyakta, and jna. In discriminative knowledge of these consists the preferable mode; and he who knows them knows the twenty-five principles (he has perfect knowledge).

The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, and thinking principles, is next explained.

COMMENT.

Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly evil are ineffectual, it is next asserted that devotional remedies, such as the rites enjoined by the Védas, are equally unavailing; and knowledge of the
three parts or divisions of existence material and spiritual, is the only mode by which exemption from the infirmities of corporeal being can be attained.

The Védas are inefficient, from their inhumanity in prescribing the shedding of blood: the rewards which they propose are also but temporary, as the gods themselves are finite beings, perishing in each periodical revolution. The immortality spoken of in the Védas is merely a long duration, or until a dissolution of the existent forms of things*. The Védas also cause, instead of curing, pain, as the blessings they promise to one man over another are sources of envy and misery to those who do not possess them. Such is the sense given by Gaurápáda to atikaya, and the S. Tatva Kaumudi understands it also to imply the unequal apportionment of rewards by the Védas themselves: 'The jyotishtoma and other rites secure simply heaven; the vājapéya and others confer the sovereignty of heaven: this is being possessed of the property of excess (inequality) †.'

In like manner, the original aphorism of Kapila affirms of these two modes, the temporal and revealed, that there 'is no difference between them ‡,' and that 'escape from pain is not the consequence of the latter ___,' because 'recurrence is nevertheless the result of that immunity which is attainable by acts (of devotion) §,' as 'the consequences of acts are not eternal**.' Here however a dilemma occurs, for the Veda also says, 'There is no return (regeneration) of one who has attained the sphere of Brahma by acts (of devotion) ††.' This is explained away by a Sūtra of Kapila, which declares that the Veda limits the non-regeneration of one who has

* अमृतनाभिषेकं विरंचे मानसुपलक्ष्यति यदाह ज्ञानस्मृतस्मृतवं खा

† ज्योतिषोपाध्याय: स्वर्गेश्च साधनं वाजपेयाद्वं: खर्जनेश्चतिक्षात्स्वयमः।

‡ ज्योतिषोपाध्याय: स्वर्गेश्च साधनं वाजपेयाद्वं: खर्जनेश्चतिक्षात्स्वयमः।

§ शास्त्रियोपाध्याय: स्वर्गेश्च साधनं वाजपेयाद्वं: खर्जनेश्चतिक्षात्स्वयमः।

** कामसाध्याद्वेः पुनर्गृहम्।

†† कामसाध्याद्वलोकसंपन्नाचारं वृत्तिः।
attained the region of Brahmá to him who, when there, acquires discriminative wisdom.

This discriminative wisdom is the accurate discrimination of those principles into which all that exists is distributed by the Sánkhyá philosophy. Vyakta, ‘that which is perceived, sensible, discrete;’ A vyakta, ‘that which is unperceived, indiscr e;’ and Jna, ‘that which knows, or discriminates;’ the first is matter in its perceptible modifications; the second is crude, unmodified matter; and the third is soul. The object of the S. Káriká is to define and explain these three things, the correct knowledge of which is of itself release from worldly bondage, and exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final separation of soul from body.

III.

Nature, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the Great or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

Bháshya.

Múla (the root) prakriti (nature) is pradhána (chief), from its being the root of the seven principles which are productions and productive; such nature is the root. No production.—It is not produced from another: on that account nature (prakriti) is no product of any other thing. Seven principles.—Mahat and the rest; from its being the great (mahat) element; this is Intellect (Buddhí). Intellect and the rest.—The seven principles are, 1. Intellect; 2. Egotism; 3–7. The five subtle rudiments. These seven are productions and productive: in this manner: Intellect is produced from the chief one (nature). That again produces Egotism, whence it is productive (prakriti). Egotism, as derived from Intellect, is a produc-
tion; but as it gives origin to the five subtle rudiments, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of sound is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production; but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of touch, as generated from Egotism, is a production; as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of smell is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtle rudiment of form is a production from Egotism; as generating light, it is productive. The subtle rudiment of flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the Great principle and the rest are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements: these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term vikāra being the same as vikriti. Soul is neither a production nor productive. These (principles) being thus classed, it is next to be considered by what and how many kinds of proof, and by what proof severally applied, the demonstration of these three (classes of) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the thinking soul, can be effected. For in this world a probable thing is established by proof, in the same mode as (a quantity of) grain by a prastha (a certain measure), and the like, or sandal and other things by weight. On this account what proof is, is next to be defined.

COMMENT.

In this stanza the three principal categories of the Sāṇkhya system are briefly defined, chiefly with regard to their relative characters.

Existent things, according to one classification, are said to be fourfold: 1. prakriti; 2. vikriti; 3. prakriti-vikriti; and anubhaya rápa, neither prakriti nor vikriti. Prakriti, according to its ordinary use, and its etymological sense, means that which is primary, that which precedes what is made; from pra, pra, and kri, 'to make.' This, however, is further distinguished in the text into the múla prakriti; the prakriti which is the root and substance of all things except soul, matter or nature; and secondary, special, or relative prakriti, or every production that in its
turn becomes primary to some other derived from it. By prakriti may therefore be understood the matter of which every substance primarily or secondarily is composed, and from which it proceeds, the primary, or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it, 'productive' principle of some secondary substance or production. This subsequent product is termed vikriti, from the same root, kri, 'to make,' with vi, implying 'variation,' prefixed. Vikriti does not mean a product, or thing brought primarily into existence, but merely a modification of a state of being, a new development or form of something previously extant. We might therefore consider it as best rendered by the term 'development,' but there is no objection to the equivalent in the text, or 'product.' In this way, then, the different substances of the universe are respectively nature, or matter, and form. Crude or radical matter is without form. Intellect is its first form, and Intellect is the matter of Egotism. Egotism is a form of Intellect, and the matter of which the senses and the rudimental elements are formed: the senses are forms of Egotism. The gross elements are forms of the rudimental elements. We are not to extend the materiality of the grosser elements to the forms of visible things, for visible things are compounds, not simple developments of a simple base. Soul comes under the fourth class; it is neither matter nor form, production nor productive. More particular definitions of each category subsequently occur.

IV.

Perception, inference, and right affirmation, are admitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results.

BHÁSHYA.

Perception;—as, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose, are the five organs of sense; and their five objects are respectively, sound, feel,
form, flavour, and odour: the ear apprehends sound; the skin, feel; the eye, form; the tongue, taste; the nose, smell. This proof is called, (that which is) seen (or perception). That object which is not ascertainable either by its being present, or by inference, is to be apprehended from right affirmation; such as, Indra, the king of the gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs of heaven; and the like. That which is not ascertainable by perception or inference, is derived from apt (or sufficient) authority. It is also said; “They call scripture, right affirmation; right, as free from error. Let not one exempt from fault affirm a falsehood without adequate reason. He who in his appointed office is free from partiality or enmity, and is ever respected by persons of the same character, such a man is to be regarded as apt (fit or worthy).” In these three are comprised all kinds of proof. Jaimini describes six sorts of proof. Which of those then are not proofs? They are, presumption (arthāpatti), proportion (sambhava), privation (abhāva), comprehension (pratibhā), oral communication (aṭṭhāya), and comparison (upamāṇa). Thus: “Presumption” is twofold, ‘seen’ and ‘heard.’ ‘Seen’ is where in one case the existence of spirit is admitted, and it is presumed that it exists in another. ‘Heard;’ Devadatta does not eat by day, and yet grows fat: it is presumed then that he eats by night. “Proportion;” By the term one prastha, four kuravas are equally designated. “Privation” is fourfold; prior, mutual, constant, and total. ‘Prior;’ as, Devadatta in childhood, youth, &c. ‘Mutual;’ as, Water jar in cloth. ‘Constant;’ as, The horns of an ass; the son of a barren woman; the flowers of the sky. ‘Total’ privation, or destruction; as when cloth is burnt, or as from contemplating withered grain, want of rain is ascertained. In this manner privation is manifold. “Comprehension;” as, The part of the country that lies between the Vindhya mountains on the north and Sahya mountains on the south, extending to the sea, is pleasant. By this sentence it is intended to express that there are many agreeable circumstances comprehended in that country, the name of the site indicating its several products. “Oral communication;” as, When people report there is a fiend in the fig-tree. “Comparison;” The Gavaya is like a cow; a lake is like a sea. These are the six kinds of proof; but they are comprised
in the three; for presumption is included in inference, and proportion, privation, comprehension, oral communication, and comparison, are comprehended in right affirmation. Therefore from the expressions (in the text), they comprise every mode of demonstration, and are admitted to be threefold proof, it is said, that by these three kinds of proof, proof is established. Belief of that which is to be proven results from proof.—The things to be proven are, Nature, Intellect, Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, and Soul. These five and twenty principles are classed as the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the peripient; and some are verifiable by perception, some by inference, and some by authority; which is the threefold proof.

The definition of each kind (of proof) is next given.

**COMMENT.**

The work pauses in its enumeration of the physical and metaphysical principles of the system, to define its dialectical portion, or the proofs which may be urged in support of its principles.

The doctrine that there are but three kinds of proof, is said to be supported by a text of the Védas: ‘Soul is either to be perceived, to be learned from authority, or to be inferred from reasoning.’ It is opposed to the tenets of the Naiyáyikas and Mímánsakas, the former of whom describe four kinds, and the latter six kinds of proof. The proofs of the logicians are, pratyáksa, ‘perception;’ anumána, ‘inference;’ upamána, ‘comparison;’ and śabda, ‘verbal authority.’ Of these, comparison and verbal authority are included by the Sánkhyas under right affirmation; the term ápta meaning ‘fit, right,’ and being applied either to the Védas, or to inspired teachers, as subsequently explained. The Mímánsakas do recognise six kinds of proof; but Gaurapáda has either stated them incorrectly, or refers to a system different from that now found in the best authorities of this school. Kumárilá Bhatta alludes
to the sixfold proof of an older scholiast or Vrittiśāra, but those six proofs are, as Mr. Colebrooke states, perception, inference, comparison, presumption, authority, and privation; and the author of the Sāstra dipikā excludes expressly sambhava, pratibhā, and aitihya from the character of proofs. With regard to the terms specified, it may be doubted if exact equivalents can be devised. Arthāpatti is literally, 'attainment of meaning;' conjecture or presumption, 'inference;' from which it differs only in the absence of the predicate or sign from which the subject is inferred. The illustrations of the commentator do not very clearly explain the purport of the two kinds of this proof, 'seen' and 'heard.' In the Sāstra dipikā the first is exemplified by the sentence, "Devadatta is alive, but not in his house; it is presumed therefore that he is abroad." 'Heard,' sruta, is referred to the Vēdas, and applies to the interpretation of precepts by the spirit as well as the letter, as in a direction to offer any particular article, it may be presumed, that should that not be procurable, something similar may be substituted. Vāchespati also considers arthāpatti to be comprised in inference, as well as sambhava, 'identity' or 'proportion.' Privation, he argues, is only a modification of perception; and aitihya, or 'report,' is no proof at all, the person with whom it originates being undetermined. Pratibhā he does not mention. The concluding expressions of Gaurāpāda, Pratijāvāsa sanjnānam, are of questionable import, and there is possibly some error in the copy. The 'objects of proof,' prameya, are, according to the Sankhyā, all the principles of existence. Siddhi, 'accomplishment, determination,' in the last hemistich, is explained by pratīti, 'trust, belief.'

V.

Perception is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation.
BHASHYA.

Drishti 'seen,' or pratyaksha, 'perception,' is application or exertion of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of the ear, and the rest, to sound, &c. *Inference is of three kinds,* subsequent, antecedent, analogous. *Inference antecedent* is that which has been previously deduced; as, rain is inferred from the rising of a cloud, because formerly rain had been the consequence. *Subsequent;* as, having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred. *Analogous;* as, having observed their change of place, it is concluded that the moon and stars are locomotive, like Chaitra: that is, having seen a person named Chaitra transfer his position from one place to another, and thence known that he was locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars also have motion (because it is seen that they change their places). So observing one mango tree in blossom, it is inferred that other mango trees also are in flower. This is inference from analogy.

*Again; premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. That inference.* Premises a prior argument; that is, the thing which has a predicate is inferred from the predicate, as, a mendicant (is known) by his staff; or it premises the subject of the argument, when the predicate is deduced from that of which it is predicated, as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this is his triple staff. *Right affirmation is true revelation.—Apta means ácháryas, 'holy teachers,' as Brahmá and the rest. Sruti means 'the Védas.' *Teachers and Védas* is the import of the compound, and that which is declared by them is true revelation.

In this manner threefold proof has been described. It is next explained by what sort of proof ascertainment is to be effected, and of what objects.

COMMENT.

The three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and right affirmation, are here more particularly explained.

The first is defined, 'what severally relates to, or is engaged in, an
object of sense*. Adhyavasāya is explained by VĀCHESPATI, ‘Knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty†.’ NĀRĀYANA explains it, ‘That by which certainty is obtained‡.’ The organs do not of themselves apprehend objects, but are merely the instruments by which they are approximated to the intellect: ‘neither does intellect apprehend them (rationally), being, as derived from (prakriti) matter, incapable of sense; but the unconscious impressions or modifications of intellect, derived through the senses, are communicated to soul, which, reflecting them whilst they are present in the intellect, appears by that reflection actually affected by wisdom, pleasure, and the like.§.’

The explanation given by GAURAPĀDA of the three kinds of inference is not exactly conformable to the definitions of the logicians, although the same technical terms are employed. Thus in the Nyāya Sūtra Vṛitti, in the comment on the Sūtra of Gautama⁷, we have the following: ‘Threefold inference. Prior, that is, cause; characterized by, or having, that (cause); as inference of rain from the gathering of clouds. Posterior, effect; characterized by it, as inference of rain from the swelling of a river. Analogous (or generic); characterized as distinct from both effect and cause, as the inference of any thing being a substance from its being earthy**.’ Here then we have inference a priori, or of effect from cause;

* प्रतिविश्वामयत्वसायः—विषयं प्रति विचारति।  
† अध्यवसायी बुद्धिशारणी ज्ञानं।  
‡ अध्यवसायीयते निषीदितेन।  
§ बुद्धि तत्त्वं हि प्राकृतवादवेत्तमतिः तद्योभवसायार् श्रेष्ठेतनाः घटादि वल्।  
हं बुद्धित्वस्य सुशारयोषपि परिषामोंदा अचेतना।  
पुरुषसु सुखाध ननुषिशर चेतना।  
सोऽद्व सुझ्वितवाक्षिनाज्ञानसुखादिवत् सत्याविविक्षतः।  
हायाध्वाज्ञानसुखादिविविविक्षति।  
†† बिविधानानां पूर्वं केषवत् सामायतीहं च।  
** बिविधानां पूर्वं कारणं तहत् केषवत् गच्छे।  
वषणा सेविनिविवेष्ये।  
वृख्यन्मानां।  
मेघं कार्यं तक्षिऩं शेषवत्।  
वषणा नदीवृक्षाय वृख्यन्मानं।  
सामायती।  
हं कार्यं कार्याकार्याभिज्ञानं।  
वषणा पूर्विज्ञ्ये नुषाकानुमानं।  

inference *a posteriori*, or of cause from effect; and inference from analogy, or community of sensible properties; for *samānyato drishām* is ‘that which is recognised from generic properties, its own specific properties being unnoticed’. The *S. Chandrikā* gives a similar, or logical, explanation of the three kinds of inference.

The definition of inference in general is the subject of the first member of the second hemistich. The expressions *linga*† and *lingī*‡ are analogous to ‘predicate and subject,’ or the mark, sign, or accident by which any thing is characterized, and the thing having such characteristic mark and sign. Thus *linga* is explained by logicians by the term *vyāpya*, and *lingī* by *vyāpaka*; as in the proposition, There is fire, because there is smoke, the latter is the *linga*, *vyāpya*, ‘major or predicate;’ and fire the *lingī* or *vyāpaka*, the ‘minor or subject,’ or thing of which the presence is denoted by its characteristic. Inference, then, is a conclusion derived from previous determination of predicate and subject; or it is knowledge of the points of an argument depending on the relation between subject and predicate; that is, ‘Unless it were previously known that smoke indicated fire, the presence of the latter could not be inferred from the appearance of the former.’ This is what the logicians term *paramersha*, ‘observation or experience.’ *Āpta*§, according to Gaurāpāda, means ācharya; and *āpta sruti*∥ implies ‘holy teachers and holy writ.’ Nārāyana expounds it in a similar manner¶, and adds, that *āpta* means Īśvara, or ‘god,’ according to the theistical *Sāṅkhya*. Vāchespāti explains the terms similarly, though more obscurely. *Āpta* is equivalent with him to *prāpta*, ‘obtained,’ and *yukta*, ‘proper, right;’ and *āpta sruti* is ‘both that which is right and traditional, holy knowledge §§,’ for *sruti* is defined to be ‘knowledge of the pur-
port of texts derived from holy writ; which knowledge is of itself proof, as obtained from the Védas, which are not of human origin, and fit to exempt from all fear of error*. The first term, vákya, is explained to signify, ‘the Védas is the teacher of religion’; and the expression vákyártha is equivalent to dharma, ‘religion or virtue.’ ‘Religion is heard by it; as, “Let one desirous of heaven perform the jyotishyoma sacrifice:” such is a text (of scripture) †. The texts of the Védas and of other inspired works are authority, as having been handed down through successive births by the same teachers as Jajjíshavya says, “By me living repeatedly in ten different great creations.” So the Védas was remembered by Kapila from a former state of being. The Mânasakas distinguish between ápta vákya and védá vákya: the former is human, the latter inspired, authority.

VI.

Sensible objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained: and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.

BHÁSHYA.

By inference from analogy; of things beyond the senses—the ascertaining of existing things which transcend the senses. Nature and soul are
not objects of sense, and are to be known only by reasoning from analogy. For as the predicates Mahat and the rest have the three qualities, so must that of which they are effects, the chief one (nature), have the three qualities; and as that which is irrational appears as if it was rational, it must have a guide and superintendent, which is soul. That which is perceptible is known by perception; but that which is imperceptible, and which is not to be inferred from analogy, must be learnt from revelation, as, Indra, the king of the gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs of heaven: these depend upon sacred authority. Here some one objects, Nature or soul is not apprehended, and what is not apprehended in this world does not exist; therefore these two are not, any more than a second head, or a third arm. In reply it is stated, that there are eight causes which prevent the apprehension of existing things.

COMMENT.

In this verse, according to the translation followed, the application of the three different kinds of proof to three different objects is described: according to a different version, only one class of objects is referred to, those which transcend the senses, and of which a knowledge is attainable only by inference from analogy, or by revelation.

The S. Tatwa Kaumudi concurs with the S. Bhāshya in understanding the terms of the text, sāmānyato drishtat*, to refer to anumāndt†, intending ‘inference from analogy ‡.’ A similar explanation occurs in the S. Prawacana Bhāshya: ‘Thence, from reasoning by analogy, the determination of both, of nature and soul, is effected §.’ It appears therefore that in this place the text does not refer either to perception or to inference in general, as evidence of perceptible things, but solely to inference.
from analogy, as proof of imperceptible objects. For inference _a priori_ or _a posteriori_ regards things not necessarily beyond the cognizance of the senses, like nature and soul, but those only which are not at the moment perceptible, as fire from smoke, rain from floods or clouds, and the like. It might be preferable, therefore, to render the verse somewhat differently from the text, or, 'It is by reasoning from analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained; and imperceptible things, not thereby determined, are to be known only from revelation.' The version of Mr. Colebrooke, in which he is followed by Professor Lassen ("Æquality intellectus est per perceptionem: rerum quae supra sensum sunt per demonstrationem vel hac non evictum, quod præter sensum est, probatur revelatione"), rests apparently upon the authority of the _S. Chandrikā_ and _S. Kaumudi_. 'Sāṁāyatas has the affix _tasi_ in the sense of the sixth (possessive) case. The ascertainment of all objects appreciable by the senses, whether actually perceived or not, is by perception: therefore knowledge of earth and the other elements is by sense; but knowledge of things beyond the senses, as nature and the rest, is from inference.'

When inference from analogy fails, then, according to all the authorities, the remaining proof, or revelation, must be had recourse to, agreeably to the Sutras; 'Oral proof is fit instruction,' and 'fit instruction is communication of the proofs by which the nature of both _prakṛiti_ and _purusha_ may be discriminated.'

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**VII.**

From various causes things may be imperceptible (or unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of the organs, inatten-
tion, minuteness, interposition of objects, predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the like.

**BHASHYA.**

Non-perception of things here existing may proceed from, their remoteness, as of Vishnumitra, Maitra, and Chaitra, dwelling in different countries; or their propinquity, as the eye does not see the collyrium applied to the eyelids; from defect of the organs, as sound and form are undiscernible by the deaf and the blind; from inattention, as a person whose thoughts are distracted does not apprehend what is said to him, however intelligibly; from minuteness, as the small particles of frost, vapour, and smoke in the atmosphere are not perceived; from interposition, as a thing hidden by a wall; from predominance of others, as the planets, asterisms, and stars are invisible when their rays are overpowered by those of the sun; from intermixture with the like, as a bean in a heap of beans, a lotus amongst lotuses, a myrobalan amongst myrobalans, a pigeon in a flock of pigeons, cannot be perceived, being confounded in the midst of similar objects. In this way non-perception of actually existing things is eightfold.

Be it granted, that whatever is to be ascertained (by any means) is; by what cause is apprehension of nature and soul prevented, and how is it to be effected?

**COMMENT.**

Reasons are here assigned why things may not be perceived, although they actually exist.

The terms of the text, as illustrated by the comment, are easily understood: the particle cha, in connexion with the last, is considered to imply the existence of other impediments besides those enumerated, such as non-production, as of curds from milk*. But these circumstances, for

* चकारीशनुक्समुखायेंः तेनानुक्सविध्यं संगृहीत यथा छोरायक्ष्या यां दुधनुक्सवच्च हृदयनि ।
the most part, account for the non-perception of perceptible things, and it is still to be considered why nature and soul, which are not amongst things ordinarily perceptible, are not perceived.

VIII.

It is owing to the subtilty (of nature), not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative principles are effects; (whence it is concluded as their cause) in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar.

BHÁSHYA.

From subtilty the non-perception of that nature. Nature is not apprehended (by the senses) on account of its subtilty, like the particles of smoke, vapour, and frost, which are in the atmosphere, although not perceived there. How then is it to be apprehended? Its perception is from its effects. Having observed the effects, the cause is inferred. Nature is the cause, of which such is the effect. Intellect, egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, are its effects. That effect may be dissimilar from nature: ‘nature,’ prakrīti; ‘the chief one,’ pradhāna; dissimilar from it: or it may be analogous, of similar character; as in the world a son may be like or unlike his father. From what cause this similarity or dissimilarity proceeds, we shall hereafter explain.

Here a doubt arises, from the conflicting opinions of teachers, whether intellect and other effects be or be not already in nature. According to the Sámkhya doctrine, the effects are in nature; according to the
Bauddhas and others, they are not; for that which is, cannot cease to be; and that which is not, can by no means be: this is a contradiction. Therefore, it is said—

**COMMENT.**

Nature is said to be imperceptible, from its subtilty: it must be therefore inferred from its effects.

The effects are the products of nature, or intellect, egotism, and the rest; some of which are of a similar, and some of a dissimilar character, as subsequently explained.

Effect, according to the Sāṅkhya system, necessarily implies cause, as it could not exist without it*: but on this topic there are different opinions, thus particularized by Vāchespati: 1. Some say, that that which is may proceed from that which is not. 2. Some say, that effect is not a separately existent thing, but the revolution of an existent thing. 3. Some say, that that which is not may proceed from that which is. 4. The ancients assert, that that which is comes from that which is (or *may from *may). By the three first propositions the existence of nature would not be proved; for,

1. The materiality of the cause of the world, of which the qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness are the natural properties, comprises sound and other changes of its natural condition, and is diversified by pleasure, pain, and insensibility; but if that which is, is born from that which is not, how can that insubstantial cause which is not, comprehend pleasure, pain, form, sound, and the like? for there cannot be identity of nature between what is and what is not.

2. If sound, and other diversified existences, were but revolutions of one existent thing, yet that which is could not proceed from such a source, for the property of manifold existence cannot belong to that which is not twofold: the notion of that which is not manifold through its comprising manifold existence is an obvious error.

* कापीकार्खमार्गे गम्यते।
3. The notion of the Kanabhakshas, Akshacharanas, and others, that
that which is not may proceed from that which is, excludes the compre-
hension of effect in cause, as that which is and that which is not cannot
have community: consequently the existence of nature is not proved;
and in order to establish its existence, the existence of effect in it must
first be determined.

Of the doctrines here alluded to, the first is said to be that of some of
the Buddhists, who deny the existence of prakriti, or any universal cause,
or of any thing which they cannot verify by perception. The second is
that of the Védántis, who maintain that all that exists is but the vivarittas,
literally the ‘revolutions’—the emanations from, or manifestations of, one
only universal spirit. It might be said that the Sánkhya seems to teach
a similar doctrine, in as far as it refers all that exists, exclusive of spirit,
to one common source, and makes all else identical with prakriti. It
differs however in this, that it regards the substances evolved from the
radical prakriti as substantial existences, as effects or products of a cause
which exists no longer except in its effects. The Védántis, on the other
hand, maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and that effects are

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* केषिदाहुरसत: सज्जायत इति। एकस्य सती विवर्ज्जे: कार्यविज्ञान न वभित्यपरे। अथे तु अतिरिक्तत्त्वहो। सत: सज्जायत इति जूता:।
तत: पूर्वभित्यपरे कल्पत्रोऽध्याय धर्मन्त न सिध्धति मुख्यः-समौभेदवत्त स्वरूपपरि
शान्ति-क्षणांस्वत्वं हि जगात् कार्यवित्त धर्मन्त वर्तम्भक: स्वभावं।
यदि पुनरसत: सज्जायत असाधिक्प्राप्तं कार्यं कर्म सुखाप्राप्तस्वाधि
शान्ति-क्षणां स्वातं सदस्तोत्तरादामानवपरस्य:। अयोध्य: सती विवर्ज्जे: सब्दा
दिमल्पक्षविभाषित: सज्जायत इति न स्वातं नास्त्याधिक्यप्रचाराद्वे।
अयोध्यपर्च: प्रचाराविभाषतं तत्तमायस्तेऽव। श्वंस्कपि क्षणभ्रा
शान्ति-क्षणांस्वत्वं सत: एव कार्यार्धस्व: जग्नेत अष्टाद् सदस्तोत्तरादामानव
पोहे कार्यविज्ञान कार्यविज्ञानित न प्रधानसिद्धि:। सत: प्रधानसिद्धां धर्मन्ता
तावतं सत्त्वाः प्रतिवज्जानीते।
only its present operations. The popular form of Védántism asserts, indeed, that nothing exists but cause, and that its effects, or all that appears to exist, are unrealities, illusions, the phantoms of a dream: but the commentator on the Śāṅkhyā Pravachana declares, that the doctrine of māyā, or ‘illusion,’ is modern, and is contrary to the Védas, and that those who advocate it are nothing but disguised Baudhhas: ‘The cause of the bondage of soul asserted by those concealed Baudhhas, the modern advocates of māyā, is here refuted.’ In the third case we have the authors specified as Kanabhakshas, ‘Feeders upon little,’ or upon atoms, perhaps; and Aksharanaras, ‘Followers of controversy,’ contemptuous terms for the Vaišēshikas, who maintain the origin of all things from primordial atoms, or monads; and who may therefore be said to deduce what is not—the insubstantial forms of things—from actual corpuscular substance.

The fourth or ancient doctrine, that that which is comes from that which is, ens from ens, ὅτι ὑπό ὅτι is the converse of the celebrated dogma of antiquity, ex nihilo, nihil fit; and although in this place it is especially restricted to the relation of certain effects to a certain cause, yet it comes to the same thing as regards the world in general, the things of which cannot be derived from no primary existent thing; agreeably to the Sūtra of Kapila: ‘The production of a thing cannot be from nothing’; ὅτι γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὅρτος: not only according to Democritus and Epicurus, but according to all the ancient philosophers, who, Aristotle states, agreed universally in the physical doctrine, that it was impossible for any thing to be produced from nothing: Τὰ τῶν ὅτι ἐκ μὴ ὅρτον γίνονται ἁδύνατον περὶ γὰρ ταύτας ὀμορφιμάνως τῆς δόξης ἀπαντεῖ οἱ περὶ φύσεως. Phys. I. 4.
IX.

Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause); for what exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence. Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose: every thing is not by every means possible: what is capable, does that to which it is competent; and like is produced from like.

BHÁSHYA.

From there being no instrumental cause of what exists not—non-existent, what is not—there is no making what is not: therefore effect is. In this world there is no making of what is not; as, the production of oil from sand: therefore the instrumental cause produces what is, from its having been formerly implanted. Hence perceptible principles, which are effects, exist in nature.

Further, from selection of materials.—Upádána is '(material) cause,' from the selection of it: thus, in life, a man who desires a thing, selects that by which it may be produced; as he who wishes for curds, takes milk, not water (for their material cause). Thence effect is.

Again, every thing is not by every means possible. The universal possibility of every thing is not; as of gold in silver, &c. or in grass, dust, or sand. Therefore, from the non-universality of every thing in every thing, effect is.

Again, what is capable does that to which it is competent; as, a potter is the capable agent; the implements, the lump of clay, the wheel, rag, rope, water, &c. (are capable), by which he makes the jar, which is capable of being so made from earth. Thence effect is.

Lastly, like is produced from like. Such as is the character of cause, in which effect exists, such also is the character of effect; as, barley is produced from barley, rice from rice. If effect was not (did not pre-exist), then rice might grow from peas; but it does not, and therefore effect is.

By these five arguments, then, it is proved that intellect and the other
characteristics do (pre)exist in nature; and therefore production is of that which is, and not of that which is not.

COMMENT.

Arguments are here adduced to shew that the effects or products of nature are comprised in, and coexistent with, their cause or source; consequently they are proofs of the existence of that primary cause or source.

It is laid down as a general principle, that cause and effect are in all cases coexistent, or that effect exists anteriorly to its manifestation; sat-káryam* in the text meaning 'existent effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause†;' or, as the phrase also of the text asadakaranát‡ is explained, 'If effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause does not exist, its existence cannot by any means be effected.‖ The expression sat-káryam, therefore, is to be understood throughout as meaning 'existent effect,' not the effect of that which exists: and the object of the stanza is to establish the existence of cause from its effects, and not of effects from the existence of cause, as Professor Lassen has explained it:

"Quænam sint rationes docetur quibus evincatur mentem ceteraque principia effecta esse a rea.‖ Mons. Pauthier (Traduction de la Sánkhya Káriká, 105) is more correct in his view of the general purport of the verse; "Ce qui n'existe pas ne peut arriver à l'état d'effet;‖ but he has mistaken the particulars—the reasons why that which is not can never be, for the means which would be fruitlessly exercised for its production: it is not that such existence cannot be effected "par la co-opération d'aucune cause matérielle," &c., but because an effect requires an adequate material cause, and the like.

* सकार्येः। † सकार्येः मात्र कारश्यापारादितिशेषः। ‡ इस
दक्षिणात्। || इसवें त् कारश्यापारात् पूर्वेऽ कार्यो नास्य सत्तं केनापि
कं थेरः॥
Not only has the meaning of this verse been misapprehended by its translators, but the doctrine which it conveys seems to have been somewhat misconceived by high authority. M. Cousin, referring to this passage, observes, "L'argumentation de Kapila est, dans l'histoire de philosophie, l'antécédent de celle d'Enésidème et Hume. Selon Kapila il n'y a pas de notion propre de cause, et ce que nous appelons une cause n'est qu'une cause apparente relativement à l'effet qui la suit, mais c'est aussi un effet relativement à la cause qui la précède, laquelle est encore un effet par la même raison, et toujours de même, de manière que tout est un enchaînement nécessaire d'effets sans cause véritable et indépendante."

M. Cousin then supports his view of the doctrine by selecting some of the arguments contained in the text; as, "That which does not exist cannot be made to exist;" and, "Cause and effect are of the same nature:" and he adds, as a third, that "il ne faut pas s'occuper des causes, mais des effets, car l'existence de l'effet mesure l'énergie de la cause; donc l'effet équivaut la cause." In this instance, however, he is scarcely justified by his authority, whose object is not to dispense with the consideration of cause altogether, but to prove its existence from that of its effects. Kapila, therefore, is far from asserting that "il n'y a pas de cause," although he may so far agree with the philosophers referred to, in recognising no difference between material cause and material effects: for it must be remembered, that it is of material effects, of substances, that he is speaking. His doctrine is, in fact, that on which Brown enlarges in his lectures on power, cause, and effect—that "the forms of a body are the body itself; and that all the substances which exist in the universe are every thing which truly exists in the universe, to which nothing can be added which is not itself a new substance: that there can be nothing in the events of nature, therefore, but the antecedents and consequents which are present in them; and that these accordingly, or nothing, are the very causes and effects which we are desirous of investigating." Lect. on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 175. Kapila, however, has not asserted a series of antecedents and consequents without beginning; and whatever we may conceive of his múla-prakriti, his original and unoriginated substance whence all substances proceed, it is a fixed point
from which he starts, and the existence of which he deduces from its effects: the mutual and correlative existence of which, with their cause, he endeavours to establish by arguments, which, as regarding a curious and not uninteresting part of the Sāṇkhya philosophy, it may be allowable to recapitulate a little more in detail.

1. Asadakaranāt; ‘Because efficient or instrumental cause cannot make or produce that which is not.’ Professor Lassen renders this, ‘E nulla nonentis efficacitate, nonens nil efficit. Asat in this passage, however, is the object, not the agent; and karana is employed technically to denote the efficient or operative cause, the energy of which would be exerted in vain, unless applied to materials that existed: that which does not exist cannot be brought into existence by any agent. It would be useless to grind the sesamum for oil, unless the oil existed in it: the same force applied to sand or sugar-cane would not express oil. The appearance or manifestation of the oil is a proof that it was contained in the sesamum, and consequently is a proof of the existence of the source whence it is derived. This dogma, in its most comprehensive application, is of course the same with that of the Greeks, that nothing can come from nothing, and makes the creation of the universe dependent upon pre-existing materials. Here, however, the application is limited and specific, and as Sir Graves Haughton, in his vindication of Mr. Colebrooke’s exposition of the Vēdanta philosophy, has justly observed, it means no more than that things proceed from their respective sources, and from those sources alone; or that certain sequents follow certain antecedents, and indicate consequently their existence.

2. Upādana grahanāt; ‘From taking an adequate material cause: a fit material cause must be selected for any given effect or product.’ There is no difference of opinion as to the purport of upādana; ‘Such as the substance evolved, such is that from which it is evolved;’ or as illustrated by Gaurapāda, ‘He who wishes to make curds will employ milk, not water:’ but this being the case, the effects which we behold, or infer, must proceed from something similar to themselves, and consequently prove the existence of that substance. ‘The relation between cause and effect is the generation of effect; but there can be no relation
(between cause and) a non-existent effect, and therefore effect is*;” and consequently so is cause.

3. From the unfitness of all causes for every effect; sarva sambhāvatvābhāvatā. There must be an identity of character between the sequent and its antecedent, and the existence of one indicates that of the other: a jar is made with clay, cloth with yarn; the latter material could not be used to fabricate a water-pot, nor clay to weave a garment. If this was not the case, all things would be equally fit for all purposes,

... ex omnibus rebus

Omne genus nasci posse.

It is not, however, here intended to assert, that “idonea causa non est ulla quam sād, tē ña,” but that the effect must have a determinate existence in that cause, and can be the only effect which it can produce; as in the commentary on this expression in the S. Pravachana Bhasya: “If effect prior to production do not exist in cause, there would be no reason why cause should not produce one non-existent effect, and not another †.”

4. Saktanya sakyāravandit; ‘From the execution of that which the agent is able to do.’ Active or efficient causes can do only that to which they are competent: the potter and his implements fabricate a water-jar, not a piece of cloth; they are not competent to the latter, they are capable of the former. If effect did not pre-exist, if it were not inseparable from cause, power, or the exertions of an agent, and the employment of means, might derive from any antecedent one consequence as well as another.

5. Kāramabhāvat; ‘From the nature of cause;’ that is, from its being of the same nature or character with effect, and consequently producing its like; or, according to Vāchespata, ‘from the identity of cause with effect ‡:’ ‘Cloth is not different from the threads of which it is woven,

* कार्येश संबंध चारण कार्येश जनक संबंध जार्येशातान्तो न सम्बंध वउरत तस्मातातिति। † उत्पन्न प्राण चारणे कार्यास्बानं हि न को संबंधविशेषत्वं चेन कारप्रदत्तं जनयेतरसमिति। ‡ कार्येश कार नानात्।
for it is made up of them *.' Here, then, we have precisely the discovery of modern philosophy, "that the form of a body is only another name for the relative position of the parts that constitute it; and that the forms of a body are nothing but the body itself:" (Brown's Lectures) a discovery which, simple as it may appear to be, dissipated but recently the illusion of 'substantial forms,' which had prevailed for ages in Europe. It seems, however, to have been familiar to Hindu speculation from the remotest periods, as the commentator on the S. Pravachana, and the author of the S. Chandriká, cite the Védas in its confirmation: 'Before production there is no difference between cause and effect †.' There is good reason, however, to think that the conclusion drawn from the doctrine by the Védas was very different from that of the Sákhyas, being the basis of Pantheism, and implying that before creation the great First Cause comprehended both cause and effect: the texts illustrating the dogma being such as, 'The existent tó ॐ verily was unevolved'—This, the Existent, was, oh pupil, before all things'—The Unborn was verily before all.' The Sákhyas, like some of the old Grecian philosophers, choose to understand by tód, idam, tó ॐ, tó ॐ, 'the comprehensive, eternal, material cause.'

From the arguments thus adduced, then, it is concluded that effect is, sat káryam ‡; that is, that it exists in, and is the same with, cause; or, as Gaurapáda has it, makat and the other characteristics of pradhána are in pradhána. Sat káryam is therefore neither 'ponendum est existens (sad) emphatic ita dictum tó ॐ tó ॐ, per se ens,' nor 'effectus existentis, ab existente effectum, effectum a tó ॐ tó ॐ:' the question is, whether effect exists or not before production; and not whether it is produced 'a tó ॐ tó ॐ an a tó ॐ μη ॐ tó ॐ.' It is the production, or appearance, or that which is or is not; not the production of any thing by that which is or is not; agreeably to the Sútra of Kapila: 'There is no production of that which

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* न पद्मलिखित निष्ठु तद्माऽवातः। † उपमेषु: प्रागापि कार्येभुषणः कारणामिदं श्रूति। ‡ तद्भवसम्बन्धुतमात्मसिद्धः। † सदेव सौभयं द्वियवासी। † सचमेवदस्यस। ‡ सत् काम्यः।
is not, as of a man’s horn—The production of that which is not is impossible, as would be that of a human horn†. Agreeably to the same doctrine also is the reply made in the Sūtras to the objection, that if effect exists already, existence is superfluously given to it; ‘It is absurd to produce what is already extant‡.’ The answer is, ‘It is not so; for the actual occurrence or non-occurrence of production depends upon manifestation∥:’ that is, the present existence of an effect is not the production of anything new, but the actual manifestation of a change of form of that which previously existed: something like the notions which Aristotle ascribes to ancient philosophers, that all things were together, and that their generation was merely a change of condition: ‘Ἡν ὁμοὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ γίγνοντα τοιὸνδε καθέστην ἀλλοιωθαί: and it is curious enough to find the doctrine illustrated almost in the words of Hobbes: ‘Faciendum est quod faciunt statuarii, qui materiam exculpentes, supervacaneam imaginem non faciunt sed inveniunt;’ or as Vijnāna Bhiṣkhu has it, ‘The active exertion of the sculptor produces merely the manifestation of the image which was in the stone.§.’

Although however, as identical with cause, and regarded as proofs of its existence; effects or products, in their separated or manifested condition regarded as forms only, possess properties different from those of their source or cause: these differences are detailed in the next stanza.

X.

A discrete principle is causable, it is inconstant, unpervading, mutable, multitudinous, supporting, mergent, conjunct, governed. The undiscrete one is the reverse.

* नास्तुपर्यंतो नर्यृगच्छति। † नर्षुद्धतुल्यस्यात ज्वादिनो म सम्पवति। ‡ नभावि भावोपगच्छति। ∥ नानिश्चिनिनिवन्धनी ष्वत्वा ष्वत्वारी। § शिलामध्यमतिमाया लेघ्र्क्ष्यापरिश्चानिश्चितिमायं।
BHÁSHYA.

Discrete; intellect and the other effects. Causable; that of which there is cause; the term hetu meaning 'cause,' as synonymous with upádána, kárana, and nimitta. Nature is the cause of a discrete principle; therefore discrete principles, as far as the gross elements inclusive, have cause: thus, the principle intellect has cause by nature; egotism by intellect; the five rudiments and eleven organs by egotism; ether by the rudiment of sound; air by that of touch; light by that of form; water by that of taste; and earth by that of smell. In this way, to the gross elements inclusive, a discrete principle has cause. Again, it is inconstant, because it is produced from another; as a water-jar, which is produced from a lump of clay, is not constant. Again, it is unpervading, not going every where: a discrete principle is not like nature and soul, omnipresent. Again, it is mutable; it is subject to the changes which the world undergoes: combined with the thirteen instruments, and incorporated in the subtile frame, it undergoes worldly vicissitudes, and hence is mutable. It is multitudinous; it is intellect, egotism, the five rudiments, and eleven organs; and the five gross elements are supported by the five rudiments. It is mergent; subject to resolution; for at the period of (general) dissolution, the five gross elements merge into the five rudiments; they, with the eleven organs, into egotism; egotism into intellect; and intellect merges into nature. Conjunct; conjoined, made up of parts, as sound, touch, taste, form, and smell. Governed; not self-dependent; for intellect is dependent on nature, egotism on intellect, the rudiments and organs on egotism, and the gross elements on the rudiments. In this way the governed or subject discrete principle is explained: we now explain the undiscrete.

The undiscrete one is the reverse. An undiscrete principle is the contrary in respect to the properties attributed to the discrete: that, is causable; but there is nothing prior to nature, whence follows its non-production, and therefore it is without cause. A discrete principle is inconstant; an undiscrete is eternal, as it is not produced. The primary elements are not produced from any where; that is, nature. A discrete
principle is unpervading; nature is pervading, going every where. A
discrete principle is mutable; nature immutable, from the same omni­
presence. Discrete principles are multitudinous; nature is single, from
its causality: "Nature is the one cause of the three worlds;" thence
nature is single. Discrete principles are dependent; the undiscrete one
is independent, from its not being an effect: there is nothing beyond
nature of which it can be the effect. A discrete principle is mergent;
the undiscrete immergent (indissoluble), being eternal: intellect and the
rest, at the period of general dissolution, merge respectively into one
another; not so nature; and that therefore is immergent (indissoluble).
A discrete principle is conjunct (or compound, made up of parts); nature
is uncompounded, for sound, touch, flavour, form, and odour, are not in
(crude) nature. Discrete principles are governed; the undiscrete is inde­
pendent, it presides over itself. These are the properties in which discrete
and undiscrete principles are dissimilar: those in which they are similar
are next described.

COMMENT.

It was stated in the eighth stanza, that intellect and the other
effects of nature were in some respects similar, and in others dissimilar, to their
cause: the properties in which the dissimilarity consists are here enu­
merated.

The generic term used for the effects or products of primeval nature
(\textit{vyakta}) means, in its etymological and commonly received senses, that
which is evident or manifest, or that which is individual or specific; from \textit{vi}, distributive particle, and \textit{anja}, 'to make clear or distinct.' The
purport is therefore sufficiently well expressed by the equivalent Mr. Cole­
brooke has selected, 'discrete,' detached from its cause, and having a
separate and distinct existence. Nature (or primary matter) is the reverse
of this, or \textit{avyakta}, 'undiscrete, unseparated, indistinct.' If \textit{natura} were
substituted for \textit{tellus}, these lines of Lucretius would illustrate the appli­
cation of the terms in question:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{अनु} \hspace{1cm} \textit{अत्यन्त} \hspace{1cm} \textit{अनु}
\end{itemize}
Multa modis multis multarum semina rerum
Quod permixta gerit tellus discretaque tradit.

Discrete or separated effect or principle (meaning by principle a tatwā, or category, according to the Sānkhya classification of the elements of existent things) is described by its properties, and they are the same which are specified in the original Sūtra. 1. Hētumata, 'having cause, or origin;' hētu implying 'material, efficient, and occasional cause;' 2. Anitya, 'temporary;' for whatever has cause has beginning, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. At the same time this is to be understood of them in their actual or present form or condition: 'Of their own nature (or as one with their cause) they are eternal, but they are perishable by their separate conditions.' So in the Sūtras 'destruction' is explained 'resolution into cause.' 3. Unpervading: 'Every one of the effects of nature is not observable in every thing, they are dispersed as different modifications.' Vyāpti is the essential and inherent presence of one thing in another, as of heat in fire, oil in sesamum, &c. 4. Sakriya, 'mutable,' or 'having action;' perhaps 'movable' or 'migratory' would perfectly express the sense; for the phrase is explained to signify that the effects of nature migrate from one substance to another: 'Intellect and the rest leave one body in which they were combined, and enter into the composition of another: this is their transition: the transition of the gross elements earth and the rest, composing body, is well known.' 5. Multitudinous: many, anēka, being repeated in various objects and persons, as 'the faculties in different individuals, and the elements in different forms.' 6. Supported
by, referable to, ásrita*; as an effect may be considered to be upheld by its cause, or an individual referable to a species; as trees form a wood.

7. 'Mergent,' linga†; that which merges into, or is lost or resolved into, its primary elements, as subsequently explained. Intellect and the rest are the lingas, signs, marks, or characteristic circumstances of nature: and when they lose their individuality, or discrete existence, they may be said to have been absorbed by, or to have fused or merged into, their original source. Although, therefore, the application of linga as an attributive in this sense is technical, the import is not so widely different from that of the substantive as might at first be imagined. Váchespati, explaining the term, has, ‘Linga, the characteristic of pradhánu, for these principles, buddhi and the rest, are its characteristics, as will be hereafter explained‡:’ and the author of the S. Chandriká has, ‘Linga is that which characterizes, or causes to be known∥;’ it is the anumápaká§, ‘the basis of the inference;’ ‘For this effect (of nature) is the parent of the inference that an undiscrete cause exists¶.’ (See also Com. on v. 5. p. 24.) According to these interpretations, ‘predicative’ or ‘characteristic’ would perhaps be a preferable equivalent; but ‘mergent’ or ‘dissoluble’** is conformable to the S. Bháshya. The commentator on the S. Pravachana explains it by both terms ‘inferential’ or ‘resolvable:’ ‘Effect is termed linga, either from its being the ground of inference of cause, or from its progress to resolution††.’

8. Combined, conjunct, sávayava‡‡; explained by Váchespati, ‘mixing,’ misranam||, or ‘junction,’ samyoga §§, as the elements combine with one another. It might be said, then, that nature is a compound, as its products combine with it; but this is not so, for their union with nature is not mere ‘mixture or conjunction,

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* आच्छित। † लिंग। ‡ लिंगं प्राचान्य यथा चैते बुद्धायः प्राचान्य लिंगमुपरिप्राथित। • लिंगं लिंगयित स्यायत। ‣ अनुमाप्त। ․ भवित हि कार्येनिर्देशायायूपालमनिति जनर। ** लयुक। †† कार्यानुमाप्तेक्तलाभमननादान। लिंगं कार्यं जातं। †‡ सावयव। || निष्ठ्रण। §§ संयोगः।
but identification from the sameness of the cause and effect*; a notion which distinguishes the pradhāna of the Sānkhyas from the first principles of those Grecian philosophers, who, if their doctrines have been rightly represented, taught that substances existed either as distinct particles of an aggregate, or component parts of a mixture, in their original form. In the Sānkhya they separate or reunite as one and the same.

10. The effects of nature depend upon its existence, and each in its turn produces its peculiar effect or product, in furtherance of the influence of nature, or in consequence of its existence, without which they would cease to be, and their effects would be null; as, 'In the effect of egotism, which intellect has to produce, the fulfilment of nature is regarded; otherwise intellect, being ineffective, would not be able to produce egotism."

The properties of nature, or the undiscrete principle, are the reverse of these; it has no cause; it has no end; it is omnipresent; it is immutable; it is single; it is self-sustained; it is the subject, not the predicate; it is entire, or one whole; it is supreme.

Although the especial object of the text here is the dissimilarity between the effects of nature and their material cause, yet the term avyakta applies equally to purusha, or 'soul,' also an invisible or undiscrete principle; and accordingly soul differs from discrete principles in the same circumstances as nature. In the properties, therefore, of non-causability, constancy, omnipresence, immutability, singleness, self-support, substantiveness, entireness, and supremacy, soul and nature correspond. They differ, however, in other respects, and particularly in those in which nature and its effects assimilate, as enumerated in the succeeding stanza.

* न हूँ प्रधानत्व बुधादिभि संयोगात्मादामात्।
† परतम।
‡ बुधा हि स्वजातिः संहारे जननित्ये प्रकृतिपूर्वोपेख्यत अन्यथा धीरा सति नानादहि जानोगुणिमिति।
XI.

A discrete principle, as well as the chief (or undiscrete) one, has the three qualities: it is indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse.

BHÁSYA.

*Has the three qualities:* it is that of which goodness, foulness, and darkness are the three properties. A discrete principle is indiscriminative; discrimination does not belong to it: that is, it cannot distinguish which is a discrete principle and which are properties, or that this is an ox, that is a horse: such as the properties are, such is the principle; such as is the principle such are the properties; and the like. Objective; a discrete principle is to be enjoyed (made use of), from its being an object to all men. Common; from being the common possession of all, like a harlot. Irrational; it does not comprehend pain, pleasure, or dulness. Prolific; thus, egotism is the progeny of intellect; the five rudiments and eleven organs of egotism; and the five gross elements of the five rudiments. These properties, to prolific inclusive, are specified as those of a discrete principle; and it is in them that the chief (or undiscrete) one is similar: "Such as is a discrete principle, such is the chief (or undiscrete) one." Therefore as a discrete principle has three qualities, so has the undiscrete, or that of which intellect and the rest, having the three qualities, are the effects: so in this world effect is of the like quality with cause, as black cloth is fabricated with black threads. A discrete principle is indiscriminative; so is the chief one, it cannot discern that qualities are distinct from nature, that qualities are one thing, and that nature is another; therefore the chief one is indiscriminative. A discrete principle is objective; so is the chief one, from its being the object of all men. A discrete principle is common; so is the chief one, being common to all things. A discrete principle is irrational; so is the chief one, as it is not conscious of pain, or pleasure, or dulness. Whence is this inferred? From the irrationality of its effects; from an irrational
lump of clay proceeds an irrational water-pot. Thus has (nature) the chief one been explained. *Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse:* this is now explained.

**Reverse** of both the discrete and undiscrete principles. Soul is the reverse of both, thus: Discrete and undiscrete have (the three) qualities; soul is devoid of qualities: they are indiscriminative; soul has discrimination: they are objects (of sense or fruition); soul is not an object (of sense or fruition): they are common; soul is specific: they are irrational; soul is rational; for inasmuch as it comprehends, or perfectly knows, pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is rational: they are prolific; soul is unprolific; nothing is produced from soul. On these grounds soul is said to be the reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles.

It is also said, *as in those,* referring to the preceding verse; for as the chief (or undiscrete) principle is there said to be without cause, &c. such is the soul. It is there stated that a discrete principle is causable, inconstant, and the like; and that the undiscrete one is the reverse; that is, it has no cause, &c.; so soul is without cause, being no production. A discrete principle is inconstant; the discrete one is constant; so is soul; and it is immutable also, from its omnipresence. A discrete principle is multitudinous; the undiscrete is single; so is soul. A discrete principle is supported; the undiscrete is unsupported; so is soul. A discrete principle is mergent; the undiscrete immergent (indissoluble); so is soul; it is not in any way decomposed. A discrete principle is conjunct; the undiscrete one uncombined; so is soul; for there are no (component) parts, such as sound, &c., in soul. Finally, discrete principles are governed; the undiscrete one is independent; so is soul, governing (or presiding over) itself. In this way the common properties of soul and nature were described in the preceding stanza; whilst those in which they differ, as possession of the three qualities, and the like, are specified in this verse. Next follows more particular mention of these three qualities, with which both discrete principles and the undiscrete one are endowed.

**COMMENT.**

In this verse the properties common to crude nature and to its products
are specified, continuing the reference to the eighth verse, in which it was asserted, that in some respects the effects of nature and nature itself were analogous. This being effected, the text proceeds to state that soul has not the properties which are common to nature and its products, but possesses those which are peculiar to the former; agreeing therefore in some respects with crude nature, but dissimilar in every respect to its effects or products.

The three qualities*, or satwa†, 'goodness,' rajas‡, 'foulness,' and tamas§, 'darkness,' which are familiar to all the systems of Hindu speculation, are more particularly described in the next verse; soul has them not. Pradhâna, 'the chief one,' crude nature, and its products, have not discrimination, viveka‡, the faculty of discerning the real and essential differences of things, of 'distinguishing between matter and spirit, of knowing self; the exercise of which is the source of final liberation (from existence)¶.' By the term 'objective**' is intended that which may be used or enjoyed, such as the faculties of the mind, and the organs of sense; or such as may be perceived by observation, vijnâna††: such nature, or pradhâna, may also be considered as the origin of all things inferable by reason. Soul, on the contrary, is the observer or enjoyer, as afterwards explained. Achetana¶¶, 'irrational;' that which does not think or feel, unconscious, non-sentient; as in the Meghadûta; 'Those afflicted by desire seek relief both from rational and irrational objects'||; explained either 'living and lifeless§§,' or 'knowing and ignorant••;' chetana*** being defined 'knowledge of right and wrong,' or 'of what ought, and what ought not, to be done†††.'

The general position, that the properties of soul are the reverse of

* गुणा।। † सत्व।। ‡ रजस।। § विवेक।
†† विज्ञान।। ††† अचेतन।। || का मानसिक प्राकृतिक अचेतन।। "वि
§§ प्राकृतिक अचेतन।। "वि
*** चेतना।। ††† सामाोकार्मिक बिवेचना।"
those of the products of nature, requires, however, some modification in one instance. A discrete principle is said to be multitudinous, many, aneka*; consequently soul should be single, eka†; and it is so, according to the S. Bhāshya‡. On the other hand, the S. Tatwa Kauṇḍinya makes soul agree with discrete principles, in being multitudinous: ‘The properties of non-causability, constancy, and the rest, are common to soul and nature; multitudinousness is a property common to (soul and) an undiscrete principle.’ The S. Chandrikā confirms the interpretation, ‘The phrase tathā cha implies that (soul) is analogous to the undiscrete principle in non-causality and the rest, and analogous to discrete principles in manifold enumeration.§’ This is, in fact, the Sāṅkhya doctrine, as subsequently laid down by the text, ver. 18, and is conformable to the Sūtra of Kapila; ‘Multitude of souls is proved by variety of condition¶:’ that is, ‘the virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regenerated in hell; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set free.’

Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. vol. I. p. 31), ‘individual.’ So in the Sūtras it is said, ‘that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of vessels.’ This singleness of soul applies therefore to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and liberation; for, as the commentator observes, ‘one soul is born, not

* अनेकः। † एकः। ‡ अनेकं व्यक्तमेकमेकं तथा पुष्पा नष्ठकः। || अभेदमुखिनिवलादिः प्रधानसाधकर्ममक्षितं पुष्पत्वं एवं नेकं व्यक्तसाधकर्मम्। § तथा चाभेदकाः पक्षेहितुस्मातिडिना एवं व्यक्तसक्ख्योपकेकसंहस्त्येति। ¶ जन्मादि यथाभाषाः पुष्पवह्वल्म। ** पुष्पवान् स्मरघो जायते पापी नरेन चाङ्गो भमयते ज्ञानी मुम्प्ते। †† उपाधिभेदेश्चेकं नानायोग श्रायशयं घटादिदिमः।
another (in a regenerated body). The singleness of soul therefore, as asserted by GAURAPĀDA, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.

XII.

The qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness; are adapted to manifestation, activity, and restraint; mutually domineer; rest on each other; produce each other; consort together; and are reciprocally present.

BHĀSHYA.

The qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness, are severally the same as what is agreeable, what is disagreeable, and what is indifferent: thus goodness is all that is pleasure, priti meaning 'pleasure;' being one with (or consisting of) that (pleasure): foulness is one with, or consists of, disagreeableness (aprīti): darkness consists of, or is the same with, dulness; visḵāda meaning môha, 'dulness, stupidity.' Next, are adapted to manifestation, &c.; artha signifying 'competency' or 'fitness.' Goodness, then, is for the sake of manifestation; it is fit for, or adapted to it: foulness is for activity; darkness for restraint: that is, the qualities are connected with, or possessed of, manifestation, action, and inertia. They mutually domineer: they are mutually paramount, sustaining, productive, cooperative, and coexistent. Thus, they are said to domineer mutually; that is, they severally prevail or predominate over each other, or they are displayed by the properties of pleasure, pain, or dulness. When goodness is dominant, it overpowers foulness and darkness by its own properties, and is exhibited or identified with light and joy. When foulness predominates, it overpowers goodness and darkness, and exists in pain and action. When darkness triumphs, it suppresses goodness and foul-
ness, and is supreme as one with insensitivity and inaction. So they rest on each other: the qualities combine with one another, like binary atoms. They produce each other, as the lump of clay generates the earthen jar. They consort together, as males and females cohabit: as it is said, "Goodness is the consort of foulness, foulness of goodness; darkness is called the consort of both:" that is, they are respectively associates. They are reciprocally present: they abide or exist reciprocally, according to the text, "qualities abide in qualities" (that is, the same qualities may be regarded as different, according to their different effects): thus, a beautiful and amiable woman, who is a source of delight to every one else, is the cause of misery to the other wives of her husband, and of bewilderment (insensibility) to the dissolute: and in this manner she is the cause of the influence of all three qualities. Thus also, a king, assiduous in protecting his people, and curbing the profligate, is the cause of happiness to the good, of misery and mortification to the bad: here foulness (activity) produces the effects of goodness and darkness. So darkness, by its investing nature, produces the effects of goodness and foulness, as clouds, overshadowing the heavens, cause delight upon earth, animate by their rain the active labours of the husbandman, and overwhelm absent lovers with despair. In this manner the three qualities are reciprocally present (or perform the functions of one another).

COMMENT.

The three qualities are here described, by their effects and relations; by the production of pleasure, pain, and indifference; and by the manner in which they are detached or combined in their operations and influence.

The terms priti and apriti are here used as synonyms of sukha, 'pleasure,' and dukha, 'pain;' vishāda as a synonyme of moha, 'bewilderment, stupefaction, dullness, or insensibility.' The composition of ātma with these terms, prītyātma, implies 'essential or inseparable presence,' like that of life or soul in the living body. An exact equivalent for such a compound can scarcely perhaps be supplied, but the sense may be conveyed by such expressions as 'consists of, comprehends, is one or iden-
tical with,' and the like. *Atma* is here used also to shew that the properties have positive existence; that is, pleasure is not the mere absence of pain; pain is not the mere absence of pleasure; as, 'Negatives could not be essential ingredients in any thing: pleasure, pain, and insensibility are therefore entities; the word *atma* implying being, existence, existent nature, or property.'

The absolute and relative influence of the several qualities is sufficiently illustrated by *Gaurapada*; but *Vachespata* understands the text as in some respects differently constructed. Instead of considering the last term, *vrittaya*†, as a distinct condition, *anyonyavrittaya‖, expounded in the *S. Bhāṣya, parasparam var tantē‖*, they are reciprocally present, † he interprets *vritti* by *kriyā, 'act, operation, function,' and compounds it with each of the foregoing terms §. In all other respects his explanation of the terms coincides with that of the elder commentator. The passage quoted by *Gaurapada* is cited by *Vachespata*, with some difference, from the Vedas: 'As it is said in the *ágama*, all universally present are the associates of each other: goodness is the partner of foulness, foulness of goodness; both are the companions of darkness, and darkness is said to be the associate of both. Their original connexion, or disjunction, is never observed.' The *Chandrikā* concurs with the *S. Tatwa Kavmudi* in the explanation of *vritti***. This commentary likewise offers some additional interpretation of the terms *priti*, &c. Thus *priti* is said to

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comprise 'rectitude, gentleness, modesty, faith, patience, clemency, wisdom': apriti, besides 'misery,' implies 'hatred, violence, envy, abuse, wickedness:' and vishāda is not only 'insensibility,' but 'tardiness, fear, infidelity, dishonesty, avarice, and ignorance. Whenever either of these is observed, it is referable to the corresponding quality *.'

In speaking of qualities, however, the term guna is not to be regarded as an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the medium of the faculties. It is, in fact, nature, or prakriti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, unduly prominent; nature entire, or unmodified, being nothing more than the three qualities in equipoise, according to the Sūtra, 'Prakriti is the equal state of goodness, foulness, and darkness †:' on which the commentator remarks, 'Satwa and the rest are "things," not specific properties, from their being subject to combination or disjunction, and from their having the properties of lightness, heaviness, and strength ‡:' and again, 'From the construction of intellect and the rest endowed with the three properties, like cords wherewith to bind the victim the soul ||. So in the S.Sāra, 'Goodness and the rest are not the faculties of that (prakriti), being of the same nature §:'—Such expressions as "qualities of nature" are to be understood (in the same sense) as (the term) "the trees of a forest" ‡:' that is, the forest is nothing different from the trees of which it is the aggregate, although particular trees or clumps may sometimes be indivi-

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* अग्नि प्रीति: सुखमिल्लेन्द्रासर्वाधाराभिलक्ष्यमोक्षिण्य शामानुप्रसादानां दीनाः। ऋषिविन्दुः समुद्रालीक्रमनुप्रसादानां दीनाः। विषाणु भोव्य उपर्याण विप्रतमभवचनास्तिक्षेत्रः कौतिष्कार्याख्यातानांदीनां यथे ततुपरम्यस्ते तन्त्र ताहं गुण: प्रवेशविष्णु इति भावः।
† सावर्जनमां साम्याक्ष्याम प्रकृति:।
‡ सबादेयि दुष्पाशि न वैशेषिका गुणः संयो गतिज्योगवादान्त समुद्रवल्लगुल्लादिपर्यङ्खाण।
§ पुस्तकपुस्तककर्ति गुणालक्षमहदादि रत्निन्मितात्वातः।
†† सबादेयिनामधमर्मैं तद्दृष्टवातः।
‡‡ व्रतापैर्गुण: इति दादिवाक्ष्य तु चन्द्र्युष्मा इति वोच्चः।
dualized. In like manner nature is not different from the qualities, but is the aggregate of them. ‘Ingredients or constituents of nature,’ therefore, would be a preferable term perhaps to ‘quality;’ but ‘quality’ is the more ordinary acceptation of the word guna, and it may therefore be used, remembering only the distinction made by the Sánkhyas of its materiality, as a constituent part of nature itself; the qualities being, in fact, only the conditions of things, and therefore not separable from the things themselves. It may be thought possible that there is some connection between the gunas which are the constituents of prakriti, and the qualities, passions, or affections of primary matter of the older philosophers, alluded to by Aristotle; from the changes produced by which on one unaltered substance all things originated: Τὰ ἐν μιᾷ οὐσίᾳ ὑπομενόντα, τοῖς δὲ πάσιν μεταβαλλόντα, τούτο στοιχεῖον καὶ ταύτην τῶν δυνά τίν ἄρχην φασιν εἶναι. Metaph. I. 3. Another analogy may be conjectured in the identification of the two gunas, satwa and rajas, with priti, ‘affection,’ and apriti, ‘aversion,’ as they thus correspond with the φίλε and νέικος, the ‘love’ and ‘strife’ of Empedocles, as the principles of creation; respectively the source of what is good or evil.

The sense in which the several terms for the three gunas is employed is sufficiently clear from the explanation given of them in the text; and the meaning of the equivalents which Mr. Colebrooke has assigned them must be understood according to the same interpretation. Prof. Lassen renders them essentia, impetus, and caligo; which, similarly understood, are equally unobjectionable: but as the name of a ‘quality,’ satwa, is not perhaps well rendered by ‘essence,’ or even by ‘existence,’ which is its literal purport, ‘goodness,’ denoting exemption from all imperfection, seems to be preferable. Impetus is rather the effect of rajas, than the quality; and the term ‘souliness,’ derived from its etymology from ranj, ‘to colour or stain,’ will better comprehend its characteristic results. The quality bears a striking analogy to the perturbatio of the Stoics, and might be rendered by that word, or by ‘passion,’ in its generic acceptation. ‘Darkness,’ or caligo, expresses both the literal and technical signification of tamas.
XIII.

Goodness is considered to be alleviating and enlightening: foulness, urgent and versatile: darkness, heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp, they cooperate for a purpose (by union of contraries).

BHĀSHYA.

Goodness is alleviating, &c.—When goodness predominates, the frame is light, the intellect is luminous, and the senses are acute. Foulness is urgent and versatile.—What urges, urgent, exciting: as a bull, upon seeing another bull, exhibits vehement excitement; that is the effect of foulness. Foulness is also seen to be versatile; that is, a person under its influence is capricious. Darkness is heavy and enveloping.—Where darkness prevails, the members of the body are heavy, the senses obtuse, or inadequate to the performance of their functions. But here it may be said, If these qualities are contraries to one another, what effect can they produce by their several purposes, and how therefore can it be said, they cooperate, like a lamp, for a (common purpose). Like a lamp, their operation is for a (common) purpose: as a lamp, which is composed of the opposites, a wick, oil, and flame, illuminates objects, so the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, although contrary to one another, effect a (common) purpose.

This question involves another. It was said (in ver. 11) that a discrete principle, as well as the chief one, has the three qualities, and is indiscriminative, objective, and the like. Admitting this to be true of the chief one (or nature), how is it ascertained that intellect and the rest have also the three qualities, and are indiscriminative, and the like? This is next explained.

COMMENT.

The description of the three qualities is continued in this verse.

Goodness is alleviating: laghu, 'light;' it is matter, elastic and elevating, generating upward and lateral motion, as in the ascent of flame, and the currents of the air. It is the cause of active and perfect functionality
also in the instruments of vitality*; enlightening, prakásakam, 'making manifest,' the objects of the senses. The term ishíam, meaning ordinarily 'wished, desired,' imports in the text merely drishíam, 'seen, regarded, considered'—by the Sáňkhya teachers†. Foulness is urgent and versatile.—The qualities of goodness and darkness are both inert and inoperative, even with regard to their own peculiar consequences; and it is only by the restless activity and stimulating agency of the quality of foulness that they are roused to action; upashíambhakam‡ being here explained to signify 'stimulating, impelling,' udyotakam, prédakam‖, contrary to its usual sense of 'opposing, bindering.' It might be supposed to imply some relation to the primitive shíabhi§, 'stop, hinder, oppose, be stupid;' inasmuch as the idea appears to be that of action consequent upon obstruction, or inertia, 'reaction.' Thus, as illustrated in the S. Bháshya, a bull displays excitement on beholding, or being opposed by, another. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi has, 'The qualities goodness and darkness, on account of their own inertia, are inoperative, in regard to the exercise of their own effects, until excited by foulness. Having been roused from inactivity, they are made to put forth vigour and energy; and therefore foulness is said to be urgent‖.' The Chandriká is to the same effect: 'The meaning is this: From the production of combination and activity by foulness, the definition of that quality is excitement and versatility**.' It is not necessary, however, to take into consideration the sense of the primitive shíabhi, for upashíambhaka is not derived from that root, but from stambhu††, a Sautra root; which therefore, although the meanings of

* करणां वृत्तिपुलहेतुलोकाभवं। † सांख्याचायीः। ‡ उप स्थमर्थ। †† उद्धोतक प्रेडक। § हभ। ††† संततमसी स्वयम ज्ञित्यत्या स्वकायेर्वृत्तिः प्रायवसीदतो रजसोपशमने। ज्ञवसादात् प्रवक्ष्याय उक्तां प्रसां कार्येत्। तदर्शुरूपायुपशमां रज्जे इति। ** रजसीव संप्रभु त्रियोक्ष्यते प्रेडकां सङ्क्रियां च रजसो लक्षणमितिभावः।
shtabhí are usually also assigned to it, may take the import required by the text, of 'urging' or 'exciting.'

The quality of darkness is 'heavy,' guru, causing sluggishness of body and dulness of mind. It is also varanaka, 'surrounding, enveloping,' so as to obstruct light, retard motion, &c.

But these qualities, although contraries, cooperate for a common purpose; as the cotton, the oil, and the flame, although mutually destructive, combine in a lamp to give light. The common object of the qualities is the fulfilment of the purpose of soul, as is subsequently explained.

XIV.

Indiscriminativeness and the rest (of the properties of a discrete principle) are proved by the influence of the three qualities, and the absence thereof in the reverse. The undiscrete principle, moreover, (as well as the influence of the three qualities,) is demonstrated by effect possessing the properties of its cause (and by the absence of contrariety).

Bháshya.

That which is the property of indiscriminativeness and the rest is proved from the influence of the three qualities in mahat and the other discrete principles: but this is not proved in the undiscrete; therefore it is said, by the absence the reverse of it: the reverse of it; the absence; the non-existence of the reverse of that: thence the undiscrete principle is established; as, where there are threads, there is cloth; the threads are not one thing, and the cloth another. Why so? From the absence of the reverse (they are not contraries to each other). In this manner the discrete and undiscrete principles are established. The latter is remote, the former is near: but he who perceives discrete principles, perceives the undiscrete one also, as there is no contrariety between them. Hence also the undiscrete one is proved by effect possessing the properties of cause in this world: such as is the nature of the cause, such is that of the effect;
thus, from black threads black cloth is made. In the same manner, as
the characteristics of intellect and the rest are their being indiscrimi­
native, objective, common, irrational, prolific, such as they are, such the
undiscrete is proved essentially to be. From the influence of the three
qualities, indiscriminativeness and the rest are proved to be in discrete
principles; and from there being no difference between them (and the
undiscrete), and from essential identity of the properties of cause and
effect, the undiscrete principle also is demonstrated.

But it is replied, this cannot be true; for in this world that which is not
apprehended is not; but the undiscrete one is, although not applicable.

COMMENT.

It was stated in ver. 8, that mahat and the other effects of prakriti
were in some respects like, and in others unlike, to their original. The
circumstances in which they were dissimilar were specified in ver. 10,
and those in which they agreed in ver. 11. In the latter stanza, the first
of the concurrent properties that was named was that of their possessing
the three qualities; and in verses 12 and 13 it was explained what was
meant by the three qualities. In the present stanza it is asserted, that as
the effects of prakriti have the three qualities, they must have, as a neces­
sary consequence, the other properties, want of discrimination and the
rest, enumerated in ver. 11; and that as they have them, their origin, or
prakriti, must have them also, as there is no essential difference between
the properties of cause and effect.

The influence of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or the varied affec­
tions and conditions of all substances, is the obvious cause of perplexity,
or want of discrimination, &c.; being, in fact, the same state or condition.
Traigunya is the influence or any consequence of the three gunas. The
next expression is variously interpreted.

Mr. Colebrooke renders tad viparyaya abhavat*, 'and from the absence
thereof in the reverse;' that is, the absence of want of discrimination, &c.

* तद्विपर्यायाभावात्
in that subject which is the reverse of the material products of nature, as, for instance, soul, is a negative proof of their existence in the former. The properties of contraries are contrary. Soul and matter are contraries, and consequently their properties are mutually the reverse of each other: but one property of soul is freedom from the three qualities, whilst that of matter, or any material product of prakriti, is their possession; consequently the former must be capable, and the latter incapable, of discrimination. The same may be said of the other properties of mahat and the rest. Thus Vāchespati observes: 'It (the assertion) is first plainly or affirmatively expressed in the natural order: it is then put negatively, or in the inverted order; from the absence thereof in the reverse; from the absence of the three qualities in soul, as the reverse of the products of prakriti, in regard to want of discrimination and the like.' The S. Chandrikā has a similar explanation: 'The reverse of that want of discrimination; where that is that is the reverse (of mahat, &c.), or soul: for in soul there are not the three qualities; or, where there is not want of discrimination there are not the three qualities, as in soul †: intimating, therefore, that tad, 'thereof,' may refer either to the three qualities traiguṇya, or to want of discrimination, &c.

There is, however, another sense attached to the expression; and the reverse is understood not to signify soul, or any thing contrary to mahat and the rest, but to imply contrariety or incompatibility in the properties of their origin, or prakriti: that is, indiscriminativeness and the rest are the properties of mahat, &c. not only from their possessing the three qualities, but because there is nothing contrary to indiscriminativeness, &c. in prakriti. This proposition is indicated by Vāchespati, who, after explaining the passage as above, adds, 'Or it may be understood as

* सङ्कुचाद्वैतेनेति ग्यातिरेकानाएः। तत्त्विपरिवर्तेदिवेक्षादिविविद्विवाहवात्।
† तत्त्वाविवेकलस्य विपरिवर्तीयो यष्टमेव समशंकूष्ठयं शालमः तष्ठ चेगुण्याभावात्वधा च यष्टविवेकलस्य भावश्च चेगुण्याभाव शालस्वदिति।
taking for its two subjects *vyakta* and *avyakta* (discrete and undiscrete matter), and by the inverted proposition (or negatively) asserting that there is no reason (to the contrary) arising from one being exempt from the three qualities*. The same is more explicitly stated by Gaurapāda. The absence of indiscriminativeness, he observes, as deduced from the influence of the three qualities, relates in the first instance to *vyakta*, 'discrete matter,' not to *avyakta*, or 'indiscrete:' but the same must apply to the latter also, because there is no property belonging to it which is incompatible with, or the reverse of, the properties of the *vyakta*, or 'discrete matter,' *mahat*, &c.; as in the case of the cloth and the threads of which it is woven, there is no incompatibility between them.

The first portion of the stanza having shewn, then, either simply that discrete matter is possessed of indiscriminativeness, &c. or that both it and indiscrete matter are equally devoid of discrimination, proceeds to draw the conclusion that such an indiscrete cause must exist, endowed with properties similar to those of its indiscrete effects, because there is no difference of property between cause and effect; agreeably to the Sūtra, 'The three qualities, insensibility and the rest, belong to both (*prakriti* and its products)†; and Vācespāti observes, 'Effect is seen to be the same in its properties with cause. As the properties of the threads, &c. are identical with those of cloth and the like, so the attributes of pleasure, pain, and insensibility, evidenced in the effects, which are distinguished as *mahat* and the rest, are proofs that similar conditions must belong to their cause: the existence of *pradhāna* or *avyakta*, as a cause, of which pleasure, pain, and insensibility are the conditions, is consequently established ‡.'

\* ऋषि वा व्यक्तिकृत । व्यक्तिभावेन चिन्तुष्यावतीत एवं हेतु ।

† चिन्तुष्याचेतनलवार्दिष्टः। कार्यः हि कारणसाधारितं हेतु । यथा तंत्रादिगुणाधिकं परादि तथा महद्दिलवार्धेनायि कार्येन सुखं समोहत्वेः स्वकारणेन गत्सुखं समोहस्यना भविष्यं तथा च तत्

‡ कार्यां सुखं समोहस्यन्तः प्रधानमय्यान्तः सिद्धं भवति ।
XV.

Since specific objects are finite; since there is homogeneousness; since effects exist through energy; since there is a parting (or issue) of effects from cause, and a reunion of the universe,—

BHÁSHYA.

The undiscrete principle is cause: this is the completion of the construction of the sentence. Since specific objects are finite: as in the world, wherever the agent is, his limits are observed: thus, a potter makes certain jars with certain portions of clay; so with intellect: intellect and the other characteristics (of nature) are finite, as specific effects of it. Intellect is one, egotism is one, the subtile rudiments are five, the organs eleven, the gross elements five: from the limitation of these species nature is their cause, which produces finite discrete principles. If nature were not the cause, then discrete principles would have no limit: from the measure (or limit) of specific objects, therefore, nature exists, whence discrete principles are produced. Since there is homogeneousness: as in the world, that which is notorious is observed; for having seen a religious student engaged in sacred study, it follows that his parents were assuredly of the Brahmanical tribe: so having observed that mañcat and the other characteristics have the three qualities, we conclude what their cause must be; and in this way from homogeneousness the chief one exists. Since effects exist through energy: in life, that which is effective in any thing is active in the same: a potter is able to make a jar, therefore he makes a jar, not a piece of cloth. Since there is a parting of effect from cause: the chief one is cause; that which makes is cause, that which is made is effect: the separation of cause and effect: thus; a jar is competent to hold curds, honey, water, milk; not so is its cause, or the lump of clay; but the lump of clay produces the jar, the jar does not produce the lump of clay. So having observed intellect and the other effects, it is inferred that cause must have been separated, of which these discrete principles are detached portions. Again, since there is a reunion of the
universe (vaisvarūpa). Viswa here means ‘the world;’ répa, ‘individualization’ (or specific form): the abstract condition of the form of the world is the universe: from its reunion, nature exists (as cause); whence there is no mutual separation of the five gross elements, earth &c., composing the three worlds; or, the three worlds are comprised in the gross elements. The five gross elements are earth, water, fire, air, ether; which at the season of general dissolution return in the order of creation to a state of non-separation, or into the modified five subtile rudiments: they and the eleven organs reunite in egotism; egotism resolves into intellect; and intellect into nature. Thus the three worlds, at the period of general dissolution, reunite in nature; and from such reunion of the discrete and undiscrete principles, like that of curds and milk, it follows that the undiscrete principle is cause.

COMMENT.

The sentence is incomplete, the government being in the first member of the following verse; kārānam asti-avyaktam, ‘There is (a general) cause (which is undiscrete).’ Hitherto the subjects discussed have been the existence of effects, and their correspondence or disagreement with their cause. It is now shewn that cause exists imperceptible, or undiscrete.

From specific effects being finite: from the certain or definite measure of the varieties of discrete principles, as one intellect, one egotism, five rudiments, and the like. If there were no certain and defined cause, the effects would be indefinite and unlimited: the water-jar, however, must be limited by the earth of which it consists, and which, as a distinct body, is no longer extant. ‘Homogeneousness,’ samanwaya, is defined ‘the common nature of different things,’ as the property of generating pain, pleasure, and dulness, which is possessed by intellect and the rest. Effects exist through energy: ‘through the energy, ability, or power of cause they

* भिन्नां समान ख्यताः
become active.*' A parting, or issue, of effect from cause, and final reunion of the separated effect. *Vaisvarūpa* is merely a synonyme of *kārya*, 'effect;' that which is of various, or every, sort of form, or nature. The evolution of effect from unseparated cause is illustrated by comparing nature to a tortoise, the limbs of which are at one time protruded, and at another retracted within the shell: 'As when the limbs which are in the body of the tortoise protrude, then they are distinguished, or (it is said) this is the body, those are the limbs: so when they are withdrawn into it they are undistinguished (from the body)†.' S. *Tatwa Kaumudi*. In like manner the water-jar or the diadem exist in the lump of clay or of gold, but are distinguished from it only when individually manifested; they become mere clay or gold again on losing their detached condition: thus earth and the rest exist in the subtile rudiments; those and the organs of sense and action in egotism; egotism in intellect; and intellect in nature: when manifested or put forth they are separated or distinguished from their several sources, but at the period of universal dissolution lose their distinct form, and become progressively one with their common original: the existence of which therefore, as their undiscrète cause, is proved both by their appearance or separation, and disappearance or reunion.

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**XVI.**

There is a general cause, which is undiscrete. It operates by means of the three qualities, and by mixture, by modification, as water; for different objects are diversified by influence of the several qualities respectively.

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* कार्यशक्ति: काय्य प्रवेशते । । यथा कृम्मेशरीरे शून्यवाच्यानि
  निष्कल्पिन्तो विभज्जना इत्यं कृम्मेशरीरेतेर्मतान्यक्यायानीति ।
  एवं निविष्मानानि तस्मिन अभिभवति ।
That which is known as the undiscrete principle is the cause; whence intellect and the other effects proceed. *It operates by means of the three qualities.*—That in which are the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the (aggregate of the) three qualities. What then is that? The equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the chief one (nature). *Also, from mixture.*—In like manner as the Ganges unites into one river the three streams that descend upon the head of Rúdra, so the (aggregate of the) three qualities, the undiscrete, produces a single discrete principle; or, as many threads combined form one piece of cloth, so the undiscrete generates intellect and the rest from the interweaving of the three qualities: and thus from the influence of the three qualities and their aggregation the discrete world proceeds. But if discrete principles proceed from one undiscrete, then one form should be common to all. This objection is invalid; for it is by modification, like water, from a variety in the receptacles of the several qualities, that the three worlds, derived from one undiscrete principle, assume different conditions of being. The gods are united with pleasure, mankind with pain, animals with dulness; so that a discrete principle, emanating from one nature, becomes modified, like water, according to the diversified receptacles of the qualities. *Pratiprati* implies *several order:* *gunā sraya,* *a receptacle of the qualities,* by the difference of that receptacle (according to that several receptacle) in which it is lodged. Discrete principles are varied from modification; as the simple element water, when fallen from the atmosphere, is diversely modified as various fluids, according to its various combinations, so from one *pradhána* proceed the three worlds, which are no longer of one (uniform) character. In the divinities the quality of goodness predominates, foulness and darkness are inert; therefore they are supremely happy. In men the quality of foulness abounds, and goodness and darkness are inert; therefore they are supremely miserable. In animals goodness and foulness are inactive, and darkness prevails; and therefore they are supremely insensible.

In these two stanzas the existence of nature (*pradhána*) has been determined: in the next place, that of soul is to be established.
COMMENT.

In this verse, besides the conclusion drawn from the arguments in the preceding stanza, it is here explained how nature, which is one, produces diversified effects. This is said to be through the influence of the three qualities, the combination or several predominance of which in various objects is attended with a modification and diversity of that which is essentially one and the same.

"Modified condition," according to Vāchespati, "is the character of the three qualities, which are never for a moment stationary," except when creation is not: and from this constant vicissitude ensues combination in different proportions, or the predominance of one or other in different objects; for they are always combined, or mixed, in different proportions. This is the mixture, the blending, or contention of the qualities which the text intends. Hence proceeds the modification of the original matter; as rain water, falling upon different trees, is modified as the juice of their different fruits. "As simple water shed by the clouds, coming into contact with various situations, is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, or astringent, in the character of the juice of the cocoa-nut, palm, bel karanja, and wood-apple," S. Tatwa Kaumudi. So, according to Cudworth, the Italic philosophers maintained that the forms and qualities of bodies were only different modifications of primary matter. "The same numerical matter," he observes, "differently modified, causing different phantasm in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things, as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice." Intellect. System, III. 426.

It may be doubted if the latter portion of the verse should not be

* परिश्रमस्त्वभावा बिगुशा नापरिश्रमः सभासमर्थः।
† यथा बारितमुहुसमुदङ्कलसमपि तत्स्तुमित्वित्तासाध्य तारिकलतालिवित्त
चिरविव्वामलक्र रापन्न्वलासतया परिश्रमपि मधुरामुतिक्कुदक्काय
तया विषयः।
preferably rendered, 'By modification, like water, according to the receptacle, or subject, of the qualities.' Such is evidently the sense in which the S. Bhāṣya understands it, and such appears to be that of the above illustration; the simple water being modified, as sweet, sour, &c., according to the tree by which it is absorbed, and the fruit of which it constitutes the juice. So certain objects are fitted for certain qualities; as the gods for goodness, men for foulness, animals for darkness; and nature is modified in them accordingly; that quality predominating which is conformable to the receptacle: the question here being, not the origin of things, but of their different properties. Vāchespati, however, seems to make the diversity of objects depend upon the qualities, not the difference of qualities upon the subject; explaining the phrase prati gunāsraya viṣheśhāt. 'The difference which is produced by the recipience of each several quality; thence, &c.'† The Chandrika has the same explanation, adding, 'Diversity is from diversity (different ratio) of qualities ‡.' There is no incompatibility, indeed, in the two views of the meaning of the text, as the variety of things depends upon the difference or disproportion of the three primary qualities, whether those qualities modify, or be modified by, the subject to which they belong: in either case the variety is not a different thing, it is only a modification of the same thing, pradāna.

XVII.

Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; since the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties (before mentioned), must exist; since there must be superintendence; since there must be one to enjoy; since there is a tendency to abstraction; therefore, soul is.

† प्रतिप्रतिगुणाष्ट्रयबिशेषायत् । एवेकगुणाष्ट्रयेऽयोविशेषत्त
स्मात् । ♯ वुख्विविश्वन्तब्धिष्यत् ।
BHÁSHYA.

As it is said, "Liberation is obtained by discriminative knowledge of discrete and undiscrete principles;" and whereas the undiscrete has been shewn to be distinct from the discrete by five arguments (ver. 9), so soul being, like the undiscrete principle, subtile (not cognizable by the senses), its existence is now established by inference. Soul is.—Why? Because the assemblage of objects is for another’s use.—The assemblage of intellect and the rest is for the use of soul: this is inferred from the irrationality (of nature and its effects), like a bed. In like manner as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding, props, cords, cotton, coverlid, and pillows, is for another’s use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service; thence it is concluded that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed, and for whose use it was made: so this body, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another’s use; or, there is soul, for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of an aggregate of intellect and the rest, has been produced.

Again, soul is, because the reverse of that which has the three qualities has been declared: as it was stated in a former verse (11), ‘A discrete principle has the three qualities, is indiscriminative, objective, &c.;’ and it is added, "Soul is in these respects the reverse."

Again, soul is, because there must be superintendence.—As a charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses able to curvet, to prance, to gallop, so the soul guides the body: as it is said in the Shashti Tantra, "Nature, directed by soul, proceeds."

Soul is, because there must be an enjoyer.—In like manner as there must be some one to partake of food flavoured with sweet, sour, salt, pungent, bitter, and astringent flavours, so, as there is no capability of fruition in intellect and the other products of nature, there must be soul, by which this body is to be enjoyed.

Again, soul is, because there is a tendency to abstraction.—Kaivalya is the abstract noun, derived from kevala, ‘sole, only’—for, on account of, that (abstraction): the practice of it: from the exercise of (or tendency to) abstraction (for the sake of its own separation or detachment) it is
inferred that soul is. That is, Every one, whether wise or unwise, equally desires imperishable release from succession of worldly existence.

It is next to be determined whether this soul be but one superintendant over all bodies, like the string that supports all the gems of a necklace; or whether there be many souls presiding severally over individual bodies.

COMMENT.

Arguments for the existence of soul as a distinct principle are here adduced.

The existence of soul is established by inference: a bed implies a sleeper; nature, made up of its effects, is for the production of pain, pleasure, and insensibility, of which soul alone is conscious*. But admitting that the assemblage is for the benefit of another, why should that other be soul? because soul is not a similar aggregate; it is not made up of qualities and the like, but is the reverse of nature in these respects, as was explained in verse 11: or, as the commentator on the Sūtra, Sanhata parārthatwāt†, observes, because the property of pain or pleasure, which is identical with body, must be different from that which enjoys the one, or suffers the other. Because there must be an enjoyer.—The existence of an enjoyer implies the existence of both pleasure and pain; election between which cannot be made by intellect and the rest, which are inseparable from them, and it must be the act of something else, which is soul. 'Intelect and the rest are the things to be used (bhogya) or perceived (drīya), and consequently imply one who perceives.' S. Tatwa Kaumudi.

The term kaivalya, rendered 'abstraction,' signifies 'detachment from the world;' or, as it is explained, 'absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must therefore be something different from intellect and the

* मुखदुःसमोहालकतया ध्वजादय: संसंवादः। ।। सङ्गतिपरारं
लात्। ।। भोग्या हत्त्वा वृद्धादयो न च दृष्टारमणिर्याह हस्यता युक्षा
tैतिष्टं तस्मादक्षिण द्रष्टा हस्यबुद्धाधिकिर्यं स चास्मेवत।
rest, which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a separation from their own essence. S. Tatwa Kaumudi. So Vijnana Bhikshu explains kaivalya, ‘absolute extirpation of pain.’

The arguments in the text for the existence of soul are so many original aphorisms of Kapila; as, 1. ‘Soul is distinct from body, &c.’
2. ‘From an aggregate being for another’s use.’
3. ‘From (the properties of) soul being the converse of the three qualities, &c.’
4. ‘From superintendence.’
5. ‘From the tendency to abstraction.’ The commentator notices a different reading of the last Sutra ‘From nature not being competent to abstraction;’ but this he considers erroneous. The fifth book of the S. Pravachana contains other Sutras affirmative of the separate existence of soul.

XVIII.

Since birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally; since occupations are not at once universal; and since qualities affect variously; multitude of souls is demonstrated.

BHASHYA.

Life and death, and the instruments (of life).—From the several allotment of these: this is the meaning of the text. Thus, if there was but one soul,
then when one was born, all would be born; when one died, all would die; if there was any defect in the vital instruments of one, such as deafness, blindness, dumbness, mutilation, or lameness, then all would be blind, deaf, dumb, maimed, and halt: but this is not the case; and therefore, from the several apportionment of death, birth, and instruments of life, multiplicity of soul is demonstrated. 

Since occupations are not at once universal.—Yugapat means, ‘at one time.’ Not at once; or, at one time. Occupation: as engaging in acts of virtue and the like are not observed to occur at one moment; but some are busy with virtuous, others with vicious, actions; some cultivate indifference to the world, and some acquire true wisdom: therefore, from the non-contemporaneousness of occupation, multitude of souls is concluded. Also, since qualities affect variously.—From the contrary nature of the qualities multitude of souls is proved; as, in birth in general, one endowed with the quality of goodness is happy; another with that of foulness is wretched; and a third having that of darkness is apathetic: hence, therefore, multitude of souls is proved.

Soul is not agent: this is next declared.

COMMENT.

The multitudinous existence of soul, or the individual incorporation of soul in different bodies, is here maintained.

Birth is defined to be the association of soul with body; death, its detachment: soul being always existent, and not in itself subject to birth or death; as in the S. Pravachana Bhāshya*: also the S. Tatwa Kaumudī; ‘Life is the combination of soul with the pains incident to body, &c.; not any modification of soul. Death is the abandonment of those bodies, &c.; not the destruction of soul †.’ The instruments of life are

* जन्ममर्यम्र चाष नौपनिविनाषी पुरुषविनिहाराभाभावं।
† देहनिद्री यादिवेदनामः पुरुषस्यसबक्रो जन्म न तु पुरुषस्यपरिशामः। तेषांसेव देहादिनां परिवागो मरणं न नामनो विनाशः।
the organs of perception and action, with egotism and intellect. 'Allotment,' nyāma, properly 'rule, regulation,' is explained by vyāvasthā, which may import 'distribution;' as, 'The distribution is in regard to different souls in several bodies.' so also the Sūtra of Kapila; 'From the distribution of life, &c. follows the multitudinousness of soul.' The term is especially understood, however, of the distribution which is laid down by religious and legal authorities, 'a prescribed distribution or allotment,' as the commentator on the Sūtra observes, after stating, 'The virtuous man is happy in heaven,' &c. (see p. 48), 'Souls are many, as otherwise there would not be the occurrence of such division, or appointment of conditions, as is laid down in the Vēda and the law.' If soul were one, all the accidents, vicissitudes, and interests of existence would simultaneously affect all individuals.

But though manifold, as individualized, this individual soul is one and unchanged, through all its migrations into various forms, until its final liberation. It is the disguise which is changed, not that which wears it, as has been before explained (p. 48).

The multiplied existence of soul is in especial contradiction to the doctrine of the Vēdānta, of the universality of one supreme soul of the world, from which all human souls are derived, as in such texts as this; 'One only existent soul is distributed in all beings; it is beheld collectively or dispersedly, like the reflection of the moon in still or troubled water. Soul, eternal, omnipresent, undisturbed, pure, one, is multiplied by the power of delusion, not of its own nature.' This is undoubtedly the doctrine of the Vēdas, and the Sānkhya teachers, who profess to receive those works as authority, are obliged to interpret the texts
unfavourable to their dogmas in a peculiar manner. Thus the Sútra of Kapila asserts, 'There is no contradiction (to the doctrine of many souls) in the unity of the Védas, from its reference to the comprehensiveness of genus *:' that is, Soul, considered as genus, is but one; its nature and properties are common to all souls, individualized and manifold in connection with individual aggregates of the products of nature. 'Genus here means community, unity of nature; such is the purport of the unity of the Védas; not indivisibility, from the absence of any motive (for its continuing undivided). This is the meaning of the Sútra †.' The subject is discussed at considerable length by Vijnána Bhikshu; but, notwithstanding his arguments, it is clear that the Sánkhya doctrine is contradictory to that of the Védas.

The doctrines of those Grecian philosophers, who maintained the immateriality and eternity of soul, conformed to that of the Védas. As far as we are able to learn of the doctrines of Pythagoras, he taught that human souls were portions of one supreme soul. Plato held the souls of men to be emanations from God, through the soul of the world. Souls and bodies were both portions of the ṛta, the 'one existent,' of the Stoics; and even Aristotle appears to have conceived the human soul to be an intellectual energy, derived from an eternal intelligence. Cudworth asserts that none of the ancient philosophers maintained the Sánkhya notion of the eternity of individual souls. "It doth not follow," he remarks, "because they held souls to be ingenerable, that therefore they supposed souls to have existed from all eternity of themselves unmade. This was never asserted by theist or atheist. The philosophic theists, who maintained aeternitatem animorum, did, notwithstanding, assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun, as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradiation, from an eternal Sun." Intell. Syst. III. 429.

* नाबितगृतितिविरोधो जातिपर्वतः । जाति: सामान्यमेकश्चायं
  तत्वविवितशुष्को तत्त्वमात्रं विभावमनाधिर्मस्यः ।

† नाबितगृतितिविरोधो जातिपर्वतः । जाति: सामान्यमेकश्चायं
  तत्वविवितशुष्को तत्त्वमात्रं विभावमनाधिर्मस्यः ।
XIX.

And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows, that soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, and passive.

BHÁSHYA.

*And from that contrast:* the contrast of the possession of the three qualities. *Contrast:* reverse. Soul is void of qualities, is discriminative, enjoyer, &c. The contrast is that presented by these attributes of soul; and thence, the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness being agents (active), *it follows that soul is (passive) witness.* This sentence is syntactically connected with the preceding, regarding the multitudinousness of soul. The qualities, as agents, act; a witness neither acts nor desists from action. Again, *abstraction* (detachment) is an attribute (of soul); the property of being sole is detachment or abstraction, difference or distinctness (from all others); that is, it is distinct, or separate, from the three qualities. Next, *being a bystander* (is an attribute of soul): the condition of a middle man (or looker-on, or neutral). Soul is a bystander, like a wandering mendicant: as a vagrant ascetic is lonely and unconcerned, whilst the villagers are busily engaged in agriculture, so soul does not act where the qualities are present. Hence also proceed the properties of being a spectator and passive. From being a bystander, soul is a spectator, and is not a performer of those acts (which it contemplates). The three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, engage in acts in the relation of agent and act; not soul: and in this manner the existence of soul is demonstrated.

But if soul is a non-agent, how does it exercise volition? as, I will practise virtue, I will not commit crime: here soul must be the agent; for if soul is not the agent (then these purposes cannot be entertained). This is a dilemma: to explain which it is said—

COMMENT.

In the preceding verse it was stated that soul was many; in this, its other attributes are enumerated.
The conjunction *cha*, in the term *tasmát-cha*, connects the sentence with the preceding, or with *bahutwam*, 'multitudinousness.' The contrast alluded to is that intimated in ver. 14, and is this: Soul has not the three qualities, it is discriminative, it is perceptive, it is specific, it is rational, it is unproductive; being the reverse, in these respects, of nature and its effects. Not being an object of sense, but perceptive of such objects, it observes and testifies to the existence of nature and its products, like an evidence in a lawsuit being plaintiff and defendant. 'That which is irrational cannot observe, and that to which an object is apparent is a witness.†' Solitariness is 'exemption from the three kinds of pain ‡;' or, in fact, total abstraction from the world: this is the necessary consequence of being devoid of the three qualities, which are essentially the same with pleasure, pain, and dulness; and from them, therefore, soul is equally free. From the same cause, absence of qualities and insusceptibility of agreeable or disagreeable emotions, proceeds the next property of soul, that of being a bystander; *madhyastha*, 'neutral, indifferent, unconcerned;' *udâsâna*, 'neither rejoicing in pleasure, nor sorrowing in pain.' Qualities, and particularly foulness, are indispensable to activity; and being without them, soul is consequently inert: the same is considered to be also the necessary result of its being 'discriminative and unproductive, or unproductive †.' VIJÑANÂ BHIKSU restricts the term *sâksâti*, 'witness,' to the sense of 'beholder,' distinguishing it from the other term, to which such a translation is more applicable, *drâshtri*, as importing one who has the object near to, or before, his eyes; the latter implies seeing in general; hence he says, 'Soul witnesses or contemplates *buddhi* (intellect), and sees the other principles ‡.'
Therefore, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible; and though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.

BHÁSHYA.

Here soul is said to be possessed of sensation; and in connection with it, intellect and the other predicates of nature assuming the appearance of sense seem sentient: as in life, a jar with cold water appears to be cold, with warm water seems to be warm; so intellect and the rest, from union with it, with soul, seem sensible. But the qualities perform the active application (of sense), not the soul: for although in common it is said, soul is the doer, the goer, yet soul is not the agent. How so? Though the qualities be active, (soul) the stranger appears as the agent. There being activity of the qualities, soul, which is indifferent, or inactive, appears as if it was the agent; which it is not. Here is an illustration: as a man who is not a thief, being taken up along with thieves, is suspected to be a thief also; so soul, being connected with the three active qualities, is supposed, though inert, to be active also.

In this manner the distinction of the perceptible, imperceptible, and thinking principles (ver. 2. p. 13) has been explained; from the discrimination of which liberation is obtained. It is next expounded why the union of the two (chief) principles, nature and soul, takes place.

COMMENT.

It is here taught that the sentient faculty resides in soul, and not, as it appears to do, in the products of nature; and that activity resides in the qualities, not, as it appears to do, in soul.

The term chéttaná, from chit, 'to reflect,' means in general 'reason, intelligence;' but it is here applied to the possession or exercise of every faculty proper to a sentient and thinking being. It is the attribute of soul only, as will be more distinctly made clear when the functions of the senses, of consciousness, and intellect are explained, and they are shewn
to be merely the vehicles or instruments through which ideas and notions are conveyed. They seem, however, to act independently, but this is merely from their union with, or, more correctly, proximity to, soul; samyoga being explained by the commentators to mean here merely sannidhâna, 'approximation.' In like manner, soul, which is contemplative, not active, mover, though itself unmoved, appears to be active through a similar contiguity. 'I am sentient; wishing to do, I do: here a common origin or subject of action and reflection is apprehended.'

S. Tatwa Kaumudi. But this is an error, as the site or subject of action and reflection is distinct†. The term linga in the first line is explained to denote mahat and the subtle products of pradhâna. Uddâsa, 'indifferent,' is said also to mean 'inert.'

But it appears that there are passages in the Vedas and in the law-books which attribute agency to soul, and knowledge to buddhi; and to meet this is supposed to be the purpose of the aphorism, 'Agency from affection, intelligence from propinquity;' that is, 'The apparent agency of soul is from the affection (or operation) of buddhi; the apparent intelligence of buddhi (understanding) is from the proximity of soul; neither is actual. Their mutual transfer of properties is like that of fire and iron in a heated bar, or of the sun and water, in the reflected rays of the former from the latter. S. Prav. S. In like manner the S. Chandrika exemplifies the doctrine by reference to buddhi, the organ of the understanding; and furnishes also an example of the sense in which chêtanâ,
intelligence,' is to be understood: 'Thence the effect (of pradhána), the
category buddhi, which is unintelligent, is as it were intelligent, (seems to
be that which says) I know, becomes as it were endowed with know-
ledge*:' that is, it is not the understanding, but soul, that knows. This,
however, applies equally to all the other products of nature, as far as to
the subtile rudiments, whether individually considered, or as composing
subtile body†. They are all non-sentient, or irrational and inert. Their
activity depends on combination with the qualities; their sentient power
on proximity to soul: and the conjoint presence of these two properties
leads to the erroneous belief that soul is agent, as well as sentient.

XXI.

For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction,
the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that
union a creation is framed.

BHÁSHYA.

The union of soul with nature is for its contemplation (of nature);
that is, soul contemplates nature (in the state of) intellect and the other
effects to the gross elements inclusive. For that object is the union of
nature with soul; and the same union, which is also for the abstraction
(of the latter), is like the association of the halt and blind. As, a lame man
and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who in making their
way with difficulty through a forest had been dispersed by robbers, hap­
pening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to
inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of
walking and of seeing; accordingly the lame man was mounted on the

* तस्माद्वेतनमिः लिङ्कं चुविततथं चेतनाविदिः ज्ञानामीति ज्ञानवत्र

† लिङ्कं महदादि सूक्ष्मपथम्
blind man's shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion. In the same manner the faculty of seeing is in soul, not that of moving; it is like the lame man: the faculty of moving, but not of seeing, is in nature; which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey's end, so nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to act; and soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstractedness; and consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between them is dissolved.

Again, By that, by that union, a creation is framed.—As the birth of a child proceeds from the union of male and female, so the production of creation results from the connection of nature and soul.

The text next describes the particulars of all the products of nature.

COMMENT.

The object of the union of soul and nature, or the final liberation of the former by its knowledge of the latter, is here explained.

'Contemplation,' darsana, is considered to comprise 'fruition,' bhoga. As nature is devoid of sensibility and reflection, it can neither enjoy nor observe; and its existence would be therefore without an object, unless there were some other one capable both of observation and fruition. This other one is soul. But, again, as pain is inseparable from nature, so enjoyed soul desires, after a season, to be loosed from the combination; and this detachment, or the liberation of purified soul, necessarily requires some one from which to be liberated: that some one is nature: consequently, for the fulfilment of their respective ends—the fruition of nature, and liberation of soul—their mutual cooperation and combination are essential. 'Abstraction,' kaivalya, is explained by Vāchespati. 'The cause of the attribution of separation to purified soul, which cannot be
without previous union with nature*. But these results cannot be attained without the evolution of the products of nature, and consequently they assume their several developments, or, in other words, a creation is framed; as it is only in the state of discrete principles that nature is to be contemplated by soul, and it is only by the exact appreciation of the same, and of their source, that soul can detach itself from nature. For both purposes, therefore, the world must exist, as developed from its material cause.

There are passages in the Védas, however, attributing creation to soul; as, 'That was from it—From this soul was ether produced†.' To this it is replied, that all that is herein intended is the attribution of the act of the inferior, or nature, to the superior, soul: 'As in the world it is said that a king triumphs or is defeated, when it is not he, but his army, that suffers a defeat or achieves a victory‡.' S. Prav. Sára.

XXII.

From nature issues the great one; thence egotism; and from this the sixteenfold set: from five among the sixteen proceed five elements.

BHÁSHYA.

Nature (prakrti) is also termed 'the chief one' (pradhána), 'the supreme' (brahme), 'the undistinguished' (avyaktam), 'the multi-comprehending' (bahudhanaka) and máyá. Such are its synonyms. From that which is devoid of characteristic attributes, or from (crude) nature, the great one (mahat) is produced: this is also termed 'intellect' (budháhi); it is also called ásuri, or 'demonic;' mati, or 'understanding;' 'notoriety'

* सत्यपुरुषायत्वत्यातिनिवन्धनं न च सत्यपुरुषायत्वत्यातिति: प्रधान
** मन्त्रेष्ये ति िि
† ततु तत्साधा एतसाधारण शाकाशः सम्भृतः।
‡ यथा लोकः स्वशक्तिः योधेषु वर्षेमानी जयपराणयी राज्ञि उपचर्येः।
(khydti), 'knowledge' (jnána), 'wisdom' (prajñá). From thence proceeds egotism, also called 'the origin of the elements,' &c. (bhútádi), 'the luminous' (tajasa), 'the modified' (vaikrita), 'conscience' (abhimána). From this the sixteenfold set.—From this, from egotism, the class of sixteen is derived. This consists of the five subtile elements, or the archetypes of sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour: the synonyms of tan-mátára are all words denoting 'subtile' (suksáma): also the eleven organs, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose, which are the five organs of perception; the voice, the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation, which are the five organs of action; and, besides these, mind, making the eleventh, and being an organ of both action and sensation. These constitute the class of sixteen produced from egotism. From five among the sixteen.—From the five subtile elements proceed the five gross elements: as it is said, "From the archetype sound, ether is produced; from touch, air; from form, light (or fire); from flavour, water; from odour, earth: and thus from these five rudiments the five gross elements proceed." As also it is said, "From discriminative knowledge of perceptible and imperceptible principles and the thinking soul (see ver. 2) liberation is obtained." Now, therefore, intellect and the rest, to the gross elements inclusive, forming twenty-three categories, have been specified (in the text); the undiscrete principle has been described (see ver. 15, 16); and soul has been explained (ver. 18, 19); and these constitute the twenty-five tatwas (physical and metaphysical categories of the Sánkhya system of philosophy). He who knows the universe to be composed of these principles—called tatwas, from the abstract of tad, 'that,' implying the abstract existence of those principles—as it is said, "He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated: of this there is no doubt." (See p. 1.) The twenty-five categories are, nature, soul, intellect, egotism, the five subtile (or rudimental) elements, the eleven organs of sensation and of action, and the five gross elements.

It is stated in this stanza, from nature issues the great one. What is meant by that great one is next defined.
COMMENT.

The categories of the Sánkhya system have been before alluded to (ver. 3. p. 16), in explanation of their mutual relations, and of the properties which they have in common, or by which they are discriminated from one another; but we have them here enumerated in the order of their production, as prefatory to a detailed description of them and of their functions contained in the following stanzas.

The generic term for the twenty-five principles, tattva, or as usually and with equal correctness written tatwa, is explained by Gaurapáda to mean 'the abstract existence,' astitwa*, őbra, essentia, of tat†, that; that thing, which is the object of philosophical investigation, or which has a real existence, and must be known. The more common etymology, tat, 'that,' and twam, 'thou,' belongs to the Védánta system; as in the Muhávákya, tat-twam asi, 'that (supreme soul) thou art,' implies the identity of universal and individualized spirit.

We have in the scholia of Gaurapáda on this stanza some synonyms of nature and the two first principles, the analysis of which elucidates the ideas entertained of them by the Sánkhya. The succeeding stanzas will afford an opportunity of adverting to the terms used for intellect and egotism, and we may here confine the inquiry to the synonyms of nature, or matter.

Prakriti, as has been previously mentioned (p. 17), intimates, that which precedes, or is prior to, making; that which is not made from any thing else. It is also used relatively, to signify that which is the source from which a product is derived; so that mahat is the prakriti of ahankára, &c. (see p. 18). Here, however, our business is with the primary source of all material products, and the term indicates merely that which preceded (pra) production (kriitī); what that may have been is left wholly undefined or unimplied by the particular term. The same may be said of it agreeably to another etymology given in the Sánkhyá Sára, where

* ऋक्षिबं
† तत्
pra is interpreted by prakrishi, 'principal, chief, best,' analogously to
its other denomination, pradhána, 'the chief.' Pradhána is derived from
pra, 'principal,' and dhá, 'to hold:' 'that in which all generated effect
is comprehended.' The next synonyme, avyakta, 'the unseparated,
the undistinguished, the unperceived,' has been also previously noticed
(p. 41) as derived from anja, 'to make clear,' with vi, separative prepo-
tion, and the negative a prefixed: the term is of as frequent occurrence
as either of the preceding, and is constantly used as a synonyme of prak-
riti in the Puránas and in Manu. Brahma, which is to be carefully
distinguished from Brahmá, the personified creative power, is ordinarily
applied either to the Védas or supreme spirit, and is an uncommon syno-
nyme of prakriti; but, as derived from vriha, 'to increase,' it implies
the first principle of which the expansion becomes all perceptible objects.
Bahudhánaka is derived, like pradhána, from dhá, 'to hold'; dhánaka,
'the holder' or 'comprehender' of bahu, 'much,' of all things. Máyá, in
its ordinary sense of 'illusion,' is applied to prakriti, not by the Sánkhyas,
for they maintain the reality of existing things, but by the Védántas and
Pauranikas, who regard creation as a delusion or as a sport of the Creator:
it is derived from the root má, 'to measure,' and may here perhaps imply
either 'comprehension,' like pradhána, or 'extension.' There is no ex-
planation of the term by any of the Scholiasts. Vijnána Bhikshu quotes
the Védas to shew that it is synonymous with prakriti. In the Sánkhya
Sára we have other synonymes, as, sakti, 'power,' cóvam; aja, 'the un-
born, the unproduced'; tama, 'darkness'; and avidyá, 'ignorance.'

Now what is to be considered as the sense of these words? By what
equivalent is prakriti to be best rendered? Professor Lassen translates
it procreatrix, but this seems to convey too much the idea of personality,
and therefore, although very well agreeing with the original term as used
by the Pauraniks, where prakriti is commonly personified, yet it can
scarcely be considered as indicative of that which not only produces, but is the thing produced, being at once the origin and substance of all things. Mr. Colebrooke has rendered the term sometimes by 'nature,' and sometimes by 'matter:' the former expresses both the parent and the progeny, and agrees in being also the constant subject of prosopopeia. It is therefore preferable to perhaps any synonyme that the English language can offer. At the same time the correct equivalent is 'matter,' materia, quasi mater, 'the substance and source of material things;' not, however, crude, visible, or divisible matter, but that first principle of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, and of Aristotle, which having neither parts, nor form, nor sense, nor quantity, nor any of the properties of body, was yet the one universal, incorporeal, invisible substance from which all bodies were derived. Διὸ δὴ τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ἀρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχῆς μήτε ἄμα μήτε ἄφρα μήτε ὄψω μήτε ὄψω λέγομεν, μήτε ὅσα ἐκ τούτων μήτε ἐξ ὅν ταῦτα γέγονεν. ἄλλον ἀνάρτου εἴδες τι καὶ ἀμορφον πανδρέχιον. Timeæus. See also the Physics, b. III. c. 6. That we are to understand this of the prakriti of the Sánkhyas is evident from the meaning of its several appellations. It is also said by Vijñâna Bhipshu, that 'the world is merely modification of form, of which prakriti is the materiality.' 'It is not individual or formal, but universal material.' S. Pr. Bhaśkya. Its invisibility is, as we have seen (ver. 8. p. 29), attributed, not to its non-existence, but to its subtlety (saúkshmya). Prakriti is also defined 'the equilibrium of the three qualities;' and here it differs from the subject matter of Aristotle in having qualities. These qualities, however, whilst prakriti is yet unevolved, neutralize each other, and are scarcely qualities as regards primary nature, because their loss of equilibrium, or their activity, is concurrent with the discontinuance of prakriti as separate from its products. So far, however, prakriti may be considered as different from the brute matter of the ancient physiologists, that it produces

* परिशासिन्य जगद्रावणकल्लं तु प्रकृति:।
† पारस्रि न संकीर्णान—संकीर्णान प्राप्तन न परिशासिन्य ज्ञापनसिथिष्यः।
‡ चिन मुनासम्बं।
products of its own energy or power for a special cause, and is therefore more akin to the “plastic nature that acts, ἑαυτῇ ἐργαζόμενα, for the sake of something.” In the Sānkhya system, however, such nature is not distinct from matter itself, whilst it appears to be a different principle in the writings of the Greek philosophers, although not always very intelligibly described; for, as Cudworth observes of Aristotle, “he nowhere declares of this nature of his, whether it be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental.” To conclude, we are to understand of the prakriti of the Sānkhyas, primary, subtile, universal substance, undergoing modification through its own energy, and for a special motive, by which it is manifest as individual and formal substance, varied according to the predominance of qualities, which are equipoised and inert in the parent, and unequal and active in the progeny.

XXIII.

Ascertainment is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse.

BHÁSHYA.

The definition of intellect is ascertainment. Ascertaining (discerning, determining) is ascertainment: as in the seed the future germinating shoot is contained, so is determination (in intellect). This is a jar, this is cloth: that intellect which will so determine is so defined. This intellect has eight members, according to the twofold affection of goodness and darkness. The first kind, or intellect, partaking of goodness, is of four kinds, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power. Virtue comprises humanity, benevolence, and acts of restraint (yama) and of obligation (niyama). The former are said in the Pātanjala to be, restraint of cruelty, of falsehood, of dis honesty, of incontinence, and of avarice: the latter are the obligations of purification, contentment, religious austerity, sacred study, and worship of God. Knowledge has for its synonyms, manifestation, cer-
It is of two kinds, external and internal. The former is (knowledge of) the Védas and their six subordinate branches, recitation, ritual, grammar, glossary, prosody, and astronomy; also (of) the puránas, and of logic, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is that of nature and soul, or (the discrimination that) this is nature, the equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness: this is soul, perfect, devoid of qualities, pervading, and sentient. By external knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is acquired; by internal knowledge, liberation. Dispassion is also of two kinds, external and internal. The former is the indifference of one who contemns sensible objects from observing their defects, or the trouble of acquiring and preserving them; the inconvenience of attachment to them; their liability to decay; and the injustice they cause. The latter is the indifference of one who is desirous of liberation, and looks upon nature as if it was a piece of witchcraft or a dream. Power is the abstract property of a superior (or divine) being: it is eightfold, (the capacity of) minuteness, magnitud, heaviness, lightness, reach, gratification of will, dominion, subjugation, and irresistible purpose. Atomic existence is meant by 'minuteness;' so that a person becoming atomically subtle or minute may traverse the world: 'magnitud' is said of one who may make himself a giant: 'lightness' is having limbs like the fibres of the lotus stalk, or like cotton, so as to be able to stand upon the tops of the filaments of a flower: 'reach' is attainment of a desired object by going to the place where it is situated, wherever that may be: 'gratification of will' is obtaining or effecting whatever is desired: 'dominion' is governing the three worlds, as a king: 'subjugation' is having all things subject: 'irresistible purpose' is compelling the site, rest, and motion of all things, from Brahmá to a block, agreeably to the will of the person endowed with this faculty. These are the four properties of intellect which soul obtains when the qualities of foulness and darkness are overcome by that of goodness.

But those partaking of darkness are the reverse.—When intellect is influenced by the quality of darkness, then its four properties are the reverse of the above; they are, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. In this manner intellect having eight members, as it is affected by goodness or
foulness, is produced from the undiscrete principle having the three qualities.

Intellect has thus been explained. Egotism is next described.

**COMMENT.**

The first product of nature, or intellect, is here described by its properties.

Intellect (buddhi) is adhyavasaya*. It is not easy to offer a satisfactory equivalent for this word, nor to understand precisely what is meant by it. In the *Amera Kosha* it occurs as a synonyme of utsāha†, 'effort, strenuous and continued effort, perseverance;' according to Rāmārama, 'possessing great power'; He derives it from *sho antakarmmani*, 'finishing, making end of,' with *adhīj*, 'over,' and *ava*, 'off;' that is, entirely or absolutely ending or effecting; as in the *Hitopadēsa*: 'The precepts of knowledge confer not the least benefit on one who is afraid of exertion: of what use is a lamp to a blind man, though it be within his reach.'

In the *Mitakshara*, utsāha is explained, 'Effort (or perseverance) in the performance of acts accomplishing the objects of man.' In the *Bhatti Kārtya* we have the word used in the sense of 'wish, purpose, determination:' 'The bird said to the monkeys, You have not studied the law, if at such a season you wish (or resolve) to die.'

In a preceding passage (ver. 5) the phrase prati vishaya adhyavasaya, 'ascertainment of several objects,' was given as the definition of *drisṭia*,

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* ādhyakṣayā.† utsāhā.‡ adhyavasaya.§ prati vishaya adhyavasaya.||

† स्वत्त्वः || अतिश्रेष्ठः || यो घनतः कम्पिति || ऋधि || यव || न स्वविज्ञानावध्वसायभवोऽरः

‡ ऋधि. || यव. || ॥ न स्वत्त्वमशायवसायभवोऽरः ऋरोति विज्ञानविधिगुः हि. अञ्चल विन्ह हस्ततत्स्थितोऽपि प्रकाशयवयः सिद्ध प्रदीपः || ॥ पुञ्च वश्यशास्त्रनक्षरार्फोऽवध्वसायः || ॥ जगाद वानरानु पशी नाथगीवर्ष स्मृतिः || नूयं संहृतिं यस्मात् कालिष्ठिनयम्

§ ऋधि. || यव. || ॥ प्रतिविषयावध्वसायः ||
'perception;' and the explanation of the Scholiast, *buddhivyāpāra jñānānam*, 
'knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty,' was cited (p. 23). The same commentator, Vāchespāti, here defines it, 'the specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect itself;' or, to quote the passage at length, 'Ascertainment is intellect, from the identity of the act and the agent, as will be explained. Every one who engages in any matter first observes, or considers; he next reflects, it is I who am concerned in this; and then determines, this is to be done by me; thence he proceeds to act: this is familiar to every one. Thence this ascertainment that such act is to be done is the determination of intellect, which is as it were endowed with reason, from the proximity of the sentient principle. This is the specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect itself; and the definition of intellect is ascertainment, as that comprehends both its generic and specific distinctions.'

The explanation of the *S. Chandrikā* is to the same effect: 'Adhyānasāya is a sort of modified condition of intellect, as flame is of a lamp; it is certainty in this form, such an act is to be done by me.'

These explanations, however, would rather seem to intimate intention, or volition, or, at least, the determination to act after reflection; but the determination or conclusion that such an act should be done, does not necessarily signify that it shall be done: it is only the conclusion or ascertainment of its fitness. This function of the intellect, also, is not indispensably connected with the notion of will; as in the example given
by Gaurapāda; where, in the simple conclusion after consideration, "this object is a jar; that, is a piece of cloth," no wish, or will, is indicated; no act follows. It is clear also that he considers adhyavasāya merely as the functions of intellect in exercise: they are in intellect, and part of it, as the germ is in the seed, until brought into activity. Intellect is only an instrument; that which, having received the ideas or images conveyed through the organs of sense, and the mind, constructs them into a conclusive idea, which it presents to soul. Its function in exercise, therefore, is ascertainment or certainty, as described in the S. Pravachana Bhāshya, which explains adhyavasāya, ' the synonyme, as well as buddhi, of the great principle (mahat), and its specific function denominated ascertainment.*

The other synonymes of this principle are, buddhi, derived from budh, ' to know,' knowing, intellect.' Mahat, ' great, the great principle ;' 'The first and most important of the products of nature, and presiding over and pervading the whole†.' Āsuri; this is a very unusual and questionable denomination. It occurs only in the S. Bhāshya, and may be an error, perhaps for ēmūshi, one of the synonymes of buddhi in the Amera kosha. It cannot be connected with āsura, ' a demon,' as if the faculty were incompetent to convey divine knowledge; for one of its properties, in connexion with the quality of goodness, is jñāna, 'true knowledge.' There is no good reason why it should be derived from āsuri, the pupil of Kapila, unless allusion is made to some personification of intellect, as the bride of the sage. No explanation of the word is given in the Bhāshya, and I must confess my inability to suggest one entitled to any confidence. Mati means 'understanding:' manyatē anyātō, that by which any thing is understood. Khyāti properly signifies ' fame,' but here means ' notoriety, notion, familiar knowledge;' as in the Smṛiti,
"The great one it is, whence the familiar notions of the universe are always produced." Jnyána is usually the term for 'true or divine knowledge;' knowledge of matter and spirit leading to liberation; but it is here employed in its generic purport, 'that by which things are known.' The same may be said of praJná, which is also commonly used in the sense of 'true wisdom,' but here implies merely, 'that by which knowledge is obtained;' praJnáyát anayá, as RÁMÁSRÁMA expounds it. Several of these terms, in their technical, as well as literal application, bear an analogy to the roór of Aristotle, and the φρόνησις of Plato. M. Cousin considers the category to be 'une sorte d'âme du monde.' It is, however, the instrument most proximate to soul, by which the latter perceives, wills, and acts.

InteJect is of two kinds, or has two sets of properties, as it is influenced or affected by the opposite qualities, goodness and darkness. The former are, 'virtue,' dharma; 'knowledge,' jnyána; 'dispassion,' vairágya; and 'power,' aiswaryya. The latter are their negatives, 'vice,' adharma; 'ignorance,' ajnyána; 'passion,' avairágya; and 'weakness,' anaiswaryya. These again comprehend specific varieties.

Dharma, 'virtue,' according to the S. Bháshya, comprehends morality and religion. The S. Tatwa Kaumudí explains it, 'The cause of happiness and liberation.' As the source of prosperity and happiness in life, it is the discharge of religious and moral obligations; as the means of liberation, it is the observance of the eightfold yoga, or eight modes of contemplative devotion. Jnyána, or 'knowledge,' is defined by the same Scholiast to be, 'distinct notion of the difference between the three qualities and soul.' 'Dispassion,' vairágya, is the extinction of rága, 'colour,' or passion, which like dyes of various hues tinctures the soul.'

* महात्मि यतः क्षणितौऽकानां जायते सदा।
† धर्मस्मेव मूद्द
यनि:चेष्टेनतु:।
† सामातानादि:।
† शाश्वक्षेयङ्गनुमहान्त।
† गुणपुुःच्यतपत्तार्क्ष्यातिस्वरूप।
† रागाद्यः क्षणाधिकारकिन्तुसः
महातो वैराग्यः।
‘Power,’ *aśvāryya*, is the possession of superhuman faculties. It is always termed eightfold, even in the *S. Bhāṣyā*, although nine varieties are there named: one of them, however, ‘heaviness,’ *gurīman*, finds no place among the definitions given there, any more than in other authorities. It may be supposed to be included under the faculty of magnitude.

The four first faculties, ‘minuteness,’ *anima*; ‘lightness,’ *laghimā*; ‘reach,’ *prápti*; and ‘magnitude,’ *mahimā*; are explained and illustrated every where much in the same way. According to Vāchespāti, the person endowed with the first can make his way into a solid rock: with the second, he may ascend to the solar sphere upon a sunbeam; or, as Moore has it, “may dance on a beam of the sun ;” with the third, he can touch the moon with the tip of his finger: and with the fourth, he may expand himself so as to occupy all space. The latter four faculties are less distinctly defined, and are sometimes confounded: the shades of difference are indeed so slight, that they may all be resolved into one, ‘absolute power over matter.’ ‘Gratification of will,’ *prákāmya*, is generally defined by *ichchhānabhīghātā*, ‘unobstruction of wish;’ or, as explained by Hēmāchandra, in his commentary on his own Lexicon, ‘The wishes of a person possessing this faculty are unimpeded by the properties of material nature, such as form and the like; so that he can swim, dive, or float in earth as readily as in water.’ This is sometimes adduced in illustration of the meaning of the next faculty, but less accurately. That, is termed *vasilā*, which Vāchespāti defines, ‘absolute subjugation of the elements and elementary beings.’ The Chandrikā makes it ‘independence on matter,’ which is much the same as *prákāmya*; and a similar confusion occurs in Rāmāsrama’s commentary on Amera, for he illustrates it by ‘swimming or diving on dry land.’ ‘Subjugation of nature’ is the usually accepted import; as Hēmāchandra, ‘Thus as (with this faculty)
any one determines the elements shall be, so they remain. The next faculty is "dominion," īśītā. According to Vāchespāti, it is "disposition at will of the production, arrangement, and expenditure of the elements and elementary beings." Nārāyana explains it, "directing or impelling them at will." Rāmasrama interprets it prabhutva, "dominion, sovereignty; under which inanimate things obey command." The last faculty is termed yatrakāmāvasāyitā. In Rāmasrama's commentary he reads the word kāmāvasāyitā; and the only variety he notices is that of the sibilant, which is sometimes, he observes, the dental, instead of the palatal letter. According to the latter reading it is derived from īśītā, 'to sleep;' to the former, from shōti, 'to destroy.' In either, with ava prefixed, meaning, as Rāmasrama explains it, 'he who tranquillizes or destroys (that is, accomplishes) his desires.' The reading of Gauro-pāda is, however, yatrakāmāvasāyitā, as one compound; and the common definition of the term is 'true (infallible) purpose,' wherever exercised: 'Whatever the person having this faculty intends or proposes must be complied with by that which is the subject of his purpose; the elements themselves must conform to his designs.' The Chandrikā has, 'Whatever the will proposes, that it obtains.' Hēmachandra, in his text, gives the word as in the Bhāskyā, yatrakāmāvasāyitām; and explains it, 'he who accomplishes his desires, to whatever they may be directed;' and he illustrates it by saying that 'an arhat, or Baudhāna saint, can, by
virtue of this faculty, convert poison into ambrosia, and administer it as means of vitality."

XXIV.

Consciousness is egotism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation. The elevenfold set is one: the five elemental rudiments are the other.

BHÁSHYA.

The elevenfold set: the eleven organs. The five elemental rudiments: elementary matter of five kinds, or the rudiments, sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour. What sort of creation proceeds from that which is thus defined is next explained.

COMMENT.

The third category is here specified, and described as the source of the senses and their respective objects.

The term here given as the synonyme and definition of ‘egotism,’ abankárā †, is abhimána ‡, translated ‘consciousness.’ The ordinary sense of both words is pride, and the technical import is ‘the pride or conceit of individuality;’ ‘self-sufficiency;’ the notion that ‘I do, I feel, I think, I am,’ as explained by Váchespáti: ‘I alone preside and have power over all that is perceived and known, and all these objects of sense are for my use. There is no other supreme except I; I am. This pride, from its exclusive (selfish) application, is egotism.’ The principle, therefore, is something more in Hindu metaphysics than mere consciousness,
or conscience. It might be better expressed, perhaps, by 'le moi,' as it adds to the simple conception of individuality the notion of self-property, the concentration of all objects and interests and feelings in the individual.

The other synonyms of this category express rather modifications of it, as the next stanza intimates. *Taitasa,* 'the active' or 'the ardent,' from *tējas*, 'light, splendour, ardour,' refers to its animating or exciting influence on human actions, in connection with the quality of foulness. *Bhūtādi,* 'primitive element,' and *vaikrita,* 'the modified,' as explained in the *Bhāshya,* on the next verse, regard its being, in connection with darkness and goodness, the principle from which the organs and objects of sense proceed: for it must not be forgotten, that this category of egotism or consciousness has a physical, not a metaphysical character, according to the Sāňkhya philosophy, being the organ or instrument by which the impression of individuality is conveyed to soul. It is in this capacity that it may be considered the primary element, the parent of the rudiments of the elements, or the objects of sense, and of the organs by which they are perceived. It is, in fact, the same with both these, as it is only by the application of our own senses to the objects of sense that we can become conscious of individual existence.

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**XXV.**

From consciousness, affected by goodness, proceeds the good elevenfold set: from it, as a dark origin of being, come elementary particles: both issued from that principle affected by foulness.

**BHĀSHYA.**

When goodness predominates in egotism over darkness and foulness, that egotism is of the pure kind; the name of which, according to ancient

*तेजस्*  
*भूतादि:*  
*वेङ्कुट:*  

*†*
teachers, was *vaikrita*, 'the modified.' From this modified egotism the class of eleven organs is produced. The good set: perfect organs; adequate to their functions: the set is thence called good. Again; from it, as a dark origin of beings, &c.—When darkness predominates in egotism over goodness and foulness, that egotism is called dark, or, as it was named by the old masters, 'primitive element,' *bhūtādi*. From it come elementary particles; the fivefold set. The first element of the elements is darkness; therefore it is usually called the dark: from that primitive element the fivefold rudimental set proceed. Both issue from that principle affected by foulness: that is, the egotism in which foulness predominates over goodness and darkness takes the denomination *taijasa*, 'the active;' and from that both proceed; both the eleven organs and five rudiments. For the pure egotism, which is *vaikrita*, 'the modified,' becoming so modified, produces the eleven organs: but to do this it takes active egotism for its assistant; for pure (sātwika) egotism is inert, and is only able to produce the organs when combined with the active. In like manner the dark egotism, or that which is called 'primitive element,' is inert, and becomes active only in union with the active, when it produces the five rudiments. Therefore it is said, both the organs of sense and their objects issue from the modification of egotism affected by foulness. The good elevenfold set proceeds from modified egotism, or that which is affected by the quality of goodness. They are next particularized.

**COMMENT.**

The products of egotism are here described as proceeding from three modifications of that principle, varied by the influence of the three qualities.

The terms used to designate the 'pure,' or sātwika principle; the 'dark,' or tāmasa; and the 'foul,' or rājas; 'variety of egotism,' or vaikrita, bhūtādi, and taijasa; have been explained. According to our text, as understood by the Scholiasts, the eleven organs of sense issue from pure or modified egotism, and the five rudiments from elemental egotism; both being influenced by ardent or active egotism.' The commentator on the *S. Pravachana* has a rather different explanation,
interpreting ēkādaśaka, ‘eleventh,’ not ‘elevenfold;’ according to him, this eleventh, which is mind, proceeds from the first kind of egotism; the other ten from the second kind; and the elements from the third. "Sutra: The pure eleventh (organ) proceeds from modified egotism. Comment: Eleventh, is mind, which in the class of sixteen organs and rudiments is of the quality of goodness; therefore it is born from egotism, affected by goodness, called vaikrita. This is the sense. Hence it follows, that from egotism, affected by foulness, proceed the other ten organs of sense; and from egotism, affected by darkness, proceed the rudiments." This interpretation he defends by the authority of the law-books and Puranas; and he gives a similar turn, although rather indistinctly expressed, to the text of the Kārikā. In the stanzas subsequent to this, to ver. 37, the organs of sense are fully described, and in ver. 38. the text returns to the elements. It is not necessary, therefore, to enter upon any explanation of them in this place. There is a remarkable expression in the Bhāṣya, which presents a notion familiar to all ancient cosmogonies. GAURAPĀDA says, ‘the first of the elements was darkness.’ It is the first of the ‘elements,’ not the first of ‘things;’ for it was preceded by unevolved nature, and intellect, and it is itself a modified form of individuality. It therefore harmonizes perfectly well with the prevailing ideas in the ancient world, of the state of things anterior to elementary or visible creation, when "chaos was, and night," and when

Nullus adhuc mundo praebet lumina Titan,
Nec nova crescento reparat cornua Phoeb.

In the influence of the quality of foulness, or passion, for the word rājas has both senses, may be suspected an affinity to the doctrine of an active principle, the moving mind, the eros, that set inert matter into motion, and produced created things.

* सातिकमेयादश्रं प्रवर्तते वेद्यातदुप्रकारात् ॥ याज्ञवल्क्यांपूर्वमेकादशरं मनः योद्धास्तमस्तम् सातिकसत्सत्येन वेद्यात् सातिकाधुंकारार्धायत।

† भूतानामादिशृङ्गसः ॥
XXVI.

Intellectual organs are, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin: those of action are, the voice, hands, feet, the excretory organ, and that of generation.

BHÁSHYA.

Reckoning from the eye to the organ of touch, the organs are called 'intellectual.' Touched by it, the organ of touch, which is the skin: thence the term for the skin which is used (in the text), 'that which touches,' sparianaka. Intellectual organs are five, as they ascertain or know (severally) five objects, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell. Those of action, &c.—They perform acts, whence they are called 'organs of action:' thus, the voice articulates; the hands variously manipulate; the feet effect motion; the excretory organ, excretion; and the sexual organ, generation. Thus are enumerated ten organs, five of intellect and five of action. The character and nature of the eleventh, or mind, is next described.

COMMENT.

The five instruments or means of perception and five of action, products of egotism, are enumerated in this stanza.

The term 'organs' is correctly applicable to the material instruments by which perception is exercised; but it is not to be understood of the gross corporeal bodies, the visible eye, ear, hand, &c., which are parts of gross body. The word 'senses' would therefore be a less equivocal term, only that it does not so distinctly convey the idea of an instrument which, though suhile, is substantial. The original word, indriya, is defined to mean whatever relates or belongs to indra, said to be a synonyme of soul, the senses being indicative, being marks or signs, of the presence of soul*:

* इंद्रायनानिदिरादिविनिदिरिजन्याते ।
accordingly each is denominated a linga (see p. 24), 'a characteristic feature or indication.'

XXVII.

(In this set is) mind, which is both (an organ of sensation and of action). It ponders, and it is an organ as being cognate with the rest. They are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities.

BHĀSHYA.

Here, as one of the class of organs, mind is said to be both. Among the organs of sensation it is one of sensation, and among those of action it is an organ of action also. As it performs the function of the organs of sensation and of those of action it belongs to both. It ponders (or purposes); whence the term sankalpaka. It is also an organ as being cognate with the rest; for such is the meaning of the word sadhermya. The organs of sensation and action being (cognate or) produced, along with mind, from egotism affected by goodness, have this (property, of origin) in common with mind; and from this common property mind is an organ likewise.

Thus eleven organs are produced from egotism affected by goodness. What, then, is the function (vritti) of mind? Reflection (sankalpa) is its function. Sound and the rest are the functions of the organs of sensation. Speech and the rest are the functions of the organs of action. Now are these various organs, apprehending various objects, so created by Īswara? or are they self-generated? since nature, intellect, and egotism, are devoid of sense; and soul is devoid of action. Thence, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, a certain spontaneity is the cause (of the variety of the senses). Therefore it is added, They are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities: that is, the several objects of these eleven

* रूपयहशालिकः चक्षुः शर्पयहशालिकः ऋषभमिवादि।
organs, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour, which are the objects of five; speech, manipulation, motion, excretion, and generation, the objects of other five; and reflexion, the object of mind; these all proceed from specific modification of qualities. From the variety (or special difference) of such modifications of the qualities the multifariousness of the organs proceeds, as well as the diversity of external objects: consequently this variety is not the work of Iswara, nor of egotism, nor of intellect, nor of nature, nor of soul; but from modification of the qualities, produced by spontaneity. It does not proceed designedly (it is not the result of a will to act), because the qualities are non-sentient (unconscious or irrational). How then does it take place? This, as will be afterwards explained, is in like manner as the secretion of milk is for the growth of the calf, so the proceedings of nature take place for the liberation of soul, without soul’s being cognizant of them; so the unconscious qualities become modified by the existence of the eleven organs, and their varieties are thence derived. Hence the eye is placed in its elevated orbit for the purpose of looking up to heaven; and in like manner the nose, the ear, the tongue are commodiously situated for the apprehension of their respective objects: the organs of action are also distributed conveniently for the discharge of their several duties of their own nature, through the modification of the qualities, not as their objects; as it is elsewhere said, “Qualities abide in qualities; that which is the function of the qualities is their object.” External diversities, therefore, are to be regarded as made by the qualities: this is the meaning of the text. Of which nature is the cause.

The several functions of the organs are next specified.

COMMENT.

After defining mind as an instrument both of sensation and of action, this verse explains how it is that there are various organs and objects of sense; and it is said to depend in both cases upon specific modifications of the qualities of nature.

Mind is an instrument both of sensation and of action. Its function is sankalpa, a word that more commonly means ‘resolve, purpose, expecta-
tion;' as in the Hitopadësa, 'the crow,' Laghupatanaka, says, 'All has been heard by me; and this is my resolve, that we must be friends.' And Menu: 'Desire is the root of expectation; sacrifice is its product.' or, as Kullëka Bhatta explains it, 'Sankalpa is understanding to this effect, that by a certain ceremony a desired consequence is effected.' In both passages the notion of 'conclusion from foregone premises' is conveyed, and that seems to be its meaning here. Thus Vâchespati explains it: 'The mind carefully considers a substance perceived by an organ of sense, (and determines) this is simple, that is not so; or discriminates them by their condition of predicate and predicatable.' Again, it is said, "First, knowledge or perception is simple (inconsiderate), like the knowledge of a child, a dumb man, or the like: it is produced by the mere thing; but when, after this, the thing, as distinguished by its properties, by its genus, and the like, is recognised by the understanding, and intellect is in accordance with perception, that period (or interval) of determination is the operation of the mind." Here, then, sankalpa is the process of reflection, the consideration of the object of simple perception, so as to form a definite idea, which mind transmits, through individuality and intellect, to soul. In this way mind is an organ both of perception and action; perceiving the objects presented by the senses, and forming them into a positive idea. It is further identified with both classes of organs by originating from the same source, egotism affected by goodness; and consequently it consists of the same material.

The second portion of the stanza conveys a doctrine that is not very intelligible. The variety of the senses and of the objects of the senses is

* Chuan maya sarve tathapâ cha iti hitavatisamkrtva sah sthidmabhavan kar yeyam. † Sankalpakamal: kano eva yatha: sankalpamabhava: I. ‡ Chanyen karmkesam evam pauru sah pat imagination evam visaya jyoti: sankalpa: I. § Chana loka atmanibhupreke smaritanivalma sah smarita sankalpa kalyani bija kalyanakaropa padaanam ch sahamsyang.

<**Note:** The text contains a mix of English and Sanskrit. The English portions are quoted, while the Sanskrit is translated. The exact translation and context may require additional cultural and linguistic knowledge.>
said to arise spontaneously in them, from specific modification of the three qualities. Váchespati understands the allusion to external objects to be merely illustrative; that is, the internal organs are diversified by modification of the qualities, in the same manner that external objects are varied by the same modification*; and the translation follows this explanation. In the Bháshya a different reading in the original occurred, which would require the passage to be rendered, 'and from variety of external objects †; thus ascribing the diversity of the organs, not only to modification of the qualities, but to the diversity of external objects, which require suitable, and therefore various organs for their apprehension. The reading is, however, clearly incompatible with his argument, although Gaúrapáda is somewhat obscure; but the variety is noticed and admitted by the author of the Chandriká‡.

The S. Pravachana Bháshya considers the multifariousness spoken of in the Sútra, which conveys apparently a similar doctrine to that of the Kariká, as restricted to mind: 'Multifariousness is from modification of qualities, as the variety of human condition (is from various association): that is, as the very same individual assumes different characters, according to the influence of his associations; becoming a lover with a mistress, a sage with sages, a different person with others; so mind, from its connection with the eye or any other organ, becomes identified with it, and consequently is diversified according to the function of sight and the rest of the organs with which it is severally associated. The association of mind with the organs is intimated by the Védas, as in the text, 'My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear.' The very illustration used by Locke:
"A man whose mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, takes no notice of impressions made by sounding bodies upon the organ of hearing: therefore it is evident that perception is only when the mind receives the impression," says the English philosopher; and the Hindu infers, that 'the mind must cooperate with the organs of sense, even for perception, as they would otherwise be incapable of performing their functions.'

The materiality of mind, considered as distinct from consciousness, intelligence, and soul, and as neither more nor less than an internal sense, a sensorium, is much less absurd than the same character of it when considered as part of, or identical with, soul, as was the doctrine of the Epicureans, whose description of mind, as an organ merely, agrees well enough with the Hindu notion:

Primum; animum dico mentem quam scopo dicamus
Esse hominis partem nihil minus ac manus ac pes
Atque oculei, partes animantes totius existant. LUCRETIUS, III. 94.

XXVIII.

The function of five, in respect to colour and the rest, is observation only. Speech, handling, treading, excretion, and generation are the functions of five (other organs).

BHÁSHYA.

The term 'only' (madra) is to be understood in the sense of specialty, or the exclusion of what is not specified; as in the sentence, "Alms only are received;" that is, nothing else is received. Thus the eyes are observant of colour (form), not of flavour and the rest; and so of the

चतुर्दीनं मनं संघों विना ब्यापारायणमवादननुमायते।
other senses. And in this way the function of the eye is colour (vision); of the tongue, taste; of the nose, smell; of the ear, sound (hearing); of the skin, touch: these are the functions of the intellectual organs. *Speech and the rest (are the functions) of the five organs of action; or, speech is the function of the voice (larynx, &c.); handling, of the hands; treading, of the feet; dejection of excrement separated from food, of the rectum; and generation of offspring, of the sexual organs: ‘function or object’ being required for each term by the grammatical construction of the sentence.

The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are next described.

**COMMENT.**

The text particularizes the functions of the organs of sense severally.

The general term for the office of the senses is *ādhyātana*, literally ‘seeing, beholding, perceiving, observing.’ According to ancient authorities it is said to comprise both the first undeliberative, and the second deliberative knowledge; or, in short, what is understood by ‘perception†.’

The commentator on the *S. Pravacchana*, who gives this explanation, observes, however, that some consider deliberative perception to be the property of the mind only, whilst simple or undeliberative perception is that of the external senses; and this appears to be the doctrine of the Sánkhyás: the senses receive simple impressions from without of their own nature; whether those impressions are perceived, depends upon the cooperation of the internal sense, or mind. The term for ‘function’ is *vṛtti*, explained by *vyāpāra*, ‘active exercise or application;’ also by *śāntityām*, ‘ability, adequacy;’ and *phala*, ‘fruit, result.’

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* आलोचना। † आलोचनाम् पूर्वायत्तवात्। अखिलात्मकः
चनः ज्ञान प्रकट निबिंद्यतम। परंपरान्विता वल्लुप्रमणेयादिदिनिर्देशित।
तथाच निबिंद्यक्षत्रविधिधधीर्भविमोक्षसाधन्यं ज्ञानमालोचनसंगममिति।

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has *vishaya*, 'object;' and it may be said, that the function and object of a sense is the same thing, sight being both the function and the object of the eye. There is some difficulty in translating some of the terms satisfactorily, although there is none in understanding what is meant by them. Thus *rūpa*, 'form,' or, as rendered in the text, 'colour,' is the object and office of the eye; it is therefore equivalent both to visible substance and sight. So of *śabda*, 'sound;' it is both hearing and that which is heard. *Sperśa*, 'touch,' is the faculty and the substance to which contact may be applied. In *rasa*, 'taste,' and *gandha*, 'smell,' we have the double equivalents, as both words in English, as well as in Sanscrit, express both the sense and the sensible property. In English, 'voice' is a function; but here, at least, *vāch* is also the instrument of speech. In the other organs of action the function is more readily rendered; but the difficulty in any case is only that of language, and the sense is sufficiently explicit.

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**XXIX.**

Of the three (internal instruments) the functions are their respective characteristics: these are peculiar to each. The common function of the three instruments is breath and the rest of the five vital airs.

**BHĀSHYA.**

The natural properties, which are the several characteristics, are the respective characteristics (as previously defined). *Ascertainment is intellect* (ver. 23): that also is the function of intellect. *Consciousness is egotism* (ver. 24): consciousness is both its characteristic and its function. *Mind ponders* (ver. 27): such is its definition; and reflection, therefore, is the function of mind. Of these three, intellect, egotism, and mind, their respective characteristics are their specific functions. The functions of the intellectual organs, as before explained, are also specific (the same is

* ्वाच्।
the case with the organs of action). But now their common function is described. The common function of the instruments.—The function of the instruments in common is breath and the rest of the five vital airs; the airs called prāna, apāna, samāna, udāna, and vyāna. These are the five airs which are the common function of all the organs of sense. The air, for instance, called prāna is that which is perceptible in the mouth and nostrils, and its circulation is the common function of the thirteen kinds (of instruments): that is, where there is breath, the organs acquire (are connected with) soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage, gives motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called prāna, 'breath' or 'life,' from 'breathing.' From carrying downwards (apānayana), the air apāna is so named; the circulation of which, also, is the common function of the organs. Samāna is so named from conducting equally (samanayana) the food, &c. (through the frame). It is situated in the central part of the body, and its circulation is the common function of the instruments. The air udāna is denominated from ascending, or from drawing or guiding best (un-nayana). It is perceptible in the space between the navel and the head, and the circulation that it has is the common function of the organs. Lastly, the air by which internal division and diffusion through the whole body is effected is called vyāna, from its pervading (vyāpti) the body like the ethereal element. The circulation of that, also, is the common function of the assemblage of the organs. In this manner these vital airs, as the common function of the instruments, are explained; that is, the common function of the thirteen kinds (of organs).

COMMENT.

Besides the peculiar functions of the three internal instruments, mind, egotism, and intellect, which as the same with their definitions have already been specified, they have a common office in the evolution or circulation of the internal aerial humours which constitute vitality.

The translation limits this community of function to the three internal instruments only, or to intellect, egotism, and mind; and such is the interpretation of Váchespati Misra: 'The five airs, or life, is the function of the three (internal) instruments, from being present where they are,
and absent where they are not.” So the *S. Pravachana Bh.* explains the Sūtra *Sāmānya karana vṛitti* †; which is also the phrase of the *Kārikā,* the function of the three internal instruments ‡. Gaurāpāda, however, understands vitality to be the common function of all the organs, external and internal; or thirteen instruments, ten of the former, and three of the latter kind. The expression of the text also is general, and applicable either to all the organs, or to any of them, as variously understood. The two meanings are not irreconcilable, although, strictly speaking, the sense followed in the translation is most correct; for although vitality is the common function of all the senses, yet it is essentially so of the internal senses only: it might continue with the privation of any or all of the external senses, but could not, as Vāchespati states, subsist without the internal organs, as it depends upon their existence for its own. So also the *S. Pravachana Bhāṣya* calls the vital airs not only the ‘functions,’ but ‘modifications, of the internal instruments.’ These vital airs are not to be confounded with *vāyu,* or ‘elemental air,’ for the Vēdas are authority for their different origin: ‘From him is born vital air, mind, and all the senses, heaven, wind, light, water, and the all-sustaining earth §.’ The attribution of aerial operation to modification of the internal instruments arises from their being susceptible of a sort of motion similar to that of air, and from their being governed by the same deity ¶. The vital airs are, in fact, the vital functions of breathing, circulation, and digestion. That these functions, resulting from organization, should be supposed to partake of the nature of aerial humours, originates very possibly from some misapprehension of the phenomena of breathing, flatulence, and arterial pulsation. The term used by Gaurāpāda to designate their

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*हयासामपिस्कर्षानां पश्चायमित्रो जीवनं वृत्तिस्मात्रे भावास्त्राये
वानालाथ।† सामान्यकराश्वृति।‡ झातः जलवयस्यश्वृति।
¶ परिशास्तः। § एतस्माज्ञाति प्राणी मनः संद्रिष्याशिच। सं
वायुयोगितारपथ्य पृथिवी विद्याश्रीरल। ⁴ झातः जरापरिशाकामिति
वायुद्यसंचारविशेषायादेवताधिकाराय सायुष्यवहारोपायायिति।
action occurs syaudana, 'moving, circulation,' in the copy; but spandana, 'throbbing, pulsation,' were perhaps a preferable reading. The offices assigned to them are evidently connected with notions either of circulation or a pulse. Thus Prāna is breath, expiration and inspiration. Apāna is flatulence, crepitus. Samāna is eructation, supposed to be essential to digestion. Udāna is the pulsation of the arteries in the head, the neck, and temples; and Vṛāna is the pulsation of the rest of the superficial arteries, and occasional puffiness of external parts, indicating air in the skin. The situations assigned to the five airs by the S. Tatwa Kauumudi are much less consistent and intelligible. Thus Prāna is there said to be the function of the tip of the nostrils, head, navel, and great toes; Apāna, of the back of the neck, the back, the feet, and the organs of excretion and generation; Samāna, of the heart, the navel, and the joints; Udāna, of the head, throat, palate, forehead, and root of the nose; and Vṛāna, of the skin. With exception of the last, it is not easy to understand how such absurd situations should have been selected. The S. Bhāshya may be taken as the expression of the earlier notions.

XXX.

Of all four the functions are instantaneous, as well as gradual, in regard to sensible objects. The function of the three (interior) is, in respect of an unseen one, preceded by that of the fourth.

BHĀSHYA.

Of all four the functions are instantaneous.—The four are, intellect, egotism, and mind, in connection with any one of the organs of sense. Of these four the function is instantaneous in regard to perception, or in the ascertainment of perceptible objects. Intellect, egotism, mind, and the eye see form at once, in one instant, (coming instantly to the conclusion) that is a post. The same three, with the tongue, at once appreciate flavour; with the nose, odour: and so with the ear and skin.
Again; their functions are also gradual in regard to sensible objects.—Of that aggregate of four the function is also (occasionally) gradual (progressive). Thus, a person going along a road sees an object at a distance, and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man; he then observes some characteristic marks upon it, or a bird perched there; and doubt being thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding discriminates that it is a post; and thence egotism interposes, for the sake of certainty, as, verily (or, I am certain) it is a post. In this way the functions of intellect, egotism, mind, and eye are (successively) discharged. And as in the case of a visible object, so it is as to sound and the rest of the objects of perception.

But in respect of an unseen one, the functions of the three are preceded by that of the fourth.—Unseen implies time past, or future: for instance, in respect to ‘form,’ the function of the eye has preceded that of intellect, egotism, and mind, as has that of the skin in respect to touch; of the nose in regard to smell; of the ear in relation to sound; and of the tongue in respect to taste. The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are preceded in order by those of the senses in regard to time future or past, whilst in regard to time present they may be either instantaneous or gradual. Further—

COMMENT.

The consentaneous or successive operation of the three internal and any one of the external organs in the formation of ideas is here described.

The cooperation of the three internal organs and any organ of sense may be instantaneous (yugapata), like a flash of lightning, or as at the sight of a tiger, when the recognition of him, knowledge of his ferocity, conclusion of personal peril, and determination to try to escape are the business of one and the same moment: or their operation may be gradual or successive (kramaius), allowing leisure, for instance, for the eye to see, for the mind to consider, for egotism to apply, and for intellect to conclude. GAURAPADA rather disarranges the order of succession, and places the function of egotism last, assigning to it the office of belief or conviction. VACHESPATHI’s illustration is more regular: ‘Thus, the ear
hears the twang of a bowstring; mind reflects that this must be for the flight of an arrow; egotism says, It is aimed at me; and intellect determines, I must run away.* Whenever the object is unseen, adrīśī, not present, whether it be past or be to come, there must have been a prior perception of it; that is, as the text is explained by the commentators, there must have been a prior perception of it by an organ of sense. The expression of the text, tat pūrvikā vṛtti, 'their prior function,' might be thought to refer to a prior notion gained by the conjoint operation of the internal and external organs at some former period. This, however, would be recollection, the seat of which, as well as of judgment or inference, is in buddhi, or 'intelect,' alone; as in the Pātanjala Sūtra, 'Proof, refutation deliberation, sleep, memory; these are said to be the functions of intellect†.' The prior operation, therefore, is merely perception or observation by the external sense, alochanam (see ver. 28), conveying simple ideas to the mind. Taking, then, this prior simple idea acquired through an external organ, any further consideration of it is the gradual operation of the three internal instruments. Where the object is present, conviction may be either momentary or successive: the Sāṅkhya maintaining the possibility of consentaneous operation of the organs of sense and mind, egotism and intellect, in opposition to the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas, that the formation of ideas is in all cases a graduated process: Where the object is absent, the idea must be formed by the internal organs so far in successive order that they must be consequent upon a former impression received by an external sense; but as concerns themselves, their action may be either simultaneous or succesive‡.

* साधनाशिष्टमानाः कर्माणात्नात्सरस्रजस्वात्मांश्चतीतीकृतानां
† प्रभावितमेवात्तत्त्थतयः
‡ सत्त्वं सर्वं पात्रश्चै सृष्टिः यत्त बुद्धिवृत्तय उत्क्रम
† अनातः कर्मायत्स्य युगपत् अभेष्य च वृत्तिहेत्यपूर्वैः—यथा हि तथासहेशविश्वासी योजना।
illustration which occurs in the Bhāshya and other commentaries, of the course of reasoning by which the nature of a distant object is determined, is something like that with which, in the Philebus, the formation of opinion is elucidated.

XXXI.

The instruments perform their respective functions, incited by mutual invitation. The soul’s purpose is the motive: an instrument is wrought by none.

BHĀSHYA.

Swam is repeated, implying ‘several order:’ that is, intellect, egotism, mind, perform their respective functions, the incitement to which is mutual invitation. Ākāta implies ‘respect and alertness.’ They do this for the accomplishment of the purpose of soul. Egotism and the rest effecting it through intellect: that is, intellect, knowing the wishes of egotism and the rest, proceeds to its own peculiar function. If it be asked, why it does so? the answer is, the purpose of the soul is the motive. Soul’s purpose is to be fulfilled: for this object the activity of the qualities occurs, and thence these instruments make manifest the object of the soul. How is it that (being devoid of intelligence) they act? They act of their own accord. An instrument can be wrought by none.—The purpose of soul alone causes them to act: this is the meaning of the sentence: an instrument is not made—not roused—to act by any human superior.

It is next specified how many (instruments) intellect and the rest are.

COMMENT.

The circumstances that induce the internal and external organs to perform their respective functions are said to be mutual incitement, and spontaneous disposition to effect the objects of soul.

The organs of sense are said to act by mutual invitation or incitement. Their cooperation in the discharge of their respective functions is compared to that of different soldiers in an army, all engaged in a common
assault, but of whom one agrees to take a spear, another a mace, another a bow. It is objected, that the organs being declared non-sentient, incapable of intelligence, cannot be supposed to feel, much less to know, any mutual design or wish, akūta* or abhiprāga†; and the terms are explained to signify the insensible influence which the activity of one exerts upon that of another, if there be no impediment in the way; a sort of sympathetic or consentaneous action. Akūta here means incitement to activity; that is, at the time when one organ is in action, the activity of another, if no obstruction hinder it ‡. With this view the several instruments are directed by a presiding power, which may be termed the adaptation of the mutual fitness of their natures §. The motive for this sympathetic action is the purpose of soul, fruition or liberation; which purpose they of their own accord, but unconsciously, operate to fulfil, in the same way as the unconscious breast spontaneously secretes milk for the nourishment of the infant; according to the Sūtra, ‘As the cow for the calf’; that is, as the milk of the cow of its own accord exudes for the use of the calf, and awaits not the effort of another, so the organs of their own accord perform their office for the sake of their master, soul ¶. S. Pravachana Bh. They must act of their own nature; it is not in the power of any one to compel them to act. Gaurapāda’s expression is, ‘Not by any sovereign man’; perhaps some particle, such as vā, may have been omitted in the copy, making the sense, ‘Neither by a deity nor a mortal;’ or the phrase may imply, that they are not compelled to action even by soul, as a divinity; but fulfil soul’s purposes through an innate property, undirected by an any external agent.

* आकूत। † आभिमूय। ‡ साक्तम प्रवृत्तिसुन्मुखं तद्वेषकः ज्ञापारजननसमय एव तथा चास्ति वाहेकेष्वत्स्यापि। § तेनित्वम बिद्वाय खरणां स्वध्यासामधेशोपयोगाभिग्रेष्व भविष्यस। ¶ देनुदव बालाय। यथा वानलाएष्य पेनोः स्वयमेव द्वीरं स्रवितं नान्यायमपेश्वे तथेव स्वामिन। पुस्तव स्वज्ञे स्वयमेव करणानि प्रवृत्तेऽद्वये। ¶ न नेत्र चिदीरेष्य पुरुषेऽ।
XXXII.

Instrument is of thirteen sorts. It compasses, maintains, and manifests: what is to be done by it is tenfold, to be compassed, to be maintained, to be manifested.

BHÁSHYA.

Instrument.—Intelect and the rest are three; the intellectual organs are five; the organs of action are five: all together thirteen. What this performs is next declared: it compasses, maintains, and manifests; that is, the organs of action compass and maintain; those of perception manifest. How many kinds of action there are is next specified. Its action, that which is to be done by it, is tenfold; of ten kinds, as hearing, touch, &c. by the instruments of perception; speech and the rest by those of action: and thus by the former, manifestation, and by the latter, comprehension and support, are effected.

COMMENT.

The sense of the term karana, ‘instrument’ or ‘organ,’ is here explained, as a generic denomination for the external and internal organs.

The instruments or organs are thirteen; that is, three internal, intellect, egotism, and mind; and ten external, or the organs of sensation and action. Their respective functions as organs have been explained: their effects as instruments are classed under three heads, ‘compassing,’ áhárana*; ‘maintaining,’ dhárana†; and ‘manifesting,’ prakásana‡. The first, which means, literally, ‘taking, seizing,’ and rendered in the text ‘compassing,’ signifies ‘the application of an organ to the object to which it is adapted,’ and is the especial function of the organs or instruments of action. ‘Maintaining,’ dhárana, ‘supporting, upholding,’ is, according

* ज्ञाहरणं। † धारणं। ‡ प्रकाशनं। || यथा स्मृतादत्ते

स्वायोऽर्थः आपुवनतीति यावन्।
to the *Bhāṣhya*, also the office of the instruments of action; but the authors of the *S. Tatwa Kaumudi* and *S. Chandrikā* assign it to the three internal instruments, intellect, egotism, and mind, as being especially the supporters of vitality. ‘Buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and mind uphold, through their function being designated as the production of the vital airs, &c.*’ The elder commentator could not, of course, admit this doctrine; for we have seen (ver. 29) that, according to him, all the senses or instruments contribute to support the vital principle. All the Scholiasts agree in attributing ‘manifestation, enlightening,’ *prakāśana*, to the intellectual organs. The objects to be effected by the instruments are tenfold, reducible to the same three classes: speech, manipulation, walking, excretion, and generation are to be compassed, to be effected, *āhārya*, by the actual application of the several organs: sound, taste, touch, smell, form to be manifested, to be made sensible, *prakāśya*: and all of them, together with the vital airs, constituting in fact animal life, are to be *āhārya*, upheld or maintained.

XXXIII.

**Internal** instruments are three; external ten, to make known objects to those three. The external organs minister at time present: the internal do so at any time.

**BHĀŚHYA.**

*Internal instruments.*—Intelllect, egotism, and mind are three, from the difference between intellect and the others. *External ten.*—The five organs of perception and five of action are the ten external instruments, and they are to make known objects for the fruition of intellect, egotism,

* बुद्धहंसारमनांसि तु स्वच्छः प्राणादिलक्ष्णया धारयिनः ।
†  ज्ञाहार्यः ।
‡ धार्यः ।
and mind. *Time present*: that is, the ear hears a present sound, not one that is past, nor one that is to come: the eye sees present form, not that which is past, nor that which is future: the skin touches present substance: the tongue tastes present flavour: the nose smells present odours, nor past nor future. It is the same with the organs of action: the voice articulates actual, not past nor future words: the band takes hold of a present water-pot, not one that has been or is to be: the feet traverse a present, not a past nor a future walk: and the organs of excretion and generation perform present, not past nor future offices. External organs, therefore, minister at time present. The internal ones do so for any time.—

Intellect, egotism, and mind regard objects of any period: thus intellect forms an idea, not only of a present water-jar, but of one that has been or will be made: so egotism exercises consciousness of an object past, present, or future: and mind considers the past and future, as well as the present. Internal instrument is, therefore, for all times.

It is next explained which of these instruments apprehends specific, and which unspecific objects.

**COMMENT.**

The difference between the functions of the external and internal organs, as concerns time, is here explained: the action of the former being confined to time present; that of the latter comprehending also the past and the future.

Internal instrument is so denominated from operating within the body*; the external from being applied to exterior objects, making them known to the internal organization. The term *vishaya*, 'object,' is also explained by *bhogya*, 'that which is to be enjoyed;' and *vyápára*, 'exercise;' and *vishayákhya*, 'that which declares or makes objects known.' It is also defined as 'that which occasions the exercise of the functions of the three internal instruments†.'

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*शरीरार्थक्षत्रचृतिलाभः कर्मः।
† विषयं वापारसार्थपति जनयति।
necessarily confined to present objects, but mind, consciousness, and intellect apprehend from present objects those which have past, or are to come; as past rain from the swelling of a river; and future rain, in the absence of any other prognostic, from the destruction of the eggs of the ants*. This last phrase alludes probably to the well known destruction of various species of the ant tribe, which in the East takes place immediately before the setting in of the rainy season: they then take wing, and fly abroad in vast multitudes, of which few survive; according to the Hindustani proverb, "When the ants are about to die, their wings come forth." The expression "ants' eggs," pipiltikānda, is, however, rather questionable. It occurs in both copies of the S. Tutwa Kaumudi.

XXXIV.

Among these organs the five intellectual concern objects specific and unspecific. Speech concerns sound. The rest regard all five objects.

BHASHYA.

The intellectual organs concern specific objects: they apprehend objects which have specific properties. The intellectual organs of men distinguish sound, touch, form, taste, smell, along with objects of indifference, pleasure and pain. The organs of the gods apprehend objects which have no specific distinctions. So, amongst the five organs of action, speech concerns sound. Speech, whether of gods or of men, articulates words, recites verses, and the like; and this instrument is the same in both orders of beings. The rest—all except speech; the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation—regard all five objects: that

* बशान्तीपूर्णिकदातमृहुस्तिवुङ्क्षकादे निष्प्रिकामृहुस्तिवुङ्क्षकादे संवेदनशीलिति
is, sound and the other four objects of perception belong to all the other organs; for there may be sound, touch, form, taste, and smell in the hands; the foot treads upon the earth, of which sound and the rest may be characteristics; the excretory organ separates that in which the five objects abide; and the generating organs produce the secretion which is equally characterised by the five organs of sense.

COMMENT.

Another distinction is made in the functions of the external instruments, as they regard objects with or without specific characteristics.

Objects are distinguished as having specific characters or effects, saviśeṣa*, and as devoid of them, nirviśeṣha†; and the instruments are discriminated according to their capability of conveying notions of either. The organs of sense in mortals can apprehend only those objects which have specific characters; either sensible, as colour, form, taste, &c.; or moral, as pleasant, painful, or indifferent. The faculties of the gods and of sages can apprehend objects without such characteristic properties, and which exercise no moral effect, producing neither pleasure, pain, nor indifference. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi identifies ‘specific’ with ‘gross corporeal’ objects‡, and ‘unspecific’ with ‘subtile and rudimental’ objects§; the latter of which are cognizable alone by the organs of holy men and deities¶. This distinction applies to all the external organs, except the voice, which in men, saints, and gods can articulate sensible, specific, or corporeal words alone; for it is the organ of the voice that is the origin of speech. Speech cannot, like sound, taste, &c., originate with any thing gross or subtile exterior to the speaker; it must proceed from him, through the agency of a gross material instrument, and must therefore be gross or sensible itself. Gross corporeal mechanism cannot be the source of a subtile product, and therefore with every order of beings

* सविशेषः। † निरविशेषः। ‡ स्थूलविशेषः। † मूर्छन्विशेषः। § तत्प्रथातथात्तमाण्यो विषयं स्थूलविशेषः। † अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलश्चन्विशेषमेव।
speech must be specific. 'The rest,' śēśāni referring to the organ of speech, implies the other organs of action, all of which may regard the five objects of perception; that is, they may comprehend them all; as 'from the combination (or capability) of sound, touch, colour, smell, taste, in objects like a water-jar and others, which may be compassed or taken hold of by the hand, &c.*' S. Tatwa Kaumudi.

XXXV.

Since intellect, with the (other two) internal instruments, advert to every object, therefore those three instruments are warders, and the rest are gates.

BHASHYA.

With the internal; that is, intellect, with egotism and mind. Adverts to; takes, apprehends; that is, apprehends sound and the rest at all three seasons. Therefore these three are warders, and the rest are gates.—The rest; the other instruments; instruments being understood. Further—

COMMENT.

A metaphor is employed to illustrate the functions of the external and internal instruments.

The internal instruments are compared to warders, doorkeepers, or to persons having charge of a door or gate; not opening and closing it merely, but as taking note of all that enter: the external senses being the doors or gateways by which the objects of perception gain admission.

* पाक्याभायायोखां घटादीना मध्यस्थ्यायायामस्त्रादिति ।
XXXVI.

These characteristically differing from each other, and variously affected by qualities, present to the intellect the soul's whole purpose, enlightening it as a lamp.

BHÁSHYA.

These, which are called instruments: they variously affected by qualities. How affected? Like a lamp; exhibiting objects like a lamp. Characteristically differing; dissimilar, having different objects; that is the sense. Objects of the qualities is intended. Variously affected by qualities; produced or proceeding from qualities. Soul's whole purpose.—The instruments of perception and action, egotism and mind, having illustrated the object of soul (as attainable) through each respectively, present it to the intellect; place it in the intellect; and consequently soul obtains pleasure and the rest; that is, every object seated in intellect. Further—

COMMENT.

The process by which ideas are conveyed to soul is here described.

InteHect (buddhi or mahaY) is the instrument or organ which is the medium between the other instruments or organs and soul; that is, all ideas derived from sensation, reflection, or consciousness must be deposited in the chief or great instrument, intellect or understanding, before they can be made known to soul, for whose use and advantage alone they have been assembled. They are variously affected by the qualities.—They convey impressions or ideas, with the properties or effects of pleasure, pain, and indifference, accordingly as they are influenced by the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness. In fact these organs are identified with the qualities by all the commentators. GAURAPÁDA says, 'they proceed or are born from them': and in the S. Tatuwa Kaumudi and

* गुखेष्योजाताः
S. Chandriká they are called also 'products or modifications and varieties of the qualities;' thus the former has, 'The external organs, mind, and egotism are affections of qualities; they are changes of condition of the qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness'; the latter, 'These affections of the qualities are kinds (or varieties) of them.' It might have been preferable, therefore, to have rendered the expression gunaviśēsha, 'modifications or affections of the qualities.'

The progressive communication of impression to soul is thus illustrated by Vāchespāti: 'As the head men of a village collect the taxes from the villagers, and pay them to the governor of the district; as the local governor pays the amount to the minister; and the minister receives it for the use of the king; so mind, having received ideas from the external organs, transfers them to egotism; and egotism delivers them to intellect, which is the general superintendent, and takes charge of them for the use of the sovereign soul. The same idea is more concisely expressed in the S. Pravachana Bh. 'Sūtra: In the common employment of the organs the chiefship belongs to buddhi, as in the world. Comment: As the function of the organs is in common, through subservience to the purposes of soul, so the most important is that of intelligence; like the office of the prime minister amongst the chiefs of villages and the rest, who are all alike engaged in the service of the king.' The cooperation of opposites for a common purpose has been once before (p. 54) compared to the light of a lamp, derived from the combination of oil, cotton, and flame.

...
XXXVII.

Since it is intellect which accomplishes soul’s fruition of all which is to be enjoyed, it is that, again, which discriminates the subtle difference between the chief principle (pradhāna) and soul.

BHĀSHYA.

All: whatever comes within the reach of the organs, and in all three (past, present, and future) periods. Fruition: several or respective enjoyment, through the instrumentality of the organs of perception and action, whether in gods, men, or animals. The internal instrument intellect accomplishes, completes or effects; consequently it is that, again, which discriminates, makes a distinction between the objects of nature and soul, (or establishes) their difference or severalty. Subtle: not to be apprehended by those who have not practised religious austerities, (or such distinctions) as, this is nature, the equipoised condition of the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness; this is intellect; this is egotism; these are the five subtle rudiments; these the eleven organs; these the five gross elements; and this, which is different from them all, is soul. He whose intellect explains all this obtains liberation.

It was said above (ver. 34) that “objects are specific and unspecific:” which these are respectively is next described.

COMMENT.

The function of discriminating between soul and nature is here also assigned to intellect.

The immediate contiguity and communication of intellect with soul, as that of a prime minister and a sovereign, enables it to appreciate the latter; whilst its being the medium of conveyance to external objects familiarizes it with them also; and thus it is enabled to distinguish between both: or, as explained in the Chandrika, this discrimination is the necessary consequence of its relative function; for as it conveys ideas of pleasure or pain to soul, and is in this way the cause of its fruition, it is
subservient to another, to something of a different nature from its own; and the knowledge of this is discrimination between nature and soul. 'All, sound and the rest, with which the preposition prati (implying severalty) is to be connected. The fruition is that of soul. As intellect accomplishes this, consequently although it be as it were a chief principle, yet it is for another's use, not its own; and as hence arises the purpose of liberation, this sense is accordingly intended to be expressed in the phrase, *It is that again which discriminates, &c.*

XXXVIII.

The elementary particles are unspecific: from these five proceed the five elements, which are termed specific; for they are soothing, terrific, or stupifying.

Bháshya.

The five subtile elements, which are produced from egotism, or the rudiments sound, touch (substance), form, flavour, and odour, are said to be unspecific; they are the objects (of perception) to the gods, characterised by pleasure, producing neither pain nor stupefaction. *From these five proceed the five elements, called earth, water, fire, air, and ether. These are said to be specific. From the rudiment smell, earth proceeds; from the rudiment flavour, water; from form (colour), fire; from touch (substance), air; and from the rudiment sound, proceeds ether. These gross elements are termed specific. They are the objects of the senses of men, and are soothing, causing pleasure; terrific, causing pain; and stupifying, causing insensibility; as the ethereal element may give delight to one*
person coming forth at once from within a house, so the same may be the source of pain to one affected by cold, or heat, or wind, or rain; and if he be going along a road leading through a forest, in which he loses his way, it may then, from the perplexity of space, occasion stupefaction: so the air (or wind) is agreeable to a person oppressed by heat, disagreeable to one feeling cold; and when tempestuous and loaded with clouds of sand and dust it is stupifying. The same may be said of fire and the rest. There are other specific varieties.

COMMENT.

It was intimated in ver. 34, that objects were both specific and unspecific; and it is here explained, that by the former is meant the various property which the same element possesses at different times, and under different circumstances, in regard to mortals; and by the latter, the uniform and unvaried operation of the subtile rudiments in respect to the gods.

The precise nature of the rudimental elements is not very intelligible, according to their usual identification with what we are accustomed to consider as qualities, not substances, or sound, tangibility, form or colour, flavour, and odour; sabda, sparsa, rūpa, rasa, and gandha. It seems, however, that we should regard the rudimental elements as the imperceptible subjects of these qualities, from which the grosser and visible elements, ether, air, light, water, and earth, originate. So Vijnāna Bhiṣkhu calls them 'subtile substances, the elements which are the holders (sustainers or subjects) of the species of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell; but in which, as a genus, the three species of pleasurable, painful, and indifferent do not occur: they are not varieties of the gross elements, but in each respectively the elementary property exclusively resides; whence they are said to be rudiments. In those elements that elementary property resides alone (without being diversified, as agreeable, &c.); and as there is no distinction between a property and its subject, that which is a rudimental substance is called a rudiment, tan mātra; the existence of which as a cause is inferred from that of the
gross element as an effect*. * *Tan mátra is a compound of tād, ‘that,’ and mátra, ‘alone;’ implying, that in which its own peculiar property resides, without any change or variety: so Vāchespati explains the text, ‘Sound and the rest; the subtle rudiments; for the properties of agreeable, &c. do not belong to them, they have no quality which is fit for (mortal) fruition. This is the meaning of the word mátra †.’—These rudiments, though not appreciable by human sense, are said to be sensible to sages and to gods, producing to them pleasure only, from the predominance with them of the quality of goodness, and consequently of happiness ‡.

The notion of something more subtile than the elements was not unknown to early Grecian philosophy, and Empedocles taught that they were compounded of some more minute matter, or of elements of the elements, στοιχεία στοιχείων. Plutarch and Stobæus, according to Cudworth, understand by these rudiments of the elements primary atoms; but it may be doubted if they are to be so understood, for, according to Aristotle, Empedocles held that there were four elements, out of which all bodies were composed, and which were not mutually transmutable. In fact the doctrine of Empedocles, which was that of the school of Pythagoras, offers another analogy to the Indian, in the assertion, not of four, but of five elements, according to Plutarch, or the author De placitis philosophorum, I. II. c. 6, or ether, fire, earth, water, and air. Intellect. Syst. I. 97. That Empedocles was not of the atomic school is evident from

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‡
Lucretius, who specifies him as one of those who greatly misunderstood the principles of things:

Principiis tamen in rerum fecere ruinas
Et graviter magnei magno ceccidere ibi caso. I. 741–2.

It may be suspected that something like the Hindu notion, that the senses, or their faculties, and the gross elements, partake of a common nature, is expressed in the celebrated, though otherwise not very intelligible verses of the same philosopher:

Γάρ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀφάντωμεν, ἀκαρ. δ' ἀκαρ
Αἰθήρι καὶ αἰθήρι διαν, ἀκαρ ποιεῖν ἀνθρωποι:

'By the earthy element we perceive earth; by the watery, water; the air of heaven by the aerial element; and devouring fire by the element of fire.'

As opposed to the simple unvaried rudiments, the derivative gross elements, which are sensible to men and animals, are susceptible of three qualities; they may have specific or varied effects, may be diversified as species; they are said, accordingly, to be soothing or agreeable, terrific or disagreeable, and stupifying, bewildering; that is, they may be either of these, according to the different circumstances in which the influence of one or other of the three qualities predominates. When goodness prevails, whether it be in themselves or in the object affected, they are śanta, 'tranquil or pleasant;' when foulness, they are ghora, 'frightful, disagreeable;' and when darkness prevails, they are 'perplexing;' mūrka: as Vāchespati; 'In the gross elements, ether and the rest, some, through the predominance of goodness, are soothing, pleasant, agreeable, light; some, through the prevalence of foulness, are terrific, painful, restless; whilst others, through the influence of darkness, are stupifying, depressing, heavy.'
XXXIX.

Subtile (bodies), and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects. Among these, the subtile bodies are lasting; such as issue from father and mother are perishable.

BHÁSHYA.

Subtile: the rudimental elements, that, when aggregated, form the rudimental or subtile body, characterised by intellect (mahat) and the rest, and which always exists, and undergoes successive states of being (transmigration): those are subtile (bodies). Such as spring from father and mother are the cementers or means of the aggregation of gross bodies, or by the effect of the mixture of blood and seminal secretion in sexual cohabitation, at fit seasons they form the envelopment of the subtile body in the womb; that subtile body then is nourished, through the umbilical cord, by the nutriment derived from the food and drink received by the mother; and the (entire) body, thus commenced with the triple ingredient of the subtile rudiments, the cognate investure, and the gross elements, becomes furnished with back, belly, legs, neck, head, and the rest; is enveloped in its sixfold membranes; is provided with blood, flesh, tendons, semen, marrow, and bones; and is composed of the five gross elements; ether being supplied for its cavities (or extension), air for its growth, fire for its nutriment, water for its aggregation, and earth for its stability: and thus being equipped with all its (component) parts, it comes forth from the maternal womb. In this way there are three kinds (of bodies): which of these is constant, and which temporary, is next described. The subtile bodies are lasting.—Subtile; rudimental elements: these are lasting, constant; by them body is commenced, and migrates, according to the imperative influence of acts, through the forms of beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, or immovable substances; or, in consequence of virtue, proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celestial abodes. So the subtile body migrates until knowledge is attained; when that is
attained, the sage, abandoning all body, acquires liberation: these sorts of bodies, or subtle, therefore, are called lasting. Such as issue from father and mother are perishable.—Having left that subtle body, the frame that proceeds from mother and father ceases, even here, at the time that the breath departs; the body born of parents ceases at the time of death, and merges into earth and the other gross elements.

What subtle body is, and how it migrates, is next described.

COMMENT.

Objects were distinguished in the preceding verse according as they were with or without specific or diversified effects: they are here classified according to their forms, their origin, and duration.

A question of some difficulty, however, arises here, as to the objects of the classification. Are they bodies in general? or are they gross bodies only? In the preceding stanza it was stated, that the subtle elements, the tan mátras, were unspecific; whilst their effects, the gross elements, were 'specific,' viśéśha. It is now stated, that there are three kinds of viśéshas, 'sorts, species, specific differences;' but it is not explicitly defined of what these are the varieties. Mr. Colebrooke, following the principal commentators, renders it 'sorts of objects;' that is, of bodies in general. Professor Lassen, carrying on the sense of viśéśha, 'specific,' from the preceding stanza, considers the variety here spoken of to concern only gross or perceptible elementary bodies: “Distincta, elementa que distincta dicuntur (ver. 38). Distinctorium triplex est divisio in subtilia, a parentibus progenita, crassa” (ver. 39). He admits that the commentators are against this interpretation, but concludes rather that they are in error, than that ISWARA KRISHNA should have employed the word viśéśha in a double sense.

The interpretation of Prof. Lassen is highly creditable to his critical acumen and judgment, and is possibly correct, although it is scarcely compatible with the notions of subtlety and durability which the text ascribes to this branch of the triad. His view is not, as he supposes, wholly unsupported by the commentators; for VIJNANA BHISHKU similarly explains the stanza, as will presently be noticed. The passage
is one of some importance, as it regards apparently the history of the Sánkhya doctrines respecting the nature of that subtile body which is the immediate vehicle of soul, as we shall have occasion to notice more particularly, when we come to verse 40. If the meaning of the text be as Prof. Lassen renders it, it furnishes reason to suppose that the author of the Káriká had introduced an innovation upon the original doctrine, as will be subsequently indicated.

According to Gaurapáda and Nárayana, the sorts or species intimated in this verse are different from those described in the preceding; the former calls them, as above, 'other varieties'; and the latter has, referring to ver. 38, 'So many are the specific varieties; but these are not all, there are others.' Vácheśpati's expression, 'A further species of species,' might be thought to refer to the gross elements; but, from the explanation that follows, it is evident he does not intend to limit the specific differences to gross elementary bodies. Agreeably to the explanation, then, in which these writers concur, bodies in general are threefold, subtile, generated, and elementary; and consistently with this view they consider 'subtile,' súkshma, as equivalent to tan-mátra, 'rudimental': thus Gaurapáda has, 'Subtile is the aggregated rudimental elements, forming a rudimento-elemental subtile body ||' so also Vácheśpati; 'Subtile means subtile bodies; subtile body is one specific object;' and the Chandriká; 'Subtile are what are called rudimental bodies.' Consequently they also conceive the subtile objects spoken of in this verse to be something entirely different from the gross elementary viśeśhas, or 'species,' of the preceding verse; not merely sub-species or varieties of the same: and it must be admitted that there is some inconsistency in the Káriká's speaking of subtile bodies being a species of gross bodies; of
the imperceptible being a variety of the perceptible. According to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, however, the text merely intends by 'subtile,' sūkṣma, a modification of gross elementary body; a corporeal frame, which is subtile only relatively, or which is more refined than the second kind of body specified in the text, that which is begotten: 'The nature of that body which is the support of rudimental body is explained in the Kārikā, "subtile, generated," &c.; here is meant, body aggregated of the five elements, the (product or) effect of the rudimental elements, which is subtile relatively to generated body.' The same notion is again intimated by expressions which will be subsequently cited; and there remains no doubt that this commentator understands by the sūkṣma of the text, 'a subtile variety of gross elementary body,' distinctorum distinctio. The other commentators understand by it, 'rudimental bodies,' elementa indistincta. Either interpretation is therefore allowable: the latter agrees best with the philosophy, the former with the construction, of the original.

In the second variety of bodies of course specific or sensible bodies only are intended; bodies generated or begotten are made of the gross elements, agreeably to the Śūtra, 'Body consists of the five elements': they are, however, in some degree distinguished here from the elements; holding, according to Gaurepāda, a middle place between them, and rudimental bodies serving to combine them; upachāyaka causing upachaya, 'proximate aggregation;' the parts of the embryo being derived in the first instance from the parents, and their development being the result of the accession of the elements, for purposes which he describes. There is some incongruity, however, in this explanation, as it makes a distinction where there is no essential difference; organized matter being, in fact, the same with elementary matter. The other commentators, therefore, give a different explanation of the term 'great elements,' restricting...
it to inorganic matter. Thus Vācheśpati observes, 'Subtile body is one variety of objects; generated bodies are a second; and the great elements a third: water-jars and the like (inorganic bodies) are comprised in the class of the great elements.' So also the Chandrika: 'Subtile bodies are those called rudimental; generated, are gross bodies; and the great elements are mountains, trees, and the like.'

In this threefold division of bodies, as explained by the Scholiasts on the Kārikā, we have, in fact, but two distinctions, subtile and gross; the latter being subdivided into organic and inorganic. The twofold distinction is that which is especially recognised in the Sūtras: thus in the S. Pravachana Bhāṣya, the Sūtra, 'Thence (the origin) of body,' is explained, 'from the twenty-three tatwas (or categories) two kinds of bodies, subtile and gross, proceeded || and again, 'Gross body is for the most part generated (some bodies being inorganic), the other (subtile body) is not §§.'

The chief object of the stanza is, however, to assert the different duration of these three kinds of bodies; subtile are permanent: and here we have an argument in favour of the translation adopted; for no form of gross body could be considered as lasting: as composed of the elements, in however delicate a form, it must resolve into them at the time of death; whilst the subtile bodies, consisting of the subtile elements, endure either till liberation §§, or until the great Pralaya

Dissolvi quo quaque suprema tempore possint.

* सूक्ष्मं शरीरं भेदते। मातृपीठं वसीय:। महाभूतवर्गं घटातीनं विषेश इति।
† सूक्ष्मा लिङ्गशरीरराज्ञा:। मातृपीठं: स्वूलदेह:। प्रभूता: पर्ष्ववृक्षादयं।
‡ तस्माज्ञारस्य।
‖ तस्माच्योनिष्ठितवम् स्वूलसूक्ष्मशरीरवस्यारभं इति।
§ माता पितृजं स्वूलं प्रायण इतरचातथा।
|| तस्माओक्षावस्यायिन।
" ता महाप्रलयाद्वतिष्ठले।
XL.

(Subtile body), primæval, unconfined, material, composed of intellect, with other subtile principles, migrates, else unenjoying; invested with dispositions, mergent.

BHĀSHYA.

Primæval; whilst yet the universe is uncreated: in the first creation of nature, at that season subtile body is produced. Unconfined; uncombined either in the state of animals, men, or gods; and from its subtilty wholly unrestrained, or passing into rocks and the like without obstruction; it migrates; it goes. Permanent: until knowledge is attained it migrates. Composed of intellect, with other subtile principles; having mahat and the rest: that is, intellect in the first place, with egotism and mind, to the five subtile rudiments, to the subtile principles, to the rudimental elements. It migrates; it traverses the three worlds, as an ant the body of Siva. Unenjoying; without enjoyment: that subtile body becoming capable of enjoyment only in consequence of acquiring the property of action, through its aggregation by external generated body. Invested with dispositions.—Dispositions, as virtue and the rest; which we shall bereafter explain (see ver. 43). Invested with; coloured or affected by. Subtile body is that which, at the period of universal dissolution, possessed of mahat, intelligence, and the other subtile principles, merges into the chief one (or nature), and, exempted from further revolution, remains extant there until creation is renewed, being bound in the bondage of the stolidity of nature, and thereby incompetent to the acts of migrating and the like. At the season of re-creation it again revolves, and is hence called linga, 'characteristic' or 'mergent,' or sūkṣma, 'subtile.'

From what cause the thirteen instruments (intellect, egotism, and the eleven organs) revolve, as has been said, is next explained.

COMMENT.

The condition of subtile body, in regard to commencement, duration, and term, is here described.
The commentators are agreed that the subtile body here spoken of is the linga, or the linga sartra, ‘rudiment,’ or ‘rudimental body;’ ordinarily, though perhaps not quite accurately, confounded: the linga consisting, as intimated in the last phrase of the Bhāshya, of thirteen component parts, intellect, egotism, and the organs of sense and action; whilst the linga sartra adds to these a bodily frame, made up of the five rudimental elements. In this form, however, they always coexist, and it is not necessary to consider them as distinct: thus the Sūtra of Kapila states, ‘one linga of seventeen*;’ that is, according to the Scholiast, ‘in the beginning, at creation: there is but one rudimental body at the period of creation, consisting of an aggregate of the eleven organs, five rudimental elements, and intellect†.’ This was at first embodied in the person of Hiranyagarbha, or Brahmā, and afterwards ‘multiplied individually, according to variety of actions‡.’ In this enumeration egotism is omitted, being included, according to the commentator, in intellect. ‘Unconfined,’ akṣa, means unobstructed, capable of passing into any bodies. The next epithet, niyata, translated ‘material,’ is explained by Gaurapāda as above, by nītya, ‘permanent, lasting;’ and Vāchespati attaches to it the same signification, ‘It endures till the period of universal dissolution§; and the S. Pr. Bhāshya observes, also, that it ceases, or is destroyed, only at the same season∥: a property, of which it may be observed by the way, that it furnishes another reason for identifying the sūkshma, or ‘subtile body,’ of the foregoing stanza with the linga, or ‘rudimental body,’ of this verse. The Chandrikā explains niyata differently, ‘distinct in different persons¶.’ The composition of subtile body is explicitly described by Vāchespati: ‘Subtile body is an assemblage of intellect, egotism, the eleven senses, and the five

* स्स्त्रोक्तित लांॆ। † लिंगालरीरं सर्गदी समहिद्धात्मेकं भवति
† लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
‡ लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
§ लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
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¶ लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
|| लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
†† लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
‡‡ लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
§§ लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
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‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ लिंगाश्रीरं सर्गादी समहिद्धात्मां भवति
elements∗. He ascribes, however, to this a specific or ‘diversified existence, from its endowment with senses, which are the sources of pleasure, pain, or indifference †. The commentators agree that subtile body is subject to enjoyment or suffering only through its connection with generated body; understanding apparently thereby, not its abstract capability of either, but the actual condition in which it partakes of them; for it is repeatedly declared that the seat of enjoyment and suffering is buddhi, or ‘intellect; through the presence of which as an ingredient in subtile body, it is immediately added, the latter is invested with ‘dispositions,’ bhāvas; that is, with the properties of intellect enumerated in ver. 23, virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, &c. The term bhāva was rendered by Mr. Colebrooke in that place by ‘sentiments,’ but in another (ver. 43) he expressed the same ‘dispositions,’ which, as far as relates to the mental bhāvas, appears to be a preferable equivalent. Of the consequences of these dispositions, reward in heaven, or punishment in hell, dead, decomposed animal body is no longer susceptible: ‘In a dead body there can be no sense of pleasure or pain; this all admit ‡.’ In order, however, to be placed in circumstances leading to such enjoyment or suffering, generated body is necessary; and therefore subtile body migrates, sansarati, goes from one body to another continually: hence the world is called sansāra, ‘migration’ or ‘revolution.’ ‘Through the influence of intellect the whole of subtile body is affected by dispositions or conditions, in the same manner as a garment is perfumed from contact with a fragrant champa flower ||. S. Tatwa Kavumdi. Subtile body is called linga from its consisting of those principles which are so termed, either from their indicating or characterising that nature from which they proceed, or from their being ultimately resolvable into it. Thus the

∗ महत्त्वार्थोऽस्वेषोऽर्थस्थितिपरंतत्मार्थपर्यः समुदायः सूक्ष्मशरीरं।
† शास्त्रवीरमूडीरिन्द्ररामचन्द्रनिविन्तवाहिनीशेषः।
‡ मृतशरीरसुखदुःशान्ता वस्त्र सन्तसम्पत्तालात।
|| ऋषिवासितं यथा सुरभिच्छमण्डपश्चादिनं
तदासोद्वासितं भवति।
Chandriká has, 'Linga, from designating, apprising*.' Gaurapáda, as above, 'It merges into nature at the season of dissolution:' and Váchepati, 'Linga is so termed because it suffers resolution (laya), or from its characteristic indication of the source from which it proceeds†.' See also remarks on ver. 10. p. 43.

XLI.

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, &c. so neither does subtile person subsist supportless, without specific (or unspecific) particles.

BHÁSHYA.

As a picture without the support of a wall or the like does not stand; as the shadow does not stand without the stake (the gnomon of a dial); that is, without them does not exist. The term _et cetera_ comprises (other illustrations); as, water cannot be without coldness, nor coldness without water; fire without heat; air without touch; ether without extension; earth without smell; so by this illustration it is intimated that it, the rudiment (linga), does not subsist without unspecific or rudimental particles. Here also specific elements are implied, or body composed of the five gross elements; for without a body, having specific particles, where can the place of the _linga_ be; which, when it abandons one corporeal frame, takes refuge in another. _Supportless_; devoid of support. _Subtile_ (person); instrument of thirteen kinds; this is the meaning of the text.

For what purpose (these subtile elements are embodied) is next described.

* लिंगनान्त्र्यापनाशिंगः। † लिंगां लघं गाढ़तिति लिंगं हेतुम चेतनास्य लिंगलमिति भावः।
COMMENT.

In the preceding verse it was stated that subtile person migrated, or as soon as deprived of one body it took refuge in another. It is now explained why this must be; and that it proceeds from the necessity of something to give to subtile principles asylum and support.

The text accordingly states, that the 'rudiment,' the īṅga, cannot exist without such support; but with regard to the support itself there is some difference of opinion, the passage being variously read and interpreted.

Gaurapāda reads the expression, avīśkāhair vinā, 'without unspecific particles,' by which he states that he means the 'rudimental particles,' the tan mātrās. He adds, that specific particles, gross elementary bodies, are also necessary; using the terms avīśesha and viśēsha as they were before employed (ver. 38), to represent severally the rudimental and gross elements. Vāchespāti and Nārāyana read the phrase viśēsha vinā, 'without specific particles;' but they use the term 'specific' apparently in its general acceptance of 'species,' without reference to its technical employment in ver. 38; for they confine its purpose to that of 'subtile bodies.' 'Without specific particles; without subtile bodies: that is the meaning.' S. Tatwa Kaumudi. 'Without specific particles; without very subtile bodies: the rudiment (īṅga), being unsupported, does not remain; but being supported by subtile bodies it exists.' S. Chandrikā. So far therefore, although the reading be different, the interpretation appears to be the same. The īṅga, or 'rudiment'—for it is to be observed, that it is this which is spoken of by both text and comment, and not the īṅga sartra, 'rudimental body'—cannot subsist without a bodily frame. Whence that frame is derived, Gaurapāda makes sufficiently clear. The īṅga, or 'rudiment,' consists of but thirteen principles—the unclothed faculties and senses: the rudimental body, by which they are aggregated and

* विना विशेषता सूक्ष्मशरीरिकरित्वः।
† विशेषतासूक्ष्मशरी
रैविना लिंग निरामयं न तिष्ठति किंतृ सूक्ष्मशरीरिकरित्वं तिष्ठति।
defended, is a *tan mátrika* body, composed of the rudimental elements (p. 123). This again, for worldly existence, is enveloped in a bodily frame of gross elementary composition.

It may, however, be suspected that the authors of the *S. Tatwa Kau­madí* and the *Chandriká* have not attended to the distinction, and that they intend by their ‘specific or subtile bodies’ only one of the ‘species,’ or *viśeshas*, which may be intimated in ver. 38; a modification of the gross elements enclosing, not the naked ‘rudiment,’ the *linga*, but the ‘rudimental body,’ the *linga sartra*. Such, at any rate, is the interpretation of *Vijnána Bhikshu*, who, commenting on this stanza of the *Káriká*, explains ‘specífic particles, those which are called subtile amongst gross; a species or variety of gross elements’; and he says, that ‘the definition of subtile body which is given in the preceding stanza, “composed of intellect with other subtile elements”’ (p. 128), as compared with the expression of the present verse, proves that there is a distinction made between subtile body and the specific variety of the gross elements, which is also called subtile*.

The question then is not one merely of a difference of interpretation, but it is a difference of doctrine. According to *Gaurapada*’s explanation, which appears to be the original theory, living bodies consist of two parts, one of a subtile, and one of a gross nature; the latter perishes or decomposes at death; the former may live on through the existence of the world: the latter gives cover to the former, which is the immediate vehicle of soul, and accompanies it constantly, through successive perishable bodies, until soul’s liberation, or until a period of universal dissolution restore its component parts to their primitive and common parent. To this body the term of *linga sartra*, ‘rudimental body,’ is properly applied; it is also called *ätiváhika*, that which is swifter than the wind in passing from body to body; and, as Mr. Colebrooke observes, "it seems
to be a compromise between an immaterial soul and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter." Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 32.

But some of the expounders of the Sāṅkhya doctrines have not thought even the rudimental body sufficiently material for the purpose of independent existence, when separated from gross body; and a third corporeal frame has been devised for its support, to which the present verse of the Kārikā and the other passages which seem to allude to a subtile form of specific or gross elementary matter relate, according to Viṣṇāna Bhīshu: 'Having abandoned gross body, a support is necessary for the passage of rudimental body to other regions, and another species of body is established.' This is more particularly explained in the same writer's commentary on a somewhat obscure Sūtra immediately preceding: "In the body, which is the receptacle of the receptacle of that (rudimental body); for the denomination of body is applied to one as it is to the other." That is, the receptacle or support of that rudiment, which will be described as composed of the five elements, is supported or contained in body constituted of the six organic ingredients (bones, blood, &c.) to which the name body is applied, from the same being applicable to the sense of the word adhishāna (dēha, "body," being understood apparently in either case "containing" or "comprehending"). The corporeity of the vehicle or receptacle (adhishihāna) arises from its relation to the (aggregate) linga; the corporeity of gross body, from its being the receptacle of vehicular body. This is the meaning of the text. We have therefore three (kinds of) body established.
this, and to intimate, as Gaumāpāda has done, a twofold distinction only of bodies, the same writer observes, ‘What is said in writings, upon the authority of the Vedas, that there are but two (kinds of) bodies; arises from their identifying the rudimental and vehicular bodies as one, as they are mutually permanent and subtle.’ This is no doubt correct; but it is very unlikely that the elder writers admitted any form of the gross elements to be equally permanent and subtle as the rudiments from which they proceeded. In the institutes of Manu, for instance, although the doctrine there laid down is of a different tenor from that of the Sāṅkhya system, we have but two kinds of bodies, a subtle and a substantial one, described: ‘After death another body, composed of the five rudimental elements, is immediately produced, for wicked men, that may suffer the tortures of the infernal regions.’ Manu, XII. 16. We have here, then, a body composed of the five rudimental elements. In the Bhagavad Gīśa it is intimated that soul retains the senses and mind in the intervals of migration: ‘At the time that spirit obtains a body, and when it abandons one, it migrates, taking with it those senses, as the wind wafts along with it the perfume of the flowers.’

If Vāchāspati be correct in his interpretation of the word puruṣa, the Veda makes one kind of subtle body of the size of the thumb: ‘“Yama drew forth violently the subtle body, as big as the thumb.”—The specification of the size merely denotes minuteness; extraction of soul would be absurd; and therefore by puruṣa must be meant “a subtle body,” that which reposes in gross body.’ This, agreeably to the older doctrine, would

* यक्षाश्रेष्ठ जरीराश्रेष्ठमिववामचर्यते तत्त्वादित्तात्त्वातिन्यायानायतिः।
* पञ्चब्ध एव माणायः प्रेव द्वस्तुत्सनास्त्याय। शरीरं गतनाग्निमपन्नपत्यते घुरं।
* शरीरं वदा वाक्रृति यक्षापुत्राश्चामाशीरः। गृहोद्वितानि संयंति वाक्ष्णापानिवाध्यायात।
* स्वामित्वामाशीरः। सामुहसन्ध्यं पुरं निविष्टचवम। यमो चतुरादिति। सागुर्जु माणासहसामुखालक्ष्यति।
* शाक्मो निर्बलसंभवेन सूक्तमेवशरीरं पुरुषस्यदिष्ठि हि पुरि ख्वैले शरीरं शेत इति।

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be rudimental body; according to later refinement, vehicular. It is the latter which, as Mr. Colebrooke mentions (Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 33) in *Patanjali’s Yoga sāstra*, is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp over its wick, to a small distance above the skull; and which, according to M. Cousin, is “la fameuse pensée intracraniennne, dont on a cru faire récemment une découverte merveilleuse.” *Hist. de la Philosophie*, I. 195.

The notion of some corporeal, however subtle, envelopment of soul—the ἔνδολος, umbra, manes, simulacrum, spirit, or ghost—giving to invisible and intangible soul some visible and tangible materiality, “such,” as Good (Translation of Lucretius) observes, “as will at least enable the soul to assume some degree of material configuration, and to be capable of corporeal feelings, however spiritualized and refined, even after its separation from the body”—has prevailed in all times and in all ages. Nor was the doctrine confined to the people or the poets: such of the philosophers as maintained the immateriality of soul, attaching to it, until its final purification, some portion of corporeal substance, or some substantial, though subtile investure, or ἔσχατα, or vehicle. Thus Cudworth (vol. III. 517) states, that the ancient assertors of the soul’s immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body, but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them; as also they conceived this spirituous body to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it when that other gross earthly part of the body is by death put off as an outer garment.” It also appears, that “besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous body, the ancients held that there is a third kind, of a higher rank, peculiarly belonging to such souls, after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, called by them σώμα ἀναγεννητα, or a luciform body.” The authorities quoted by Cudworth for these opinions are new Platonists, or Christian writers of the fourth and fifth centuries; and it seems not unlikely that they borrowed some of their notions from the doctrines of Christianity. They profess, however, to repeat the tenets of Pythagoras and Plato; and Cudworth asserts, that the distinction of two interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the
terrestrial body, is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists, but a
tradition derived down from antiquity. Mosheim, in his translation of
Cudworth, has entered, in a note, very fully into an inquiry as to the
origin of the opinion of a subtile body investing soul, and concludes,
"Vetus haec opinio aut si mavis superstition, ab ipsis fere Graecorum
heroicis temporibus ducta;" and Brucker, in reference to his observa-
tions on this subject, remarks, "Hoc vero magna doctrina et ingenio
demonstravit Mosheimius hanc de vehiculo opinionem non demum in
juniorum Platonicorum cerebro enatam esse sed fuisse dogma canae
antiquitatis." Hist. Philos. I. 714. Although, therefore, less clearly
expressed than by the Hindu writers, the early Greek philosophers en-
tertained similar notions of the nature of the subtile body, which was
inseparable from soul until the period of its final exemption from trans-
migration.

XLII.

For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it), like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence,
with the aid of nature's influence.

BHÁSHYA.

The purpose of soul is to be fulfilled, therefore nature proceeds to
action. This (purpose) is twofold, apprehension of sound and the other
objects of sense, and apprehension of the difference between qualities
and soul. Apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense is enjoy-
ment of sensual gratification, as fragrance and the like in the spheres of
Brahmā and the rest: apprehension of the difference between the quali-
ties and soul is liberation. Therefore it is said, For the sake of soul's wish
subtile person is active. Through relation of means and consequences.—
Means (or antecedents) are virtue and the like: consequences are their
results, such as their ascending to heaven and so forth, as we shall here-
after explain. By their relation; their connection. With the aid of
nature's influence; of the influence of the chief one, nature. As a king in his own kingdom does what he wishes of his own authority, so by the application of the supreme authority of nature, through the relation of means (or causes) and consequences, subtile body exhibits: that is, nature commands subtile body to assume different conditions, by taking different (gross) bodies. Subtile body is that which is aggregated of subtile atomic rudimental elements, and is possessed of thirteen instruments (or faculties and senses). It assumes various conditions, by its birth, amongst gods, animals and men. How does (it exhibit)? Like an actor, who when he enters upon the scene is a god, and when he makes his exit is again a mortal: or again, a buffoon. So the subtile body, through the relation of causes and consequences, having entered the womb, may become an elephant, a woman, or a man.

It was said (ver. 40), “Subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions.” What those dispositions are is now described.

COMMENT.

The circumstances on which transmigration depends are here said to be the purpose of soul, enforced by the authority of nature.

Soul's purpose is either fruition or liberation; and to accomplish one or other of these, subtile body passes through various conditions, assuming different exterior forms, as an actor puts on different dresses to personate one while Rāma, another while Yudhishthira, or again, Vatsa*. The purpose of soul is enforced by the power, authority, or influence of nature†. Vibhutwa, as illustrated by Gaurapāda, means 'kingly or supreme authority.' Vāčespati understands it as 'universality' rather, as in the text of the Purāṇa: 'This wonderful vicissitude is from the universality of nature†;' that is, from its invariable presence and consequent influence. But besides these motives, the purpose of soul and

* यष्ठा हि नत्स्त्रूर्मिस्क्षामाधाय रामो वायुजातश्चतुर्वी बसराजो वा भवति।
† विभुषयोगात्।
† वेशस्थपात्त प्रथानस्य परिशामोय मन्नु:।
influence of nature, which may be regarded as the remote and proximate causes of transmigration in general, it is still necessary to have what may be regarded as a special, or exciting, or efficient cause; the reason of the particular migration; the cause wherefore, in particular instances, subtile body should ascend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a god, or wherefore it should descend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a brute. This depends, then, upon the relation of certain occasional or instrumental means or causes, nimittas*, with their incidental consequences or effects, the naimittikas†; as virtue and vice, which lead severally to reward and punishment after death; that is, to regeneration in an exalted or degraded condition. Thus the Chandrikā explains the terms: ‘Nimitta is virtue and the rest; naimittika is the effect, having the nimitta for its cause, as gross bodies, &c. By the relation or connection of these two, subtile body, assuming the form of gods or other beings, performs its part. Professor Lassen has been needlessly perplexed by this verse, and has strangely rendered it as follows: “Corpusculum hocce propter genii causam effectum, ludionis instar se habet ad has modo ad illas originarias et derivatas conditiones pronum, post conjunctionem procreatricis cum potestate sua.”

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XLIII.

Essential dispositions are innate. Incidental, as virtue and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the instrument. The uterine germ (flesh and blood) and the rest belong to the effect (that is, to the body).
BHÁSHYA.

Dispositions (bhávas, 'conditions') of being are considered to be threefold, innate, essential, and incidental. The first, or innate, are those four which in the first creation were cognate with the divine sage Kapila, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The essential are declared; these were four sons of Brahmá, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanátana, and Sanatkumára; and these four dispositions were produced with them, who were invested with bodies of sixteen years of age (or perpetually juvenile bodies), in consequence of the relation of causes and effects (or in consequence of merit in a former existence): therefore these dispositions are called essential. Incidental are those derived through the corporeal form of a holy teacher; from which (in the first instance) knowledge is incidentally obtained by such as we are; from knowledge comes dispassion; from dispassion, virtue; and from virtue, power. The form of a teacher is an incidental product (of nature), and therefore these dispositions are termed incidental: "Invested by which, subtle body migrates" (ver. 40). These four dispositions are of the quality of goodness; those of darkness are their contraries: as above, "Virtue, &c. are its faculties partaking of goodness; those partaking of darkness are the reverse" (ver. 23). Consequently there are eight dispositions, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, weakness. Where do they abide? They are considered appurtenant to the instrument. Intellect is an instrument, and to that they are appurtenant; as in ver. 23, "Ascertainment is intellect; virtue, knowledge," &c. Effect; body. The uterine germ and the rest belong to it; those which are born of the mother, the germ and the rest, or the bubble, the flesh, the muscle, and the rest, which are (generated), for the development of the infant, in the union of the blood and the seminal fluid. Thus the conditions of infancy, youth, and old age are produced; the instrumental causes of which are food and beverage; and therefore they are said to be attributes of the effect (or of the body), having, as the instrumental cause, the fruition of the sensual pleasures of eating and the like.

It was said (ver. 42), "Through the relation of means and consequences:" this is next explained.
COMMENT.

We have here an explanation of what is to be understood by the term *dispositions*, used in a former passage (ver. 40).

The translation of bhāva * adopted by Mr. Colebrooke in this place is 'disposition;' in the passage referred to he had employed, as above remarked, 'sentiment;' but it was there changed, in order to preserve consistency. Neither word perhaps exactly expresses the purport of the original, nor is it easy to find one that will precisely correspond. In some respects 'condition,' mode, or state of being, *conditio*, as rendered by Professor Lassen, is preferable, as better comprehending the different circumstances to which bhāva is applied; although, as he has occasion subsequently to remark, it does not very well express all the senses in which bhāva occurs. These circumstances or conditions, according to the obvious meaning of the text, are of two kinds, or intellectual and corporeal.

The first comprise virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries; the second, the different periods of life, or embryo, infancy, youth, and senility. They are also to be regarded as respectively cause and effect; virtue, &c. being the efficient cause, or nīmītta; bodily condition the naimītika, or consequence; as Vāchespati explains the object of the stanza, 'which,' according to him, 'distinguishes incidental cause and consequence, the latter being the incidental conditions of body †.'

But besides the division of conditions or dispositions into the two classes of intellectual and corporeal, they are also characterised according to their origin, as sāṁsiddhika, prākrita, and vaikrita, rendered in the text 'innate, essential, and incidental.' Prof. Lassen translates them *conditiones absolutae, pendentes ab origine, pertinentes ad evoluta principia.* Both the two first are innate, and some further distinction is necessary. 'Superhuman' or 'transcendental' would perhaps best explain the first, as they are, according to the commentator, peculiar to saints and sages. According to Gaurapāda, they occur only in one instance as the cognate

*भावः।† निमित्त नैमित्तिकं च विभाजते। वैकृतिकाः नैमित्तिकाः।
conditions of the divine Kapila, the author of the Sánkhya system. The second class, which may be rendered ‘natural,’ agreeably to his view, which is a little mystical, originated with the four holy and chaste sons of Brahma. The third class, those which are incidental or constructive, vaikrita, belong to mortals, as they are produced in them by instruction. Váchespati recognises but two distinctions, identifying, as in the translation, the innate (sánsiddhika) with the essential (prákrita) dispositions, they being both svábhávika, ‘inseparable, inherent,’ not the production of tuition, and opposing to it the constructive or incidental (vaikritika)\(^*\). A similar account of their origin as in the Bháshya is given, but under these two heads only: ‘Thus in the beginning of creation the first sage, the venerable and great Muni Kapila, appeared, spontaneously endowed with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The incidental and un-spontaneous dispositions were produced by the cultivation of the means (of producing them), as (the lessons of) Práchetasa and other great Rishis\(†\).’ These dispositions or conditions are dependent upon the instrument, that is upon buddhi, or ‘intellect,’ of which they are faculties, as was explained in verse 23. The states or conditions of life depend upon the body, and are the immediate effects of generation and nutriment, the more remote effects of virtue, vice, &c.

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XLIV.

By virtue is ascent to a region above; by vice, descent to a region below: by knowledge is deliverance; by the reverse, bondage.

\(*\) वैकृतिका नैमितिका—प्राकृतिका सांसिद्धिकाभवा: स्वाभाविका इति यावत्।

\(†\) तथाहि सगोदायादिविद्याम् चतु भगवान् कपिलो महामुनिनिधमंज्ञानविद्यार्योंसमयं: प्रातुप्रेमृवेति। वैकृतिकाश्च भावा असांसिद्धिका उपायानुष्ठानोत्तर्भा यथा प्राचेतसप्रभृतीनां महर्षीयां।
BHÁSHYA.

By virtue ascent.—Having made virtue the efficient cause, it leads upwards. By upwards eight degrees are intended, or the regions of Brahmá, Prajápati, Soma, Indra, the Gándharbas, the Yákshas, the Rákshasas, and Piśáchás: the subtile body goes thither. Or if vice be the efficient cause, it migrates into an animal, a deer, a bird, a reptile, a vegetable, or a mineral. Again; by knowledge, deliverance: knowledge of the twenty-five principles; by that efficient cause, deliverance: the subtile body ceases, and (soul is) called ‘supreme spirit’ (paramátmá).

By the reverse, bondage: ignorance is the efficient cause, and that (effect) bondage is natural (prákrita), incidental (vaikárika), or personal (dákhina), as will be explained: “He who is bound by natural, incidental, or personal bondage is not loosed by any other (means than knowledge).”

Next, other efficient causes are declared.

XLV.

By dispassion is absorption into nature; by foul passion, migration: by power, unimpediment; by the reverse, the contrary.

BHÁSHYA.

If any one has dispassion without knowledge of principles, then from such dispassion unpreceded by knowledge occurs absorption into nature, or when the individual dies he is resolved into the eight primary elements, or nature, intellect, egotism, and the five rudiments; but there is no liberation, and therefore he migrates anew. So also by foul passion; as, I sacrifice, I give gifts, in order to obtain in this world divine or human enjoyment; from such foul passion proceeds worldly migration. By power, unimpediment.—Where eightfold power, as minuteness, &c. is the efficient cause, then non-obstruction is the effect. Such power is unim-
peded in the sphere of Brahmá, or in any other. By the reverse, the contrary.—The contrary of unimpediment is obstruction, which proceeds from want of power, everywhere obstructed.

Thus sixteen efficient causes and effects have been enumerated: what they comprehend (or amount to) is next described.

**COMMENT.**

In these two verses the efficient causes of the various conditions of subtile body and their effects, or its conditions, are detailed.

These causes and effects are collectively sixteen, eight of each: the former are positive and negative, as diversified by the qualities of goodness and foulness (ver. 23); and the effects respectively correspond. They are accordingly,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Effect</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Virtue</td>
<td>2. Elevation in the scale of being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ignorance</td>
<td>8. Bondage or transmigration.</td>
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By 'virtue,' dharma, both religious and moral merit are intended. Ascent, going upward, is elevation to a more exalted station in another birth; the term sthána implying both place and degree. According to Gaúrapáda, this ascent is eightfold, and the subtile frame may after death assume a new body amongst the various classes of spirits, Piśáchas, Rákshasas, Yákshas, and Gandherbas; or may attain a place in the heaven of Indra; of Soma, or the moon; of the Prajápatis, or progenitors of mankind; or even in the region of Brahmá. It is a curious, though perhaps an accidental coincidence, that the Syrians and Egyptians enumerated also, according to Plato (Epinomis), eight orders of heavenly beings: their places, however, seem to be the planets exclusively. The
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author of the *S. T. Kaumudi* understands by *ascent*, or elevation, ascent to the six superterrestrial regions, *Dyu,* or Bhuvah loka, the atmosphere; *Sver loka,* the heaven of Indra; *Mahar loka,* Janaloka, and Tapoloka, worlds of sages and saints; and *Satya loka,* of Brahmá. By *degradation* he understands descent to the subterrene regions, *Pátála,* Rasátalá, &c. These notions are, however, not incompatible, as rewards and punishments in heaven and hell are but temporary, and subtile body must even afterwards assume terrestrial form, and undergo a series of migrations before escape from the bondage of existence can be finally accomplished.

*Bondage* is said by the commentators to be of three kinds, intending thereby three different errors or misconceptions of the character of soul and nature; the prevalence of which precludes all hope of final emancipation. ‘These errors or bonds are, 1. *Prákritika*; the error or bondage of the materialists, who assert soul in nature (or matter): 2. *Vaikritika*; the error of another class of materialists, who confound soul with any of the products of nature, as the elements, the senses, egotism or intellect; and, 3. *Dákshína*; the error or bondage of those who, ignorant of the real character of soul, and blinded by the hope of advantage, engage in moral and religious observances:’ as Váchespati*. These errors confine the soul to its subtile material frame for various protracted periods; as, for instance, in the case of those who identify soul with sense, for ten manvantaras, or above three thousand millions of years (3,084,480,000).

By *dispassion* occurs ‘absorption into nature,’ *prakriti laya*†; or, as the *Kaumudi* and Chandriká express it, ‘resolution into the chief one and the rest ‡.’ Gaurápáda makes the meaning of the phrase sufficiently clear: according to him it signifies the resolution of even the subtile body into

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††
its constituent elements: but this is not in this case equivalent to liberation; it is only the term of one series of migrations, soul being immediately reinvested with another person, and commencing a new career of migratory existence until knowledge is attained.

The remainder of the text requires no explanation.

XLVI.

This is an intellectual creation, termed obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. By disparity of influence of qualities the sorts of it are fifty.

BHĀSHYA.

This aggregate of sixteen causes and effects is called an intellectual creation. Pratyaya means buddhi, 'intellect.' "Intellect is ascertain-ment," &c. (ver. 23). This intellectual creation is of four kinds, obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. In this classification, doubt (obstruction) is ignorance; as when any one beholding a post (at a distance) is in doubt whether it is a post or a man. Disability is when, even though the object be distinctly seen, the doubt cannot be dissipated. The third kind is called acquiescence; as when a person declines to doubt or determine whether the object be a post or not; saying, What have I to do with this. The fourth kind is perfectness; as when the delighted observer notices a creeper twining round the object, or a bird perched upon it, and is certain that it is a post. By disparity of influence of qualities.—By the unequal (or varied) influence of the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, acting on this fourfold intellectual creation, there are fifty modifications of it: and these kinds in which severally goodness, foulness, or darkness prevails, and the other two are subordinate, are next particularized.

COMMENT.

In this and the five following stanzas the modifications of the causes and consequences, or the conditions of existence produced by the intel-
lectual faculties, as influenced by the three qualities, are detailed and classified.

By 'intellectual creation,' pratyaya serga*, is to be understood the various accidents of human life occasioned by the operations of the intellect, or the exercise of its faculties, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries. Pratyaya properly means 'trust,' but is here considered to be synonymous with buddhi. It may be understood as implying 'notion;' and pratyaya serga is the creation or existence of which we have a notion or belief, in contradistinction to bodily or organic existence, of which we have an idea or sensible perception; the bhūta serga†, or 'elemental creation.'

Existence then, dependent on the faculties of the intellect and their consequences, is further distinguished as of four kinds: 1. 'Obstruction,' viparyaya, is explained by Vāchespatti 'ignorance' (ajnāna), by Gaura­pada 'doubt' (samsaya): 2. 'Disability,' asakti, is imperfection of the instruments or senses: 3. Tushti is 'acquiescence' or 'indifference:' and, 4. Siddhi is 'complete or perfect knowledge.' In the three first are comprised the seven intellectual faculties, virtue and the rest (see p. 88), all except knowledge, which is comprehended in perfectness.† S. Tatwa Kauinudi. This is the collective or generic division. Each genus is again divided so as to form fifty species, according as they are affected by the three qualities, or the predominance of one, and the depression of another. The species are enumerated in the succeeding verse.

* प्रत्ययसर्गं: ।
† भूतसर्गं: ।
‡ तत्तत्त्वप्रपन्धायाशिष्ठितुहि यष्ठायोगं समानां धम्मात्मानां ज्ञानव्रज्जनतर्भो: सिद्धि च ज्ञानस्वेतिः ।
∥ एकस्मात्वधिकान्तता ध्योयो एकस्मात्मुत्तरता ध्योयो।
XLVII.

There are five distinctions of obstruction; and, from defect of instruments, twenty-eight of disability: acquiescence is ninefold; perfectness eightfold.

BHÁSHYA.

Five distinctions of obstruction; namely, obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness: these will presently be explained. There are twenty-eight kinds of disability from defect of instruments; which also we shall describe. Acquiescence is ninefold, being the kinds of knowledge partaking of the quality of foulness in an ascetic. Perfectness is eightfold, which in holy men consists also of the kinds of knowledge partaking of the quality of goodness. These will all be explained in order; and first of obstruction.

COMMENT.

We have here the fifty varieties of intellectual creation, or conditions dependent upon the faculties of intellect, simply enumerated under each head respectively.

The text in each case is limited to the enumeration of the number of the varieties, leaving their designations and descriptions to be supplied by the scholia: accordingly we have in the Bháshya the five distinctions of obstruction specified. They are referred to in the text, in the succeeding stanza, for the purpose of enumerating their subdivisions, and it is unnecessary therefore to enter upon the detail here.

XLVIII.

The distinctions of obscurity are eightfold, as also those of illusion; extreme illusion is tenfold; gloom is eighteenfold, and so is utter darkness.
BHASHYA.

Obscurity is eightfold; final dissolution being so distinguished through ignorance; as when a person thinks that soul merges into the eight forms of prakriti, or the five rudiments, egotism, intellect, and nature, and thence concludes, I am liberated: this is eightfold obscurity. The same is the number of kinds of illusion; in consequence of which, Indra and the gods, being attached to the possession of the eight kinds of superhuman power, such as minuteness and the rest, do not obtain liberation, but upon the loss of their power migrate again: this is called eightfold illusion. Extreme illusion is of ten kinds, accordingly as the five objects of sense, sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, are sources of happiness to the gods or to men. In these ten objects (or the five objects of sense twice told) consists extreme illusion. Gloom is eighteenth.—The faculties of superhuman power are eight sources, and the objects of sense, human or divine, are ten, making eighteen; and the feeling that makes men rejoice in the enjoyment of these eighteen, and grieve for the want of them, is gloom. Utter darkness has in like manner eighteen varieties, originating with the eightfold superhuman power and the ten objects of perception; but it applies to the profound grief felt by one who dies amidst the abundance of sensual delights in the season of enjoyment, or who falls from the command of superhuman faculties: that is utter darkness. In this manner the five varieties of obstruction, obscurity and the rest, are severally subdivided, making sixty-two varieties.

COMMENT.

The five kinds of obstruction, ignorance, or uncertainty, alluded to in the preceding stanza, are here specified, and their subdivisions enumerated.

Obstruction, viparyaya*, means, properly, whatever obstructs the soul's object of final liberation: it is consequently any cause of bondage.

* विपर्ययः: ।
ङङ
of confinement to worldly existence, or of perpetual migration, and is therefore one of the four elements of the creation of the world; as, if spirit was not so confined, created forms would never have existed. So the Sūtra of Kapila has, 'Bondage is from obstruction; but liberation depends on knowledge: bondage therefore arises from ignorance, and ignorance or error is obstruction. Gaurapāda accordingly uses sanśaya, 'doubt' or 'error,' as the synonyme of viparyaya; and the specification of its sub-species confirms this sense of the term, as they are all hinderances to final emancipation, occasioned by ignorance of the difference between soul and nature, or by an erroneous estimate of the sources of happiness, placing it in sensual pleasure or superhuman might.

The five varieties of obstruction or error are, 'obscurity,' tamas; 'illusion,' moha; 'extreme illusion,' mahāmoha; 'gloom,' tāmisra; 'utter darkness,' andhatāmisra. The distinctions are more subtle than precise, but their general purport is sufficiently obvious; they all imply ignorance of self, and thirst of pleasure and power. Another enumeration, that of the Yoga, or Pātanjala school, as repeated by Viñāna Bhaiṣajyā, calls the five species, 'ignorance' (avidya), 'egoism' (asmita), 'love' (rāga), 'hate' (dwēṣa), and 'idle terror' (abhinivēṣa), as fear of death and the like. They are called also in the same system, 'the five afflictions.' These are identified with the species named in the text. Obscurity is that ignorance which believes soul to be sealed in primary nature, or one of its seven products; and is therefore eightfold. Illusion is that egoism that exults in the appropriation of the eight superhuman faculties; and is consequently eightfold also. Extreme illusion, or love, is addiction to sensual objects, as they are grateful respectively to gods and men; therefore this class of impediments to liberation is tenfold. Gloom, or hate, is of eighteen kinds; ten as affecting the ten objects of sense, or the five divine and five human, as before distinguished, and termed by Gaura-

* जन्म विविधवेयः। । संशयः। । ज्ञानासितारागब्रह्मबिनवेशः पञ्च योगोक्षा जन्महेतुविविधवेयस्यावानतरेदा इति। । ज्ञान

**सितारागब्रह्मबिनवेशः पञ्चक्षेत्र इति पातर्चले।**
The mental conditions here intended are those of fierceness and impatience, with which sensual enjoyments are pursued, or superhuman powers are exercised. *Utter darkness,* or terror, is the fear of death in men; and in gods, the dread of expulsion from heaven by the Asuras: in either case the loss of pleasure and power is the thing lamented; and as their sources are eighteen, so many are the subdivisions of this condition. These distinctions are said to be the work of former teachers; as in the S. Pravachana Bhāshya: 'The subdivisions are as formerly described: that is, the subdivisions of obstruction, which is said to be of five species, are such as were fully detailed by former teachers, but are in the Sūtra but briefly alluded to, for fear of prolixity.'

**XLIX.**

Depravity of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability. The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion of acquiescence and perfectness.

**BHĀSHYA.**

From defect of instruments there are twenty-eight kinds of disability; this has been declared (ver. 47): these are, *depravity of the eleven organs,* or deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness, mutilation, lameness, constipation, impotence, and insanity. *Together with injuries of the intellect:* as, together with these, there are twenty-eight kinds of disability, there are seventeen kinds of injuries of the

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*हःः। †नाशायिनः। ‡नावानारभेदः पुरैवत्। विपर्यः
बस्यावानारभेदः ये सामायः पंचोऽकाशः पुरैवत् पुरैवतःयःयः भृकुषः विषेषः अवधाराः विस्तरभेदाहोपध्यायः।
intellect. *By inversion of acquiescence and perfectness:* that is, there are nine kinds of acquiescence, and eight of perfectness; and with the circumstances that are the reverse of these (seventeen), the eleven above specified, compose the twenty-eight varieties of disability. The kinds of injury of the intellect which are the reverse of (the sorts of) acquiescence and perfectness will be understood from the detail of their varieties.

The nine kinds of acquiescence are next explained.

**COMMENT.**

The various kinds of the second class of conditions or disability are here enumerated.

*Disability,* *āśakti,* or incapability of the intellect to discharge its peculiar functions*, is the necessary result of imperfection of the senses, or of any of the organs of perception and of action. But besides these, which are sufficiently obvious, such as blindness, deafness, and any other organic defect, there are seventeen affections of the intellect itself equally injurious to its efficiency. These are described as the contraries of the conditions which constitute the classes acquiescence and perfectness. Under the former head are enumerated, dissatisfaction as to notions of nature, means, time, and luck, and addiction to enjoyment of the five objects of sense, or the pleasures of sight, hearing, touching, &c. The contraries of perfectness are, want of knowledge, whether derivable from reflection, from tuition, or from study, endurance of the three kinds of pain, privation of friendly intercourse, and absence of purity or of liberality.

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L.

Nine sorts of acquiescence are propounded; four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck; five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of) objects.

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BHÁSHYA.

Five internal sorts of acquiescence.—Those which are in the individual are internal. They are said to relate to nature, to means, to time, and to luck. The first is, when a person understands what nature is, its being with or without qualities, and thence knows a principle (of existence) to be a product of nature; but knows this only, and is satisfied; he does not obtain liberation: this is acquiescence in regard to nature. The second is, when a person, ignorant of the principles (of existence), depends upon external means, such as the triple staff, the water-pot, and other implements (used by ascetics): liberation is not for him: this is acquiescence in regard to means. Acquiescence in regard to time is when a person satisfies himself that liberation must occur in time, and that it is unnecessary to study first principles: such a one does not obtain liberation. And in the same way acquiescence as relates to luck is when a person is content to think that by good luck liberation will be attained. These are four kinds of acquiescence. Five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of objects).—The external sorts of acquiescence are five; from abstinence from enjoyment of (five) objects of sense; that is, when a person abstains from gratification through sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell; such abstinence proceeding from observation of (the evils of) acquiring, preserving, waste, attachment (to sensual pleasures), and injuriousness. Acquiring is pain (or trouble), for the sake of increase, by the pasturage of cattle, trade, acceptance of gifts, and servitude. There is pain in the preservation of what has been acquired; and if they be enjoyed, they are wasted; and waste, again, is vexation. When attachment to sensual pleasures prevails, the organs have no repose: this is the fault of such attachment. Without detriment to created things there is no enjoyment (of sensible objects); and this is the defect of injuriousness. From observing then the evil consequences of acquiring and the rest, abstinence from enjoyment of the five objects of sense is practised; and these are the five sorts of external acquiescence. From the variety of these internal and external kinds proceed the nine sorts of acquiescence. Their names are differently enumerated in other works, or ambhas, salilam, ogha, trishiti, sutamas, páram, suncram, nárikam, and anuttamámbhusikam: and from
the reverse of these kinds of acquiescence, constituting the varieties of
disability, injuries of the intellect arise, named (according to the last
mentioned nomenclature) anambhas, asalilam, and so on. From the con-
trariety of these, therefore, are inferred the injuries of the intellect.

Perfectness is next described.

COMMENT.

The different kinds of acquiescence, apathy, or indifference, are spe-
cified in this verse.

The kinds of acquiescence, content, or complacency, tushita, are of two
descriptions; internal or spiritual, adhyatmika, and external or sensible,
bahya. Gaurapáda explains the former, ‘being in self or spirit †.’ Váches-
páti defines them, ‘Those kinds of acquiescence are called internal which
proceed from discrimination of self, as different from nature †.’ According
to Vijnána Bhikshu, they are those principles or sentiments which preside
over collected or composed soul †. Of the different species, the first, or
that which relates to nature, acknowledges it as the radical principle of all
things, but expects that as every thing is but a modification of nature, so
nature will effect all that is necessary, even liberation, for example, and
the individual I remains passive and complete ‡. Another person, as the
means of liberation, adopts a religious or mendicant order, or at least bears
the emblems, as the staff, the water-pot, and the like: the term vividikā
used in the Bhāshya is of doubtful import, and is perhaps an error. Others
suppose that liberation must come in time, or at least by a long con-
tinued course of meditation. Others imagine it may come by good luck;
and contenting themselves with these notions or practices, omit the only
means of being freed from existence, discriminative meditation. The five

* ātmam bhavā. † pravṛtti ātītirikmatmahamadhikroha vasagatu

† stāslakṣasādāthālakṣa. ‡ ātmanāṃ sāntamadhikroha vaśenāte. ||

śāsthānāvakārāyena: parīkṣā: saṃvedipy pravṛtterv tām (mātā) va pravṛtterv

krēvyah tu kūrthā. pūrṣe śanti.
external kinds of acquiescence are self-denial, or abstinence from the five objects of sensual gratification; not from any philosophic appreciation of them, but from dread of the trouble and anxiety which attends the means of procuring and enjoying worldly pleasures; such as acquiring wealth, preserving it, spending it, incessant excitement and injury or cruelty to others. Besides the terms ordinarily significant of these divisions of acquiescence, the Scholiasts specify other words, the usual sense of which is quite different, and which may therefore be regarded as the slang or mystical nomenclature of the followers of the Yoga. There is some difference in the precise expressions, but they are of a similar purport in general. The first four, the synonyms of the internal modes of acquiescence, are alike in all the authorities; or, ambhas, 'water'; salila, also 'water'; ogha, 'quantity'; and vrishi, 'rain.' Gaurapada then has for the five exterior modes, sutamas, 'great darkness; pāra, 'shore;' suntra, 'a beautiful eye;' nārika, 'feminine;' and anuttamāmbhikasika, 'unsurpassed water.' Vāchespati makes them, pāram, supāram, 'good shore;' apāram, 'shoreless;' anuttamāmbhita, 'unsurpassed water;' and uttamāmbha, 'excellent water.' The Chandrikā has the same, except in the third place, where the term is pārāpara, 'both shores;' with which the S. Prav. Bh. agrees. No explanation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption.

LI.

Reasoning, hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift) are perfections (or means thereof). The fore-mentioned three are curbs of perfectness.

- चमस्॥ † सलिलं॥ ‡ ऋषि:॥ ‡ वृद्धि:॥ ‡ सुबोधस्॥
- चारं॥ ‡ चारं॥ ‡ चारं॥ ‡ चारं॥ ‡ चारं॥ ‡ चारं॥
- च्यां॥ †† च्यां॥ †† च्यां॥
Reasoning; as when a person always reasons, What here is truth? What is the future? What is final felicity? How may I attain the object (of my existence)? and from reflecting in this manner, the knowledge is acquired that soul is different from nature; that intellect, egotism, the rudiments, the senses, the elements, are several and distinct. In this manner knowledge of the (twenty-five) principles is attained, by which liberation is accomplished. This is the first kind of perfectness, called reasoning. Next, from knowledge acquired by hearing proceeds knowledge of nature, intellect, egotism, the rudiments, the senses, and the elements; whence liberation ensues: this is perfectness by hearing. When from study, or the perusal of the Védas and other (sacred) writings, knowledge of the twenty-five principles is acquired; that is the third kind of perfectness. Prevention of the three kinds of pain.—When, for the purpose of preventing the three kinds of pain, internal, external, and superhuman, a holy teacher has been attended, and liberation is derived from his counsel; then this constitutes the fourth kind of perfectness. This is threefold, with reference to the three different sorts of pain, and makes, with the three preceding, six varieties of perfectness. Next, intercourse of friends; as when a friend, having acquired knowledge, obtains liberation: this is the seventh kind of perfectness. Gift; as when a person assists holy men, by donations of a dwelling, of herbs, of a staff, a wallet, food, or clothing; and (in requital) receives from them knowledge, and thus obtains liberation: this is the eighth sort of perfectness. In other books these eight kinds of perfectness are termed tāram, sutāram, tāratāram, pramodam, pramoditam, pramodamānam, ranyakam, and sadā-pramuditam.—From contrariety to these, the injuries of intellect which occur, or causes of disability, are termed atāram, asutarām, &c.; thus completing the twenty-eight kinds of disability, as in the text (ver. 49), “Depravity of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect,” &c. Thus the contraries of the sorts of acquiescence being nine, and the contraries of the kinds of perfectness being eight, they form seventeen injuries of intellect; and these, with the eleven defects of the organs, constitute twenty-eight kinds of disability, as previously stated.
In this way the various kinds of obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness, have been affirmatively and negatively described. Again, the forementioned three are curbs of perfectness.—Forementioned; that is, obstruction, disability, and acquiescence; they are curbs of perfectness: threefold curbs from their severalty. As an elephant is kept in check when restrained by a goad (or curb), so, impeded by obstruction, disability, and acquiescence, the world suffers ignorance: therefore abandoning them, perfectness alone is to be pursued; for by a person having perfectness knowledge is attained, and thence liberation.

It was stated (ver. 40) that "subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions:" those dispositions were previously said to be virtue and the rest, eight in number, modifications (or faculties) of intellect; which again have been described as modified by obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. These (together) constitute intellectual creation, also called dispositional (or conditional): but subtile body is called a rudimental (or personal) creation, extending throughout the fourteen sorts of created things. (See v. 53.) It then becomes a question, whether soul's purpose is accomplished by one kind of creation, or by both? This is next explained.

COMMENT.

The different kinds of perfectness are here specified.

By 'perfectness,' siddhi*, is here to be understood the means of perfecting or fulfilling the purpose of soul, or the conditions essential to its attainment; the circumstances productive of knowledge; the necessary consequence of which is exemption from future transmigration. ↑Reasoning, hearing, study, intercourse of friends, and gift, are secondary kinds of perfectness, as subsidiary to the prevention of the three kinds of pain,

* siddhi: । ↑विहन्यामानयं दुःसत्य चिन्ताबिविधातात्सत्य इति। इमा मुख्यालिका: सिन्हयमहत्पायतत्यालिताए गीताय: पच सिद्धयः। ताक्षा शापी हेतुदेहुरस्तत्याश्यवस्थितः।
which constitutes a triple principal class: they are respectively distinguished as objects, and the means of effecting those objects. \textit{S. Tatwa Kaumudi}. \textit{Reasoning}, according to \textsc{Vāchespāti}, is ‘investigation of scriptural authority by dialectics which are not contrary to the scriptures:’ and \textit{investigation} is defined, ‘refutation of dubious doctrine, and establishment of positive conclusions.’ ‘\textit{Hearing} is oral instruction, or rather the knowledge whence derived, or knowledge derived either from hearing another person read, or from expounding a work.’ \textit{S. Pr. Bh. Intercourse of friends} is explained in the \textit{S. Tatwa Kaumudi} to signify ‘dissatisfaction with solitary inquiry, and discussion with a teacher, a pupil, or a fellow-student.’ \textsc{Vijnāna Bhiṣṇu} defines it, ‘acqurement of knowledge from a benevolent visitor, who comes to give instruction.’ \textsc{Vāchaspāti} and \textsc{Nārāyaṇa} agree in rendering \textit{dāna}—which \textsc{Gaurapāda} explains by ‘gift, liberality,’ particularly to religious characters—by \textit{suddhi}, ‘purity;’ meaning the purity of discriminative knowledge; deriving it from the root \textit{daip}, ‘to purify,’ and not from \textit{dā}, ‘to give.’ The former cites the authority of \textsc{Patanjali} for this sense of one kind of perfectness: ‘Undisturbedness of discriminative knowledge, that is, purity; which is not attained except through long repeated and uninterrupted practice of veneration. That is also comprehended in discrimination by the term \textit{dāna}.’ He also observes that others interpret it ‘gift, by which a sage, being propitiated, imparts
knowledge •. The S. Prav. Bh. gives this interpretation only †. The term for 'curb,' ankuṣa ‡, is the goad or iron hook used to guide an elephant: it is here explained by nivārana, 'hindering,' and 'as obstruction, disability, and acquiescence hinder perfectness, they are to be shunned §.'

LII.

Without dispositions there would be no subtile person; without person there would be no pause of dispositions: wherefore a twofold creation is presented, one termed personal, the other intellectual.

BHÁSHYA.

Without dispositions, without intellectual creations, there would be no subtile person, no rudimental creation; from the non-assumption of repeated successive bodily forms, without the necessary influence of anterior conditions (or dispositions). Without person, without rudimental creation, there would be no pause of dispositions; from the indispensability of virtue or vice for the attainment of either subtile or gross body, and from the non-priority of either creation, they being mutually initiative, like the seed and the germ. There is no fault in this, for (the relation) is that of species, it does not imply the mutual relation of individuals. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, one termed conditional (or intellectual), the other rudimental (or personal). Further—

COMMENT.

It is here explained that a double condition of existence, a twofold creation, necessarily prevails; one proceeding from the intellectual facul-
ties, the other from the rudimental elements; each being indispensable to the other.

It was stated (ver. 40) that subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions: and it was then explained (ver. 43, et seq.) what those dispositions or conditions were, viz. the conditions of the intellect (described in ver. 23), or virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, passion, dispassion, power, and debility. These were said (v. 46) to constitute an intellectual creation, or a series of conditions originating in affections of buddhi, or the intellectual principle. But the effects of these dispositions, the consequences of virtue or vice and the rest, can only be manifested in a bodily state, and therefore require necessarily a creation of a different character, personal or rudimental creation, such as subtile body, investing the imperceptible products of nature; intellect and its faculties included. Nor is such a creation indispensable for the existence or exercise of the intellectual conditions or sentiments alone, but it is equally necessary for their occasional cessation: thus virtue, vice, and the rest necessarily imply and occasion bodily condition; bodily condition is productive of acts of vice and virtue; vice and virtue, again, occasion bodily condition; and so on: like the seed and the tree, each mutually generative of the other; the tree bears the seed; from the seed springs the tree, again to put forth seed; and so on for ever; neither being initiative, neither being final. But one result of bodily condition is knowledge; knowledge is liberation, when soul is disengaged: subtile body then resolves into its rudiments, and the dispositions or conditions of the intellect terminate. In this way there are two creations, the bhâvâkhya*, that termed 'conditional' or 'intellectual,' and the lingâkhyâ†, that called 'rudimental' or 'personal.' Both these seem to be considered by the text, as well as by Gaurapâda and Vâchespati, as varieties of one species of the Pratyaya sarga, or 'intellectual creation.' The commentator on the S. Pravachana so far agrees with them, but he seems to restrict the two kinds more closely to a creation of intellect, regarding the linga as buddhi itself, and the bhâva

* भावाख्यः। † लिङ्गाख्यः।
as its conditions or dispositions. Thus, commenting on this verse of the Karikā, he observes, 'Bhāva signifies the modes of the apprehension (or the faculties) of intelligence, as the properties knowledge, virtue, and the rest. Linga is the great principle, or intelligence.' He calls them both samashī sarga, 'a collective or generic creation.' By the other commentators, however, the linga is also called the tanmātra, or 'rudimental creation;' and it further seems to imply 'gross body;' for 'fruition, which is one of soul's objects, cannot be accomplished without both bodies; without the receptacle that enjoys, and the objects to be enjoyed.' The author of the Chandrikā has accordingly adopted a totally different version of this passage, understanding by bhāvakhyā, not any reference to intellectual creation, but the creation of sensible objects, the objects to be enjoyed; lingākhyā, or 'personal creation,' being the enjoyer: 'Without the bhāvas, or present objects of sense, the linga, or aggregate of imperceptible principles, intelligence and the rest, could not be means of fruition; whilst without intelligence and the rest there could be no pause, no cessation, of the means of enjoying sensible objects. This is the purport of the text.' And he defines linga to be 'that which is only indicated, which is actually not visible, as intellect and the rest;' and bhāva, 'that object which is perceived or apprehended by the senses, the class of sensible objects.'

The succession of the two kinds of creation, as mutually cause and effect, is said by Vāchespatī to be eternal, and without a beginning, as

* Bhāvo vasantāṅgko pūrṇāṅgadigrūpam līṅga mahāśāṃ būdhīrāti.
† lingagāmī tattvārthasyaśāntapalakṣyātī. ‡ bhāva pūrṇāṅgko na bhūgyaṃ
dharmatīl na bhūgyante tathārthaṃ vartamānaṃ samajhītī. || bhāva: pravṛttiśvābhāvādina līṅga mahādāntiṣṭhītyāṃ na bhūgyaṇaṃ saṃsārynāṃ nirvṛttiṃ moṣyarthaṃ saṃsārynāṃ prāvā: || līṅgaḥ
dharmatīlitā chīna na bhūvalā vishānyānāṃ nirvṛttiṃ moṣyarthaṃ saṃsārynāṃ prāvā: || līṅgākhyā līṅgaḥ yāt eva na tu satājanā tṛṣṇās tṛtīya līṅga
dharmatīlīśyārā: bhūvalā bhūvante mahādāntiṣṭhītyādīśyaḥ khyātā vyāhārī vishānyānā: ||
even in the commencement of a *kalpa* bodily existence results from the conditions of similar existence in a former *kalpa*.

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LIII.

The divine kind is of eight sorts; the grovelling is fivefold; mankind is single in its class. This, briefly, is the world of living beings.

BHÁSHYA.

*Divine, of eight sorts; Bráhma, Prájapatya, Saumya, Aindra, Gándherba, Yáksha, Rákshaša, and Paisácha. Animals, deer, birds, reptiles, and immovable substances are the five *grovelling* kinds. *Mankind is single.* In this way there are fourteen sorts of creatures, there being three classes in the three worlds. Which is supreme in each is next explained.

COMMENT.

The intellectual or rudimental creation hitherto described has been that of creation generally; we now have an account of specific or individual creation, composed of fourteen classes of beings.

The fourteen classes of beings are, first, eight superhuman, or *Bráhma*, that of *Brahma* and other supreme gods; 2. *Prájapatya*, that of progenitors, the Menus, the Rishis, or divine sages; 3. *Saumya*, lunar or planetary; 4. *Aindra*, that of *Indra* and divinities of the second order; 5. *Gándherba*, that of the demigods attendant on *Indra*, and of similar beings; 6. *Rákshaša*, that of demons, foes of the gods; 7. *Yáksha*, that of the attendants of *Kuvera*; 8. *Paisácha*, that of mischievous and cruel fiends. These are divine or superhuman beings. The ninth class is that of man, which contains but one species. We have then five classes of

* कस्यादावपि प्राचीनकथोपयत्नमावलिङ्गसंस्कारवश्चावलिङ्गयोहस्य 
  बिनानुपप्रेति सर्वेभवदात ।"
inferior beings; or, counting from the preceding, 10. Animals, or domestic animals, paśu; 11. Wild animals, as deer and the like, mṛiga; 12. Birds; 13. Reptiles, or creeping things, including fish sarisripa; and 14. Sthāvara, fixed things, such as vegetables and minerals. These constitute the vyashiti serga*, specific or individual creation; or, as denominated in the text, the bhautika sarga, the creation of bhūtas, ‘beings;’ or elemental creation; the forms of things requiring the combination of the gross elements.

LIV.

Above, there is prevalence of goodness: below, the creation is full of darkness: in the midst, is the predominance of foulness, from Brahmā to a stock.

BHĀSHYA.

Above: in the eight divine regions. Prevalence of goodness: the extensiveness or predominance of the quality of goodness. Above is goodness predominant, but there are foulness and darkness also. Below, the creation is full of darkness.—In animals and insensible things the whole creation is pervaded by darkness in excess, but there are goodness and foulness. In the midst, in man, foulness predominates, although goodness and darkness exist; and hence men for the most part suffer pain. Such is the world, from Brahmā to a stock; from Brahmā to immovable things. Thus non-elemental creation, rudimental creation, conditional and elemental creation, in beings of divine, mortal, brutal, and (immovable) origin, are the sixteen sorts of creation effected by nature.

COMMENT.

The various qualities dominating in the different orders of beings are specified in this stanza.

* भाषिस्वग: ।
The coexistence of the several qualities, with the predominance of one or other of them, in different beings, has been previously explained (p. 54), as well as the different orders or states of existent beings; constituting, according to GAURAPÁDA, sixteen forms or kinds of creation: that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings proceeds from four modifications of nature; or, from the invisible principles, from the subtile rudiments, from the conditions or dispositions of intellect, and from the gross elements.

LV.

There does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person: wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily existence).

BHÁSHYA.

There: in the bodies of gods, men, and animals. Pain produced by decay, and produced by death. Sentient soul: soul having sensibility. Experiences: soul experiences; not nature, nor intellect, nor egotism, nor the rudiments, senses, nor gross elements. How long does it suffer pain? this (the text) discusses. Until it be released from its person. As long as it is in subtile body, composed of intellect and the rest, it is discrete (or individualized); and as long as migratory body does not rest, so long, in brief, soul suffers pain, arising from decay and death, in the three worlds. Until it be released from its person: until the discontinuance of subtile person. In the cessation of subtile body consists liberation; and when liberation is obtained, there is no more pain. By what means, then, can liberation be effected? Whenever knowledge of the twenty-five principles, the characteristic of which is knowledge of the distinctness of soul and body, is attained; or whenever a person knows that this is nature, this intellect, this egotism, these are the five rudiments, these the eleven senses, these the five elements, and this is soul, separate and dissimilar
from them all; then from such knowledge proceeds cessation of subtile person, and thence liberation.

The object of the activity (or development of nature) is next explained.

COMMENT.

The presence of soul in these creations, and for what period, is here specified.

Having defined the different objects which form the twenty-five categories or *tatwas* of the Sánkhya philosophy, the text now comes to the main object of that and of all Hindu systems, the final dissolution of the connection between soul and body. The rest of the *Káriká* is devoted to the illustration of this topic. In this verse it is said that soul experiences pain in the different stages of existence, until its corporeal frame is discontinued; for soul itself is not susceptible of pain, or of decay, or death: the site of these things is nature, but nature is unconscious, insensible; and the consciousness that pain exists is restricted to soul, though soul is not the actual seat of pain: its experience of pain depends upon its connexion with rudimental person, of the material constituents of which, decay, death, and pain are concomitants. ‘Pain and the rest are from nature, they are properties of intelligence. How do they become connected with sense? Soul (*purusha*) is that which reposes (*séte*) in body (*puri*): subtile body is immediately connected with it, and becomes thereby connected with sense *s*.’ *S. Tatwa Kauṇudit.* When soul is released from body, its susceptibilibility of pain ceases: pain is therefore of the essence † of its own nature: that is, it is the inseparable concomitant of bodily creation, according to *Patanjali*, as quoted in the *S. Chandriká*: ‘All is pain to the wise, through the conflict of opposite qualities, and by the sufferings arising from afflicting vicissitudes ‡;’ that is, from the

* दुःसादयः माणुष्का वुद्दिगुणालक्ति ऋषमेति बेतनसबविनो भवनीति ।
पुरुषा इति पुरी दिनगेशं शुक्लः । लिङ्गस्य च तत्सबविनीति बेतनोध्व ॥ तस्य बन्धी भवनीतय: ।
† समावेन ।
‡ परिखंडतात्परसंस्कारदुःसिगुः
ङ्गासनिनिरोधाय दुःखमेत संब सविवेकनां ।

uu
dread of death and the reiteration of birth; to which even the conditions of spirits, sages, and gods are subject. Thus the Sūtra of Kapila: 'The pain of death, decay, and the rest is universal*; as explained in the S. Praw. Bhāṣṭya: 'The pain of death, decay, and the rest is the common portion of all beings, whether above or below, from Brahmā to immoveable things†.' So also another Sūtra: 'It is to be shunned, from the connection of successive birth by the thread of regeneration II:' that is, according to the commentator, 'since regeneration is unavoidable, even after ascent to the regions above; and in consequence of the succession of births, that regeneration must be in an inferior condition; even the world above is to be shunned II.' GAURAPĀDA and VĀCHEŚPATI take no notice of the expression, 'Pain is of the essence.' The S. Chandrikā explains it, 'Creation is essentially of the nature of pain §.' RAMA KRISHNA calls it, 'Former acts;' the acts of a former life.

LVI.

This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for another's sake as for self.

BHĀŚHYA.

This (or 'thus, this,' ityēsha) implies conclusiveness and limitation (that is, in this way all that has been hitherto described). Evolution of nature: in the instrumentality or act of nature. Whatever evolution of

* समानं जरामरणशादिद्व: सुः।
† जगद्योगतां ब्रह्मादिकाच रात्रािं सर्वात्मेव जरामरणशादिद्व: सुः साधारण।
‡ जगद्योगतां ब्रह्मादिकाच रात्रािं सर्वात्मेव जरामरणशादिद्व: सुः साधारण।
¶ तथापि तृणायुज्यां च वामावृत्तिर्गृह्य सत्य रोहितायोऽपि योगाध्योगिनिः सोपितः हेयः।
§ ह्रत एव सर्गो दुःखस्य।
¶‡ सत्वव देव प्रारम्भकम्।
nature, from intellect to the special elements: that is, (the evolution) of intellect from nature; of egotism from intellect; of the rudiments and senses from egotism; and of the gross elements from the subtile. Is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively.—This evolution is effected for the liberation of each individual soul which has assumed body, whether brute, human, or divine. How (is it effected)? It is done for another's sake as for self: as, for instance, a person neglecting his own objects transacts those of a friend, so does nature; soul makes no return to nature. As for self; not for self: for the sake, in fact, of another is the apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense, or knowledge of the difference between soul and qualities; for souls are to be provided (by nature), in the three worlds, with objects of sense, and at last with liberation: such is the agency of nature; as it is said, “Nature is like a utensil, having fulfilled soul's object it ceases.”

It is here objected, Nature is irrational, Soul is rational; then how can nature, like a rational thing, understand that by me, soul is to be provided in the three worlds with the objects of sense, and at last with liberation? This is true; but action and cessation of action are both observed in irrational things; whence it is said—

COMMENT.

The object of nature’s activity is here said to be the final liberation of individual soul.

Nature is properly inert, and its activity, its “motion” or evolution, takes place only for the purpose of soul, not for any object of its own. The term is árambha, ‘commencement,’ ‘successive origin or beginning,’ as detailed in former passages: that is, of intellect from crude nature; of egotism from intellect; and so on. This is the spontaneous act of nature: it is not influenced by any external intelligent principle, such as the Supreme Being or a subordinate agent; as Brahmá, it is without (external) cause*. ‘But it is objected, Nature being eternal, her works

* प्रकृतीत दृष्टा नेष्वरेष्य न ब्रह्मकान्तानामाशकारः।
should be so too; and forms once evolved should therefore endure for ever. To this it is replied, The work is done for a special purpose, the liberation of individual soul; and that when this is accomplished, nature ceases with regard to that individual, as a man boiling rice for a meal desists when it is dressed †. S. Tatwa Kaumudi. According to Gaunapada, and to the text of the following stanza, nature so acts spontaneously; but the incompetency of nature, an irrational principle, to institute a course of action for a definite purpose, and the unfitness of rational soul to regulate the acts of an agent whose character it imperfectly apprehends, constitute a principal argument with the theistical Sankhyas for the necessity of a Providence, to whom the ends of existence are known, and by whom nature is guided, as stated by Vachespata: 'But whether this (evolution) be for its own purpose or that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore there must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its character; therefore there is an omniscient Being, the director of nature, which is Iswara, or God †. This is not inconsistent with the previous doctrine, that creation is the evolution of nature: it is so, but under the guidance of a ruling Power. The atheistical Sankhyas, on the other hand, contend that there is no occasion for a guiding Providence, but that the activity of nature, for the purpose of accomplishing soul's object, is an intuitive necessity, as illustrated in the ensuing passage.

* यष्ठीदन्त्राम् जोदनस्य पक्ष प्रवृत्तिरोदनस्तिभि निवर्तेत एवं प्रवृत्ति
पुस्तानस्मौ चारितमिलित्रं दर्शनां प्रवृत्तिः पुस्तां चारितमिलित्रतं प्रति न पुनःप्रवृत्ति।
† स्वादितत् स्वार्थं परार्थं च चेतन: प्रवृत्ति। न च प्रवृत्तिरचेतनेव भवि
तुमहःस्तति तस्मादधिधिः प्रकृतिरप्रियताः चेतन:। न च खैश्चाश्च चेतना श्रोपि
प्रकृतिमधिधितुमहःस्ति तेषां प्रकृतिस्वस्वमिनविज्ञात। तस्माद्धिः सदार्थे
दशीं प्रकृतिरप्रियः चेतना इति।
LVII.

As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (substance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief (principle) to liberate the soul.

BHÁSHYA.

As grass and water taken by the cow become eliminated into milk, and nourish the calf; and as (the secretion ceases) when the calf is grown; so nature (acts spontaneously) for the liberation of soul. This is the agency of an unintelligent thing.

COMMENT.

The intuitive or spontaneous evolution of nature, for soul's purpose, is here illustrated.

As the breast secretes milk for a purpose of which it is unconscious, and unconsciously stops when that purpose, the nutriment of the young animal, is effected; so nature, though irrational, constructs bodily forms for the fruition and liberation of soul; and when the latter is accomplished, ceases to evolve. The illustration is from Kapila, as in the Sástra, 'From irrationality the activity of nature is like (the secretion of) milk.'

LVIII.

As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the undiscrete (principle) to liberate the soul.

BHÁSHYA.

As mankind, being influenced by desire, engage in acts of various kinds for its gratification or fulfilment, and desist when the object is...
accomplished, so the Chief one, active for the purpose of liberating soul, desists, after having effected the twofold purpose of soul; one, cognizance of enjoyment of the objects of sense; the other, cognizance of the difference between soul and qualities.

COMMENT.

Another illustration is here given of the activity of nature.

According to Vācheśpati, this verse is an explanation of the phrase (in ver. 56), 'For another's sake as for self *'; assigning, in fact, an object to nature, the accomplishment of its own wish; avatsukya being rendered by ichchha, 'wish:' and this wish, which is, 'the liberation of soul, being gratified, nature desists †.'

LIX.

As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.

BHĀSHYA.

As a dancer (or actress), having exhibited her performances on the stage in dramatic representations, rendered interesting by the display of love and other passions, in situations drawn from history or tradition, and accompanied by music and singing, desists from acting when her part is finished, so nature, having exhibited itself to soul, in the various characters of intellect, egotism, the rudiments, senses, and elements, desists.

What the cause of such cessation is, is next described.

COMMENT.

An illustration is here given of the discontinuance of nature's activity.

Ranga, properly a stage or theatre, is said in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi

* स्वामे इत्य परायें।
† सा बलिष्ठसङ्गामानी निवर्षेत।
to imply also the audience*. A dancer is equally an actress, nartlaki, at least was so in ancient times. The dancing girls of Hindustan are rather singers, than either actresses or dancers.

LX.

Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself) the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.

Bhāṣya.

By manifold means.—Nature is the benefactress of soul, of unrequiting soul. How? By the characters of men, gods, and animals; by circumstances involving pain, pleasure, and insensibility; by the properties of the objects of sense: in this way having by various means exhibited herself to soul, and shewn that 'I am one; thou art another;' having done this, nature desists. Thus she accomplishes the wish of that (soul) which is eternal, without benefit (to herself): as a benevolent man gives assistance to all, and seeks no return for himself, so nature pursues or effects the purpose of soul, without deriving from it any advantage.

It was said above (ver. 59), 'Having manifested herself, nature desists.' It is next shewn what she does, having desisted.

COMMENT.

This verse may be considered as a further explanation of the expression in ver. 56, 'Nature labours for the benefit of soul as if for self, but not for any advantage.'

'Generous, benevolent †: 'Not expecting a return; for it is not true generosity to do good to another with the expectation of requital.'

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* रजस्येति स्मानेन स्मायिनः पारिषदानुपलक्षयति। † उपञ्ज रिचि। परार्थे प्रज्ञुपदासारस्कथ्येनैव प्रपौष्टिर्निति न नियमः।
S. Chandrikā. ‘Soul being devoid of qualities (ver. 19), is consequently devoid of action, and can therefore do nothing by way of return.’ Nature ‘accomplishes, goes to,’ charati or ácharati, or ‘effects,’ kurutē. The last word of the verse is differently read.

LXI.

Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul.

BHASHYA.

There is nothing in the world more soft (gentle, timid) than nature, in my opinion: for which reason (nature’s) opinion consults another’s advantage. Wherefore nature says to herself, “I have been beheld by that soul,” and does not again present herself to the view of that soul; that is, she disappears from the presence of soul. That indicates what the text means by gentle.

It (the text?) declares Íswara (God) to be the cause of the world: thus; “Let this ignorant, brute, godless (soul), for its own pleasure or pain, go to heaven or hell, sent (thither) by Íswara.” Others say, spontaneity is cause: “By what (or whom) the swan is created white, the peacock of many colours;” that is, they are so naturally (or spontaneously). Here, therefore, the Sánkhya teachers have said, How can beings endowed with qualities proceed from Íswara, who is devoid of qualities? or how from soul, equally devoid of qualities? Therefore (the causality) of nature is rendered probable. Thus; from white threads white cloth is fabricated; from black threads black cloth: and in the same manner, from nature, endowed with the three qualities, the three worlds, endowed with the three qualities also, are produced. This is determined. Íswara is without qualities: the origin of the three worlds endowed with qualities, from

* पुरुषस्य गुरूतिमत्वात् श्वानुप्रजारिष्य उपजारासमस्यः ।
him, would therefore be an inconsistency. By this (same reason) soul also cannot be cause. According to some, time is cause: "Time is the five elements; time destroys the world; time watches, when all things sleep; time is not to be surpassed." There are but three categories, the discrete principle, the undiscrete principle, and soul; and by one of them time must be comprehended. Time, then, is a discrete principle; for nature, from its universal creative power, is the cause of time; spontaneity merges into it (nature): and time, therefore, is not cause; neither is spontaneity. Nature alone, therefore, is cause; and there is no cause of nature. She does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul. Therefore it is my opinion that there is no cause more gentle, more enjoyable, than nature, such as Iswara and the rest.

It is said familiarly in the stanzas of the text, "Soul is liberated; soul migrates:" on this it is observed—

COMMENT.

Nature being once properly understood by soul ceases to act.

Nature being once fully seen—that is, known or understood—by soul: disappears, goes no more into its sight; it ceases to be, with respect to that individual soul. Why is this? Because it is the most soft, the most gentle or timid, sukumárata, of all things. The term kumára, properly implying 'soft' or 'young,' is explained by the Scholiasts to signify 'bashful, modest, unable to bear the gaze of soul.* Váchéspati. Sukumárata salajja†, Náráyana and Ráma Krishna. In the S. Bhaveya it is rendered by subhogyatara‡, 'more fit to be enjoyed;' but this refers less to the metaphorical illustration, than to the doctrine, of the text, and might be rendered, 'more plastic;' there being nothing so suitable as nature (matter) for the cause or origin of sensible objects. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi amplifies and explains the illustration: 'Nature is like a woman of virtue and family: such a one, of retired habits and modest looks, may be, by

* Sukumárratramatiyéshaná páhmadhíshánáhpatita.  † Sukumárratár
salajja.  ‡ Subhogyatátar.  y y
some inadvertence, surprised in disabille by a strange man, but she takes
good care that another shall not behold her off her guard. Nature being
once fully seen by discrimination, has too much matronly decorum to
allow herself to be looked at a second time. The S. Chandriká has a
similar exposition. The S. Pravachana Bh. cites this verse in explana-
tion of the Sútra, "Upon the detection of her faults, there is no further
approach of nature (to soul); like a woman of family." that is, 'When
nature finds that soul has discovered it is to her that the distress, &c. of
migration are owing, she is put to shame by the detection, and ventures
no more near soul; as a woman of family keeps aloof from a husband by
whom she knows her faults to have been found out. And this is consid-
ered as an additional reason for the discontinuance of the activity of
nature." This is my opinion refers to what has preceded, there is nothing
more gentle, as is shewn by the term iti; also by the Bkáshya of Gaura-
páda. It is clear, therefore, that the expression refers to the author;
such is his opinion; that is, he does not here dogmatise, and say that
nature is actually more timid or soft than any thing else—for the phrase
is merely a figure of speech, a metaphorical illustration—but that it seems
so to him; the words having the force of 'methinks, it seems:' Nature,
it seems to me, or methinks, is the most soft, timid, retiring, of all things, and cannot bear to be stared at rudely: once seen, therefore, as she is, she takes care, like a truly modest matron, to be seen no more. Such is the obvious purport of the text, which is merely a further illustration of the idea conveyed in ver. 59. Gaurapada has gone out of his way rather to discuss the character of a first cause; giving to sukumāratara a peculiar import, that of 'enjoyable, perceptible;' which nature eminently is, and is therefore, according to him, the most appropriate source of all perceptible objects, or, in other words, of creation.

LXII.

Verily not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates.

BHAŚHYA.

Therefore, from that cause, soul is not bound, nor indeed is loosed, nor migrates; for, because, nature, in relation to various beings—in relation (or connection) with celestial, human, or brute forms, in the character of intellect, egotism, the rudiments, senses, and gross elements—is bound, is liberated, or migrates. For soul is of its own nature loosed, and goes everywhere, and how therefore should it migrate? Migration being for the purpose of obtaining something not previously obtained. The phrases, therefore, Soul is bound, Soul is loosed or migrates, originate in ignorance of the nature of migration. From knowledge, the end of soul and existence, the real nature of soul is attained. That being manifest, soul is single, pure, free, fixed in its own nature. Consequently if there is no bondage there can be no liberation of soul. It is therefore said (see next verse), "Nature binds and liberates herself;" for where subtle body, composed of the rudiments, and having a triple cause, exists, such body is bound with triple bonds; as it is said, "He who is bound by the bonds of nature," of nature's products or of works, "cannot by any other be
loosed" (see Comment, ver. 45). Such a subtile body is affected by virtue, vice, &c.

Nature is bound, is loosed, and migrates. *How* is next described.

**COMMENT.**

The subjection of nature, not of soul, to the accidents of bondage, liberation, and migration is asserted in this verse.

The doctrine here laid down seems at variance with what has preceded, and with the usual purport of the notions that attach the accidents of bondage and liberation to soul. Apparently, however, the difference is one of words only.

Soul is incapable of action, consequently is not liable to change. It cannot be bound, as the consequence of acts which it does not perform; and as it is never in bondage, it cannot be set free. The application of these terms to soul, therefore, is to be understood in a relative, not in a positive sense; and their positive signification is properly restricted to nature. It is nature that is bound, nature that is liberated, nature that undergoes change or migration. When nature attaches herself to soul, when she separates from it, the converse is equally true, soul is attached to, or is separated from, nature; and is consequently said to be bound, to be set free, to undergo change. But soul is passive in all these things; it is nature that is active, that binds, loosens, or changes form. GAURAPADA'S explanation of these subtleties is not very clear, but such appears to be his understanding of the text. So also VACHESPATI: 'Soul is without qualities, and exempt from vicissitude. How then can it be liberated? To soul, not liable to change, there could apply none of the circumstances termed *bondage*, arising from acts, sufferings, or consciousness: nor could worldly change or migration, another name for which is *death*, affect soul, incapable of action*.* The same commentator adds, 'These circum-

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* युहवेदगुशोदपरिशार्मी कथमस्य मोहः । सवासनक्रियकमोषयानां
  च बन्धसिद्धतानां पुहवेदपरिशार्मात्मसमभवत चत एव कथम पुहष्ठव न
  संसारः प्रेतभावापरनामात्मिन्निश्चितवान् ॥
stances, which are in truth the acts and conditions of nature, are ascribed
to and affect soul as the superior, in the same manner that victory and
defeat are attributed and relate to a king, although actually occurring to
his generals; for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is his, not
theirs. So Náráyana explains the text: 'Binding is the confinement
of nature, in the various forms of intellect, &c.; and bondage and libera-
tion are attributed to soul only through the contiguity of intellect, to
which they belong, and not to soul.' It is from ignorance only that
bondage and liberation are ascribed to soul; as by the Sútra, as ex-
plained by the Scholiast, 'Binding and liberation, or endurance of, and
exemption from pain, are not (conditions) of soul in reality or absolutely,
but (are considered as such) from ignorance; for the binding and libera-
tion mentioned are (conditions) of nature.' So also the Sútra, 'From
actual pain suffered by nature proceed binding and liberation, and from
its attachments; that is, from its being affected by virtue and the rest,
which are the causes of pain; like an animal; that is, as an animal may
be bound or loosed, when entangled in a rope.' The distinction, after
all, is little more than nominal, except as it is the necessary consequence
of the inactivity attributed to the soul.
LXIII.

By seven modes nature binds herself by herself: by one, she releases (herself), for the soul's wish.

BHÁSHYA.

By seven modes.—These seven have been specified, as virtue, dispasion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. These are the seven modes (or conditions) of nature by which she binds herself, of herself. And that same nature, having ascertained that soul's object is to be accomplished, liberates herself by one mode, or by knowledge.

How is that knowledge produced?

COMMENT.

Nature is bound by seven modes, and liberated by one.

Nature binds herself by acts of whatever kind, especially by the faculties of intellect, enumerated above (ver. 23). She binds herself of her own accord. She frees herself by one mode, by the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. 'Nature binds herself (in her own work), like a silkworm in its cocoon.' Sūtra. Ātman is here uniformly explained by swa, 'own self.'

LXIV.

So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.

BHÁSHYA.

So, by the order explained, the study of the twenty-five principles, knowledge of soul, or the discriminative knowledge, 'this is nature, this

* ज्ञानानं बन्धा्ति प्रकारं कोष्ठार्थवः
is soul, these are the rudiments, senses, and elements,' is acquired. *Neither I am: I am not. Not mine: not my body; that is, I am one (thing), body is another. Nor do I exist: that is, exempt from egotism. This is conclusive, incontrovertible: free from doubt. Viparyaya means 'doubt,' with the negative prefixed, 'absence of doubt;' and viśuddha, 'pure;' pure through absence of doubt. Single.—There is no other (true knowledge). In this way the cause of liberation is produced, is manifested (individually). Knowledge means knowledge of the twenty-five principles, or of soul.

Knowledge being attained, what does soul?

COMMENT.

The knowledge that is essential to liberation is here described. It is acquired through study of the twenty-five principles, tatwābhyaśa; familiarity with them; frequent recurrence to them: it is finite or conclusive, aparīśkha; it leaves nothing to be learned: it is perfect, as being without doubt, aviparyaya viśuddha: and single, the one thing needful, kévala. What sort of knowledge is this? or what is the result it teaches? The absence of individuality; the notion of the abstract existence of soul. Neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist: that is, there is no activity, nor property, nor individual agency. I am not precludes action only. Indeed As, the root, together with bhū and kri, are said to signify action in general. Nāsmi therefore signifies, not 'I am not,' but 'I do not.' The S. Tatva Kaumudi then proceeds: 'Thus all acts whatever, whether external or internal, ascertainment, consciousness, reflection, perception, and all others, are denied as acts of soul: consequently, there being no active functions in soul, it follows that neither do I (as an individual agent) exist. Aham here denotes "agent;" as, I know, I sacrifice, I give, I enjoy—or so on, implying uniformly the notion of an agent—nor is aught mine: an agent implies mastership; if there be no agent

* नास्तीन्यात्मनि क्षियामां निषेधति।
† कृप्यात: क्षियासा मात्यवचना इति।
there can be no abstract mastership (or possession)*. The same authority gives also a different reading of the first expression, násmi, explaining it ná asmi, 'I am male;' or purusha, 'unproductive of progeny,' of acts. The S. Prav. Bh.; commenting on this verse of the Karikā, has, 'Neither I am, denies the agency of soul; nor (is aught mine), denies its attachment (to any objects); nor do I exist, denies its appropriation (of faculties);' The Sūtra is to the same effect: 'From relinquishment (consequent on) study of principles; this is not, this is not it;' that is, of all the objects proceeding from prakṛti, not one is soul. The phraseology is ascribed to the Vēdas, and a similar passage is thence cited: 'Hence comes the conclusion, it is not, it is not (soul), it is not (soul is not), from it: such is not so; it is different, it is supreme, it is that very thing (that it is). It is not, it is not, (means) soul. Such is (the phrase), It is not f; &c. And the Chandrikā explains the terms similarly: 'I am not means I am not agent; therefore I am distinct from the principle of intelligence. Not mine is pain: exemption from being the seat of pain and the rest is thence determined. Nor do I exist: by this, difference from egotism is expressed.' Rāma krishna repeats the words of the

* तथा वायुवायसामाहिमानसंभवानोचनानि चातराशि वायुवाक्तवर्ते वायुरा वेदभाषिन प्रतिविद्बादिन वेदभाषि वायुरव्रवेशी ना स्थानो नाम्। अहिमितक्रृतषः। तथां जानापदं ज्ञातो मानो देशं भूत इति सबेन कहः। परावेशात्। इति एव न मे। कर्मैव स्वाभिमान तत्मते तद्भावात् कृतो भाविकी स्वाभिमानेयं।।

† रघुवरा नास्मीति पुष्पो सिम न प्रसबध्यम्।

† नास्मीपाश्चात् कर्मैवनिवेष्यं न मे इति संग निवेष्य: नाहं तदाविनिवेषः।

† तदाविनिवेषः नेति इति तदाविनिवेषः तदाविनिवेषः स एव नेति नेति नेति नेति नेति नेति।

† नास्मीपाश्चात् कर्मैवनिवेष्यं बुधिमित्रोधमिति प्रामं न मे दु:खमितिशेषं दु:खाद्यारोपाभावं तथो नास्मितिशेषं तथाकारनेद्यः।
Chandrikā. By these expressions therefore, however quaint or questionable, we are not to understand negation of soul. This would be a direct contradiction to its specification as one of the categories of the system, one of the twenty-five essential and existent principles. It is merely intended as a negation of the soul’s having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings. 

I am, I do, I suffer, mean that material nature, or some of her products, (substantially,) is, does, or suffers; and not soul, which is unalterable and indifferent, susceptible of neither pleasure nor pain, and only reflecting them, as it were, or seemingly sharing them, from the proximity of nature, by whom they are really experienced*: for soul, according to the Védas, is absolutely existent, eternal, wise, true, free, unaffected by passion, universal†. This verse, therefore, does not amount, as M. Cousin has supposed, to “le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme.”

LXV.

Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms.

Bhāshya.

By that pure (absolute), single knowledge soul beholds nature, like a spectator, at leisure and composed; as a spectator seated at a play beholds an actress. Composed: who stays (or is involved) in self; or staying or abiding in one’s own place. How is Prakriti; debarred from prolific change? Not producing intellect, egotism, and the other effects. Consequently precluded from those seven forms: desisting from the seven forms.

* प्रतिविष्कृतेऽपि पुरुषसि सृष्टः। 
† समाधे नित्यः: 
पुष्यो तुषः सत्यो सृष्टो निरञ्जनो विबु:।

3 A
or modes by which she binds herself, or virtue, vice, and the rest, and which are no longer required for the use of soul, both whose objects (fruition and liberation) are effected.

COMMENT.

Soul, possessed of the knowledge described in the preceding stanza, or divested of all individuality, becomes indifferent to, and independent of, nature, which therefore ceases to act.

Soul contemplates nature, like a spectator, prékshaka, one who beholds a dancer or actress; at leisure, avasthita, or without action, nishkriya; and at ease, suṣṭha. This is also read suṣṭha, ‘calm, collected in self’*; or nirákula, ‘unagitated.’ Nature consequently has nothing more to do. The objects of soul, fruition and liberation, having been effected, by knowledge, the other faculties of intellect are needless.

LXVI.

He desists, because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.

BHĀSHYA.

One present at a play, as a spectator, (ceases to behold;) so one, single, pure soul desists. One (nature), knowing I have been seen by him, stops, ceases. Nature is the one, chief cause of the three worlds; there is no second. Although form have terminated, yet from specific difference there is, even in the cessation of (the cooperation of) nature and soul, union, as a generic characteristic. For, if there be not union, whence is creation? There being union of these two; that is, of nature and soul; there being union from their universal diffusion: yet there is

* स्तः: स्तम्मिन् तिष्ठति ।
no further occasion for the world; from the object of creation being terminated. The necessity for nature is twofold; apprehension of the objects of sense, as sound, &c.; and apprehension of the difference between qualities and soul: when both these have been effected there is no further use for creation; that is, of further creation (of future regeneration); as in the case of a settlement of accounts between debtor and creditor, consequent on accepting what is given, when such a union is effected there is no further connection of object: so there is no further occasion for nature and soul.

If upon soul’s acquiring knowledge liberation takes place, why does not my liberation (immediately) occur? To this it is observed—

COMMENT.

The final separation of soul from nature is here indicated, as no further purpose is answered by their continued union.

The first part of this stanza repeats the illustrations given in preceding verses (61 and 65): “Nature, having been fully seen or understood, ceases to act.—Soul, having seen or understood, ceases to consider;” becomes regardless, upékshaka. Consequently there can be no future reunion, no future creation. For mere union of soul and nature is not the cause of the development of the latter, constituting worldly existence: the motive is, the fulfilment of the objects of soul. The activity of nature is the consequence of her subserviency to soul’s purposes; and when they are accomplished, all motive for action, all inducement to repeat worldly creation, ceases. ‘The two objects of soul, fruition and discrimination, are the excitaments to the activity of nature; if they do not exist, they do not stimulate nature. In the text the term motive implies that by which nature is excited in creation (to evolve the world): which cannot be in the nonentity of the objects of soul.” Vâchespati. So also Nâ—

* पुरुषार्थी च भोगविभेदी प्रकृत्यारभभ्रमोद्भावाविभिधप्रकृतानि सति
न प्रकृतिं प्रयोजयत्। अयु प्रयोगं सर्गं प्रकृतिरनेनेति प्रयोगं तद्युर्द प्राप्यें नास्तीति।
RAYANA: 'In the (mere) union of these two there is no motive for the production of the world.' With the accomplishment, therefore, of the objects of soul, individual existence must cease for ever.

LXVII.

By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless; yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it.

BHÁSHYA.

Though perfect knowledge, that is, knowledge of the twenty-five principles, be attained, yet, from the effect of previous impulse, the sage continues in a bodily condition. How? Like the whirling of a wheel; as a potter, having set his wheel whirling, puts on it a lump of clay, fabricates a vessel, and takes it off, and leaves the wheel continuing to turn round.

It does so from the effect of previous impulse. From the attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest have no influence upon one who is possessed of such knowledge. These seven kinds of bonds are consumed by perfect knowledge: as seeds that have been scorched by fire are not able to germinate, so virtue and the rest are not able to fetter soul.

These then, virtue and the rest, not being (in the case of the yogi) the causes (of continued bodily existence), body continues from the effects of previous impulse. Why is there not from knowledge destruction of present virtue and vice? Although they may be present, yet they perish the next moment, and knowledge destroys all future acts, as well as those which a man does in his present body by following instituted observances. With the cessation of the impulse the body perishes, and then liberation occurs.

What liberation, is next specified.

* तथे: संयोगेष्टिष समौत्त्व जनने प्रयोजन नाम्निि ।
COMMENT.

A reason is assigned why pure soul is not at once set free from body.

This stanza may be considered partly as an illustration of the preceding, explaining the continued union of soul and body even after knowledge is attained. It is also a kind of apology for the human forms of Kapila and other teachers of the Sankhya doctrines, who, although in possession of perfect knowledge, lived and died as men. The sage, or Yogâ, is no longer susceptible of the accidents of virtue, vice, passion, dispassion, and the rest, which are the proximate causes of bodily existence; and his continuance in the bodily form arises from the effects of virtue, &c. lasting after the cause has ceased; like the whirl of a wheel after the impulse that set it going has been withdrawn. 'As, when the potter's work is done, the wheel, in consequence of the impulse or momentum given to it, continues revolving, but stops when the period under such influence has expired; so virtue and vice, incident to body initiative and mature, constitute impulse*.' The effects of former acts of virtue and vice, then, cease when the impulse derived from them is worn out; and the possession of knowledge prevents all future acts. Gaurapâda apparently suggests a difficulty with respect to acts done in the present body; such as the observance of the Yoga, or performance of prescribed rites. These acts may be performed by a sage possessing perfect knowledge, and should therefore produce certain consequences. They lead, however, to no results; for as far as they are themselves concerned, they are but of brief duration, perishing as soon as performed; and with regard to any future effects, they are anticipated, prevented, or destroyed, by the possession of knowledge. Such seems to be the purport of the passage, but it is not very perspicuous.

* यशोपरस्य विकलामापारे च वेगार्यसंस्कारवशाधितम् स्मित हि क्षतारपि परमार्जनोत्तरते समाधिर निश्चितं भवति । शरीरस्थिति च प्रारंभिको धम्मो धर्मो संस्कारं ॥
LXVIII.

When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.

BHÁSHYA.

When bodily separation is accomplished, by destruction of the effects of virtue, vice, and the rest. In respect of it, having accomplished its object, nature ceases: then absolute, certain—final, unimpeded—deliverance, liberation, consequent upon the condition of singleness. Soul obtains singleness (separation), which is both absolute and final.

COMMENT.

This verse refers to the first stanza, and announces the accomplishment of what was there stated to be the object of inquiry, absolute and final liberation.

When the consequences of acts cease, and body, both gross and subtle, dissolves, nature, in respect to individual soul, no longer exists; and soul is one, single, free, kēvala, or obtains the condition called kaivalyam. This, according to Vāchespati and Nárāyana, means 'exemption from the three kinds of pain'. Gaurapāda gives no definition of the term, except that it is the abstract of kēvala†. What the condition of pure separated soul may be in its liberated state, the Sānkhya philosophy does not seem to hold it necessary to inquire.

* दुःखमयाविगमं दुःखविनाशं। ।
† केवल भावात् केवलं ।
This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint.

BHÁSHYA.

Soul's object is liberation: for that (purpose) this abstruse, secret, knowledge (has been expounded) by the mighty saint, by the divine sage KÁPILA. Wherein, in which knowledge, the origin, duration, and termination, the manifestation, continuance, and disappearance, of beings, of the products (or developments) of nature, are considered, are discussed. From which investigation perfect knowledge, which is the same as knowledge of the twenty-five principles, is produced.

This is the Bháshya of GÁURAPÁDA on the Sánkhyá doctrines, propounded, for the sake of liberation from migration, by the Muni KÁPILA; in which there are these seventy stanzas.

COMMENT.

This verse specifies by whom the doctrines of the text were originally taught.

The commentary of GÁURAPÁDA closes here in the only copy of the MSS. procurable; and consequently omits all notice of ISWÁRA KRISHNA, to whom a subsequent stanza of the text attributes the Káriká. In the Bháshya it is said that the work commented on is the Sánkhyá declared by KÁPILA; but that the Káriká is not the work of KÁPILA, the other Scholiasts agree. It is also different from the Sútras of that teacher, as given in the Sánkhyá Pravachana, although it follows their purport, and sometimes uses the same or similar expressions. GÁURAPÁDA may therefore probably only mean to intimate that its substance is conformable to the doctrines of the Sútras, not that it is the work of the Muni. These doctrines, he adds, are contained in seventy stanzas; of which, however, our copy has but sixty-nine. The verses of the Káriká, as usually met with, are seventy-two; but there also reference occurs to seventy verses,
as comprising apparently the doctrinal and traditional part of the text, derived from older authorities. Either Gaurapáda thought it unnecessary to explain the concluding three verses of the Káriká, or there is some omission in the copy, or they do not belong to the work. The concluding verse is evidently inaccurate, the metre of the third line of the stanza being defective.

The Kapila to whom the Sánkhyá philosophy is attributed is variously described by different authorities. In a verse quoted by Gaurapáda, in his comment upon the first stanza of the text, he is enumerated amongst the sons of Brahmá. Vijnýána Bhikshu asserts him to have been an incarnation of Vishnu*. He refers also to the opinion of a Védanta writer, that Kapila was an incarnation of Agni, or ‘fire,’ upon the authority of the Smriti; but denies their identity. There does not appear to be any good authority for the notion. Kapila is a synonyme of fire, as it is of a brown, dusky, or tawny colour; and this may have given rise to the idea of Agni and the sage being the same. The identification with Vishnu rests on better grounds. The popular belief of the Vaishnavas is, that there have been twenty-four Avatáras of Vishnu, and Kapila is one of them. The earliest authority for this specification is no doubt the Rámáyana, in which Vásudeva or Vishnu is said by Brahmá to assume the form of Kapila, to protect the earth against the violence of the sons of Sagara, searching for the lost steed intended for their father’s aswamedha. † Brahmá having heard the words of the gods, who were bewildered with the dread of destruction, replied to them, and said, Vásudeva

* तदिदं शाश्वं कपिलसूक्ष्मं भगवान् विष्णुरसिद्धोकहिताय प्रभाशि

† ऋग्वि स कपिलो नाम सांख्यशास्त्र प्रवर्तक इति स्मृते।

† देवतानां वचः भुवा भगवान् वै पितामहः

भक्तुवाच सुसंतखान् भुतानवलमोहितान्

येवेऽ वसुधा कुल्ल्वा वासुदेवस्य भीमतः

महिषी माधवसेवास स एव भगवान् भ्रुः

कपिलं रूपमासाय धारयबनियं धरारं।
is the Lord, he is Mādhava, of whom the whole earth is the cherished bride; he, assuming the form of Kapila, sustains continually the world.' So also the Mahābhārata: 'Then spake incensed, Kapila, the best of sages; that Vāsudeva, indeed, whom the holy Munis call Kapila.*' According to the Bhāgavat, he was the fifth incarnation of Vishnu: 'The fifth Avatāra was named Kapila, the chief of saints, who revealed to Ásuri the Sāṅkhya explanation of first principles, which has been impaired by time†.' Book I. s.12. The latter half of the third book describes him also as an Avatār of Vāsudeva, but as the son of Devahūti, the daughter of Sāyambhuva Menu, married to the Prajapati Kerddama.

LXX.

This great purifying (doctrine) the sage compassionately imparted to Ásuri, Ásuri taught it to Panchasikha, by whom it was extensively propagated.

COMMENT.

Purifying; that which purifies from the defects which are the cause of pain; pāvana or pavitra. Great, chief, principal, agrāyam, mukhyam. This verse anticipates an objection that may be made to the authority of the text; as it may be said, Although the words of Kapila must command attention, of what weight are the lessons of an uninspired teacher? The answer is, that they are the same which were originally taught by Kapila himself to his pupil Ásuri. According to the passage cited by

* तत्त: कुवृ महाराज कपिलो मुनिसाभम:  
वासुदेवति म प्रादु: कपिलं मुनिलङ्गवा: ||
† पन्नम: कपिलो नाम सिखेष: कालविश्वम  
प्रोजवाचसुरे सांह्यं तत्वासाबिनिनेश्यं ||

3 c
GAURAPĀDA, in his notes on the first stanza (p. 1), Āsuri is also a son of BRAHMĀ. He is mentioned elsewhere as the pupil of KĀPIĻA, and preceptor of PANCHASIKHA, but there are no details of his history. Of PAN­CHASIKHA there is some account in the Mahābhārata, on occasion of his visiting JANAKA, king of Mitkita, and imparting to him the Śāṅkhya philosophy. He is there also said to be named likewise KĀPIĻA*; which the commentator explains to mean that he was like KĀPIĻA, being the disciple of his disciple †, as the text proceeds to call him; ‘He, the long-lived, whom they term the first disciple of Āsuri‡.’ He is also called KĀPIĻEYA, from his being, it is said, the son of a Brāhmanī named KĀPIĻA. Āsuri went to the sphere in which that which is Brahma, the mystic-named, and multiform, and eternal, is beheld. His disciple was PANCHASIKHA, nourished with human milk: for there was a certain Brāhman matron, named KĀPIĻA, of whom he became the son, and at whose bosom he was fed; thence he obtained the denomination of KĀ­PIĻEYA, and divine imperishable knowledge ‡.’

LXXI.

Received by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in Arya metre by the piously disposed ISWARA KRISHNA, having thoroughly investigated demonstrated truth.

* यमाहुः कपिलसार्ष्यः प्ररम्पर्यप्रजापतिः। † सः कपिलस्य शिष्यासत्सुध्यां। ‡ आसुरेः प्रश्नं शिष्यं यमाहुशिरजीविनं।

यथेदाध्यां ब्रह्म नातारूपं प्रहयते स्मृतिसमुखेऽवै तत्स्मृतं प्रतिपदे तद्यथं ततः पंचशिश्यं शिष्यो मानुषपयसाभूतं स्माः कपिलानाम कारिदासीकुटिनीं तस्यं पुष्पमागम्य श्रीयाः स पिवति खरीं ततः स कपिलेयं लेभे वृषि च नैदिकः।
COMMENT.

'Succession or tradition of pupils,' sishyaparamparā: each pupil becoming teacher in his turn, as is the case with the Pandits to the present day. It rarely, if ever, happens that any branch of Sanscrit literature is acquired by independent study: every science is studied under some teacher of eminence, who can, not unfrequently, trace his traditionary instruction upwards for several generations. The interval between Panchasikha and Iswara Krishna is not particularized, but was probably considerable, as no allusion to the author of the Káriká occurs in the older writings. If his commentator Gaurapáda be, as is not unlikely, the preceptor of Sankara Āchārya, Iswara Krishna must date anterior to the eighth century.

LXXII.

The subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversial questions.

COMMENT.

We have here in the text reference to seventy stanzas, as comprising the doctrinal part of the Sánkhyā. In fact, however, there are but sixty-nine, unless the verse containing the notice of Kapila be included in the enumeration; and in that case it might be asked, why should not the next stanza at least, making mention of the reputed author, he also comprehended, when there would be seventy-one verses. The Scholiasts offer no explanation of this difficulty.

The sixty topics alluded to in the text are, according to the Rája Várttika, as cited by Váchespati, 1. the existence of soul; 2. the existence of nature; 3. the singleness, 4. the objectiveness, and 5. the subservience, of nature; and 6. the multifariousness, 7. the distinctness, and 8. the inertness, of soul; 9. the duration of subtile, and 10. that of gross,
body. These are the ten radical categories. To them are to be added, the five kinds of obstruction, nine of acquiescence, twenty-eight of disability, and eight of perfectness; making altogether sixty. Another enumeration specifies the sixty categories or objects: 1. soul; 2. nature; 3. intellect; 4. egotism; 5—7. the three qualities; 8. the class of the five rudiments; 9. that of the eleven senses or organs; 10. that of the five elements. These are the ten radical *padārthas*, or categories. The remaining fifty are the same as those previously enumerated. In consequence of comprehending all these topics, the *Kārikā* is a system, a *śāstra*; not a partial tract or treatise, or *prakarana*; although it omits the illustrative anecdotes and controversial arguments. The *Kārikā* must consequently refer to the collection of Kapila’s aphorisms, called Sānkhyā Pravacana. This work is divided into six chapters, or *adhyāyas*; in the three first of which are contained all the dogmas of the system furnishing the materials of the *Kārikā*; the fourth chapter is made up of short tales or anecdotes, *ākhāyikās*, illustrative of the Sānkhyā tenets; and the fifth is appropriated to the refutation, *paravāda*, of the doctrines of different schools. Exclusive of these two subjects, Iswara Krishna professes, therefore, to give the substance of the *Ś. Pravacana*, or of the *Sūtras* of Kapila assembled in that collection.

The *Ākhāyikās* are in general very brief and uninteresting. The *Sūtras*, in fact, supply only a subject for a story, which the Scholiasts may expand much after their own fancies. Thus the *Sūtra*, ‘From instruction in truth, like the king’s son†.’ On which *Vijnāna Bihikshu* narrates, that ‘there was a king’s son, who, being expelled in infancy from his native city, was brought up by a forester, and growing up to maturity in that state imagined himself to belong to the barbarous race with which he lived. One of his father’s ministers having discovered him, revealed to him what he was, and the misconception of his character was removed, and he knew himself to be a prince. So soul, from

* सकलशास्त्रार्थकङ्कनाधिकरणाचतुरं प्रकरणसप्तीतु शास्त्रसमस्व तिबतं ।
† राज्यपूर्वकस्लोपपदेशात् ।
the circumstances in which it is placed, mistakes its own character, until
the truth is revealed to it by some holy teacher, and then it knows itself to be Brahme.*

The controversial portion of the original Sūtras is as brief as the narrative, and, from the nature of the subject, much more obscure. The argument is suggested, rather than advanced, and it remains for the Scholiast to amplify and explain it. A specimen of the mode in which this is effected will best exemplify the darkness and difficulty of this part of our subject. Some modern followers of the Vēdanta assert that liberation is the attainment of (pure) felicity. To this it is replied: 'Manifestation of felicity is not liberation, from its not being a property †.

Thus explained by the Scholiast: 'The condition of happiness, or that of attainment (or manifestation), is not a property of soul. The nature (of soul) is eternal, and is neither an object to be attained, nor the means of attainment. Therefore the attainment of happiness cannot be liberation. This is the meaning (of the Sūtra).' 'Attainment of happiness in the region of Brahmā and the rest is a secondary (or inferior) sort of liberation; as to maintain the contrary would be in opposition to the text of the Vēda, which says that a wise man abandons both joy and sorrow ‡.'
Further; if attainment be a faculty of soul, what sort of faculty is it? Is it constant or temporary. In the first case, there may be, even in the state of accomplishment, still the existence of the object of soul: in the last, inasmuch as there is perishableness of all that is engendered (or, that which has a beginning must have an end), then eternal liberation is subject to termination: therefore the attainment (or manifestation) of felicity is not chief or real liberation; and the assertion that it is so, is a false conclusion of the modern Védántis: this is undeniable.*

* दिनाभिषिक्षेत्रालंबन्धमेव पि सा च निवा चनित्वा वा चायसे सिद्धवे वा पुरुषार्थवेष्ट। चाबै जन्मावस्य विनाशितेऽभा मोक्षस्य नाशपतिस्मादादा नद्याभिषिक्षिमुख्यमोक्षे इति नवीन वेदान्तिनामपरिष्धानेत्वस यवेति धिकृ।
श्रीमद्रकृष्णेन

विरचितः

सांस्कृतिकाध्ययनः

श्रीगोङपादकुटभाषायतिः

—

श्रीमता पूर्वेशीयभाषालिखितयन्यावतारप्रमाणानां

सामाजिकानानुमतः

—

उत्तराभिधाननगरे विद्यामिदिरसांस्कृतामुद्रायन्त्रालये मुद्रितः

—

संवतः १८३७
संस्कृतम्

दुःखशयामिताजिज्ञासा तदभिषाते हेतु  
हेतु सापार्श्चेत्स्वज्ञानात्यतनतोऽभावत्।

संस्कृतम्

कपिलवधू नस्सम्मै भेजाविन्दोन्द्री अगति मगे  
काश्यपान्तु साधनामीची नीरिक्षित विहिता प्रतार्थाय।

अल्पाच्यो स्पर्श प्रमाणार्थं नैतिकताः षड्युंत्वं
शास्त्रं शिषयन्ति रामसातस्तोऽहं प्रवर्धाति॥

dुःखशयामिताजिज्ञासा उपोवदै: क्रिये॥ इह भक्तवान् श्रवणः  
कपिलो नाम तद्भवः। सनकसन्नवनन्दन्स्तु तूर्तिवर्ष सनातनः।

आसुरिः कपिलचेत वोढः पञ्चाशिख्लं।
इवेते श्रवणः पुष्यः सप्रेक्षा समस्यः॥

कपिलस्त्रे सहोच्चा धर्मवै वैराग्येनीर्धर्थेचेत। एवं स उत्च:  
सम्बन्धार्थसि महर्षिद्वादिलोकः संसारपारम्पर्येश: सकल्लेखो जिन्नास  
मानव आसुरिसगोपाय वाभ्राशयेदं पञ्चाशिख्लितवांनां ज्ञानसुमूऽवान्  
केवल्ज्ञानाहुः संक्षयो भवनिः।

पञ्चाशिख्लितवां यज्ञ तन्त्राये वसेत्  
जटी मुखी गिरिक वाचि सर्वस्य नाज संबंधः।

तदिदमहः:। दुःखशयामिताजिज्ञासे:।। तत्र दुःखशयः। आध्यामिदेः:।
आध्यात्मिकरः। आध्यात्मिकेऽविविधं शास्त्रं मा  
नसमेव सत्वं शाश्वां वात्तिकस्वर्थविविधां मरातीसारादि।  
मानसं प्रियवियोगार्थसंज्ञादि।। आध्यात्मिकरः चतुर्विधं भूतपारमितिः  
मन्त्रार्थपुष्पात्मानक्षिनिर्माता।...
रायुजाग्रस्तुद्वादोऽभिविद्योऽसः सत्तासुतुप्रजायत ॥ आधिदेविरः ॥ देवाना
विदः दैविरः । दिवः प्रभवतीति वा देवं तदविकृतं यथप्रजायते श्रीतो
श्रवात्वर्षोऽनिपातादिदिः ॥ एवं यथा दुःखशापिन्याताज्ञानसा कामोऽ
। तदोऽभिधाते हेतु । तस्य दुःखश्च अभिधातो योद्धसि हेतु
स्वेच्छ ॥ हते सापार्यायेत । हते हेतु दुःखशापिन्यातके सा जिज्ञा
साधपारी चेष्टादि । तश्चाप्यामिकस्य विविधर्ष्यापि श्रावुदंशाखकिर्या
प्रयोगमास्मिनीपरिहारकुःकक्षवामादिकादिभिः ॥ एव् आधारम्
कोषयः । आधिभूतस्य रक्षादिनायाधिबान्ति हद: ॥ हते सायपारी चेष्टादि
मन्यते न । एकानातोद्विवयं आयतो
निन्तं हते हेतुनायाधिबान्ति न भवति तस्माद्वयं एकानातानायाधिबान्तके
हेतु हिज्ञासा विविधिधा स्मरेति ।

हेतुदानुभूतिः सत्वनिमुद्दिःभैरत्वीविषयः
तविपीततः धेयम् अज्ञातंः हिज्ञानात् ॥ २।

यदि हेतुवाचस्य सा कायोऽवटृप्ति नेव यद् आनुभूतिः हेतु: दुःख
शापिन्यातकः । आनुभूतस्य निर्माणविस्तारभयं: आनुभूतिः स च आगमा
तितः ॥ यथा

आपाम सीतममृता आनूमागममञ्जोतिादिः देवान्
ञिनीमस्मान् कृष्णवर्धाति: निमुः पूर्वप्रमुखस्मृतेऽस्य ॥
कदाचिदिवदारीनाैैं देवानां कत्य आशीतः । एवं ववस्मृता आभूमेति
विचारोऽसुमाक्षायमपाम सीतं पीलवनः सीतं तस्माद्वारा आभूम
आभूमाभूतपञ्चं देवं दिनव अगमम्योऽयो: गतयोऽन्त्रावतो अभो: अवतो
ञित: । आदिराम देवान् रिनान् धीदिनवनः । एवं च निस्मात्
सीतं कृष्णविदाति: नूतन निश्चित: निर्मि: छताति: शुद्धस्मान् कृष्णवत्

[ २ ]
कथिति किमु धृष्टिर्मृगुतमस्वें धृष्टिर्जेतां हिंसा वा दिन्तं किरिणि वर्णूः मन्येयं।

यबब्दे सूक्तस्य अन्नविन्दे फलं। पशुवतेन। सुपत्तास्य अवलं तरति। सूर्यं तरति पापानं तरति बशह्यां। तरति यो कोणस्येतौ वजत हितं।

एकाना एतेऽस्य एव देवो श्राधिवधासा। हितं न। उच्चंते।

हृदयधनुषां। हितं हड्डे। तुम्हीं हड्डवत्। कौसी श्राधिवधास। कस्मास्त
समादवधिशुचिष्यातिसरस्युः। श्राधिवधिशुचिष्यातिसरस्युः। कस्मात
ब्रा० श्राधिवधिशुचिष्यातिसरस्युः। पशुवतात्। तथानेत्रं
पुष्यान्त: नियुक्तान्। थानान्त: सम्भेदः।

एवमुद्यानातिक्षमुः। तथानेत्र: नियुक्तान्। विशेष
गुणदर्शनातिरस्य: हुः। स्यादि। एवमुद्यान्त: हुः। कहिः। श्राधिनितिवेदृः। उच्चंते। तक्षिपनित:। थैवन्त: देशनानुविन्द अया।

विनिर्गत:। थैवन्त: प्रक्षेपित:। श्राधिवधिशुचिष्यातिसरस्युः। स कः कः विविष्याः। श्राधिशाक्षिणानाः। तथा दंकारः महद्दारिद्रस्य:। अया
कथानं। अया भवते। एवमुद्यान्त:। प्रक्षेपित:। विनिर्गत:। श्राधिशाक्षिणानाः। अया भवते। एवमुद्यानं। अया भवते।

श्राधिशाक्षिणानाः। अया भवते।

सूक्तिकृतिकृति:। प्रक्षेपित:। समा
संस्कृतन्तिनारोऽने। प्रक्षेपित:। प्रक्षेपित:। प्रक्षेपित:। प्रक्षेपित:। प्रक्षेपित:। प्रक्षेपित:।
बिकारो न भवति। महदादा: प्रकृतिविचृतयः सत:। महाभूतादिनि बुधः। वुज्याः: सत: बुधः १ चक्रारः: २ पञ्चतन्त्राचारि ३ एतदिनि समप्रकृति विचृतयः। तथा। प्रथामाबुद्धिरुपः तेनविचृति: प्रथास्य बिकार इति। रैवाच्यासत्तापाद्यात् जत्त: प्रकृति:। चक्रारोऽपि बुद्धिरुपः इति विचृति:। च च पञ्चतन्त्राचारायुताद्यति प्रकृति:। तत: पञ्चतन्त्राचारायुताद्यति इति विचृतिविचृताचारायुताद्यति प्रकृति:। तथा स्वर्ग्यतन्त्राचारायुताद्यति इति विचृतिसंस्मादायारायुताद्यति प्रकृति:। गन्त्यतन्त्राचारायुताद्यति इति विचृतिसंस्मादायारायुताद्यति तिमिर्कृति:। रूपतन्त्राचारायुताद्यति इति विचृतिसंस्मादायाचारायुताद्यति घाप उच्चादय तीतिमिर्कृति:। रसतन्त्राचारायुताद्यति इति विचृतिसंस्मादायाचारायुताद्यति थय दयादति प्रकृति:। तव सहदादा: सत: प्रकृतियो विचृतयथ। ॥ शोडःशक्ति बिकारः। पञ्चबुद्धिसृष्टिभाष: पञ्चरसमेतन्यन्त्रायारायुताद्यति एकादश: मनः। बुधानुभूत नि एष शोडःशक्ति गती विचृतिरेत। बिकारो विचृति:। न प्रकृतियन विचृति:। पुरुषः॥ एवमेवा ब्रह्माण्डारान्तः श्रावाणं पदराध्यान्तः के किरङ्गः। महाराजः। केन कथा वा महाप्रेम सिद्धिकऽवति। इह लोके प्रभेय चलू प्रभात कोणी सामान्यो यथा प्रस्तादिभिमिर्कृतोषु चतुर्दश:। तत्सात् प्रभात। सभिषेयं।

हरमन्नमानप्राप्तनं च संप्रभावाभिषेकात्
बिचित्र प्रमाणसिद्धं प्रमेयसिद्धं: प्रमाणादि ॥ ४ ॥

इह यथा श्रोतं नकु चालुर्जित्वा धाराभिमिति पञ्चबुद्धिसृष्टिभाष: पञ्चरससृष्टिभाषः। रसगंगा एवं पञ्चारो यथाविविध्या गणासीखं पञ्चारो गुह्याभिमिति नकु स्वर्पं चाकु दृष्टं जित्या रसं ग्रामं गर्भाभिमित। इत्यथार्रुतिगुप्तेऽपि प्रमाणं। प्रकृतिरामान्तनाः च श्रोतेः न गृहस्य स श्रावविचारनां यथा। यथेऽद्रो देव
राजः उत्तरां कुरवः स्वरेणपरस्तर हेवादि। प्रवयशानुमानायायायायमार्गः चनान्त्रयते। ऋषि चोऽरसः।

झागो ज्ञाभवचनमारं दीपस्याबिधुः
झीर्षदोषोत्तुति वाक्यं न भूयाःशेषसम्भवत्
सखरम्मेवनिमित्तः यः सख्रेरशविवविनितः
पूजितस्यभिनिमित्यप्रकाशः श्रेयः स ताह्रः॥

एतेषु प्रमाणेऽपुर्णे प्रमानाप्राप्तिः सिद्धान्तं भवति। बहुः प्रमाणान्ति तैमिनः।
ऋषि कार्यन तात्त्वप्रमाणानि। ऋषार्थमसिनः सम्भवः ज्ञानः प्रतिभा ऐशिः संप
मानं चेति बहुः प्रमाणान्ति। तथार्थार्थमैव विविधं हस्ता स्वुता च। तथार्थाः।
एवर्मिन् पदेन ज्ञानभावः गृहीतशेय्यशस्यस्मिनः रामभावः गृहात एव।
चुना यथा। दिता देवदसी न भुजः ऋषि च पीनो दर्शते भकोद्वकमते
राजणि भुजः एति॥ सम्भवो रथः। प्रस्थ इति रथे चनारः कुडः। सम्भावनः।
झभावो नामः। प्रतिमातितरायायनास्तिदुभावलक्षः। प्रमाणभावो रथः देव
दसः। सूर्यायाय नवनादिपु। इत्यादिभावः। परे पराभावः। ऋच्यावावः
शरितपात्रायायायायायमा ध्वनियविधिः। सखरम्मेव ध्वनिवत्पदवतिः
गथा शुक्लदायवद्यायायायायायायायायमार्गमध्ये। एवमभावोऽपनेकथा॥ प्रतिभा
गथा। दशिणेन विन्यासं स्त्रायचं एव युवर्याः। पृष्ठियासामसूद्रायाः स प्रदे
वो मनोरमः। एववृत्ते तस्मिन् प्रदे शोभना: गुरुः। सत्तीति प्रतिभोमते
धरो प्रतिज्ञानायासंज्ञानमिति॥ ऐशिः यथा। वर्त्तीति तोपौ यथातः
केवलिणी प्रवसतीति एव ऐशिः॥ उपमानं गथा। गौरिण नवः
समुद्र इव तदार्ताः। यतनि च भुजः प्रमाणान्ति बिषु: धरादियुपनाभूताति।
तथानुसारे तात्त्वपरिशिवनरूपः। सम्भवाभावप्रतिभिति निर्मायणमार्गः
भने। तस्मातिच्चेव सर्वनिर्मायणिशिवमार्ग: विनिधं प्रमाणसिद्धं तदाल तेन
विनिधेन प्रमाणे प्रमाणायासंज्ञानमिति वाक्षेष:। प्रमेयसिद्धः। प्रमा
ख्याहि। प्रवेम प्रधानं तुविच्छिन्नाः। पञ्चस्माराणि हृदादेशे द्रियानि पञ्च
महाभूतानि पुष्क्रमा हरि एषात्मरस्यविविवितितितराति भक्ताय भक्तायहृदादेशं।
तथा हितित् प्रवेशेण सार्थं हितिशिवरं फितिदान्यमेति विविधं प्रमाणमुखं तत्स्य किं तद्यथापनेतदात्।

प्रतििविषयाध्यवसायो हर्षं विविधमनुमानमार्मार्यते
लिङ्गकृतं लिङ्गपूर्वकं प्रमाणप्राप्तचन्दन। ५।

प्रतिविषयेनु प्रेमादीनां प्रश्नादिविषयेनु सार्थवसायो हर्षं प्रवक्ष्यमित्यथा।
विविधमनुमानमार्यते ज्ञेयं पूर्ववत् सामान्यते हर्षं बैत्त। पूर्वस्या स्निति पूर्ववत् यथा मेंोत्यथा वृत्ति साध्यति पूर्ववृत्तिनात्। ज्ञेयं सत्यतं अनुपातं लवक्षामासाध्य ज्ञेयार्थविज्ञ लवक्ष्यभाव इति। सा मान्यतो हर्षं। देशान्तरतं भाषां प्रासमं हर्ष। गतिमनुमानं वेषत्।

यथा वेषनां देशान्तराधिकारं प्रासमं गतिमनुमानं तदः वेषत्। यथा वेषनां देशान्तराधिकारं प्रासमं गतिमनुमानं तदः वेषत्।

यथा हितित् प्रवेशं विविध हितिशिवरं फितिदान्यमेति विविधं प्रमाणमुखं तत्स्य किं तद्यथापनेतदात्।

सामान्यवस्तु होद्यान्तरतं हितिशिवरं फितिदान्यमेति। सिद्धि। ६।
प्रधानपुलवासिदिनिश्चति सामान्यः सहनानुसारन साध्यः वस्मानमहदीपि
कर्णेन निःस्वां। येषायं निःस्वां तत्तत्ताननिःस्वामि
वामति वालोऽधिश्वाति पुण्डः इति। वर्षः प्रत्यक्षसाधाः। तस्मादीपि
चासिन्य परोक्षानागमाम् सिंहः येषाद्विवेड़ सुवर्गः श्रेणिः
रस इति परोक्षानागमनात् सिंहि। चव चाचिदाह प्रधानः पुण्डः वा नोप
लभ्यते यथा नोपलभ्यते तोऽक तत्तोऽकति तस्मानावपि न सः। यथा वि
तीयं शिरस्वरूपः बाहुरिति। तदुच्छयः। चव सतामपा०नासरोपतयं
भिन्नो ने भवति तद्भवः।

चौतेहृदयः सामीयादिदिनिश्चति तामानोत्पतस्यानात्
सौष्ठवायुवधानादिभिष्मः समानाभिराच् । १०।

इह सतामपा०नामतिदूरदनुपलविश्वेदा। यथा देशानलस्यानां चिच सौष
विषुभिषां। सामीयादशा चाचिदाहोक्षानानुपलविभः। इन्द्रियाभिहि
तायाः विरायाः। यशोऽऽनुपलविभः। सनोजनानायाः। श्च
जिनः। श्रवणिविदितमः नावाभारयति। सौष्ठवायु कृमिपुष्पवल्ललिनः
रुपान्तनो गणनाय नोपलभ्यते। ब्यवासायाः कुम्भोऽम पिरिहितः वशु
नोपलभ्यते। चविभावात् सूष्मेत्यासाविभूता यहनमातात्कारकाः नी
पलभ्यनः। समानाभिराच्छायां मुहरातिलोऽऽनः। वखिः। कुवलयमलकमः
कुवलयामलकः चिन्ते। कपोतमयं कपोतान्तो नोपलभ्यते समानात्रमध्याय
त्वाच। एवमस्थानुपलविभः। सतामनिनासितः हस्तः। एवः चाचि किरि
थुगग्र्यः प्रधानपुलवायोरैवश्वीनुपलविभः केनहिुना केन चोपल
भ्रष्टुच्छयः।
सीख्यात्तुपलब्धिनाभावात् कार्येत्तुपलब्धिः
महेदरदि तद्यकांशि प्रकृतिविध्यं सह्यं च ॥ २ ॥

सीख्यात्तुपलब्धिः: प्रधानस्थितं । प्रधानं सीख्याबोपलभ्यशः यथा
काशे धृमोचवजलनीहारपरमाभवः: समोदिपि नोपलभ्यते । कःं तस्मै
तद्हतुपलब्धिः । कार्येत्तुपलब्धिः । काशं हस्ता कार्यमानुमियये । चक्षु
प्रधानं कारशं यस्येदं कारः । तुषिर्हागार्जनमनाभाविकण्यं एकादेशेन्द्रियांखि
पञ्चमहाभूतानि एवं तत्कां । तद्गृहसे प्रकृति विद्यं । प्रकृति: प्रधानं
तथा विद्यं प्रकृतिविद्यं सह्यं च समानवहं च यथा लोके कर्पि दितु
सुन्त्य दश मुखो भवन्तुल्यथ्या । चेन्नेतस्य तुषिमतुमस्तुपरिहारक्षाम: ।
यदिं महेदरदिसे ततं कि प्रधाने सुदताहोस्यिद्सदाबाय्यंसमतिपित्यं एवं
शयं । यतोष मानायं सत्त्रकर्माङी सकांशे ब्रह्मस्यानामसकांशे । यदि सदस
भवन्तुपाससनमनतीतिप्रियपित्येजस्यां ॥

असदकर्षादुपदानपक्षानु श्रेष्ठर्षर्षानु कार्यभावानु सकांशे ॥ ३ ॥

असदकर्षाः सदस्यसदस्तनोसदस्तुर्थकं तस्मानसकांशेः इतः लोके सकांशं नारिक
यथा: सिद्धाभविलोक्षिपास्याभ्यास: कर्षादः स्त्रो गुणः: । प्रधानेष तस्मिनः
सकांशे: । सिं हादुपदानपक्षादुपदानां कारणं तथ्यायकं दिलोकिः यो चेन्ने
यं सुदतापदानपह्यं करोति दृष्टि चौर्यां न तू
जलवस्य तस्मात् सकांशे । इत्य भवन्तुसमक्षानु सकांशे ज्ञेष्टिसबंभो
नाशिक यथा सुवर्णस्य रजतादी तुषिमथुसदस्यिद्सदायं सकांश: तत्समक्षानु
चानानु सकांशे । इत्य श्रेष्ठं शक्षरक्षानु । इह कुलानजः यशो सूक्ष्म
[ ५ ]

चक्रवीरारजनीराधिकरणोपकर्षणे वा श्रवणसेव घटं मृत्युमसायुद्वादयांति
तस्मात् सकाय्ये । इत्यथा कारणभावाय सकाय्ये । कारण वहन्यां तस्मात्
हेतुकसाय्यमेव यस्य यद्विषोधति यवः स्त्रीप्रेमयो श्रीवधयः यदाससकाय्ये
स्मात् कोटविभम शालयः स्तुने च सन्तीति तस्मात् सकाय्ये । एवं
पञ्चभित्तुः प्रधाने महाददितिक्रमस्य तस्मात् उत्पत्तिविवाहतयं इति ॥
प्रकृतिविरुष्ण सहस्रं च यदृष्टं तथा कपिलवप्ते ।

हेतुमदनियमवायुष्य सन्ययमनेकमाणिसं लिङ्गः
सावयवं परतन्त्रं यथाय विपरीतस्यहलः । ९० ।

यथा महाददिकाने हेतुमदिति हेतुरस्वालित हेतुमत् । उपादानं हेतुः कारणं
निमित्तमनिति पञ्चयः । यथाय सप्रधानं हेतुरस्वालित हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदसितिः हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं हेतुमदनियमवायुष्यं
तन्माचारीश्वरमाति च तन्माचारतलामाति प्रक्षमाहूत्तातिच । एवं परतन्त्रं वरायकं याष्ट्रयानं यवं छ यथाश्वकं याष्ट्रयानं । चिरित्रं गुंर्येत्योस्मभिरिब्रमफकं हेतुमाध्यकः । निधिप्राप्तातः परं किमिरित्य यतं प्रधानस्यात्मिष्मनिष्मणवष्कः । तथान्तिनं च यथानं नियममयं क्षमतुपालवातः नहि भूतानि कुलकुदुम्भणेत्रति प्रधानं ॥ किं चाध्यापि यथानं याच्यापि प्रधानं सर्वागतवातः ॥ संकिरं याच्यनिक्षिमफकं सर्वागतवादेव ॥ तथास्तनेतं याच्यमेकं प्रधानं कार्यानां चयायां तीकानां प्रधानमेकं कार्यां तस्मातिरं प्रधानं ॥ तथानितं याच्यनानाधितस्यात्मकः कार्याच्यति प्रधाना किमिरित्य यतं प्रधानां कार्यं स्वातः ॥ तथा यथानं रिखरिखुः सदयमयं नित्यान्दतावदिन रिखुः प्रतिष्णा परस्यं मलीयो नेव प्रधानं तस्मादतिरं प्रधानं ॥ तथा सावध्यानं यथानं निरवध्यमयं निहि शष्टिः स्वरूपसह । प्रागः प्रधाने सन्ति ॥ तथा परतन्त्रं यथानं स्वतन्त्रसम्बन्धं प्रवेष्टः ॥ एवं याच्यानं याच्यिविधयेषु साध्येषु सम्बन्धेऽधिने कददृश सहस्यं ॥

चित्रमविवेकिको विषय: सामायमचेततं प्रसवधिमिम
यथां तथा प्रधानं तत्तिरीतलक्षणो च युमान् । अनि

चित्रम यथां सत्रजसस्मांसि चयी गुप्ता यस्येति । चित्रविवेकिको यथां नवि
वेदोस्मास्वतीति । इति यथामो गुप्ता इति न विवेकवदृं याति चर्च गी
रेखायेति । यथां यथासऽगृहस्य कुल्लोकाता शब्दां च गुप्ता इति । तथा चित्र
यथामुहोस्मानं स्वप्रकर्ष्याणं विश्वम्मूलातवात । तथा सामायम यथां
सूक्ष्योहस्तिवीवं सर्वसाधारणानं ॥ चेततं यथां सूक्ष्युस्तुः केशोहाच चेततती
न्यथां ॥ तथा प्रसवधिमिम यथां तथा चुबेरिखंकर: प्रसूतं सत्मात् पञ्चत
न्यायां शक्तैद्वेद्रिथाया च प्रसूत्यं सत्मानेम: पञ्चमहाभूतातिच ॥ एव
वर्षाकाल: प्रसवधमना उक्त एवंमिलक्षण सदृश यथा धृतं
तथा प्रधानमिति। तथ्यनिवुं महाक्षारस्वपि बिनिवुं यस्मिनमहत्तदि
कामे बिनिवुं। इति यदानि कार्यं तदार्थं कामेनिति यथा कुष्ठायु
कृतं कृष्ण एवं पदो भवति॥ तथाविवेकि धर्मिन्ध्र प्रधानगृहं गुणेनभिग्यते
अथेनुष्ठान अन्यत्म प्रधानं विनं न यथि तदविवेकिण्य प्रधानं॥
तथा विखयो धर्मिन्ध्र प्रधानं शरणपुस्तविषयभुतविषय इति॥
तथा सामायन
धर्मिन्ध्र प्रधानं सर्वसांपारस्यात॥ तथाऽवेतनं धर्मिन्ध्र प्रधानं सुखदुः
प्रवत् समोहाच्छेतत्तस्य तथमनु मुयशि यह श्रवितान्मृत्तिग्राहवेतनो घर उच्चि
करते॥ एवं प्रधानं धार्मिकाः इदानीनात्तिर्तस्तथा पुमानिवेत
कृष्णायते। तिर्तिर्तस्तथा यह कृष्णायत्स्तथा विपरीतः। पुरुषः।
तथा विखयो धर्मिन्ध्र प्रधानमुखः चातिष्ठयः। पुरुषः।
तथा विखयो धर्मिन्ध्र मध्यायः च चातिष्ठयः। पुरुषः।
तथा सामायन धर्मिन्ध्र मध्यायः चातिष्ठयः। पुरुषः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
शरणपुस्तविषयभुतविषय इति॥ प्रसवधमने मध्यायः
พระ्य प्रधानसांपारस्यात कुस्ती। नाहि खिष्टः पुरुषाः
समूहः। तस्मादुरुपुरुषाः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
शरणपुस्तविषयभुतविषय इति॥ प्रसवधमने मध्यायः
พระ्य प्रधानसांपारस्यात कुस्ती। नाहि खिष्टः पुरुषाः
समूहः। तस्मादुरुपुरुषाः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
शरणपुस्तविषयभुतविषय इति॥ प्रसवधमने मध्यायः
พระ्य प्रधानसांपारस्यात कुस्ती। नाहि खिष्टः पुरुषाः
समूहः। तस्मादुरुपुरुषाः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
बङ्कोत्स्वमध्यायः च धेठः। पुरुषः।
कीवादि प्रकृतिमार्गवां आस्थातः। तत्रत्वुक्तं सिद्धिविद्यमिति भ्रात्मसंहकं च तत् के ते गुणा इति तत्त्व स्वामित्यादानयेदवाहः।

प्रीयप्रतितिविदायदाका: प्रकाशम्प्रवसितिनियमाशः।

अन्योस्वयाभिव्यक्तायज्ञनमिश्रणवृक्षमयगुणः। १२।

प्रीयालम्बकः अप्रीययः। विखादमकाशगुणः। साबरजस्तमासीतयः।

तथ प्रीयालम्बक: सत्वा प्रीति: सुः सं तदांतवायमिति। अप्रीययः रजः। विखादमकाश: तमः। विधायी: मोहः। तथा प्रकाशम्प्रवति नियमाशः। अस्त: शश्च: सामस्तयथाच: प्रकाशां: सत्वा प्रकाशसमपतिमाति:। ब्रह्मवर्षराजः रज: स्थित: समस्तमितिमाति: प्रकाशकिरियांसिविखितशीला: गुणा इति।

तथास्योस्वयाभिव्यक्तायज्ञनमिश्रणमुवृहत्वशः। अन्योस्वयाभिभवः। अन्योस्वय: चयः। अन्योस्वयजनः। अन्योस्वयमिश्रण:। अन्योस्वयवृहत्वशः ते तथीलः। अन्योस्वयाभिभवः: इति अन्योस्वयपरस्तरसम्बोधवतीति प्रीयप्रतितिविद्यार्थिति धन्मिकार्थित्वातिवतिवति: यथा यदा साबरमुक्तं भवति तदा रजस्तत्सी स्त्रीभूम:। गुणः। प्रीतिमकाशाविभक्ताविनहितास्य: यथा रजस्ततस्तत्सी स्त्रीभूम:। वृत्तिभिष्यं द्यदा तरंगम्भित तस्य भेत: सत्तमसी स्त्रीभूमिभिन्न:। इति तथास्योस्वयाभिभवः। अन्योस्वयजनः भष्या मूलितशी घटं जनयति। तथास्योस्वयमिश्रणम यथा स्त्रीयुमसी: अन्योस्वयमिश्रणी तथा गुणाः। उच्च: च

रजसी मिश्रण सत्व सत्य मिश्रण: रजः।

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वेषा राजा सदीशुक्रः प्रजापालने दुष्टनियोऽणिः सुखमुन्यादयति दुष्टा
नां दुर्लं मोहः च एवं रजस्ययमसी वृत्तिः जनयति । तथा । तमः लक्ष्मीपेशा
वर्णालंकेन सत्तारतस्तूयति जनयति । वेषा: समाधूत जगतः सुख
मुन्यादयति ने वृत्ता कुर्चाणां कर्पोध्यों जनयति विरहिणं मोहने
वर्णोद्योगृत्स्यो गुणः । सिंचायणः

सवं लघु प्रकाशकमिद्यधूपस्त्रूण चलं च रजः
गुरु वर्णकेमेव तमः प्रदीपविश्वाषेऽ वृत्तः । ९२ ।

सवं लघु प्रकाशकमच यदा सन्मुखयं भवति तदा लघून्यभाने चुतिरः
क्षाष्ण्य प्रसवतन्त्रियाणां भवति । उपस्थानं चलं च रजः उपस्थानीयुः
पद्मभक्ष्योतकं यथा वृत्तो वृत्तदर्शने उक्करस्युष्ट्रमं करोति एव रजो
वृत्तः । तथा रजस्य चलं हं रजोवृत्तिशालूविहो भवति । गुरुवर्णकेमेव
तमः यदा तमं उक्कर्यं भवति तदा गुरुश्यक्षान्यास्वतीनिद्रियायि भवति
वास्त्र्यसमाधीनि । अशाय यदि गुणः परस्यः विश्वः स्वस्त्वेनेव कस्मेन
निष्पादयति तत्त्वं पद्मविश्वाशेऽ वृत्तः प्रदीपितम तुत्त्वं प्रदीपविश्वेषे
साधनना वृत्तिरिद्ध । यथा प्रदीपः परस्याविश्वाशेऽ अनंतिनिष्पादयित्वादिम
काश्यं जनयति एवं सन्तानालंकारस्त विश्वाशेऽ निष्पादयति ।
अन्तरणीयो महामोक्षविधे सिद्धार्थादि प्रधानं पार्थं च धार्मिकं
तथा प्रधानसंगृहपुरसस्मानस्त महादायं च प्रियकन्याविश्वादीति च रक्षणव
गम्यते तथातः ।
[ ९४ ]

ऋत्विकांति: सिद्धसूत्रपद्धातिप्रमेयाभावात्
कार्याक्षमलक्षणां कामेष्यायनकम्पितिबिभ । ९४।

योगमविकांतिर्दिशुः स चैगुण्ड्यानमहादीश्वरक्षेत्रायं तिरंग:। अनो
तत्तत्तिकीप्रमेयाभावात् विषयेषुकुलिकप्रमेयाभावावत्तिकीप्रमेयाभाव
सस्मात् सिद्धमात्र:। यथा बचेनत्तमालख्यः पर: अथवे तत्वोदयः परो
न कुलिकप्रमेयाभावात्। एवं व्याप्तायोजयो भवति दूरः प्रधानमा
सन्तः यो यथा पश्चिमः स प्रधानमध्यपरश्चति तत्तिकीप्रमेयाभावात्।
इति

भेदानं परिमाणात् सम्मक्षसङ्क्षेप: प्रवृत्तेषः
कार्याक्षमलक्षणाविभागाविशेषस्य। ९४।

कार्याक्षमलक्षमितिभिन्नाविभागाविशेषस्य। भेदानं परिमाणासः वचक
व्याप्तायो तद् परिमाणां हस्त यथा कुलाः भविष्येदार्थिक: परिमित्तार्थ
कार्याक्षमक्ष: अवधारणार्थिक: परिमित्तमेव भेदानं परिमाणायें
भेदानं परिमाणार्थिक: परिमाणमेव भेदानं परिमाणमेव भेदानं परिमाणायें

यदि प्रधानम स्वचकत्व: निपरिमाणार्थिक: वेदार्थिक: स्वात्त: परिमाणायें
कारणमस्त्यभाष्यं प्रवर्तते विगुणः। समुदायां परिशेषं सलिलवर्ते प्रतिपरिशेषाय विगुणासः। १५४।

अथ यथांत्र कारणमस्त्य यस्मान्महदादिलिङ्गं प्रवर्तते। विगुणं वि
गुणां सत्तवज्ञमोगुंशा यस्मिन् तत्विः गुणां तत्विः सत्तवज्ञं भवति सत्त
वज्ञो सम्बन्धाय प्रथां। तथा समुदायं यथा गंगायोक्तसं प्रेयः रूप
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सब्रूंचना प्रतिवादिति एवं स्वाति जनवांति एव शिखरुणमध्यकल्ले में यथा जन
यति तथा वा तनावः समुद्रितः पदः जनवानि एवमध्यकल्ले गुणसमुद्रमण्य
हदादिः जनवानि प्रिचुः शिखरुण मध्यकल्ले जगाँ जगांत्र देवतः। यस्मादेवें
धमाले प्रधानाणां तस्मादेक्ष्येक्षेपाधिकारितप्रमोकोऽपि। नैपदीकः परिवारमतः सति
लवणः प्रतिरीतिशिखरुणमध्यकल्ले एकाभ्रानि प्रधानाणां निष्णो लोकः। समुत्प
ज्ञानसुखवाना न भवतित देवा: सुकेष्मसुकः मनुष्या: दुःकेष्मसुकः सोहृन
एकाभ्रानि प्रधानाणां प्रवृत्त एकाभ्रानि प्रतिरीतिशिखरुणमध्यकल्ले परिवारमतः
सतिव्यवहितेः प्रतिरीतिः दीप्सा। गुणानाभायः गुणानाभायशोभिरेष्यसं
गुणानाभायशोभिरेष्यसं प्रतिज्ञाधाय: प्रतिरीतिशिखरुणमध्यकल्ले परिवारमतः
प्रवृत्ते एकाभ्रानि यथा झाकाण्डकर्तरसं सतिव्यवहितेः नानाध्याय्यक्षेत्रिक्षेत्रोऽद्व
सान्तीरेवमेकाभ्रानि प्रधानाणां प्रवृत्तामास्यावः लोकः नेक्तुवाना भवतित देवेषु
सप्तमकर्ष रजसमसी उदासीने तेन तेजस्वेनसुकिनो मनुष्येषु रज उकर्ष
वचति सवतमसी उदासीने तेन तेजस्वेननुजसुकिनो तम उकर्ष भवति
सवरजसी उदासीने तेन तेजस्वेननुजसुकिनो एवमाबाहेन प्रधानस्वाभिल
मत्तयुगस्ये इत्योपः पुरुषायुक्तम्प्रतिपादनार्थमाहः ।

सक्तिपरार्थनात्त शिखरुणार्धिकिर्यमेकाभ्रानिनात्त
पुरुषोत्सिद्धोहुःभावानात् बैप्लव्याङ्गे प्रवृत्तेः । ९७ ।

यदुक्ष्य शिखरुणार्धिकिर्यमेकाभ्रानिनात् प्राप्त िति तथषाणुदानस्मरणामस्य प्रत्येकः
पुष्पः: कारंतविधियमयवंतू पुष्पोपि मूक्षसस्याध्यानामिनात्तिक्षिभि
प्रति कियते। चहात पुष्पः: कस्मात् संघातपरार्थनात्। योऽयं महादिः
संघात्: सप्तमकर्ष्य इत्युम्याः अन्मत्त अन्मत्त। पर्वेष्कः यथा
प्रेयः: गाधारमांगक्ष्यस्तृहितीस्माधानपरिप्राठवाननसमुहः: पराणु नन्हि
स्वायः: प्रवृत्तांस्य नन्हि किष्किष्कि गाधारमांगक्ष्यस्तृहिताय यथायमांसः।
शतोंवर्गवाहितशि पुरुषो व: प्रबंधेते चत्वार्यं पर्यङ्कुलपरार्यं सिद्ध अर्थरं पश्चातं महाभूतानं सहायतं वसंतविति पुरुषो यथेऽद्व नोगरयं महदादिसंस्काररूप संगुप्रभायमि। इत्याभिषैति निगुणादिविशेषे यथाद। यदृः पूर्वस्यामायं चिन्हुयंनिवेदिकिष्णं द्वादृः। तस्मादि पर्यङ्कावेशनात्मक सलिपुरिरतिक्षणा पुमान्। ऋषिपुणारिाशरीह तदनुत्तरनधार नसस्मयंषैर्प्रृति रथं सारणाथिष्ठितं प्रवतते तथायाधिशानाखरी तभिक्ति। तथा चौहं पशितनं पुरुषाभिषिक्तं प्रधानं प्रवतते। द्वाराश्वात्मा भोजुन्नात्। यथा मधुरामलुकयुक्तादिकाः प्रभावदत्तोरूपं रूपः संपुकज्या बालसायतेन् एवं महदादिसंस्कारयं नोगरयावादृक्तं स स्माचर यथेऽद्व नोगरयं शरीरिष्ठित। इत्यक्ष्यं प्रवृत्तेः प्रवृत्तेः केक्षस्य भावं केक्षस्य तिष्ठितम् या च प्रवृतिष्ठित्य:। स्वहित्यं प्रवृत्त: सारणाथिष्ठिते सलिपुरिरतिक्षणयं विशिष्ठदेवते यथार्थेति तथो विशिष्टविविधां संसारस्वामित्वाधिक्तित। एव नेमिहृतिरस्त्रयास्मार्थरासातिरिक्त:। ऋषि सं: शिवके ज्यविररीढिष्ठिरः। इत्यत। जननमर्शकरणां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत् प्रवृत्तेष अनि च राष्ट्रियां पुरुषवहुं पन्नं च श्रीमुगानिविभिष्याबिधि ।
तस्मातयुगसत् प्रवृत्तेष्ठ वहव श्रीति सिद्धं। किष्णान्योगुणाविपरिषधि
विगुणाभावविपरिषधि सिद्धं। यथा सामंये जनमति एकः सा
विद्युसुः तुस्यी। ज्ञेयो राजसो हुः। ज्ञेयमात्रासो महिवानः। एवं। चेंगु
ध्यानिष्ठाय सिद्धिति। ज्ञेयो पुरुष इत्येवसम्य कर्मसिद्धि।

तस्मात्विपरिषधि सिद्धं साधितमस्य पुरुषस्य
कैवल्यं माध्यमस्य दृष्टस्तम्भनः । ९५।

तस्मात्विपरिषधिसारस्तम्भ यस्योगुणाविपरिषधिसारविपरिषधि चिन्दुः। पुरु
शो विवेकी भोजियोद्गुणाः पुरुषस्य यो विपरिषधि उक्तस्तम्भातः सत्य ज्ञनमत्स्ये
सु कर्मभूततेषु साधितमस्य सिद्धं पुरुषस्य यो विभिन्नविकुलो वहवानः प्रति ।
गुष्ठा एवं कृतार्थः प्रवेश्यो साधि न प्रवेशे न निर्वेष्टत एव। किं
चातुर्युः कैवल्यं केवलभावः। कैवल्यमन्याज्ञानिन्यं।। चिन्दुः। कैवलः।
अन्यमाध्यमस्य मध्यस्याभावः। परिराजकवतः मध्यस्य: पुरुषः। यथा खष्ठितः
परिराजको यामीएको रुपस्मार्युषु प्रवृत्तेषु केवलो मध्यस्य: पुरुषोऽपेक्ष
गुष्ठा वर्षमानेषु न प्रवेशे। तस्मात्तथमात्राएवं चेंगुर यथा गुष्ठा
सत्यसत्यभावेन प्रवेशे न पुरुष एवं पुरुषस्याश्च रतिः सिद्धं। यमात्तरः
कस्तो पुरुषस्याश्च रतिः सिद्धं। यथा कस्तो भवति न च कस्तो पुरुष एवमुभाये दोषः
स्थाद्र्द्धिति। अतुः उच्चे।
तस्मात् संयोगाद्वितेन चेतनाविद्विन रितिः
गुरूस्कृतिः च तथा कर्तवं भवतीयुदातिसीः । २०।

इह्य पुरुषस्येवतन्त्रं तेन चेतनावभासं पुरुषं महदान्निर्देशं चेतनाविद्विन
बजि यथा लोके घटं: शीतसंपुष्कं शीत: उषयस्मृतः उषा चर्मं महदादि
रितिः तस्म संयोगात् पुरुषसंयोगाशेतनाविद्विन भवति तस्मात्या श्राद्धं
सायं कुर्विन्तं न पुरुषः । यथापि लोके पुरुषः क्षागतिन्यादि प्रमुखंते
तथापकत्वं पुरुषः रङ्गं गुरूस्कृतं च तथा कर्तवं भवतुदातिसीः गुप्तानं
कर्द्दृंगं सति उद्दसीनोपप: पुरुषः कर्तवं भवति न कस्म । चर्मं खण्डानो
भवति वषाषिणिः च: सह गृहीतममृ इव्यवाग्न्यते लाल्ल परो गुष्ठः: कस्म
रङ्गं संपुष्कं: पुरुषोपसासंप: जस्त: भवति कर्तवं संयोगात् । एवं यक्षग्न
क्षणां विभागो विश्वातो वषिभागान्यायामिरि । छवित्योऽः प्रथा
नपर्यतं: फि हेतुः संपात: उक्ते ।

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैव्यार्थं तथा प्रधानचत
पञ्चव्यवहुमोरिः संयोगस्तात् कृत: सर्गः । २१।

पुरुषस्य प्रधानचत् सह संयोगो दर्शनार्थं प्रकृतिः महदादिर्मान् भूतध्वमेनं
पुरुषः प्रवचित्तं प्रधानचत्याय पुरुषविधं संयोगः । कैव्यार्थं च च संयोगः
पञ्चव्यवहुमोरिः दृश्यम् यथा एकं पञ्चुर्येव कथा वल्लापिग गम्यती महा
तसात्मनुष्ठात्रात् सार्थः स्त्रीनृतानुप्रववात् स्वनृपरिविक्षी दैवरिद्धं
श्रेयस्तथागाय च तीसंयोगमुप्याती पुरुषः स्ववचस्य विश्वास्थे
संयोगो गमनार्थं दर्शनार्थं च भव्याचे तं पर्यं: स्त्रीम्यारोपितं: एवं श्रीरी
राज्यपञ्चुदित्र्येन मानिष्यांशो यति पञ्चुशान्यायापल्ल्यद् । एवं पुरुषे दर्शे
नवकिरित्रश वंगुवक्षिक्या प्रधाने सिवायकिरित्वानवल्लभनिन्नहितकः। यत्रा
चान्योऽर्न भवनेषोऽविधानोऽविधानोऽम्बन्योऽप्रभु
स्मरपी पुरुषस्य मौल ज्ञाता निविष्ठं पुरुषोऽपि प्रधानं हृदा केदारं जन्मति
तथा: कृतार्थचिहानो भविष्यति न च जात्वम् तथात: सर्गश्रेण संबो
गेन कृतार्थं नास्ति: सर्गसृष्टि: यथा जीवपुरुषस्योगात् मुनोपनिषिष्ठथा प्रधा
नपुरुषस्योगात् सर्गस्थोत्पत्ति: इदमानी सर्वविभागंतश्चनाथमाहः।

प्रकृतेषु मानवानः संहृतार्थसम्भावशीरोऽविदः
तस्मादिपि बोद्धश्रीकर्म पञ्जध्ये: पञ्जवृत्तानि। २२।

प्रकृति: प्रधानं वर्ण शिल्पतं सुधानप्रज मायेति पञ्चध्ये:। कालिकृष्टं प्रकृ
ते: सकाशास्त्रानिहानुपयोगम महाद् भुजिरासुरी मति: ख्याति तिम यथापर्वम्
शृङ्खलास्ते तस्मादप्रभुतोः सारण्येहार्यो भूतादिवेक्तिश्लेषस्वती
मान इति पञ्चध्ये: तस्मादस्मिन्नस्योऽविदः तस्मादश्रीकारणोऽविदः बोद्धश्री
रूपेष्माणसु उपज्ञेऽस। स यथा। पञ्चतमोऽविदः श्रेयस्ततमात्म स्पर्शस्ततमात्म इति
तस्माद रसतमात्म गणतमात्मतमात्म इति। ततो
एका देवदिव्यार्थायों बलकु चस्यु जिज्ञा ग्राह्यमिति पञ्च जुदीनित्रेत्यायि।
वाकु पाणिप्राधयुक्तायोऽयथा: पञ्चतमिद्विधाश्चास्यायुक्तायायावदेकार्याद विवाह: इति
निच पञ्जध्ये: पञ्चभूतानि तस्मादोऽविदः बोद्धश्रीकर्म
काल्पनियाः पञ्जभून्नाट्यायाय: सकाशात् पञ्जव वे महाभूतानुपत्तिः। यदुर्व
श्रेयस्तत्तमात्तादाय यस्तेकतास्तादाय: उपत्ततमात्स्वेताः रसत्तमात्तादायः
गणतमात्ताः पुरावी एवं पञ्जध्ये: परमर्थस्य: पञ्जवन्मात्तानुपत्तिः। यदुर्व
श्रेयस्तत्तमात्तादायः यस्तेकतास्तादाय: उपत्ततमात्स्वेताः रसत्तमात्तादायः
गणतमात्ताः पुरावी एवं पञ्जध्ये: परमर्थस्य: पञ्जवन्मात्तानुपत्तिः।
यदुर्व अक्षाजन्याविकानामोऽविदः इति तथ महदायधृतानं पञ्जभूतानि इति
ཁायः पञ्चभून्नाट्यायायाय अक्षायत पञ्जवृत्तिः संविदापराजनानिद्विन्युत्कथि:। एवमेतानि पञ्जविशिष्टि तत्त्वा
नि बख़्तीराण यांच साक्षात तस्य भावोऽक्षते तनं यष्टेऽऽं 
पञ्चविंशति तलाभ यशस्त्रायेषुं तत्र यष्टेऽऽं 
ताति यत्र प्रकृति् पुरुषो वृजन्नक्षः पञ्चतमः श्राद्धेनिन्द्रियाक्षः 
पञ्चसहायोत्तराणि पञ्चविंशति तत्वानि 
तथाति पञ्चश्चयमनुत्पत्ते तस्य महतः किं लक्ष्मणमिथेत्दाहः 

अध्यायसायो वृष्ण्णेश्वरो झानं विराग ऐश्वर्य 
सांविकनेतदूर्ध पादसमस्माहिपयस्ते । २३ ।

अध्यायसायो वृजन्नक्षः। अध्यायसनमधवसायः: यथा वैवे भविष्यूति 
क्रृष्णकृष्णदधवसायोध्वंसपतिबन्धुं इतिवथ स्मृति या सा 
वृजन्नक्षःक्षात सांविकनेत्रदूर्ध तथ भेदः: सांविक हृदं 
अविध्य भवति धर्मान झानं विरतेमिष्यं चेति तथ धर्मो नाम 
धर्म यम नियमविक्षणमण्यार्थमार्थानाया पात्रशेलेवस्मिता च 
भविषयोपारिहार यमां: शीतांसौति यमः सांविकेयप्रशिर्षणायमां ।
झानं प्रकाशोध्वंसमेव भानमित पञ्चांमक्षायधिविध वायसमथनां चेति 
तथ वाहण नाम वेदा: शिश्वा कत्रियो वाक्यां निरूपन 
उद्वेक्याययो वाक्यां इव 
झानं प्रकाशोध्वंसमेव भानमित पञ्चांमक्षायधिविध वायसमथनां चेति 
तथ वाहणेन लोकप्रज्ञ्नानुसार इव 
झानं प्रकाशोध्वंसमेव भानमित पञ्चांमक्षायधिविध वायसमथनां चेति 
तथ वाहणेन लोकप्रज्ञ्नानुसार इव 
झानं प्रकाशोध्वंसमेव भानमित पञ्चांमक्षायधिविध वायसमथनां चेति 
तथ वाहणेन लोकप्रज्ञ्नानुसार इव
वैदिकान्य सूत्रों भूषण ज्ञाति विचरतीति। महिषा महान्म भूषण विष
रति त। सूत्रण सूत्रसातिरचरणबोधिति लघुस्कु युक्तस्वायत्क्रिकि
तिलेखं। प्रारम्भान्तं वस्तु यथा तत्परस्वितः मातृभ्रोतः। प्राचार्यं अर्थ
सति यदिस्मलि ददेहनिति तदुप विद्याति। हृदिम् प्रभुस्तो चैत्यस्माक्षेपि धे। विषयं
सारं वशीभवति। यथार्थां वान्यं ब्रह्मदिक्षितपर्यंत बप बन्धीणेकसः
वेकृष्या न्यायसन्विहारानां रतिति। चार एतानि बुके भिभिन्नानि
वृद्धि यदा सदनं ज्ञातमसि ज्ञातिनिति तदा पुजान् रुक्षिकुणान् धम्मा
दीनामोति। यथार्थाक्तामस्माहिनियोऽपस्वायत्क्षेपिन्यं तत
मसं बुद्धिर्म पन सम्ममिक्षिरीमिक्षिसन्विहारानां सम्ममिक्षिसन्विहारानां
ति। एवं नामात्मासि। लक्ष्यपरार्यां वुखिलिगुक्षाद्वकालपते। एवं
बुद्धिलिगुक्षाद्वकालकालकुमोचायते।

चुबिनातीड़ाकरस्माहिनिविव्यः प्रवर्णी सागः।
एकादशक्षणगच्छन्माषः पञ्चरथीव। ॥ ॥

एकादशक्षणगुण एकादशदिव्याशि तथा तम्मानो गधः पञ्चकः पञ्चतत्त्रा
शुपितः। बद्धतमाम संस्थितमाश्रुपतमाष्टरसंस्थितमाष्टरसत्तमाष्टरसत्
संस्थितमाष्टरसत्तमाष्टरसत्तमाष्टरसत्तमाश्रुपतमाष्टरसत्तमाष्टरसत्
शुपितः। कि लक्षणान् सागे इशेतदाह।

साविक एकादशः प्रवर्णी व्रजताद्विकारात्
भूतदेशनीस्माः सतामस्त्रीज्ञानसुवभन्न। ॥ ॥

साविकान्तान्यतं यदा ज्ञातस्मात् ब्रह्मकोर्तं भवतस्तदा सोऽद्विकारः साविकस्तव
च पूर्णांभि संहा जूता। निकृष्ट इति तस्माकिलुक्काद्विकारादिकायादशयः इद्धि
[ २३ ]

चनराभ दानाबन्धे । तस्मात् सानिकर्णि विगुणानीद्रियाणि स्वविशेषतः 
चानिनि तस्मादोप्येव तार्किक एकादशक्ति इति । बिंचावब्रह्मणाः स 
तामसः तमसाभिन्नते सतश्रवी साधनार्ये यदा भवतः सोहांकलामस 
उच्च्ये तत्व पूर्णाविधस्थिता सङ्क मुहादिस्माथ्यावजूदकरात्मकः 
प्रष्ठको गात्र विश्वासेऽभूतानामाशधुस्मेविजयोक्षेत्रोऽः स तामस 
इति । तस्मातःपञ्चतममांको गात्रः चिन्त तेजसायुभव्यरङ्ग राजसा 
कृत्ये सतागृहः भन्तकसदा तस्मात् सोहास्त्रस्त्रिः इति संन्यां लभते 
तस्मातेजसायुभव्यरङ्गः । उत्तमनिति एकादशी गणस्थापिणि: पंचकः । 
बेदभूत सामीकृतंकारी वैज्ञानिकः: चिन्तृकों भूतका एकादशेणुविगुणाय 
स तेजसायुभव्यरङ्गः सहार्यं गृह्नृतिः साविकी निरन्त्रकः: स तेजसायुभ 
इतिकीस राणम्यः: तथा तामसोहास्त्ररी भूतादि: सत्तती निःविश्वायन्ते 
इत्यादिः किरियात्तु युक्तमानाशद्युक्तायाः सैनीकवः तेजसायुभावः 
एव तेजसायुभव्यार्येणिद्रियाकाण्डः पञ्चतममांक्षि कृतानि भवति सा 
विन्य एकादशक इत्यः: यो चेतकत् सानिकादंकारायुभव्यम् तस्मा का 
सज्जियां।

वुद्धिद्रियायानि चाकुः: चोद्धमारासनस्पर्शनकानि 
वाक्पुष्पिकापदपुष्पस्तानु कमेन्द्रियायाभुः । २६।

चनराभेन्द्रि स्पर्शनपयीनानि वुद्धिद्रियायाभुः। सृष्टिं कन्नेिति स्पर्शिं 
लगिन्द्रिं तत्ताजिं सिंहः। स्पर्शनश्रीविद्वित्तिः तेनेत्यं पद्धतें स्पर्शनकानीि 
शस्त्रमश्नपरसगम् वन्धविवर्णनु वुढख्या। अवगाढ़लित यज्ञ वुढ़ 
विद्यानि। वाक्पुष्पिकापदपुष्पस्तानु कमेन्द्रियायाभुः कमेनुविश्वायन 
कमेन्द्रियायानि। तथ वाग्वदते हली नानाशायायं कुज्या: पादि गमना 
मणि वायुहस्तगति करोिि उपस्य ज्ञानम् नापोषपया। एवं वुद्धिद्रियायानिः
निद्रामें दृश्यमणि शाखानात्मक मन एकादशसंख्याय फ्रियार किंवा स्वरूपे चेति तदनुसारे।

उभयालक्षणमन: संक्षिप्तकृतियत्र च साधनमीति
गुणपरिकारमविशेषानां वाच्पादासि। २५।

अपेक्षिकयर्गे मन उभयालक्षणु युद्धिन्द्रयापु युद्धिन्द्रयवर्तकेमन्दिरयु प्रस्तुत इत्त्वमानि कर्मेन्द्रियवाहां प्रवृत्ति रुत्यवर्तकेमन्दिरयाधारां च तत्साहुभ यानस्य मनः संक्षिप्तवर्तति संक्षिप्तस्य। विनिवेशिन्द्रियं च साधनस्याश्च समा नाथमाल्लवान् साविकारानां कर्मेन्द्रियार्थं शनसा सहैया धस्मानानि मनस्: साधनस्य प्रति तत्साहुभायान्त्योपाते क्रियाकेशिन्द्रियार्थं शुचिकार्यान्तराद्वारा गुणानि। तथ मनस्: क्षा वृत्तिरि
ति। संक्षणो वृत्ति। युद्धिन्द्रयाश्च शन्तद्वद्वो वृह्दयं कर्मेन्द्रियाश्च वचना द्वेषेष्ठेनानीं कर्मेन्द्रियार्थं भित्रानि भिधारणहार्थी फिमीव्रतियोत स्वभा वेन कृतादि तव: प्रधानवहुहारिकारं प्रवेशना पृष्ठोपकर्षणवषाह। इह सांग्लाना स्वभावी नाम शरीकर्षणमस्वि। अनेकार्थे गुणपरिकारमविशेषानां वाच्पादासि। इत्यादि। कर्मेन्द्रियार्थं शच्चमस्मर्तपरस्माध्यं पञ्चाना न वचनानानविहरितीशवानस्यनदायस्य पञ्चाना संस्कृतस्य मनस। एवम्भते भिा
जनामवेषें कर्मेन्द्रियायामः। गुणपरिकारमविशेषाय गुणाना परिहारो गुणपरिकारमविशेषायाय। अषितव्रतानां नेष्ठर्य नालाकरशन न वुज्धा नप्रधानेन नपुष्पिया चवानवातदुःगुरुपरिषि
शास्वतिक। गुणानामस्य आचारवस्तेन एववते एव चर्चातिहिन्तवस विनिवेशिनिन्तं तीर्थाय गुणपरिकारमविशेषाय चवानवातदुःगुरुपरिषि
शास्वतिक। एवम्भेतना गुणा एकादशेन्द्रियभावेन एवम्भेतने विशेषाय श्रीप्रत्य न्यिते एव धनेः। एवम्भेतने चतु शलोकानावस्यं तथा प्रार्थ तथा श्रीप्रत्य तथा जिहा स्वदेशे स्वार्थविह्याय। एवं कर्मेन्द्रियपद्यि यथार्थयाय।
स्त्रांगोपायिनि स्त्रादेशात् विशिष्टतः स्वभावतोः गुणपरिशासांतिया गेजेपातेव न
tदृश्या चेतना यत् उक्त शास्त्रान्तरे। गुणा गुंभेशु वर्णनेते गुणान्तः या वृत्तः
सा गुणविशयः एववि वांशायो विशेषा गुणपूर्तः एवविश्यः। प्रधानं यद्य
कारणमिति। साधेन्द्रस्ते कुष्ठ: का वृत्तिरितुष्यते।

शब्दान्तियूः प्रज्ञानादमोक्षानसहिष्ठिते चूलः।
श्रवणादसनिविष्टारोगाननदार्शनामवामः। २५।

साधेन्द्रस्ते विशेषः। तिरिश्चेष्यावृत्तिः यथा भिन्ना मार्गं लक्ष्यं नान्यो
विशेषः: इति। तथा। दृष्टूः रूपमाणे न रसादिदः द्रवं शेषथः यथा
मायोरूपं इत्यत्वम्या रसो ग्राहयः यथोऽत्तथ: तथा: सः प्रत्यायः। द्रव
मेया मुक्तिद्रियायः वृत्तः औषधिता कर्मिन्द्रियायाः वृत्तः। कथाते वचनादा
नविकोटिगोतानदार्शनानां कर्मिन्द्रियाणाश्रित्यः। चाहे वचनं इत्य
वोढ़ातृं पादयोगिन्हं पायोकुण्डसात्यपरिषीतो मलोत्तरः। उप
स्त्रानन्तः। मुत्तोत्तादिविशयः वृत्तिरिति सचयः। अनुना बुधाकारमान
सामुष्पणे।

स्त्रालक्ष्यः वृत्तिरितस्य सेवा भववसामान्या
सामाज्यकर्ष्णूर्वृत्तः प्रमाणः वायवः: पश्चाः। २५।

स्त्रलक्ष्यासभाया स्त्रालक्ष्यः। आयतस्येऽसो वृत्तिरितिसनामस्य सिव
वृत्तियोः। तथाभिमानोऽहंकार इत्यविभानलक्षणोऽभिमानवृत्तिः।
संस्कृतद्व: मनः इति लक्ष्यमुखः तेन संस्कृत: एव मनोस्वातः वृत्तः। चतुः
बुधाभिकारमस्य स्त्रालक्ष्यः वृत्तिरसामान्या या प्रागविनिहिताः बुधीद्रियः
वाः च वृत्तः तास्यसामान्ये। इद्यानी सामान्या वृत्तिरास्यायते। सा
युगपत्रसत्यस्य  तु धृतिः क्रमशः तत्तव निर्दिष्टा
हेतु तथापिहे चययमेव तत्पूर्वका  धृतिः : । 30।

युगपत्रसत्यस्य  बुधशंकरारम्भणास्वेदविदेशस्य  सति  चतुर्दशं  भवति  चतुर्दशम्  चतुर्दशः
धृतयो द्वारा प्रतिविषयपथमायेते  युगपत्रसत्याः  तत्समानस्य बुधशंकरारम्भणास्वेदविदेशः
बुधशंकरारम्भणास्वेदविदेशः।  बुधशंकरारम्भणास्वेदविदेशः।
किंच क्रमशः तत्तव निर्दिष्टस्य  तत्तत्स्य  चतुर्दशस्य  क्रमशः  धृतिः।
किंच क्रमशः तत्तव निर्दिष्टस्य  तत्तत्स्य  चतुर्दशस्य  क्रमशः  धृतिः।
यथा सुभद्रतः  यथा  गच्छन्  दूरादेशं  हंसा  स्वाभावः  पूर्वः  तथा  संख्ये  सति  परीक्षा
क्रमशः  तत्स्य  धृतिः। तथो तत्स्य  बुधशंकरारम्भणास्वेदविदेशः।
किंच क्रमशः  स्थिरतिः  स्वाभाविक चतुर्दशम्  क्रमशः  धृतिः।
बुद्धांकरमनस्यस्रासं ्ञमरी वृत्तिहृदा रथा रूपे तथा शत्यादिविषि वी
ब्या हृदे हत्रति। किंचायत्सप्थहे चयमातत्पूर्विका वृत्तिरहेसना
गते स्ति च काले बुद्धांकरमनसां रूपे बचुः पूर्विका यथाय वृत्ति: स्वर्ण
वस्त्तपूर्विका गते धार्मिक घस्य रसनवृत्तिका घस्ये अवश्यपूर्विका बुद्धां
कार्मसामनात्ति भविष्यति कालेस्ति च तत् पूर्विका ऋमरी वृत्तिवर्ये
थेमान युगपत्त् ऋमशब्दित। सिंह ॥

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपदने परस्मार्कृतहेतुकाः वृत्ति
पुख्षार्थ एव हतुने केनचित् कामित् फरण ॥ ३२ ॥

स्वां स्वाभवित वीसा बुद्धांकरमनानि स्वां स्वां वृत्ति परस्मार्कृतहेतुकाः
पालकासारस्मम इति प्रतिपदने पुख्षार्थस्तधाय। युक्तसामार्कृत
बुधिरहेतुकाः श्रेष्ठा स्थविषयं प्रतिपदने किरष्यन्ति चेत् पुख्षार्थे
एव हतुः पुख्षार्थे: स्त्रीययमायम गुणान् प्रतिद्वित्ति प्रत्यावित्ति यथाविनि
पुख्षार्थे क्रियन्तिता फरण स्त्रये प्रवसनते न केनचित् कामित् फरण शरी
पार्श्व स्वरुपकृमा: दानविति वाकाचारी न केनचिदीशरण पुख्षेष्यार्थे कामित् प्रवो
ध्ये करण ॥ बुधादि प्रतिविरं तद्भुतपि ॥

फरणं इत्यदि इति तदाहरणप्रकाशकारं
कामि च तस्य दशपाहार्म साम्य ख्रियाय च ॥ ३२ ॥

फरणं महादि इति इति इति इति ब्रह्मणं पंचसूत्रीयावति ब्रह्मणीति पंच
कर्मेनधीयायितावलानवियति इति इति इति इति इति इति इति
हरस्पारणप्रकाशकारं। तताहरन फरणं च कर्मेनधीयायित कुबेरनि प्रकाशं
फलोत्पत्ति के वायन रोग की रूपमें स्पष्ट नहीं तथा अन्य रिस्क रोगों के लिए भी संदर्भित नहीं है। इसके अलावा, इसमें सूचना के माध्यम से वायन रोग की रोग वाले के लिए भी संदर्भित नहीं है। इसलिए, इसमें सूचना के माध्यम से वायन रोग की रोग वाले के लिए भी संदर्भित नहीं है।


[ २५ ]

बुधिनिद्रायार्थ तेषां वर्त्तमान विशेषविशेषविषयाको वाचवति बुधविषया शेषार्थ: तु पञ्चविषयार्थ: । ३८।

बुधिनिद्रायार्थ ताति सत्वशिष्य विषय गुढ्रनिति सतविषयिकिय ग्यानानां
शस्त्रस्मर्ध्यमक्समनानां तुष्टोऽस्मृतितयमुक्तानां बुधिनिद्रायार्थ प्रज्ञा
शान्ति देवान्त निरवेदानिविषयज्ञान निरामायन: शास्त्रविभागान सभोऽ
शान्तवनि शान्तविषया देवानां मानुषाणां च यावदां स्मृतानीज्ञानस्तति
तस्मिन शान्तानां मानुषाणां च यागिर्दिस्तु तृद्यम स्तरालम्पिकि वायुधानितरक्षि
पारिशिष्ठायुपयुक्तसर्वक्षितानि पञ्चविषयार्थ पञ्चविषया शस्त्रस्मर्ध्यमक्समनानां
पापी सभो: पञ्चशस्त्रस्मर्ध्यिल
क्षणायं भुवि पादो विहरति पार्युद्धियं पंजकृतमक्स: करोति तथोपस्ये
निर्दिव: पञ्चविषयार्थ पञ्चमानन्यदर्दर्न:।

साधारणस्य बुधी सभोऽ विषयावधानस्य वस्त्रानि
तस्मात् प्रियविंक कर्त्तव: दार्शिनी शेषार्थ: । ३४।

साधारणस्य बुधीस्वेतिकार्यः सहितेन्य: वस्त्रानि सभोऽ विषयावधानस्य
गुढ्रानिति विविधच: शास्त्रहीन: गुढ्रानि तस्मातविधिक कर्त्तव: दार्शिनी
शेषार्थ: शेषार्थः करणानीमिति । ज्ञान: ।

इति प्रदीपका: परस्परविलक्षण: गुणविशेषः
कृत्यं पुनर्मस्यां दार्शिनी वस्त्रानि प्रयुक्ति । ३६।

यानि करणानुकूलनि इति गुणविशेषः किं विशिष्टः प्रदीपका: प्रदीप
विषयवस्तु: परस्परविलक्षण घटना निभाविषया इत्यः। गुरु विषया इत्यः। गुरुविषया गुरुस्वभो जातः। तुल्य पुरुषस्वभाव युद्धद्रव्य री क्रमेन्द्रियायहंश्चारो मनवितात्मं स्तं स्वर्णः पुरुषस्व प्रकाश्य तुर्वी प्रयत्नः तुर्विशंतं यथा कोणस्य सत्ते विषयं सुखादिकृ पुरुष उपलब्धते। ईवः।

सर्वं प्रत्युपोगं वस्मात् पुरुषस्व साधयति वुष्टः
सेव च विशिष्टतिः पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तः सुखः। ३८।

सर्वद्रिकतं स्वविधाः कालेषु सर्वं प्रत्युपोगमुपोगं प्रति देवमुनुष्टतिः क्षमिरेण वुजीन्द्रियायहंश्चारेण सातः करणा वुष्टिः साधयति सम्पादृयति वस्मात् तस्मात् सेव च विशिष्टति प्रधानपुरुषोविशेषविभागं करोति प्रधानपुरुषान्तः नातासिद्धेऽति। ३८।

तत्त्वविशेषविशेषायेश्वरो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चः
एते स्मृता विशेषाः शाता प्रोक्ताः सुधारः। ३८।

या निः पञ्च तत्त्वविशेषविशेषार्धावर्धितात् ते पञ्चतन्त्रमां स्पष्टतन्त्रमां द्वद्वां न्यायं रसतन्त्रां गम्भीरतन्त्रयोविशेषाः उच्यये देवानामेव सुखादिकृ ध्यना विषया दुःखोहहिताश्चायं ध्या पञ्चतन्त्रस्माणि: पञ्चमहाभूतानि पुष्पििायजोधामुक्ताश्रमाश्चायं यानुवधिने। एते स्मृता विशेषाः: गत्ततस्त्वा।
मूर्त्मा मातापित्यज़ा: सत्यभूतिलिपि विशेषा: स्युः
मूर्त्माः नियता मातापित्यजा निवर्तने । ३५।

मूर्त्मास्तम्भाय्यः यस्मांगुर्हीते तन्मालिक मूर्त्मशरीरः महादुर्लिङ्गः सदा
सिद्धित संस्कृतित ते मूर्त्मास्तम्भामातापित्यज़ा स्युःशरीरीयोपचारः चतुः
काले मातापित्यजायः शोक्तिदशुक्तिमृतमीभिन्नोदरः मूर्त्माः राज्यलोप
चतुः कुलीत तत: मूर्त्माः पुनस्मातुमुक्तिभिन्ननानाविरिन्ते नाभिन्
बनेनाहतः तथा प्रथायां शरीरः स्युः मातापित्यज़ा जणि शहस्तरभूतिस्वरूपः
शेरः पृष्ण्डरजयंवाहः सिवः प्रभृतिर दात श्रीपृभाविन्दर: सर्विस्माः
मूर्त्माशुक्तिमृतमा: मातापित्यज़ा राज्यलोपविरिन्ते तेजः राज्याद: संप्रधानोपिविवर्तः
सर्वायां शरीरां मातापित्यज़ा निवर्तने । एवमेते
परिवर्तः विशेषा: स्युः । अष्टां के नियतः के वाकनियतः मूर्त्मास्तम्भां
नियतः नियालंकारां शरीरः कर्मवर्तशास्त्रः
पुनःदशुक्तिमृतमा: मातापित्यज़ा नियतः संसर्गति धर्मवर्तशास्त्रादिकालिकोबिन्ते
विषयः मूर्त्मशरीराः सर्वत्र यथा ज्ञानमुपदते तथासे ज्ञाने विश्वासरीरां
वज्रा मोख् गंधर्ति तस्मादि विशेषा: मूर्त्मा नियतः दति मातापित्यज़ा
यदा लोकानुत्तमः प्रधानादिसर्गं तद्य सूक्ष्मशरीरमुल्यभ्रमिति । सिंचाल

do not delete

पूर्वीप्रसरसंक्षेप

निर्देशसे तत्त्व सूक्ष्मशरीरं परिवर्तनेविह प्राणधारकेता वातानुपत्त्वा नि

वन्नमेव शरीरकेव रुकीर्मिहिंजिवयस्य सूक्ष्मादिसु प्रतिधिये

गणा तत्त्व सूक्ष्म च कथं संसर्गति तदाह ।

निर्देशसे महदासिसूक्ष्मपद्यं

संसर्गति निर्देशसे भावार्थपिवाितं लिंगं । ४० ।

यदा लोकानुत्तमः प्रधानादिसर्गं तद्य सूक्ष्मशरीरमुल्यभ्रमिति । सिंचाल

दस्तकं न संयुक्तं तिथियोगोंिदेवमानुस्यानेव सूक्ष्मात । कुशंचटसंक्षेपं पर्निता

दियुक्तमित्रहः सरति गतः । निर्देशसे यावधानमुल्यवते सावनं संसर्गति

तत्त्व महदासिसूक्ष्मपद्यं महानादीं वस्य तन्महदादि बुद्धिर्हर्शारे सन

क्षिति पथं तन्मात्मानं सूक्ष्मात्मानं संसर्गतिः गूढ़त्वपिवािति

का वत् तीनं न लोकान्। निर्देशसे भोगर्हितं तत्त्व सूक्ष्मशरीरं पितृमा

तृजेन वाहिनीप्रथमेन अश्रममेष्टहरारु भोगेशु सर्निं भवतीत्वः । भावी

रथिवाित्तं पुरुषात्मानं धर्मादीन् पश्चातमात्रिपिवाितमुपरिजितं लिं

गमिति । प्रतिप्रेते महदासिसूक्ष्मपद्यं करोपेत प्रधाने तलग्य चरसं

रघुस सदासिद्धशिकालभर्तिेत प्रकृतिमोहवत्वनवर्भ सत्त संसर्गतिः दियुक्तमिति

पुनः सरगालें संसर्गति तस्मातिं सूक्ष्मं । यिं प्रथोज्जनन चयो

दशकिं तर्कं संसर्गतीत्वं चौदिते सवाह ।

चिंच यथाधर्ममुः स्वास्थ्यादिभ्यो गणा विना छाया

तद्रिवणां विशेषेन तिर्यं निराध्यं लिंगं । ४१ ।

चिंच यथा कुजनानुसृतेः न तिल्हिति स्वास्थ्यः सीतलादिभ्यो विना
पुरुषप्रेमेवेदनमिदनिमित्तविशिष्टमन्त्रेन
प्राकृतिकभुवनोपायनकार्यमेवतिषिते लिङ्गः ॥ ६२ ॥

पुरुषप्रेमेन: कल्पः इति प्रधानं प्रवस्तेत स च विविधं: शब्दशुचिपरमविशेषतः
गुणांपुरुषात्तात्तोपायनकार्य इति तत्त्वादुक्तं पुरुषप्रेमेवेदनमिदं सूक्ष्मगरीरं
प्रवस्तेत इति। निमित्तविशिष्टमन्त्रेन निमित्त धम्मक्षि नैनिशिखसूक्ष्मं
मनादि पुरस्तादेव वश्यामः प्रसीत्र प्रसङ्क्तः प्रवस्ते: प्रधानस्य विभूतियो
गाण्याः राजा स्वस्ते स्वस्ते विभूतिवादिपति तत्त्वः करोतीमि तत्त् प्रवस्ते:
सर्वविभूतियोगाचित्तविशिष्टमन्त्रेन अवस्थितेऽ पूर्णं पृथगदेवारस्तः
श्लोक्य अवस्थां करोति। लिङ्गं सूक्ष्मं: परमाकाशसूक्ष्मयिधकर्षितं श्लोकं
चयोद्घवधिकर्षितं मानुषायेत्योपयोगिनिः श्लोक्यतथां एवं नामभोजं
नत: पटाकोरश प्रविश्य देवो भूता निगृहस्तितु पुनमानुषः पुनविभूतकं ॥
एवं लिङ्गं निमित्तविशिष्टमन्त्रेनोदराणं: प्रविश्य हसी ब्रह्मानुभवति।
भाविरिवासितं लिङ्गं संसारलाभं तत् के भावा इत्यादि ॥

क
सांसिधिकाशाङ्का: प्राकृतिक वैकृतिकाशधनमोक्षः
कलाल्या: कर्माचार्यः काम्योश्रिकिकन्धकः कलाल्या: । ॥ ॥

भावालिंगविधारित्वं रूपार्द्धार्द्ध उपवग्नमानस चतुर्वर्ती भावः सहोपया धम्मोऽज्ञान वैराग्येष्यमेश्वरित्। प्राकृताः च्यातनं स्रोताः पुष्पः
सन्नकन्दनसनातनसनाकुमारः भूतः तेषामुपन्नशक्यकार्यान्यां शरीरा
णः पीडोपर्योक्तेन भावालिंगसुन्नकुमाराः मदते प्राकृताः। तथा
ज्ञाताः च चाचार्यामूल्यिनिमित्तु कुलमुक्तदानाँ ज्ञानमुक्तदते ज्ञानवेरण
वैराग्यां च धम्मेतीश्यमेश्वरित्। चाचार्यमूल्यिनिमित्तु विकृतितिं
तस्मां ज्ञाताः इति भाव उच्यन्ते चैविदग्यस्तं निम्नं संसर्बैते चतुर्वर्ती
भावः सांसिधिकाशाङ्कायीता: सांसिधिकमुन्नष्टप्राप्तौ तामसमस्रालिपक्ष
मिनुष्ठ बायास्राता एवमेही धम्मोऽज्ञान वैराग्येष्यमेश्वरित्वमें
धम्मेतीश्यमेश्वरित् भावः। इति धते इति कर्माचार्यः वुः कर्ममात्राः
तदास्त्रितः। एतदुक्कसमवस्य वुः कर्ममात्राः ज्ञानमिव तामोऽस्त्रितः
धम्मोऽज्ञान अद्वैतः कलाल्या: ये मात्राः इत्युतः सुकृतशिलायितं
विवृतिहृदयः कलाल्या बुद्धस्यांपंसेश्चूम्भतयाः। तथा चिन्तार्जुनस्वायत्वाय भावा
अचलन्ताः निर्धारिता निषिद्धाः इति काम्योश्रिकन्धकसिद्धिः निर्धारिता
काम्योश्रिकन्धकसिद्धिः यथैव च विवृतिहृदयः। निर्धारितासिद्धिप्रसंगेनेति
यदुक्कसमवस्याः।

धर्मेश्वर गम्नमूढः गम्नमथस्कर्मणयथर्धर्मेश्वर
ज्ञानन्तरार्द्धार्द्धकार्यादिपि वन्यः । ॥ ॥

धर्मेश्वर गम्नमूढः धम्ममविनिमित्तु कुलोपूष्मुपनयाः ज्ञानसिद्धिः स्मानानि
[34]

गृहन्ते तथा। शास्त्र प्राक्तं सीम्येन्द्र गाथें, यान्त राजसं पैशाच
मिति तत् सूक्ष्मं शरीरं गंधति पशुमूग्गक्षिणिस्तीर्यप्रवाहेनेवधर्मेऽऽनि
मिति। जिंक्ष ज्ञानेनचापवर्गं पञ्चविंशति तत्वङ्गान तेन निमित्तेनापव
गृहं मोहं तत् सूक्ष्मं शरीरं निविष्टे परस्माय उध्यं। विषम्याविद्यते
वाक्य श्राविन निमित्तं सवैर नैनिमिषः ग्राज्ञो वैज्ञानिको दान्तविनधकु
बन्धु ईति वस्तति पुरुस्ताधिको अक्षुरेन च वनेन तथा वैज्ञानिकः
च। दक्षिणाभिस्वरूपे वही नायेन सुध्यते। तथायदिपि निमित्तं।

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वैश्यावत् प्रकृति-श्रुतं: संसारी भवति राजसाध्रागातः
ैश्येष्याविद्यतां विषम्यावत् तत्वियोगः। 34।

ष्ठा क्षमिबिरा-श्रुतिः न तत्वङ्गानि तत्स्मद्राङ्कुमून्वैराग्याः प्रकृति
लय्य। सूक्ष्मानुसारु प्रकृतिः प्रज्ञानुसारारतत्वाश्च लीलेऽ: न मोहं।
ततो भूरोंविष्टं सवैि न श्राविन श्रावशी रागः। वजामि दस्यन्त्रां ददामि
चनामूनिविन्दकेशं वदित यथियं मानलं मुक्तमन्त्रभवान्तस्मद्राधसाध्रागातः
सं
सारी भवति। तथा ईश्वराविद्यता तत्स्मद्राङ्कुमूनिविन्दकेशं
तत्स्मद्राङ्कुमनिमित्ताविद्यताः। नैनिमिषः भवति ब्रह्मचित्रः स्वाभिस्वरूपे न
विह्यते। तिन्द्रान्विन्दकृष्टियोगियोः। तस्या विक्रमयुक्तिविद्यताः। तस्याविप्रत्यविप्रीस्तो विधाती
भवतिः भविष्यात्तस्य सवैि विह्यते। इष्ठ निमित्तः सह नैनिमिषः वोडाशक्षियो
प्रायुः: स फिरुम्भः इत्याय।
रघु प्रत्ययसंगी विपश्यक्षित तसीड्यद्विधायः
गुण वेष्यप्रविधिः तथा च भेदातू पंचाशः। ८६।

वषा एव शोधशविचर निदेशस्मान्तिधक्षेऽयाम एव प्रत्ययसंगी उच्यते। एव प्रत्ययं चुड़िरितुक्रजांकुशवस्यो चुड़िरिमण्डलेऽहस्तं स च प्रत्ययं साध्वाधृतं भिद्यते विपश्यक्षित तसीड्यद्विधायः चेष्टां। तत्तं संशयोऽञ्जान। यथा कस्यचित्तं स्थायुदश्च यस्यपूर्वं पुस्मकेष्यं चेष्टां। चेष्टा श्रियेशा। तमेकस्फायं सम्यकक्षुं संशयं क्षेत्रू न दृष्टीनीतिशक्षिः। एवं तृतीयकुशाः यथा। तमेकस्फायं ज्ञातं संशयं ति निदेशं किमेनानूति। स्माधानेयं तुष्टं। चतुर्थं सिद्धाभिः यथा। ज्ञानदिशिष्यं स्थापुर चारीं चक्षुं पर्यते श्रुतिं न तथां सिद्धाभिः यस्यपूर्वममति। एव तस्य चतुर्थिक्षण न्याय गुणविश्वस्य संशयं पक्षाक्षणेन गुणाक्षणां विषये तत्तं तद्भवति ज्ञानमभवति रजस्मसी उदासीने कापि रजः कापि तम इति भेदः। कथयते।

पंच विपश्यक्षेत्राभवत्तुण्यक्रये वेष्यधाः
श्रीविशेषतिभेदासूनिदन्तवादास्तथा सिद्धः। ८९।

पंच विपश्यक्षेत्राभवत्तुण्यक्रये ततो मोही महामहोपाध्यायेऽख्यातिहेतुतिस्मानात्मकि इति। वायु भेदाना नानां प्रक्षेत्रेनन्तरस्माति। अश्चलकुशविशिष्टि भेदः भवति कर्मम्वक्पणां तान्पति प्रक्षेत्रालक्षणाः च तुद्धिरिद्वव जर्जर्योतिषि रजस्मां ज्ञानानि। तष्ठाद्विधिं सिद्धं साक्षीजान ज्ञानानि तष्ठाद्विधिं रजस्मां ज्ञानानि। चतुर्थिक्षणं तत्र अर्थवर्धिषोतसि। एतत् वस्त्रेष्वेव पक्षेनौ ते पञ्चविपश्यक्षेत्राभवत उच्यते।

[ ३६ ]
मेदलसोड़विधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः
तामिलोड़विधशा तथा भविष्यतात्मकिः । ४५ ।

तमसाम्यावद्धर भेदः प्रत्येक्षानांभिजोता सोड़शासु प्रकृतिरु प्रवेषते प्रभानुद्बङ्कारयुक्तसत्मासाशु तथ लीनामाणां मन्यते सुमोहसितत
तानो भेदः एवोडशविधस्य मोहस्य। श्वेतोड़विध एवेवः । यष्टादगुणाविषयक्षमानि
माथिषयां तम संगादित्वाद्यो देवा न मौख्र प्राप्यविन वनस्पतत्वः च ये संसा
रणेयोडशविधो सोड़शु इति । दशविधो महामोहः वश्त्रस्थितयरपसङ्गधा
देवानामते पंचविषयः सुरसाधारणः मानुषाशृवान्ते एव श्रद्धादयः पन्न
विषयः एवमेतेऽसु दशशु महामोहः इति । तामिलोड़विधशाशविधिशन्मेभ्रमेभ्रमेभ्रम
हस्तानुविषयका विषयः दश श्रेष्ठाव्यन्द्वादित्वा सम्परसनन्दनिन्विषयः नान
नुमोदल्योडशविधशविधिशन्मेभ्रमेभ्रमेभ्रम । यष्टातामिलमुगुणाविषयां
हस्तानुविषयका दशविषयाश्वात्मानातिनिविषयः अश्वते तमसाम्यावद्धरः
सोड़स्यात्मिस्य इति । एवं विषयेनेवेदाश्वः प्रभुतमः पन्न प्रत्येकं
भविष्यनात किषपिनेद्भा: संवृता इति । अश्वकिनेद्भा: ऋष्यनोः ।

पशुदशोद्विधवाच सह वुद्वदिधशिरस्तःशिश्वः
समधानां बुद्वदिधविषद्यन्तु नुदिश्विनेनाम् । ४५ ।

भविष्यश्लेष्य कः विषयंदशशाचार्यण्यशिरसंतिमेद्भा: इत्युप्त हः तत्कादशश्लेष्यवायः
बाधितमित्तमुमुमुशिपतिमहाप्रामाणितिमात्राको मूलकता कुष्टां खंडे सांज्ञ गुदा
वर्षः कः स्थतमुभाद्यः इति । सह वुद्वदिधशिरस्विद्वाच सह वुद्वदिधवाचः सहभाष
कः विषयंदशशिरसंतिमेद्भा: भविष्य समधानां बुद्वदिधविषद्यन्तु नुदिश्विनेनसिद्धि
भविष्यपरिश्वमेते नुदिश्विनेद्भा: नव सिद्धिवेद्भा: ह्यासेन्द्रे ते विषयं इति । सह एकादश
विधा एवमस्तांविशिष्ठितिकथा ऋषिकिरिति विपमूःबत्र सिवितुद्रीनायेव
नेद्रम्मी दृष्टवः । तथा तुषितेनवथा रूप्यते ।

धात्वालाविश्वकार्यतः प्रकृतिपदानसाकलबागायणः
वाया विधोपमावः पंचन नव तुषितेनभवतः । ५००।

धात्वालाविश्वकार्यतः प्रकृतिपदानसाकलबागायणः
तथाप्रकृतिम्या यष्ट श्रुतां वेश्च सच्छः
सगुणिन्युः का तन तर्थां प्रकृतिमिच्छवे सुद्धार्थम्
नाशित सशक्त यथा प्रकृतिम्या । उपादानातः यष्ट अभिद्विश्वास्यीव
तदनं ज्ञोति विद्युक्तबलुविविद्वायो मोक्ष इति तस्यापि नाशिते
उपादानातः । तथा कालस्था कालेन मोक्षो भविष्यती दिः तथा
व्यासेनेष्वं कालायस्तु तुषितस्य नाशित मोक्ष इति । तथा भागायणः
भागेनिव मोक्षो भविष्यती भागायणः । चतुर्दश तुषिततिरि । वाज्ञ्याधः
बनोपमावः पंच । वामानसुः पञ्च विधोपपरसः श्रुत्योपमावः
दिशेयं उपरतोर्जनरमुक्यसंगीतंसङ्गीतं दशेनातः । वृहिनिमिताङ्गासुः
किंवाणिर्यपियसेवः कामेऽ एतर्जनं दु:खमर्जितानां रस्ते दु:खसुप्नो
गात् श्रीयत इति छयोः । तथा विधोपमोगांसेवः नृते नाशिक्त्रियास्या
मुष्टयम् इति संगोः । तथा न अनुपवय भूतानुपवय इवेष्ठिनियास्या:
एवम्येजनादिपदोपरसातः पंचविधोपपरसातः पंच तुषः। एवमायणिः
क्याग्नेदाजवयुक्तस्यातः नामानि शालान्ते नोक्षानि। सन्म सचित
सिवी मोहो वृहितः सुतगी पार्य सुनेत्र नारीकलन्तममतितमिति। नाशातः
तथा नापपिरामाणविद्वानः भयमिति। तथा अन्नभिवसकुललममोः
इत्यादिसारयासुः इति। सिद्धिगृहये ।
जहा यस्य कवितायमूहे विषिः सिं सिं नैच्छियसि कि युतायायः
स्वामिति चिन्तयायी शानमुपातरे प्रधानादेय एव पूर्वः इत्याया बुधिर्यो
शंकरार्यस्मानि तन्मायशीतिविणिभवमहातुमानीते तत्तज्ञानमुपातरे
वेन मीलो भवाति एषा ज्ञात्या प्रवचन सिंहि्ः।
तथा श्रद्धानात्
प्रधानपुष्पवुद्धारामाणे तिरिप्रमहातुमातिविषयः श्रान्न भवति ततो मीलो
इत्यथा श्रद्धाश्या सिंहि्ः।
अधिनयानेदादिशालाभायानात् पंचविष्णविषयः
श्रान्न प्रायः इत्यथा तृतीया सिंहि्ः।
एवेऽदुःसच्चिदेरात् विधा रूपनीया ईति छत्र
सिंहि्ः। तथासुद्धारः विरुद्ध सुहुत् ज्ञानविद्यमय सीमां गतिति
एषा सम्मति सिंहि्ः।
दान यस्य कवितालय्या प्रवचनाययिधिनिधि शुद्धिकिरीति
कार्यानां यासाहादानानां च दानेरपकृत तेऽधी ज्ञानवाय योग्यात्
शाहमि सिंहि्ः।
सरामान्नानां सिंहिनां शास्त्रानां संज्ञा: कृतायारु सुतार्
तारार्य प्रमोदति ग्रुदितमां रेव भय सदासुद्धितमिति।
आसां विपर्ययादुहः ते विपरीतसा शक्ती निन्दिन्या वषस्ततारसुतारस
तारार्यनिविन्यादिरुपमशिनेदा अधारिविशिष्टस्य कहुमहिविरिकादिः
निन्द्रयधा ईति।
तं तुविशिवध्या नव सिंहिनां विपर्यया ऋति एव
प्रेते सम्रादभुविधा भैति: सहार्यनधा अधारिविशिष्टसिनेदा: प्रजात्
कृपाता ईति विपर्ययाशिनेदातिमिनानेवोहि निवेद्यशिल्मृते ईति।
सिं काव्यात् सिंहि्ः।
पूर्णसुकुष्मलिखिविधि: सिंहि्ः।
श्रान्ना द्वितीया शिक्षितुत्वायाः
एव सिन्धुरुक्षशिलेदाति भिखीदी यस्य गृहीतानुकृतिव स्वा भवेर
विष्णुविशिष्टितुरुक्षित्वृृहीती लोकोज्ञानमृति तस्मादित्।
परिवर्तः
सिद्धि: सेषया स सिद्धस्वचारनमुत्थाते तन्मोक्ष इति। ब्रह्म यदुः भाविर्दि
वासितं लिङ्गं तत्र भावा भ्रमणद्वृत्ताच्छु कुष्णिनिध्वाम् विचारविश्वाश
कुष्णिण्यिनिध्वाम् इति। स भावाय: प्रवचनं: लिङ्गं च तन्मात्सर्गं च रूढः
सूयर्यं प्रवाहितं ज्ञात्वेन उज्ज्वलरूपमोषणं पुरुषार्थसंवर्गं विद्वान
विविधविलोक्तं चाह।

न विना भाविलिङ्गं न निर्वा लिङ्गं भावनिर्पूति:
लिङ्गार्थो भावार्थसमाविष्टिः प्रवचनं सर्गं । ৫২।

भावः प्रवचनं विना लिङ्गं न तन्मात्सर्गं न पूर्णसंक्षीरभावसिद्धं
लाभसर्वदेहाभ्याय: लिङ्गं तन्मात्सर्गं च विना भावनिर्पूततिमेवः स्वतः
सूयर्यं देहातं वायुसम्बन्धेनाद्विलिङ्गं सर्गं वीर्यकुर्वथोमाथो न दो
ष्ट्रां तत्रहातीमापेक्षितेण तद्भुजाः इतिन्वर्णात्हा तस्मात्तिमेव न परस्पारपेक्षितामस्माभावः
लिङ्गार्थसमाविष्टिः प्रवचनं सर्गं इति विनिचतमाय।

छाडनिविलो दैवत्संभ्यसंस्कृतय परं पञ्चमं भवति
मानुषविद्विषयं: समासो मौतितः सर्गं । ৫৩।

तत्र दैवत्संस्कृतां चायां प्राज्ञायणं सीम्यमेव गायकै यावां राज्यां पेशाय
मिति। पशुमूर्यमपतिश्रीमृपस्फाराणि भूतायेत पञ्चविदंश्चर्च।। मानुष
वोनिर्देश इति चतुर्दश्मूर्यानि निधियुप स्वकियं गुणसत्तसि तथ कर्मनां
विमाहाकाम्यं।
| [४७] |

जहाँ साविकिषालसमोविशालस्मृतिः समगीति।
भग्यसाविकिषालसमोविशालस्मृतिः समगीति।

अद्यभित्तिः देवस्थानेषु साविकिषालसमोविशालस्मृतिः समगीति।

जहाँ साविकिषालसमोविशालस्मृतिः समगीति।

| [४५] |

तत्र जरामरकुंकुम दुःख स्मारकः च वेदः चतुर्दशः स्मारकः

तत्सति तेन्द्रु देवमनुष्टितस्यनिषु जराकुम तत्सति च न्यायः चतुर्दशः स्मारकः

तत्सति अन्तः देवमनुष्टितस्यनिषु जराकुम तत्सति च न्यायः चतुर्दशः स्मारकः

तत्सति अन्तः देवमनुष्टितस्यनिषु जराकुम तत्सति च न्यायः चतुर्दशः स्मारकः

तत्सति अन्तः देवमनुष्टितस्यनिषु जराकुम तत्सति च न्यायः चतुर्दशः स्मारकः
इत्यादि प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यंतः
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षान्त तव परायण । ५६ ।

इत्यादि परिसमार्थी निर्देशं च प्रकृतिकृती प्रकृतिकृतरूपेयं प्रकृतिक्रियायां य
आरभो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यंतः प्रकृतिमहान् महतोऽइतिहारस्माहार
खामाखामाकृति तन्मात्रेयं: पंचमहाभूतानीवेषः प्रतिपुरुषविमो
शान्त पुरुष भ्रमित देशमनुष्याधिकाध्य गतान्त्र विमोक्षाधेयार्थम्: कथं
स्वार्थ इव परार्धमार्थम्: यथा दनमित् स्त्रां यज्ञा मित्रायायाय स्वरूपिते
कथं यथावथ प्रधान सन्त मनुष्यारूपम् करोति

पुरुषोपथ प्रधानस्य न विष्णुपूर्वकरां करोति । ह्वामिव
न च स्वार्थं: परार्ध भवान्: श्रमादिविशेषपति द्विपुरुषवादारोपत
बिष्णु विपुरुषे श्रमादिविषयः पुरुष योजनतथा अनेक मोक्ष्येति
प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिकृत्य चौहं। कुम्भवत् प्रधानं पुरुषां फूल निवर्णते इति।
अनोपयोजनेऽति प्रधानं चैतन्यं: पुरुष इति यथा बिपु लोकेषु श्रमादिभि
विष्णु: पुरुषो मोक्षोद्वृत्तो मोक्ष: कर्षण इति यथं चैतन्यवत् प्रवृत्तः। सत्यं
फलेऽति निवर्णित्ययस्मादिवाह ।

वास्तविवृत्तिविनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरस्य
पुरुषविमोक्षिनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्ति: प्रधानस्य । ५७ ।

यथा तृषोदकं गन्धं भिक्षितं क्षीरभावेन परिश्रम्य वास्तविवृत्ति करोति पुरूषं
च च च निवर्णते इव पुरुषविमोक्षिनिमित्तं प्रधानं । क्राहत्यप्रवृत्तिरिति ।
किंचि ।
श्रीतुल्लभभिवृखं यथा जिह्वासु प्रवर्तते लोक
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षणं प्रवर्तते ताहद्वारं पूर्वम् ।

यथा लोक इत्स्तुल्लभस्य तत्स्थिति निवृत्तिः जिह्वासु प्रवर्तते गमनगमन जिह्वासु कृतज्ञानी निर्वर्तते तथा पुरुषस्य विमोक्षणं श्रद्धादिविषयोपयोगो गोपालस्यनितिः गृहपुल्लभस्य च विविधायपि पुरुषां धर्मं प्राप्तां निवर्तते। सिंचायनं ॥

रक्तस्य दशेशिला निवर्तते नर्सीं यथा नृत्यात्
पुरुषस्य तत्स्थापानं प्रकाशय निवर्तते प्रकृति: ॥ ५५॥

यथा नर्सीं शुक्लारात्रितरशदासदिवनावृत्तिः निवर्गीतवंदनद्वृत्तानि रक्तस्य दशेशिला कृतज्ञां नृत्यात्मतिवर्तते तथा प्रकृतेर श्रद्धानिवर्तते श्रद्धादिविष्ययमां प्रकाशय गुजारात्रितरशदासानं हृद्यन्तिः प्रकाशय महाभूतमेव निवर्तते। कथं को वा स्वाभिस्थ नर्सीं हेतुस्वरुपः ॥

नानाविधेयप्रेमकरिक्ष्यनुपकारीशः पुंसः
गुजारात्रितरशदाससः सतास्मात्स्थापानं चरितं ॥ ६०॥

नानाविधेयप्रेमं प्रकृति: पुरुषस्योपप्रकाशनुपकारीशः पुंसः कथं देवमा नुषोत्स्थित्यमवावेन सुखद: समोहासमकावेन श्रद्धादिविषययमावेन एवं नाना विधेयप्रेमिकरिक्ष्यमां प्रकाशप्राप्तमां समानं इति निवर्तत चतो निवर्तमानं तस्यास्थमपारं कुस्तेचरितं च यथा कथितं परोपकारी सर्व्षोपपूकुले नाबन्न: प्रस्थपकारीमे यथा प्रकृति: पुरुषां प्रकृति: परोपकारीमे चरितं घरीपापार्णं। पराव पुरुषस्य तस्यास्थमपारं प्रकृति: निवर्तते निवृत्ता च किं कर्तीयाः ॥


तस्मात् सुभावइत्वे नापि मुख्ये नापि संसारित व्रीति
संसारित बयते मुख्ये च नानास्थाय प्रकृति: । ६२।

tasmāta kāraṇāt puṣṭīḥ na bhaṭaye nāpi mukhye nāpi sansārāt prakṛti。

तस्मात् सुकुमारार्तं न किंचिदकृतिर्म् नेम वकिरवर्ति
या हृदास्तीति पुनने दशेनमुपपिति पुष्पवधः । ६१।

loke prakūt: sukuśārtaṁ na kṣīḍēśāyāṃ maṁ maṁāvevatā kaṁ pāraṁ
evān maṁāś.setHeight(a) "a" hṛdayādhyāneṇa puṣkhaṁ hṛdayāśicchāūnyāḥ puṇaḥ puṇaḥ śeṣeṇeṇa ne
eviṣṭe puṣ知乎ādheṇaṁuśāttīti dhāryaḥ । tathā sukuśārtaṁ vāppatātīva kā
raṁ bhuvaḥ. saṃśārīniṣṭheṇāmāma nā: suṣṭhit: saṃśārīnastraśūlaṃ gṛhiṇeṇa vāma
marṣeṣeṇa vā. kāpere satbhāva saukārēṣaṇāāṃ bhuvaḥ. kēna puṣkha-vṛktaḥ hāsā maṁuṣā:
kēna bhūṣitaḥ. । satbhāvāyāṃvitaḥ. ṛṣṭrasāṁśāyāṃvādha kha: niṇguṇāvaśeśā
rasa kṛtvam saṃguṇataḥ praty jñānaṇaṁ kṛtvā puṣkha-śrīgṛhaḥ puṣkharāt prakṛte
bhujaṇe tathā suṣṭhitam śaktiṇeṇa: suṣṭhit eṣa pāraḥ bhavati kṛṣṇeṇa: kṛṣṇa eṣa
āyita evān niṇguṇaḥ maṁāśāśāmaḥ bhavati lokeṇaḥ śaktiṇeṇa: saṃpravāte iti ghamate
iṇguṇake śeṣa: saṃguṇanāṁ lokeṇānāṁ tasmādaṃdāryeṇaḥ puṣkharē । dhanaṃ puṣṭīयो वा
र्थात् । तथा केवलात् कालः कारणमित्तुः च। कालः प्रकाशित भूताति
कालः सहस्त्रो जगात्। कालः सुभावु ज्ञातिः कारो हि दुरारहस्यः । यथा
मद्यपुरुषवाक्यः पदार्थालोकालोखोभूततैः । यथा: सत्यप्रकाशः का
tasmāti prakṛtiṇeṣā kāraṇāṁ nā prakūtē: kāraṇaśādā
sahāvīte nā: puṣkharāṇaḥ prakṛti । tiṣyaḥ prakūtē: sukuśārtaṁ suhim
prakṛti nā: kṣīḍēśāyaṣṭādākaśāyāti me maṁāvevatā । tathā c śoñke
rūhā puṣṭīśi muṣita: puṣṭit: sansārīti cāhītīteyaḥ ।

तस्मात् कारणात् पुष्पे न बयते नापि मुख्ये नापि संसारित वस्मात्

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भवामि न मे मष शरीरं तद्ततोधमः शरीरमध्यज्ञानमिवहितपरिश्रेष्ठसः
कारार्हितपरिश्रेष्ठज्ञानविशेषार्हितविशेषणेन चिन्तते: संक्षोभतिविपरोधायसंक्षेपः।
शिष्यं देवसंदेहनागदितेऽपि मोक्षकारणमुद्योगिनिवज्ञताः ज्ञानं प्रत्येक
शिष्यं निश्चितित्वज्ञानं पुरुषस्येति । ज्ञाने पुरुषं निश्चितं करोति ।

तेन निवृहप्रमाणार्थमेवशास्त्रं सारुप्यविनिवृत्तं
प्रकृतिं परमेति शुचवं: प्रेक्षकवदद्विभाय: सुर्खः । ६६ ॥

तेन निवृहोऽसुब्रह्माण्डलज्ञाने पुरुषः ख्याति परमेति प्रेक्षकसमु: प्रेक्षकस्य तुस्यम
वशयति: सत्यो यथा रंगस्यो दोषस्यताः नामस्य परमेति सत्यः सत्यस्य
निश्चितिः सत्यः सत्यवाक्षेत्रः । असं भूतां प्रकृतिं निवृहसब्धवां निवृह
पुरुषांसन्निश्चिताय निश्चितिसंबंधाय पुरुषां संबंधिताय पुरुषां वशयति: सम्भविपरीतेणमोनिर्मितामां बधति तथा: सम्भवो रूपेषो तथो ज्ञि
वृत्ति प्रकृतिं परमेति । सिंध ॥

हस्ता संवेदनेष्वर्गः एको हस्ताहिनिपुर्वनमवया
सति संगोर्गेषिपि ततोऽ: प्रयोजनं नाति सर्गस्य । ६६ ॥

रंगस्य इति यथा रंगस्य नीवमुन्मुपेष्टक एष: केवलं: शुद्धं पुरुषशेषोऽन्त्येति
कृता उपरतां निवृहं एकं एकैव प्रकृति: चैलोकस्यापि मधुमकाराणं
भूतां न दितीया प्रकृतिरिद्ध सूचिक्षेत्तत्तेतदेव प्रकृतिपुष्करः निनिः
वचप्प व्यापकवात् संगोर्गेषिपि न तु संयोगात् वृतिः संगोर्गेषिपि ततोऽ: प्रकृतिपुष्करः सर्ववत्तात् सत्यस्य संगोर्गेषि प्रयोजनं ना
स्ति सर्गस्य सूचितारिताय एतोऽपि प्रकृतिविवातप्रयोजनं शोधिण्योपालयिणा

वापसिनारोपालिष्यि। उभारणारे चरितार्थनाले प्राचीन नासिक प्रभोजनं
यः पुनः सन्स्कृति। यथा दानविषाणिक्ष वस्माधवान्त्योद्धाबिनुि
सयनि संयोगे न क्षिपत्रस्पक्षि भवनि। एवं प्रकृति पुरुषोद्धरिणि नासिक
प्रधोजनिति। यदि पुरुषोद्धारे ज्ञाने मीछि भवनि ततो सम कस्माच भव
तीर्। सत्य उपयोगे इति।

सम्बन्धानाधिगामनोद्योगी नासिकारकाराकाराधिकरि इति।

कश्चिं पंचविंचितकानि सम्बन्ध ज्ञानं भवनि तथापि वस्माधवान्त्योद्धाबिनुि
शरीरसे योगी तिरिति कण्थ चक्रमांकनमेष्य तुहं यथा कुलालकं
बनाभिन गतं क्षोभम् नूतिकं चक्रमारीय पुनः कुला गतं परयुक्ति
चषे भगवेश वस्माधवान्त्योद्धाबिनुि सम्बन्धानाधिगाममारुवलमहेस्वरस्य
धम्मो दीनाराकाराधिकार शतानि सम्रेषिति बन्धनभूतानि सम्बन्धानिन दुःधा
नि यथा नागिना दृवधि वीजानि वरोहसमर्वशाब्रामेतानि धम्मो
दीनि वनयानि न समर्थानि। धम्मोदीनाराकाराधिकार वस्माधवान्त्योद्धाबिनुि
शरीरसंख्यति श्वासक्षेत्रमेवानथमाधवान्त्योद्धाबिनुि प्रसमाभवति वर्षमाणलावेि
क्षलग्ने यथापिति ज्ञानं विना कालमध्येि दृष्टि वर्षमाणलावेि च यत्
कृतिति तद्पीति विनि विनिविहारणानुि घातादिति संक्षा चाक्षाराधाराेि मीछि।
संि विशेषि भवतीस्वयं।
[ ४८ ]

वृत्ति एकार्निकवशयमाथ्यनितकमनंतरति सैवत् केवलभावासेऽस्य उभय मैत्रिन्द्रायतित्रितमितेवविनिप्रहितक्षेत्रमात्रोती ।

पुरुषार्थज्ञानमित्र गुह्यं परमर्षिश्च समाख्यातं
सिद्धस्यर्प्रस्तावाणीन्ने व भूतानां । ६५ ।

पुरुषार्थो सोक्ष्मतं ज्ञानमित्र गुह्यं रहस्यं परमर्षिश्च श्रीकपिलर्षिश्च
समाख्यातं सम्यगुलं यष्ट ज्ञाने भूतानां वैज्ञानिक सिद्धस्यर्प्रस्तावाणीन्ने विचारार्थ वेषं विचारार्थ सम्य भाषण पंच
विशेषतत्वविचारचन्द्रार्थमक भविष्यमनो संबंधिति
सार्थं ज्ञातमुद्यिनाम भरों संसारनिमुखिः
हि वैज्ञानिक सार्थमूलिक भाषामात्र भयं चार्गुणोपायदृढ़ ।

एतत् विभिन्नम् मुनिरासुरेषुनुकम्या प्रदर्शि
झासुरिरपि पंचशिलाय तेन च बहुतं दृढ़ं तल्लं । ५० ।
शिष्यपरमार्यागतसिंहरूश्रेष्ठ वैद्यमानेमः
संप्रभुस्मार्यमतिनातमस्विनिज्ञाय सिद्धां । ६१ ।
सम्रात् विवेकेश्वरो ज्ञानरस्त्वकः
कृत्तिस्वयमेविनमस्य
झासुरिरणनिरहिता: परवादविविज्ञेतािधारिः । ६२ ।

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VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

The text of the Káriká has been in the first instance derived from a copy in the handwriting of Mr. Colebrooke, which he had prepared for the press. I have collated this with Professor Lassen’s edition and with a very good manuscript in my own possession. Besides these, the different commentaries include the text, and the Sánkhya Pravachana Bháshya cites many verses of the Káriká. Altogether, therefore, the text may be considered as printed upon a collation of eight copies, which may be thus referred to: A. Mr. Colebrooke’s transcript; B. my MS. copy; C. Professor Lassen’s edition; D. the text in Gaurápáda’s commentary; E. that in the Sánkhya Tatwa Kaumudi; F. that in the Sánkhya Chandriká; G. that in the Sánkhya Kaumudi; and H. the passages of it in the Sánkhya Pravachana Bháshya. Of the Sánkhya Tatwa Kaumudi I had three copies, and two copies of the Sánkhya Chandriká. I had but one copy of the Bháshya of Gaurápáda.

P. 1. l. 1. तद्भिषाते A. D. G. तदस्याते B. C. E. F.
P. 2. l.14. हेतुः हृः would be more correctly हेतुः:: Wilkins, r. 53. In noticing this deviation from rule, however, my chief object is to observe, that such deviations are frequent in the MSS., and that, although I have corrected some of them, I do not regard them in all cases as errors or inadvertencies: they seem in general to be intentional, and to be designed for the sake of greater perspicuity.

P. 3. l. 9. For विशुद्धि read विशुद्धि
P. 5. l.17. For तस्मिन read तस्मिन्

P. 5. l.18. दक्ताज्ञावासस्तः: As intimated in the translation (p. 21), these words are of questionable import, and possibly erroneous. The
VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

want of another copy renders their correction hazardous, but in all probability the first term should be प्रतिभा or प्रतिभान् ordinarily 'light' or 'shining,' but perhaps here said to denote वास 'abode, place;' or the construction may be प्रतिभा — अन्वाससञ्जानं implying 'conformity, adaptation,' from सनु 'according to,' and वास 'to sit.'

P. 6. v. 6. प्रतीतिः—प्रसिद्धि D.

P. 8. v. 8. सदृशयं—स्वरूपं G. which Professor Lassen has followed. All the other copies concur in the first reading, which the sense of the verse, as explained by the scholiasts, requires.

P. 10. l. 11. For रूपं read रूप

P. 11. l. 14. v. 7. Some blanks occur in this part of the MSS. of the Bhāṣya, which have been conjecturally supplied; as, कृत्यत् तु -- कृपि and प्रभासनेव -- वेदुन् न या -- दृष्टेविषि and तथा सामाया -- प्रभानं. How these have been supplied may be seen in the respective passages.

P. 11. l. 11. For पुहष read पुहष

P. 12. l. 10. For ऋभिवा and ऋभिषवा read ऋभिभवा

P. 13. l. 2. For सत्तमसो read सत्तमसो

P. 13. v. 13. Professor Lassen changes उपमभकं to उपस्मभकं which he derives from भूभ 'stabilire, firmare.' All the MSS., however, read the word with the cerebral, not the dental sibilant, and there is no doubt of their accuracy. The rule of Panini by which a radical श is changed in inflexion to स, धातुरे: श: स: not applying to this word, which is derived from लभ्य cl. 5 and 9. This root is the subject of a special rule, by which it is provided that after a preposition containing the vowel त or त the radical स shall be changed to श. Of course after च, च is changed to च, making उपभ्रम. The original rule is Panini, 8. 3. 67. सन्मे: | सम्भु | इयेतस्य धातोर्ववस्यम् II इयेतस्योपसर्गस्यादिदा उत्तरस्य सूर्यन्य आदेश: स्पात् | ऋभिभोति परिध्धाति; to which we may add उपभ्रम, whence उपभ्रमकु.

P. 16. l. 14. ऋच्छोध्येन has been substituted for the ऋचावध्येन of the MSS., which is evidently incorrect.
VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 16. l. 15. For मयुषयगम्यते read मयुषयगम्यते
P. 16. v. 17. H. reads संहत for संघतत। The sense is the same.
P. 16. l. 18. For मात्र read मोक्ष
P. 17. l. 7. For अस्वालम् read अस्वालम्
P. 17. v. 18. For जनन—जन्म B. D. Either word is correct.
P. 19. v. 20. भृजुदातीन B. D. omitting हिति。 The sense is unaffected, and the metre is preserved by reading the final syllable long.

P. 16. l. 8. The third word should be उदासीनो।
P. 19. l. 18. For वचसो विष्णत read वचसोविष्णत।
P. 20. l. 9. For चलिंगस्य read चलिंगस्य।
P. 22. l. 1. For चनोत्त know यथोत्त।
P. 22. v. 24. The second line is read अविलय एकदालकलम्भः पञ्चकृतवै B. and एकदालकलम्भः पञ्चलक्षशोपेतः D. The sense is much the same, but the last is wrong as to metre. It is evident also from the comment that follows that it is a mistake, and that the final words should be पञ्चकृतवै—पञ्चलक्षशोपेत being the explanation of पञ्चकृत।
P. 23. v. 26. पायुप्पानि B. पायुप्पयः E. In the first line, रसनल गार्ज्यानि is the reading of B. C. E. F. but D. confirms the text, not only by the same terms, रसनलगर्ज्यानि, but by explaining the term स्फर्दनरू।
P. 24. v. 27. चाहेमेदास A. E. F. चाहेमेदास B. C. D. The difference involves a difference of interpretation, as noticed in the Comment (p. 99). The explanation of the Bhāṣya, D, is so clearly incompatible with the reading चाहेमेदास that in the first instance I corrected it to चाहेमेदास: as in the same page, l. 15, 18, which should be read, agreeably to the MSS., चाहेमेदास।
P. 24. l. 23. For तत् कृत read तत् कृता, and for चस्तु ख read चस्तु ख।
P. 25. v. 28. छपादित B. D. विहार C. D. The variations are immaterial.
P. 25. l. 12. For परिस्तो तमलोक्य: read परिस्ततमलोक्य।
P. 26. l. 6, 7. For वृत्तिदिभ्रस्म read वृत्तिदिभ्रस्म।
VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 26. 1. 3, &c. स्थदन्त ought perhaps to be स्थदन्त. See Translation, p. 105.

P. 26. 1. 22. After तथोपह्यदां some such word as वाचिं should be inserted, although it is not in the MS.: it occurs in the passage when repeated in p. 366.

P. 27. 1. 8. For ॥२ read ॥२

P. 29. 1. 3 and 15. For गुर्दानि—गुर्दानि read गुर्दानि—गुर्दानि.

P. 29. 1. 4. For प्रकाशयस्यि read प्रकाशयस्यि.

P. 30. 1. 11. For प्राप्य उं read प्राप्तमियं.

P. 30. 1. 14. अवापात्, which is the reading of the copy, should probably be अवापात् 'after departure' or 'death.'

P. 30. 1. 21. For पतिजो read पतिजो.

P. 31. 1. 6. धर्मस् has been conjecturally supplied, the writing of the copy being very indistinct.

P. 31. 1. 16. The MS. has पुष्यत्वar which has no meaning, and has been therefore conjecturally changed to पृष्यत्व.

P. 31. 1. 20. Instead of शरीरं सम्बन्धशायत् it is possible that the phrase should be शरीरमन्द्रम्बन्धशायत् 'from the influence of iniquity.'

P. 33. 1. 11. A passage has been here omitted: it should run, गुर्दासु शान्तरोपल्लभलक्षार्जु। गुर्दासूरपल्लभशास्त्रिदू प्रोक्तिइ गत्वादिभोगावाच्। गुर्दासूरपल्लभरोपल्लभविहृषे इति। It has been given in the Translation, p. 137.

P. 33. 1. 18. For वितुद्वक read वितुद्वक.

P. 36. v. 47. श्च प्. D. which is allowable.

P. 37. 1. 4. तत्मालिसासु was read in the MSS. तत्मालिसासु which was evidently an error.

P. 37. 1. 18. For तच्छबाद्म read तच्छबाद्म.

P. 39. 1. 1. The MS. has विपयेयाच्छिन्तितिनामेव which the sense shews to be erroneous.

P. 38. 1. 11. For इवेष read इवेषा.
VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 38. v. 50. जाम्यालिभवतस्य E. The difference is unimportant. F. has भागात्मक which is incorrect; विषयेयरसाठ D; and D. F. read बनिहिता for अभिमता.

P. 39. l. 9. After प्राण insert मोक्षं वाति.

P. 40. l. 9. For चापस्यो read चापस्य.

P. 40. v. 53. The reading of this verse is materially varied in D, although the sense is substantially the same:

चञ्चलविन्यं देवं तैर्येयोऽनं पञ्चथ भवति
मानुषं लेकविन्यं सामसासिनं चिधा सर्गः.

Professor Lassen has तैर्येयोन्य which is not warranted by any MS. and although perhaps a defensible, is an unusual form of the derivative. G. has तैर्येयोन्य.

P. 42. v. 56. प्रकृतिकृति D; and the variation is advisedly, as appears by the comment.

P. 43. v. 59. जातानां प्रकाश्य—प्रविठय D. But the term of our text is used in the following comment.

P. 43. v. 60. For चरति—कुष्ठे D.

P. 44. v. 61. प्रकृति: शुद्धमारतरं C; which is manifestly wrong.

P. 44. l. 6. Although suspecting some error in this citation, I had no means of correcting it. Before printing the translation, however, I met with the passage correctly given in the commentary of Madhushudana Gupta upon the Bhagavad Gita, and have rendered it accordingly in p. 172. It should be, चतुर्व जनुरनीशोऽयमावनः शुद्धुः सन्तुः.

P. 44. v. 62. तस्मात्तददत्वातास्त्रा E; and अशा is explained स्पुष्यावधार खयो: The particle is not inserted in any other copy. C. is singular in the order of the words, and transposing सुष्यं and चयो.

P. 45. l. 5. Instead of अभिष्यधारी read अभिष्यधारो।

P. 46. v. 66. A. B. E. F. G. agree in reading उपरक्षयता, although, as Professor Lassen justly objects, “metro refragatur.” D. gives the correcter reading उपरतिका, explaining it उपरता निवृत्ता एका एकिक प्रकृति:
VARIATIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

This copy also varies in the beginning of the hemistich: रंगश्य ह्युपेयक
एको ह्यटाइमिपुरतत्त्रा

P. 47. l. 4. For पुष्य्य read पुष्य्य

Other variations than those specified above may no doubt be discovered in different manuscripts, and even in those which have been consulted; but they are in general palpable blunders of transcription, unworthy of the honour of being perpetuated in print.